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 Abstract 
 
The Role of Banks in Transition Economies: A Case Study of China with an Emphasis 
on Non-Performing Loans 
 
This research evaluates the factors that caused unprecedented high levels of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) in Chinese banks and the measures that have been taken 
to deal with them. In examining the surrounding issues recommendations are made, 
which might resolve or at least ameliorate China‟s non-performing loans problem. An 
extensive literature is drawn upon and a systematic examination of the factors that were 
responsible for China‟s NPLs is presented.  
 
The research aims and objectives, and the subsequent research themes were identified 
after conducting field research in Chinese banks. Six managers in Chinese banks were 
interviewed and their views on non-performing loans in their respective banks were 
obtained. These banks included: the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the 
China Construction Bank, the Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the State 
and Development Bank and Citic Bank. The results of the interviews were used to 
design the questionnaire, which was distributed to 16 different banks. These banks are 
broadly representative of the main types of bank within China and include four 
state-owned commercial banks, seven joint-stock commercial banks, three foreign 
banks, one policy bank and one city commercial bank.  
 
Content analysis and descriptive statistical techniques were used to analyse the data and 
the findings revealed that lending managers generally lack adequate incentives to make 
efficient lending decisions. Moreover, although political interference in bank lending is 
quite widespread within China, it is not the only issue and certainly not the major issue 
in explaining why managers have a tendency to select inefficient projects. The measures 
taken to deal with NPLs in Chinese banking are also examined and the findings suggest 
that these have not been totally effective in resolving the problem. 
Key words: Chinese banks, non-performing loans, lack of incentives to make 
efficient loans, government interference and guarantees, interviews and questionnaires  
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Chapter One   Introduction 
1.1 Background in proposed area of research  
 
In 1978, Chinese authorities had made significant progress in modernizing their banking 
system. However, the Chinese government is still tackling its banking problems and it is 
doing this in a number of different ways. In particular, it is addressing the problem of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) but it is also pursuing consolidation strategies, mergers 
and acquisitions, and the closures of banks. In addition, it is in the process of allowing 
foreign banks into the country and has privatized, or partly privatized, some of the 
banks.  
   
The most serious threat to the banking system, however, lies in the accumulation of 
NPLs–many of these are policy-based loans extended by state-owned banks to 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) with little expectation of them being repaid. China has 
taken measures to ensure that the problem does not get any worse and has created four 
AMCs: China Great, China Huarong, China Xinda and China Orient. The modus 
operandi of these AMCs is to dispose of the NPLs that still have value or potential to 
realize some sort of return. Despite the fact of their creation, however, China‟s Central 
Bank Governor (Dai Xianglong) disclosed that amount of NPLs in the Chinese banking 
systems was still alarmingly high and a quarter of state banks‟ loans were still overdue. 
In 2003, the NPLs of „big four‟ banks in China were officially estimated to be 2.4 
trillion Yuan (approximately US$ 290 billion) or 23 percent of total loans. However the 
unofficial estimate from the credit-rating agencies suggests that the figure was close to 
3.5 trillion Yuan.  
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The NPLs problem has limited the growth of GDP and has had a severe influence on the 
efficiency of banking in China. Past experiences has shown that NPLs were one of the 
key factors that led to the Asian financial crisis in 1997. For example, it has been 
estimated that the share of NPLs to total loans was about 70 percent for Indonesia, 35 
percent for Korea, 30 percent for Malaysia and 50 percent for Thailand (Dick K. Nanto 
& Radha Sinha, 2002). However, Standard & Poor‟s estimated that approximately 50 
percent of China‟s bank loans are non-performing. Moreover, for China‟s non-banking 
financial institutions (i.e. trust and investment companies and rural cooperatives) NPLs 
levels appear to be even higher. This problem clearly detracts from the efficiency of the 
banking system and detracts from economic growth. Accordingly, research into NPLs in 
China is an important subject both from a theoretical and a practical perspective. 
 
1.2 The problem stated 
 
NPLs emerged in the People‟s Republic of China as early as 1958. However, they were 
a state mono-bank. If companies and enterprises were unable to repay their debts, the 
State would, therefore, either assist them in repaying their debts or provide the lending 
bank with budgetary allowances to write-off the unpaid debts. 
 
It was not until the 1990s that NPLs became a visible were not perceived as a 
“problem” during the centrally-planned economy era (1950-1979) because the 
borrowers were mainly state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the lender and publicly 
discussed problem in China. In November 1993, the 3
rd
 Plenum of the 14
th
 National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) set the future course for financial 
sector development in China as part of its “Socialist market economy” strategy. In the 
same year, the State Council adopted the “Resolution on Financial System reform”, 
which drew up a blueprint for overhauling China‟s financial system, including the 
commercialization of State banks. It was recognized at that time that with significant 
amounts of NPLs on their books, State banks could not become genuine commercial 
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banks.  
 
The real initiatives to solve the problem, however, did not begin to be implemented until 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The severity of the Asian financial crisis signaled to 
the Chinese government the importance of having a healthy financial system. 
Furthermore, there have been internal pressures to resolve the problem. The collapse of 
several Chinese financial institutions in the latter part of the 1990s raised concerns 
about the health of the financial system. Moreover, economic deflation induced the 
government to recognize that NPLs were “hurting” the real economy. This adverse 
situation depleted corporate profits and undermined the ability of weak companies, 
mainly in the State-owned sector, to service their bank debts and thus, undermined 
further the financial position of China‟s major banks. 
 
During November 17-19, 1997, the central Committee of the CPC and the State Council 
held the National Financial Working Conference in Beijing. The conference was held 
against the backdrop of financial crises in three Asian countries-Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Korea. The meeting focused on similarities between the financial sector in China 
and those elsewhere in Asia. The outcome was a call to establish a financial system 
compatible with a “socialist market” economy and to strengthen the risk management 
capacity of Chinese financial institutions in about three years. 
 
In the wake of this conference, the government announced important steps to reduce the 
risks of the Asian financial “contagion” spreading to China. These included but were not 
limited to: (1) the reorganization of the local branches of the People‟s Bank of China 
(PBOC) along regional lines in order to reduce political interference in lending 
decisions at the local level. The purpose was to end the common practice of provincial 
governors and party officials influencing the flow of lending in their regions; (2) the 
injection of RMB 270bn in new capital to the “big four” banks in 1998; (3) the write-off 
of enterprise bad debts; (4) policies encouraging banks to take risks into account when 
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they set interest rates for specific borrowers; (5) the introduction of asset-liability 
management and the removal of credit ceilings on banks; (6) the introduction of a new 
loan classification and provisioning system that was more closely aligned to 
international standards; (7) the enhancement of controls on international borrowings; (8) 
the establishment of four AMCs in 1999 to take over and manage the NPLs of the four 
largest state commercial banks; and (9) a debt-equity swap scheme to help SOEs get 
back in “the black”. The policy initiatives that have relevance to the problem of NPLs 
will be discussed later in the thesis. 
   
1.3 Research objectives and research questions  
 
The aim of this research is to analyze the factors that influence bank lending   
decisions relating to NPLs in China‟s banking sector. The thesis will also examine the 
measures taken to deal with the NPLs and try to provide arrange of policy suggestions. 
However, the problem of NPLs needs to be put into some sort of context. 
 
In this respect, the excessive levels of NPLs in China‟s banking system can be viewed 
as a manifestation of a more fundamental problem, which relates to any economy 
undergoing rapid change. In essence, this problem encapsulates the fact that bad loans 
have resulted primarily from how lending decisions are made and how the Chinese 
transition economy operates. Most of the NPLs were made to uneconomic SOEs and 
considerations of profitability and probability of repayment were of secondary 
importance relative to policy and personal /political considerations. 
 
China is also attempting to resolve the problem of NPLs through two avenues. The first 
approach has been to place lending on a more commercial basis and to channel 
so-called policy loans through special policy banks. This is an attempt to reduce the 
probability that future loans will go bad. The second approach is to reduce the current 
accumulation of NPLs being carried by banks. The target was to bring the level of NPLs 
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in state owned commercial banks to levels comparable to those in developed countries 
(WTO, December 2001).  
With these considerations in mind the following research questions are addressed in the 
thesis:  
What are the principal causes of non-performing loan in Chinese banks?  
What measures have been taken to deal with NPLs?  
Is the lack of management incentives when selecting projects an important explanatory 
reason behind non-performing loans?  
Are government guarantees and interference a main reason behind the high levels of 
non-performing loans?  
Have the measures taken to deal with NPLs been effective?  
What are the policy recommendations for resolving the problem of China‟s NPLs? 
 
1.4 Importance of the research and the possible contribution to the field  
 
Currently, China‟s financial system is in immediate need of reform and many    
state-owned banks are close to being technically insolvent. In its 2001 consultation with 
China the IMF concluded that progress had continued in addressing the problems in 
China‟s financial sector, but much remained to be done to complete the reform agenda. 
Difficult reforms are yet to be accomplished, and China‟s entry into the WTO has 
increased the urgency of the reforms, especially the non-performing loan problem. In 
December 2001, China entered the WTO, and was required to open its financial services 
sector to foreign investment and international competition. In essence, within five years 
(this had still not been achieved in 2010), China was to grant foreign banks full market 
access to conduct local currency business (including taking deposits), with no 
geographical or customer restrictions.  
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In preparation for a more market-based banking system, China has also announced 
reforms intended to strengthen its banks. To reduce the accumulation of NPLs, the 
government has created four AMCs to help dispose of NPLs that still retain some value 
and are being held by four state-owned banks. The AMCs (discussed above) have sold 
some portfolios of NPLs to foreign investors at steep discounts. If China‟s banks are 
still carrying a large burden of NPLs, they will have great difficulty in competing not 
only with foreign banks but also with new private Chinese banks that are beginning to 
emerge.  
 
This research is, therefore, both topical and important, and in attempting to identify key 
themes in the debate about how to resolve the problem of NPLs it is also both timely 
and appropriate. 
  
1.5 Research methodology and data collection methods 
 
This research uses qualitative research methods and face to face interviews and    
questionnaires are the main tools for collecting information. The researcher reviewed 
the extant academic literature on NPLs and the Chinese banking system and this was 
used to identify the main research themes, and subsequently, design the interview topic 
guide for the interviews and the study questionnaire. Content analysis was then used to 
analyze the results together with descriptive statistics.  
  
1.6 Outline of the thesis  
 
Chapter two provides an historical perspective on transition economies and the 
evolution of China‟s economic and financial system. In particular, it explains why China 
has experienced more rapid growth than the other transition economies and provides 
insight into the process of China‟s transition from a planned economy to a market 
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economy. The chapter provides useful background for examining the development of 
the Chinese banking system.  
 
Chapter three provides an overview of the development of the Chinese banking sector.         
Accordingly, it discusses the evolution of the Chinese banking system and describes the 
various types of bank. The chapter also identifies and discusses the main steps that have 
been taken in the banking reform and makes an assessment of their impact. 
 
Chapter four focuses specifically on the problem of NPLs in China‟s banking sector. It 
discusses the outstanding amounts of NPLs, how they originated and also provide a 
perspective of just how serious the problem is in China. It also examines the effects that 
NPLs have had on different aspects of the economy. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the causal factors and makes an assessment of the measures taken to deal 
with NPLs.  
 
Chapter five discusses the research methods used to collect and analyze the data, and 
introduces the aims and objectives of the research and the research themes/questions. A 
justification for the selected research methods and a description of the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with the alternative research methods is also presented. In 
essence, the research methods used in the study incorporates a combination of content 
analysis and descriptive statistics. Accordingly, six major banks were selected for 
interviews and 160 questionnaires were distributed to sixteen banks. The banks were 
also subdivided into five distinct categories of bank dependent upon the nature of their 
activities and the nature of their ownership. 
 
Chapter five also introduces the five research objectives, which can be summarized as 
follows: (1) to identify the factors that resulted in the accumulation of large amounts of 
NPLs in China‟s banks; (2) to evaluate whether managers lack appropriate incentives 
for project selection and ascertain whether this is a main contributory factor behind the 
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accumulation of NPLs in Chinese banks; (3) to evaluate whether government guarantees 
and interference is a main contributory factor behind the accumulation of NPLs in 
Chinese banks; (4) to evaluate the various measures that have been taken to deal with 
NPLs in Chinese banks.; and, (5) to make policy recommendations for improving the 
NPLs situation in China. 
 
In addressing these research objectives, three research questions or “research themes” 
were generated as follows: 1) managers‟ lack of incentives when selecting projects, 2) 
the affect that government guarantees and interference had on the banks; and, 3) the 
measures taken to deal with NPLs. These three themes provided the framework for the 
interview topic guide and also for the design of the questionnaire. Moreover, the 
research themes also form the framework for analyzing the empirical data in the 
remaining chapters. 
 
Chapter Six, Chapter Seven, Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine report on the major 
findings of the study and address the research objectives and themes. Chapter six 
presents the analysis of the interviews with the senior managers in the six major 
Chinese banks. This proved to be very useful in identifying the research themes and 
subsequently in designing the questionnaire. The interview analysis revealed that 
managers generally lacked incentives to select appropriate projects and that his was a 
contributory factor behind the accumulation of NPLs. Government guarantees and 
interference were also regarded as one of the most important causal factors behind 
NPLs, especially, in the planned economy. The main methods of resolving the problem 
of NPLs in China were considered to be effective but considerable challenges lie ahead.  
 
Chapters seven, eight and nine present the frequency analysis of the questionnaires and 
each of these chapters is devoted to a specific research theme. From the 160 
questionnaires that were sent out, 145 were collected and useable, i.e. a useable 
response rate of 90.6 percent.  
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In contrast to the interview analysis, the questionnaires revealed that political 
interference by the government was one of several reasons behind the respondent‟s lack 
of incentives to select good projects. The questionnaire analysis also showed that 
government guarantees and interference were less important in explaining NPLs than 
expected. Finally, the various measures taken to deal with NPLs in the Chinese banking 
sector have not been very effective to-date. 
 
Finally chapter ten provides a summary of the main findings of the research and 
presents the conclusions of the study. This is followed by a number of recommendations 
for regulators and professionals. The limitations and short comings of the research are 
then discussed and recommendations for future research in this area are made.  
  
1.7 Conclusion  
 
It is hoped that the research will contribute to a better understanding of NPLs in China‟s 
banking industry and that it will provide answers to questions, such as: what are the 
principal causes of non-performing loan in Chinese banks? What measures have been 
taken to deal with NPLs? Is the lack of management incentives when selecting projects 
an important explanatory reason behind non-performing loans? Are government 
guarantees and interference a main reason behind the high levels of non-performing 
loans? Have the measures taken to deal with NPLs been effective? What are the policy 
recommendations for resolving the problem of China‟s NPLs? All these questions and 
others too will be addressed in the following chapters. 
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           Chapter Two Transition Economies and the Case of China 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the final quarter of the 20
th
 century, one of the most significant historical 
developments was the process of transforming centrally planned economies into more 
market-oriented economies. This development has happened in Central Eastern Europe 
(CEE), the Former Soviet Union and many other central planned economies. Although 
different countries transformed their economies using different strategies, China has 
proved to be the most successful one of all the transition economies (Lin, Fang & Zhou, 
1996). Therefore, understanding China‟s economic situation and its transition 
experience is important for understanding transition economies better. 
 
Accordingly, this chapter reviews the major global transition economies and compares 
the differences in the transition process between Eastern Europe, the former Soviet 
Union (EEFSU) and China. In particular, it explains why China has experienced more 
rapid growth and has been more successful than the other global transition economies. 
In addition, the chapter also reviews China‟s transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy. This process is divided into three main stages: the first stage began in 
1978 when the Chinese government adopted the open door policy. This was followed by 
the second stage, which started with the government‟s decision to guide China to a 
“socialist market economy” in 1993. The third and final stage began when China joined 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2000. 
  
2.2 Global Transition economies 
 
The so-called transition economies are generally understood to refer to countries which 
have either moved or are moving from a state-planned to a market-based economic 
system (Brainard, 1991). These countries include those of the former Soviet Union 
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(FSU), and Central European Economies (CEE) and more recently include countries in 
Asia and Africa, such as China, Mongolia and Vietnam. 
 
These countries include those of the former Soviet Union and the Central European 
Economies and more recently include countries in Asia and Africa, such as China, 
Mongolia and Vietnam.  
 
The main objective of the transition from a planned economy to a market economy is to 
achieve long-term sustainable growth. Whether the transition process is successful or 
not mainly depends on creating an economic system that generates sustainable growth 
under the twin conditions of stable prices and improved living standard (Brainerd, 1991). 
These two conditions are especially important for low-income countries and far 
outweigh the desire for quick economic growth. In addition to these two conditions, 
Perkin (1988) has pointed out that equity and a developed stock market is another 
important condition for sustainable growth. Rapid growth is not sustainable if the 
benefits of growth are not distributed equitably. Sustainable growth also requires 
ecological sustainability. This means that rapid growth should not be tolerated if it is 
accompanied by unacceptably high levels of environmental damage. In other words, 
present day improvements in living standards must not be obtained to the detriment of 
future generations (World Bank, 1992). In essence, therefore, stable prices, improved 
living standards, social equity and ecological sustainability are the basic conditions for 
economic growth in transition economies. 
 
Banks are also crucial for sustainable economic growth. The seminal work of Hick 
(1969) and Schumpeter (1939), etc have revealed the critical role that banks play in the 
mobilization of capital and the promotion of capital projects. This importance derives 
from the existence of information asymmetries, moral hazard and high transaction costs 
(Levine, 1997 and 2004). These market imperfections dictate that ceteris paribus large 
banking organizations are necessary to wholesale deposits and on lend them to a diverse 
range of potential borrowers (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). The success of this 
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financial intermediation role is also determined by the ability of banks to collect and 
acquire information about potential borrowers and base their lending decisions on good 
information. In developing and emerging economies where corporate information is not 
readily available or is unsatisfactory, these considerations become even more important. 
Moreover, they can lead directly to high levels of credit risk, default and non 
performing loans. 
 
In order to ameliorate these problems banks have developed expertise and risk 
management teams that can potentially select the most viable lending opportunities. 
These considerations combined with the existence of a unique banker-customer 
relationship, partly explains why potential borrowers are generally willing to pay 
relatively higher rates of interest for bank loans compared with other forms of debt 
(Fama, 1985). This has led commentators, such as, Duisenberg, (2001); and, Miwa and 
Ramseyer, (2000) to argue that banks promote economic growth through superior 
monitoring and screening capabilities. However, the nature of this monitoring can be 
variable in the sense that it can rely on the subjective assessment of lending managers 
who, for example, could place particular emphasis on “soft” data relating to the quality 
and experience of the managers of a business. In this respect, authors, such as, Libby 
(1975) have argued that lending managers from diverse backgrounds can achieve more 
consistent lending decisions by relying on a relatively narrow range of accounting ratios 
to predict the likelihood of business failure. In practice, a combination of soft qualitative 
data and accounting ratios is arguably the best way to assess the credit risk of businesses. 
However, resolving the question of how best to allocate bank credit is not straight 
forward. Banks operate in imperfect markets and the question of adverse selection, 
which reflects the fact that different borrowers have different probabilities of repaying 
their loans, remains a difficult problem to resolve. Moreover, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
have argued that banks attempts to “price to risk”, i.e. charge potentially high risk 
customers higher interest rates, might compound the problem of adverse selection by 
changing the behavior of customers. Specifically, customers charged higher interest 
rates (or with high levels of security or collateral) may well be inclined to adopt riskier 
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business strategies on the assumption that they have little to lose and this could increase 
the likelihood of failure.  
 
The process of transforming centrally planned economies into more market-oriented 
economies has been arguably the most significant economic development during the 
final quarter of the 20
th
 century. With only a few exceptions, all previously centrally 
planned economies have embarked on this transition, although the extent of structural 
reform undertaken and the accompanying macroeconomic performances have differed 
greatly between the different countries (Peter & Bennett, 2001). Accordingly, there are 
considerable discernable differences in terms of the initial conditions prior to transition, 
and the ensuing political developments and reforms. 
 
Despite these differences in the transition experiences of different economies, there are 
still some common core factors that characterize both the objectives of the process and 
the type of reforms required to attain them. The common objective of the countries 
engaged in transition, irrespective of their actual level of development, has been to 
increase economic efficiency and to foster sustainable economic growth in order to 
narrow (and eventually close) the considerable gap between their income per capita and 
that of the established market economies (Peter & Bennett, 2001).  
 
The need to reform centrally planned economies also stems from their inherent 
characteristics, which stand in stark contrast to market economies. For example, they 
are typically characterized by poor informational properties. In other words it is difficult 
to obtain information appertaining to the performance of the economy or just as 
important, information relating to business enterprises. From a banking perspective this 
is particularly important because business lending decisions are predominately based on 
the financial performance and track records of the potential borrowers. In contrast to 
market economies, centrally planned economies also have an inability to provide for 
entry and exit. This has obvious implications for the availability of products, which tend 
to be very restricted. However, it also means that foreign businesses find it very difficult 
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to enter the economy. Foreign direct investment and/ or acquisitions and mergers, 
therefore, tend to be very limited and this has a knock on effect for the transfer of 
know-how and technological expertise in the domestic economy.  
 
Another problem associated with centrally planned economies is that they combine 
allocation and distribution decisions typically under the auspices of government 
organizations. Accordingly, this can lead to gross inefficiencies because there is no 
incentive to be efficient and market forces, i.e. supply and demand considerations, do 
not determine sustainability. To some extent this explains why China adopted a 
delineation or demarcation approach to the reform and reorganization of its banking 
system. Accordingly, rather than reforming the banking system by consolidating banks 
into larger organizational units, China created specialist banks that focused on key 
industrial sectors or areas of economic priority, such as, agriculture, building and 
construction, large capital investment projects and imports and export finance, etc. This 
enabled resources to be directly channeled to those areas of the economy that were 
considered crucial to creating sustainable economic growth and development.  
 
This approach has considerable merit, especially, when compared to countries, such as, 
Thailand and Malaysia that responded to the Asian banking crisis by consolidating the 
banking system. This is an important consideration because there is nothing intrinsic 
about larger banks that make them inherently better or more efficient than smaller banks. 
In fact, empirical evidence on this subject is inconclusive and there is strong evidence to 
suggest that larger bank can suffer from diseconomies of scale and scope and become 
less efficient. (Berger, et al 1999).  
 
Another consideration, is that in contrast to these Asian countries, China‟s approach to 
reforming its banking system was predicated on the premise that it was a former 
communist state seeking to radicalize its political system (albeit gradually) and grow its 
economy. In this respect it is rightly regarded as a transitional economy that has direct 
comparisons with Eastern European countries, such as, Hungary and Poland and to 
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some extent Russia (Lin, et al, 2010). In contrast, the Asian banking crisis of the late 
1990s was largely attributable to the irresponsibly high levels of bad lending, i.e. 
so-called “crony capitalism”, which led to excessive bank exposure, which in turn 
threatened the very survival of the banks. Under these circumstances, writing off bad 
debts, introducing appropriate risk management procedures and consolidation in the 
form of mergers and acquisitions was an appropriate way of strengthening the capital of 
these banks and placing them on a more sound footing  
 
The key elements of the transition process required to attain the objectives of economic 
growth and greater economic efficiency have also been identified in the transition 
process of the centrally planned economies. They comprise market reforms (aimed at 
allowing the market mechanism to determine relative prices in accordance with the 
relative scarcity of different inputs and outputs), enterprise restructuring and 
privatization (aimed at subjecting business enterprises to market forces and transferring 
ownership and control from the public to the private sector); and, redefining the role of 
the state (from being the main direct participant in the production of goods and services 
to establishing and safeguarding an institutional infrastructure, which allows markets to 
function properly). In addition to these key elements, effective macroeconomic 
stabilization policies are also considered to be a prerequisite for the successful 
implementation of these structural reforms (Peter & Bennett, 2001).  
 
Having described the essential characteristics of China‟s economic transition to a more 
market economy, the question as to why this approach was adopted remains largely 
unanswered. Most commentators (see for example Lin and Li, 2010) would argue that 
the government did not have a well designed blue print. The approach to economic 
reform was, therefore, largely piecemeal and characterized by being partial, incremental 
and often experimental. This approach was probably justified when bearing in mind the 
sheer size of the Chinese population and the importance of introducing economic 
reform with minimum disruption to political and social stability. Nevertheless, 
Murphy,Schleifer and Vishney (1992) regard this approach as self defeating and despite 
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the spectacular increase in China‟s GDP since 1978 suggest that the boom and bust 
cycle that has characterized the economy over the last few decades is largely 
attributable to the lack of a more systematic approach by the government.  
 
Irrespective of the rights or wrong of this approach, the truth is that China adopted a 
gradual bottom up strategy that was in direct contrast to most other transition economies 
“big bang” approach. Accordingly, China‟s systematically placed emphasis on the 
development of heavy industry, which was state owned and used the banking system to 
finance these organizations in an endeavor to promote economic growth. China‟s 
banking system was, therefore, transformed and reorganized in order to introduce large 
amounts of public and private finance into specific industrial sectors.  
 
Unfortunately, this approach created a range of potential problems and the most 
important of these from the perspective of this thesis was that the interest rate 
mechanism did not resolve the problem of adverse selection. Consequently, this 
introduced the distinct possibility that large amounts of bank lending were granted 
without being properly priced to risk and more seriously that they were granted to 
borrowers with little chance of repayment.   
 
 
2.3 Is China’s successful transition experience useful for other transition 
economies? 
  
Transition economies in the CEE differ from those in Asia and Africa and from one 
another because of differences in culture, economic structure, the extent of the informal 
sector and the pre-transition starting points, etc. Nevertheless, despite these differences 
they are all affected by transition in much the same way. The transition process typically 
has associated significant short-run costs that are well documented (Gordon, 1992) and 
these are clearly discernable in China‟s transition. 
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China‟s transition from a planned economy to a market economy began at the end of 
1978. The government did not have a well-designed blueprint and the approach can be 
described as being partial, incremental, and often experimental. Some economists have 
described this approach as self-defeating (Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, 1992). 
However, China‟s average annual rate of GDP growth has been nothing short of 
miraculous since it introduced reforms in 1978. It is, therefore, not that surprising to 
find that China is generally regarded as the most successful of the transition economies 
(Lin, Fang & Zhou, 1996). China‟s experience of transition produced many interesting 
contrasts with the experiences of transition economies in CEE and FSU. Specifically, 
China‟s transition from a market economy has been held up as superior to the one 
adopted by the CEE and FSU countries (Gordon, 1992). The essence of this superiority 
would appear to be China‟s success in simultaneously improving living standards whilst 
introducing reforms and achieving rapid economic growth whilst maintain a reasonable 
degree of political and social stability (Lin, 2004).  
 
There has been much discussion as to why China‟s reforms have been more successful 
than the reforms in CEE and FSU (Blanchard 1991; Chen et al. 1992; Qian and Xu 1993; 
Harrold 1992; McMillan and Naughton 1992; Gelb et al. 1993; McKinnon 1994; Lin 
2004). These studies have emphasized two important reasons for success: firstly, Lin 
(2004) argued that when the transition started in CEE and FSU, most economists in the 
West favored a big bang approach, which included stabilization, price liberalization, and 
privatization. They considered these three reforms to be necessary for a successful 
transition to a market economy and attempted to complete all these reforms 
simultaneously or in a short sequence (Blanchard et al, 1991). The big bang approach in 
essence is based on the basic principles of neoclassical economics and has been 
recommended by the IMF/World Bank for market-oriented reforms in developing 
countries. The proponents of the big bang approach expected the GDP in a country that 
implemented this approach to decline initially and to be followed by a strong recovery 
in a short period of time (Lin, 2004). Accordingly, most CEE and FSU countries 
followed this approach but the big bang approach has resulted in an unexpected sharp 
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and prolonged decline in GDP and was accompanied by extraordinarily high rates of 
inflation and a marked deterioration in other social indicators (World Bank, 2002). In 
contrast, China‟s experience of transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy has been essentially experimental, more gradual and, perhaps, more 
importantly, more successful (Lin, 2004). 
 
In addition to the desirability of adopting a relatively gradual approach to transition, the 
academic studies have also emphasized China‟s structural conditions prior to change 
and, in particular, China‟s decentralized regional economic structure (Chen et al. 1992; 
Qian and Xu 1993; Harrold 1992; McMillan and Naughton 1992; Gelb et al. 1993; 
McKinnon 1994; Lin Fang & Zhou 1996). Despite China‟s distinctive structural 
characteristics its economic problems prior to reform, namely, the structural imbalance 
and low financial incentives are common to all socialist economies. These countries 
also have similar macro-policy environments and planned allocation mechanisms with 
“puppet-like” state-owned enterprises (Lin, Fang & Zhou, 1996). Empirical evidence 
also shows that, as in pre-reform China, CCE and FSU were all over-industrialized with 
oversized state enterprises; their service sectors and light industries were 
underdeveloped; and employees‟ incentives were low (Newbery 1993; Brada and King 
1991; Sachs and Woo 1993).  
 
There has also been quite a lot of discussion about whether China‟s experience provides 
useful lessons for other transition economies. For example, some economists have 
argued that China‟s success demonstrates the superiority of an evolutionary, 
experimental, and bottom-up approach over the comprehensive and top-down “shock 
therapy” approach that characterizes the transition in CEE and FSU (Harrold 1992; 
Perkins 1992). As mentioned above, other economists have argued that it is neither 
gradualism nor experimentation but rather China‟s unique initial conditions that have 
contributed to China‟s success (Sachs & Woo 1993, Qian & Xu 1993). These initial 
conditions included a large agricultural labor force, low subsidies to the population, and 
a rather decentralized economic system (Sachs & Woo 1993, Qian & Xu, 1993). 
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Accordingly, these academics have argued that China‟s experience has no general 
applicability because the structural conditions prior to transition were fairly unique.  
 
However, some economists have taken a rather different stance and have argued that 
whether or not China‟s experience can provide useful lessons depends on whether the 
nature and cause of the problems that China and other transition economies attempt to 
solve are similar. For example, Lin, Fang and Zhou (1996) have argued that centrally 
planned economies have evolved with the intention of implementing a capital-intensive 
heavy-industry-oriented development strategy under conditions when the economy is 
constrained by capital scarcity. Therefore, if one accepts Lin, Fang and Zhou‟s (1996) 
argument, China‟s approach to reform can provide useful lessons for other transition 
economies.  
 
2.4 Transition process in China  
 
China has now experienced more than two decades of economic reforms. China‟s 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy is regarded as an evolutionary 
process, which can be depicted in three stages (see Table 2.1). The first stage spanned 
approximately fifteen years between 1978 and 1993; the second stage commenced in 
1994 and finished in 2000; and, the third stage started after China joined the WTO in 
2001. These three stages are discussed in details below. 
 
2.4.1 The first stage in transition process 
  
Prior to 1978, the traditional planned economic system in China was shaped in the early 
1950s. The system had three integrated components: (1) a distorted macro-policy 
environment that had artificially low interest rates, overvalued exchange rates, low 
nominal wage rates, and low prices for living necessities and raw materials; (2) a 
planned allocation mechanism for credit, foreign exchange rates and other materials; 
and, (3) traditional micromanagement type institutions for state enterprises and 
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collective agriculture (Lin, Fang & Zhou, 1996). 
                Table 2.1 Three stages in China‟s transition process 
 
Source: Author. 
 
The household responsibility system 
The commodity price system 
The foreign exchange rate policy 
Interest rate policy 
 Foreign exchange and external sector 
reform 
Non-state sector reform 
State owned enterprise reform 
The monetary and financial reform 
Social safety net reform 
Foreign Trade 
Foreign direct investment 
Challenges in other sectors 
Joining the World Trade Organization 
The first stage 
 
 
(1978-1993) 
The second 
stage 
 
 (1994-2001) 
 Tax and fiscal reform 
The third stage 
 
 
 
(after 2001) 
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Since 1978, the Chinese government began to introduce economic reforms. The primary 
goals of these reforms were to rectify structural imbalances and improve incentives. In 
the micro economy, the most important change was the replacement of collective 
farming with a household-based system, which is now known as the household 
responsibility system. In the macro economy, the main changes are composed of the 
commodity price system, the foreign exchange rate policy and interest rate policy.  
 
The first stage of reform was carried out incrementally to improve incentives and 
expand the scope of the market for resource allocation, whilst at the same time; the 
basic institutional framework of central planning remained intact. These incremental 
reforms achieved most success outside the state sector and generated high growth. In 
particular, it dramatically improved people‟s living standards and eliminated supply 
shortage, a common symptom in planned economies. Compared to the dismal economic 
performance of the Eastern European reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, China‟s 
incremental reforms between 1978 and 1993 were a remarkable success. During this 
period, China‟s GDP grew at an average annual rate of about 9 percent, or 7.5 percent 
on a per capita basis (Lin, 1992). Household bank deposits, measured against the GDP, 
increased from less than 6 percent in 1978 to more than 40 percent in 1993. Moreover, 
the number of people living in absolute poverty was substantially reduced from over 
250 million to less than 100 million (Lin, 1992). By the end of 1993, reform was 
supported by people in all walks of life simply because almost everybody benefited 
from it.  
 
China‟s success was in sharp contrast to the frustration of Eastern European reformers 
in the late 1980s. In this respect, the most remarkable example is Hungary, which 
pioneered radical economic reform by abolishing mandatory planning targets for 
enterprises as early as 1968 and became a role model for the Chinese reformers in the 
early 1980s. However, the Hungarian reforms failed to eliminate shortages and the 
Hungarian economy stagnated in the 1980s. In addition to Hungary, Poland and the FSU 
similarly failed to successfully introduce economic reform. These failures provided an 
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impetus for a more radical approach to reform, which only became possible and put into 
practice after the fall of the Communist Governments around 1990. Against this 
background, China‟s success in introducing incremental reforms between 1978 and 
1993 was unexpected and has pioneered an alternative way of transition from planned to 
market economies. 
 
The main reason for China‟s success was that its reforms were based on deeper 
institutional changes than those in Eastern Europe (Qian, 2000). These changes, which 
were known as “incremental reform”, introduced radical changes outside the state sector 
and witnessed the emergence of the non-state sector (Qian, 2000). Accordingly, in 
non-agricultural activities a variety of enterprise ownership forms emerged, such as, 
collectives, cooperatives, private businesses, joint ventures with foreign firms, and 
exclusively foreign owned firms. Unlike state-owned enterprises (SOEs), non-state 
enterprises operated outside the scope of central planning and were subject to more 
rigorous budget constraints and faced more competition than SOE. The non-state 
enterprises soon became the engine of growth and industrialization. In 1978, the share 
of the state sector in industrial output accounted for 78 percent of the national total. 
However, by 1993 it was down to only 43 percent. The share of the state sector in 
commerce was similarly 55 percent in 1978, and had reduced to 40 percent by 1993 
(Qian, 2000). The absence of privatization during this period meant that these changes 
were entirely due to the very fast growth of non-state enterprises. 
 
In contrast, in Central and Eastern European countries, despite decades of reform in the 
late 1980s, the state sector continued to dominate the economy and the non-state sector 
remained relatively insignificant, especially, in the industrial sector. However, although 
the non-state sector has developed very quickly during this period, FDI in China was 
not significant and accounted for less than 5 percent of total investment by the early 
1990s. Furthermore, domestic private firms were not that significant either, and most 
non-state firms were controlled by local government under so-called collective 
enterprises.  
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2.4.2 The second stage in transition process 
  
In the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress in November 1993, the Chinese 
government decided to establish a socialist market economic structure. This decision 
represents a strategic shift in the course of China‟s reform from a planned economy to a 
socialist market economy. For the first time in modern history, the Chinese government 
decided to abolish the central planning system and establish a modern market economy 
with the eventual aim of incorporating international institutions, which are regarded as 
being examples of “best practice”. Although the political and economic background 
leading to these reforms was quite different, the second stage of China‟ reforms was 
comparable to those in CEE after 1990 and the FSU countries after 1992. In all of the 
CEE and FSU countries, the transition to a market economy began after political 
democratization. In contrast, China entered the transition stage without such radical 
changes in its political structures.  
 
In the first five years since 1994, China attempted several radical reforms. The major 
ones included unification of exchange rates and convertibility under the current account; 
the overhaul of the tax and fiscal systems with the separation of national and local tax 
administrations; and a reorganization of the central bank, which included establishing 
cross-province central bank branches. China also started to privatize small-scale 
state-owned enterprises, to lay off surplus state employees and to establish a social 
security “safety net”. Accordingly, these reforms can be divided into the following four 
main areas: (1) foreign exchange and external sector reform (2) tax and fiscal reform (3) 
state-owned enterprise reform; and, (4) financial reform. 
 
(1)Foreign exchange and external sector reform 
 
Like many other markets, the liberalization of the foreign exchange markets in China 
followed a dual-track approach, which created an official rate and a “swap rate” (i.e. the 
market rate). However, due to the dramatic growth of international trade in the mid to 
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late 1990s, a significant difference between the official rate and the swap rate emerged 
(Lin, 2004). Accordingly, on January 1 1994 the two tracks were merged into a single 
market track and in December 1996, China went one step further and announced current 
account convertibility of its currency. However, it did not move to capital account 
convertibility and retained the existing capital regulations. Despite China‟s weak 
financial system, these capital regulations partly explain why it was able to weather the 
Asian financial crisis relatively well. In fact, during the Asian the currency appreciated 
quite markedly and both exports and FDI increased dramatically. Consequently, the 
country‟s foreign reserves increased from US$ 21 billion to US$ 145 billion and FDI 
averaged about US$ 45 billion per year in 1997 and 1998 (Lin, 2004). 
 
(2)  Tax and fiscal reform 
 
Before 1994, all the taxes were collected by local governments and paid to the central 
government. Moreover, the local governments had a large degree of autonomy and, 
therefore, considerable power in the collection and payment of taxes. 
 
On January 1, 1994, China introduced major tax and fiscal reforms, which were more 
aligned with international practices. These reforms introduced a clear distinction 
between national and local taxes, and established a national tax bureau and local tax 
bureaus for the collection of taxes. The tax reforms established fixed tax rules between 
the national and local governments and this made it very difficult for local governments 
to avoid collecting and paying national taxes as they had done in the past.  
 
In addition to these changes the new “Budget Law”, which took effect in 1995, 
prohibited the central government from borrowing from the central bank and financing 
its current account deficit. The central government can only have deficit financing on its 
capital account, which it could finance with government bonds. The Budget Law also 
imposed more stringent restrictions on local government, which were required to have 
balanced budgets. The law also strictly controlled the issuance of bonds by local 
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governments and restricted their borrowing in the financial market. 
 
(3) State-owned enterprise reform 
 
China began to privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 1992. At that time, all of the 
industrial SOEs were dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises and most of 
them were under the supervision of county and city governments. Although some local 
governments had experimented in a few provinces as early as 1992, the wholesale 
privatization of small SOEs only began to emerge in 1995. The process slowed down in 
1998 partly because of the Asian economic crisis but picked up again in 1999 (Lin, 
2004). Nevertheless, the privatization of small SOEs has been very uneven across 
provinces, with some provinces moving very fast and others lagging behind. 
 
The main problem facing many SOEs, however, is excess employment and the 
reallocation of labor is, therefore, a major concern. To place this into some sort of 
context, approximately ten million workers from SOEs and urban collectives were laid 
off during each year between 1996 and 1998 (Lin, 2004). The unemployment problem 
was also compounded by the closure of state enterprises. Accordingly, China‟s total 
state employment (including both government agencies and state enterprises) has now 
declined to below 100 million (Lin, 2004). 
 
A quick examination of the ownership and governance reforms of SOEs reveals that 
they have been largely unsuccessful. In 1997, for example, there was an experiment to 
reform 100 large SOEs by introducing several external investors in each of them but the 
vast majority remained solely state owned. Similarly, many of the SOEs that were 
already listed on China‟s stock exchanges, suffered from a conflict of interests between 
the so-called “three old committees” (the Party Committee, the Employee 
Representative Committee, and the Workers Union) and “three new committees” (the 
meetings of Shareholders, the meetings of the Board of Directors, and the meetings of 
the Supervisory Committee).  
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In some cases, the conflict between the Party secretary and the top manager in the SOE 
was so severe that it interfered with the enterprise‟s normal operation. In response to 
this conflict some enterprises appointed the same person to both positions but this led to 
so-called „inside controls”. Essentially, this is insider dealings, which refers to the 
situation where managers with privileged knowledge about the enterprise use it to 
obtain personal financial gain, usually at the expense of the shareholders (Aoki, 1995). 
To address this problem, starting in 1998, hundreds of external “special inspectors” 
were appointed by the central government to supervise the operations of large SOEs. 
However, these inspectors were mostly retired high-level bureaucrats who had no 
knowledge about business operations and financial accounting. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, they did not resolve any of the problems and were eventually abolished and 
replaced by “Large Enterprise Working Committees” Functioning within the Parties 
Central Committee they had responsibility for appointment of senior management 
within large SOEs. Today, most of these reforms have been abandoned and the reform 
of large SOEs remains largely unresolved. 
 
(4)The monetary and financial reform 
 
Prior to 1994, China‟s monetary system can perhaps best be described as being in a poor 
condition. Approximately 70 percent of the central bank‟s loans to state commercial 
banks were made by the central bank‟s local branches and these were heavily supervised 
and influenced by the local governments. Since 1993, however, these local branches 
have been supervised directly by the central bank. In 1995 China passed the “Central 
Bank Law” to give the central bank the mandate for monetary policy independent of 
local government. These reforms substantially reduced local government‟s influence on 
monetary policy and credit allocation decisions. This development largely explains why 
the overall budget constraints imposed on local governments became much draconian in 
the 1990s compared with the 1980s. In addition during 1998 the central bank replaced 
its 30 provincial branches with nine cross-province regional branches and introduced a 
system similar to that of the United States Federal Reserve. Consequently, these nine 
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regional branches, which are located in Shengyang, Tianjin, Jinan, Nanjing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, and Xi‟an, minimized even further the local 
governments‟ influence on monetary policies. 
 
In contrast to central banking, the banking and financial reforms are considered to be 
very limited and unsatisfactory (Qian, 2000). Since 1994 only limited progress has been 
made to commercialize the four major state banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, Agriculture Bank of China, Bank of China, and Construction Bank of China), 
which account for more than 8o percent of total outstanding loans. After the passing of 
the “Commercial Banking Law” in 1995, these banks began to adopt international 
accounting standards, and became more profit conscious and aware of the importance of 
the quality of their loans. They also started to compete with each other for business and 
in 1998 the central bank abandoned credit allocation ceilings and replaced them with 
standard reserve requirements, asset-liability management, and interest rate regulations.  
Accordingly, the nature of their business moved one step closer to conventional 
commercial banking. Nevertheless, even though foreign banks were allowed to open 
branches in China the state banks did not face any direct competition from them. This 
was because foreign banks could not conduct business in local currency and were 
mostly restricted to special economic zones in certain pre-designated cities. 
 
On the issue of prudential regulation and supervision, China has basically followed the 
old U.S. model. Three different government agencies now separately regulate 
commercial banks, security firms, and insurance companies. Moreover, not only is 
commercial banking separated from investment banking, but commercial banks cannot 
hold shares in companies. All financial institutions must comply with the regulations 
otherwise they will be penalized for “illegal” activities. Contravention of the regulations 
explains why several high profile banks and investment companies, such as, Hainan 
Development Bank and Guangdong International Trust Investment Company (GITIC) 
were closed down in 1999. 
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Despite a large amount of capital being injected into the four state banks in 1999, the 
financial system towards the end of 1998 was even more fragile than in 1994. A lot of 
studies analyzing the problems associated with the financial system in China focus on 
the accumulation of large amounts of NPLs and the poor corporate governance of 
state-owned banks (Yuan (2000), Zhang (1999), Xu (2001), Li (1999), Xie (2001). 
During this period the state-owned banks remained entirely state owned and 
administratively they were regarded as being inferior to the central bank. Accordingly, a 
useful reform would be to diversify their ownership structure and introduce good 
corporate governance structures.  
 
2.4.3 The third stage in transition process 
  
Considerable progress had been made before China joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. During the third transition stage the Chinese economy 
became more open than before and the foreign trade-to-GDP ratio was around 40% for 
China. This is around 20 percent higher than Japan, the United States and India (Bruce, 
2002). To some extent, this reflects the success of China in increasing its exports and 
attracting foreign direct investment. For example, FDI at this stage accounted for 17 to 
18% of China‟s total investment, compared to only 6% for the US during the same 
period (Bruce, 2002).  
 
In addition, China also made significant progress in reducing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade and reforming the overall trade regime prior to joining the WTO. In 
these trade related areas China had no problem meeting its WTO obligations but it faced 
severe adjustment challenges in other sectors, especially, the financial sector; agriculture 
sector; the services sector; the social security sector; and, most industrial sectors. 
Despite having to confront these challenges, the Chinese government was still intent on 
joining the WTO because it was perceived as a platform for the next stage of China‟s 
structural reforms (Bruce, 2002). In particular, it was regarded as conducive to China‟s 
plan to achieve sustainable economic growth whilst simultaneously creating jobs, 
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improving people‟s living standards and reducing poverty. Moreover, WTO membership 
was regarded as providing an impetus for China‟s eventual emergence as an efficient 
market economy and a globally competitive economy. 
 
        Table 2. 2   Chinese business environment after joining the WTO 
* Promoting the rule of law, making it clear, transparent, especially accessible and 
impartially enforced; 
 
* Having an efficient judicial system that disposes of cases in a timely manner; 
  
* Stamping out corruption-corruption is the enemy of legitimate business; 
 
* Honoring contracts; 
 
* Revising the taxation system, converting fees and charges into taxes and abolishing 
the illegal and arbitrary fees; 
*  Eliminating barriers to inter-provincial trade, local protectionism and promoting 
fair competition; 
 
* Revising administrative laws and regulations to reduce red tape, improve 
transparency and reduce the opportunity for rent seeking by bureaucrats; 
 
* Having good accounting and auditing standards. 
 
Source: Bruce (2002). 
 
In order to address these challenges the Chinese government tried to create a business 
environment. The essential points of this plan, which are shown in Table 2.2, are both 
consistent with WTO obligations and attractive to foreign companies. Somewhat                                                                                                                                                           
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crucially, the same points are just as important in building a sustainable environment for 
the domestic private sector. This is fairly critical to China‟s future development because 
it is the domestic private sector that will provide most of the future employment 
opportunities, effectively, becoming an engine for future job creation.  
  
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the subject of transition economies from a global perspective 
and compared the differences in the transition process between CEE, FSU and China. 
The chapter concluded that because of different initial conditions and different transition 
strategies, China experienced more rapid economic growth than the other transition 
economies. China‟s 3-stage transition process was also examined and the chapter 
presented the key economic characteristics and policy changes relating to the three 
different stages. One of the most significant changes was the adoption in November 
1993 of a program to guide China to a “socialist market economy”. Since then, China‟s 
reforms have entered another stage to systematically build market-supporting 
institutions and to address the problem of state-owned enterprises and state-owned 
banks. After more than two decades of successful reforms the non-state or private sector 
has eventually emerged to become the foundation of the economy.  
 
Another significant change was that after China joined the WTO it became more 
integrated into the global economy. In order to survive in the global market place, China 
has had no real choice other than to accelerate its transition to a fully-fledged market 
economy and this has necessitated incorporating international best practices. Moreover, 
China‟s accession to the WTO has tilted the domestic political balance in favor of 
additional radical reforms. The demand inside China for accelerating the transformation 
of its SOEs, the development of private enterprises and establishing legal regulations 
has also gained momentum and become stronger than ever. These considerations, 
together with the need to change government–business-banks relationships, will be 
extremely crucial in helping to reduce the accumulation of NPLs 
 31 
  Chapter Three The Development and Assessment of Chinese Banking System  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter has made it clear that the Chinese authorities are in the process of 
transforming a planned economy into a market economy. There are several quite 
powerful reasons to believe that this process will have consequences not only for China 
but for the rest of the world as well: China has a quarter of the world‟s population and 
its economy is expected to grow and become the most powerful economy in the World. 
China is also one of the main global exporters of capital, which is mainly used to 
financing the United States current account deficit. The previous chapter also 
emphasized that the Chinese economy has experienced unprecedented growth during 
the process of transformation. Somewhat pertinently from the perspective of this thesis, 
the banking sector has played a significant role in driving this growth.  
 
This chapter accordingly reviews and assesses the development of the Chinese banking 
industry over the last two decades and places particular emphasis on the evolution, 
structure and institutional settings of the Chinese banking system. The chapter then 
discusses the main characteristics of the Chinese banking industry and summarizes the 
major financial reforms. These financial reforms are examined in terms of bank 
restructuring, financial liberalization, and bank regulation and supervision. The chapter 
concludes by evaluating the impact of the reforms on bank performance and makes an 
assessment of what else needs to be done and what the consequences of these changes 
might be. 
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3.2 The Chinese Banking System 
 
3.2.1 Evolution 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the nationalization of private banks in 1949, bank 
management in China essentially followed a similar approach to other centrally-planned 
economies. On the surface, the Chinese banking system appeared to perform its primary 
basic intermediary function, i.e. the collection of surplus funds and their subsequent 
redistribution to deficit sectors or enterprises. However, voluntary savings were 
virtually non-existent under the centrally planned system. More significantly, the 
allocation of funds to the non-financial sectors was strictly based on production quotas, 
which were determined by the central plan. Under this system banks were mandated to 
provide the necessary credit to an enterprise in order that it could achieve its production 
quota. The borrower's ability (and willingness) to repay the loan or to provide collateral 
had no relevance whatsoever to the bank granting the credit (Berger & Roland, 1998). 
Indeed, anything vaguely resembling a credit decision making process was conspicuous 
by its absence under this system. Accordingly, the activities of banks were confined to 
mandatory credit allocations, which were determined by central planning targets and 
this consideration supplanted any profit making objectives. Furthermore, at this stage in 
China‟s development, there were no other financial institutions or financial/capital 
markets that could have provided some element of competition for the banks. 
 
During the period 1953-1978, four Chinese banks had operated intermittently as 
separate units or as single entities: the People's Bank of China (PBC), the Agriculture 
Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), and the Construction Bank of China 
(CBC). However, although the four banks were separate organizations, they were under 
the direct supervision of the PBC. All four banks were owned by the state and each one 
had a special or distinctive market niche with extensive branch networks throughout the 
country. 
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Since 1978, when the Chinese authorities started to introduce economic reforms aimed 
at an “open-door” policy, the Chinese banking system has undergone significant 
transformation. For example, during the period 1978-1984, the PBC retained its central 
banking activities, while four other banks - ABC, BOC, CBC, and ICBC (the last bank 
being established in 1979 to take over the commercial business of the PBC) provided 
specialized niche type services. In 1994, three policy-based banks were formed. They 
were the Agricultural Development Bank, the China Development Bank, and the 
Export-Import Bank of China. In this respect, these policy banks were clearly 
introduced to serve specific market niches and, therefore, complement rather than 
compete with the commercial banks.   
 
China‟s approach to banking and economic reform in general, can best be described as 
an evolutionary, experimental and bottom-up approach, which stands in stark contrast to 
the top-down big bang approach in Russia and other Eastern European countries. It has 
been argued, however, that China‟s success is not really due to these sort of issues but 
rather to the unique initial conditions-namely, a large agricultural labor force, low 
subsidies and a relatively decentralized economic system. Moreover, the Chinese 
authorities made a serious attempt to redress the problems of capital scarcity and a lack 
of long term investment in heavy industry. Construction, infrastructure projects, import 
and export initiatives, etc were similarly given priority. This strategy effectively 
attempted to identify the comparative advantages or the key corner-stones of economic 
growth in the Chinese economy and provide appropriate sources of bank finance. These 
attempts at addressing the perceived weaknesses in the economy are explicitly reflected 
in the way that the banking system was restructured. 
 
Accordingly, the modern banking system in China comprises four state-owned 
commercial banks, as well as several joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial 
banks, rural credit cooperatives, finance companies, and trust and investment companies. 
In addition, foreign banks have been allowed to become an integral part of the Chinese 
banking system. However, China‟s banking reforms have been far more radical than 
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simply increasing the number of operational banks. Accordingly, banks are no longer a 
simple extension of government but act autonomously and in a way that reflects the 
dynamics of the market place. In particular, the banking industry has played an 
important role in financing China‟s economic growth. In playing this pivotal role in 
helping to transform the economy the banking industry has accumulated high levels of 
bad debts and so-called non performing loans (NPLs). These NPLs, which have been 
accumulating since the early 1990s, are so large that they have the potential to threaten 
the soundness of the financial system and might even detract from China‟s spectacular 
economic growth.  
  
3.2.2 The Institutional setting of the Chinese Banking system 
 
China‟s modern day banking sector has two regulatory institutions, the central bank 
(PBC) and the China Banking and Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and both are 
ultimately overseen by the State Council (the cabinet). The PBC is currently in charge 
of monetary policy and the liquidity of the financial system, and ostensibly promotes 
economic growth and maintains price stability. The PBC also determines the level of 
interest rates for loans and deposits (interest rates are not fully liberalized in China), sets 
the reserve requirements, manages a range of other instruments that affect bank liquidity; 
and, monitors and regulates credit expansion within the banking system. 
 
The CBRC was established in April 2003 and became responsible for the regulation and 
supervision of the banking sector, thereby, enabling the PBC to concentrate on monetary 
policy. Its objectives included: protecting consumers and depositors, maintaining the 
stability of the banking system, enhancing the banks competitiveness, educating the 
public on the role of finance; and, eradicating financial crime. It also has responsibility 
for maintaining and safeguarding the capital adequacy of financial institutions and is 
also responsible for the restructuring of the banking sector. It also has responsibility for 
maintaining and safeguarding the capital adequacy of financial institutions and is also 
responsible for the restructuring of the banking sector. 
 35 
There are also a number of non-bank financial institutions in the Chinese banking 
system. The most important include: the Trust and Investment Corporations (TICs), 
which were created in the 1980s to support the development of the private sector and to 
provide financing outside the credit quotas imposed on commercial banks. Some TICs 
also act as the investment instrument for local and provincial governments were as 
others generate international funds (through bond issues or syndicated loans) to finance 
local companies and infrastructure/construction projects. AMCs were established in 
1999 to effectively take NPLs off state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) balance 
sheets and try and recover the debts through a range of different asset resolution 
techniques. Securities companies have also played an important role in the development 
of the stock exchanges since the 1990s. Their ownership has become more diversified 
with the increasing participation of the private sector. Insurance companies are 
generally state owned although most of the newly created companies have public 
listings. As a consequence, the insurance companies have shifted their focus from 
market share to profitability and economic return. Since China‟s membership of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) foreign companies have increasingly taken an interest 
in the Chinese insurance sector.  
 
At the core of the Chinese financial system is the banking system, which includes four 
large SOCBs, three policy lending banks and a large number of other commercial banks, 
credit cooperatives and financial institutions (see Chart 3.1). Among the commercial 
banks, there are eleven joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), which were initially 
created to service specialized product niches but now offer a full range of financial 
services. At the local level, there are more than 110 city commercial banks (CCBs), 
1,000 urban credit cooperatives (UCCs), and 35,000 rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) 
providing basic banking services. 
  
The four SOCBs: the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China 
Construction Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China were established 
in the 1980s. They were assigned sector policy objectives, which were previously in the 
 36 
hands of the PBC. In 1994, with the creation of the policy banks, their responsibilities 
were restricted to purely commercial business purposes. Although their assets have 
fallen in the last two decades (from 72 percent of total assets in the banking system in 
1994 to 55 percent at the end of 2004), they are still very large. In fact, they are amongst 
the biggest banks in the world, with total assets in above of USD 2,000 billion. They 
also have an extensive branch network (with a total of 42,000 offices) and employed 
over 700,000 staff as at the end of 2002. 
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                Chart 3.1 Structure of the Chinese Financial System 
 
                 
The three policy banks, which were created in 1994 to carry out the development 
policies previously assigned to the SOCBs currently account for approximately 10 
percent of total bank assets. They include: the Agricultural Development Bank, the 
China Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of China. Their main objectives 
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are agricultural development, national infrastructure and foreign trade, respectively, and 
they pay special attention to the poorer western and central regions. Policy lending 
banks fund themselves through central bank loans, government deposits and the 
issuance of government-guaranteed deposits held by commercial banks. They also lend 
extensively to the government (more than the SOCBs,) and consequently, profitability 
tends to be only a residual objective. 
 
There are also a number of other commercial banks in the Chinese banking system, with 
a diverse ownership structure and geographical scope. Some of these commercial banks 
have been used as a sort of experiment in the liberalization process of the financial 
system and others have specialized in specific market niches. Broadly speaking they can 
be divided into two broad categories: joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial 
banks. 
 
Joint-stock commercial banks (JSBCs) are partially owned by local governments and 
SOEs, and sometimes by the private sector. There are currently eleven JSBCs and five 
of these are listed on the local stock market and account for approximately 15 percent of 
total bank assets. The biggest ones are the Bank of Communications (BOC1), the China 
Minsheng Bank, the China Everbright Bank, the China Merchants Bank, the Shanghai 
Pudong Development Bank and the Shenzen Development Bank. The JSCBs 
predominately finance small SOEs and firms with partial private ownership, including 
small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). They maintain much smaller branch 
networks than SOCBs and are typically confined to the region of origin or to the fast 
growing coastal areas. However, they are allowed to operate at the national level. These 
banks are the most market oriented within China, with relatively good corporate 
governance and management structures. Consequently, they have experienced the 
fastest rate of expansion over the last few years.   
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The second broad category of commercial banks, namely, city commercial banks (CCBs) 
were created in the mid 1990s by the restructuring and consolidation of UCCs. There 
are currently 112 CCBs and they accounted for about 5 percent of total bank assets in 
2004. Their capital is owned by urban enterprises and local governments, and they lend 
to small and medium size enterprises, and collective and local residents in their 
municipalities. In contrast to JSCBs, however, they are not allowed to operate at a 
national or a regional level and this restriction makes them relatively uncompetitive. 
 
Rural and urban credit cooperatives were established in the 1980s as a mechanism to 
diversify the financial system and to finance projects in areas where resources were 
scarce. They typically attract deposits from rural areas or small towns and provide credit 
(a good part of which is subsidized) to small and medium-sized enterprises or peasants. 
In addition, their lending policies are controlled by the local public authorities In June 
2003 there were about 35,000 RCCs providing 80 percent of rural finance and 1,000 
UCCs. Their share of total bank assets has declined from 14.3 percent in 1995 to 10.4 
percent as at the end of 2004. This decline has occurred against a background of deposit 
growth and reflects their inability to increase lending (Alicia, Sergio & Daniel, 2005). 
Nowadays, after the consolidation of UCCs into city commercial banks, RCCs are far 
more numerous. However, RCCs are the worst performing financial institution in China, 
with very poor corporate governance structures and the highest ratio of NPLs. 
 
Finally, foreign banks play a very limited role in the Chinese banking system. In 
September 2003, there were 191 licensed foreign banking institutions. Amongst these, 
157 were classified as branches, 11 were sub-branches; and, 15 were subsidiaries 
incorporated locally with 8 branches. They account for 0.3 percent of the local currency 
lending market, around 13% percent of the foreign currency lending market; and, 
approximately, 1.5% of total bank assets (Alicia, Sergio & Daniel, 2005). 
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3.3 Characteristics of the Chinese Banking Sector 
  
3.3.1 Size of the banking system 
 
The most striking feature of China‟s banking system is its large size, not only in relative 
terms but also in absolute terms. China is ranked seventh worldwide in terms of the 
provision of bank credit to the private sector, as a percentage of GDP and sixth in terms 
of bank credit denominated in USD. Furthermore, fuelled by the rapid growth of the 
economy, bank credit continues to growth at a very fast rate. However, size and rapid 
growth in itself is not necessarily indicative of a developed banking system. 
Accordingly, the penetration of banking products in China remains low and the 
provision of bank credit to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), and households 
remains low. In 2004, for example, bank lending to SMEs and households was around 
15% and 11% of total loans (Alicia, Sergio & Daniel, 2005). 
    
3.3.2  State-owned banks domination of the banking system 
  
As with many transition economies, the Chinese banking system has been dominated by 
the four large state owned commercial banks (SOCBs). These were created in the 1980s 
to grant credit to the major corporate sectors (Alicia, Sergio & Daniel, 2005). In 
comparison, the other Chinese banks are relatively small. Accordingly, the degree of 
concentration in the Chinese banking sector is relatively high when measured in terms 
of the share of assets of the four largest banks (see m4 in Chart 3.2) but much lower 
when measured by the Herfindahl index.  
 
The Herfindhal index is a measure of the size of firms in relation to the industry as a 
whole and is an indicator of the amount of competition. The relatively low Herfindahl 
index shown in Chart 3.2, therefore, reveals that there is a lack of strong competition 
within the Chinese banking system and this reflects the oligopolistic behavior of the 
SOCBs. The lack of competition is also compounded by massive government 
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intervention in Chinese bank activities. An indication of the lack of competition is 
provided by the relatively high interest margin as a percentage of total assets. This was 
1.79% percent in 2003 for Chinese banks, as compared to 1.38 percent for European 
banks. 
 
Table 3.1 also reveals that the SOCBs share of total assets has declined during the 1993 
2004 period from 73.9 percent in 1995 down to 54.6 percent in 2004. To some extent 
this reflects the increasing importance of other commercial banks, such as joint stock 
commercial banks and to a lesser extent, city commercial banks. The former banks are 
partially owned by local governments and SOEs but they have also experienced an 
upsurge in private ownership (sometimes foreign). Accordingly, joint stock commercial 
banks accounted for approximately 15 percent of total bank assets in 2004, compared to 
only 4.4 percent in 1993. To place this increase into some sort of context it equates to a 
staggering growth rate of 30 percent per annum, compared to only 10 percent for state 
owned commercial banks. In contrast, city commercial banks, which were created by 
restructuring and merging the urban credit cooperatives, are much smaller. Nevertheless, 
they accounted for 5.4 percent of total bank assets in 2004.  
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              Chart 3. 2    Concentration of Chinese banking sector   
  
 
 
              Table 3.1     Share on assets by type of institution 
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3.3.3 The structure of the bank’s balance sheets      
 
 
Compared to international standards, Chinese banks have a rather unusual balance sheet 
structure. For example, chart 3.3 shows that loans comprised a large part of total assets 
(60.8 percent) in 2003. Moreover, over 85 percent of these loans were granted on a short 
term basis to the corporate sector. Table 3.4 also shows that 50 percent of total loans 
were allocated to financing industrial projects on a revolving credit. The dominance of 
industrial lending has continued despite the unprecedented growth in the housing sector 
and the commensurate growth in mortgage financing. Accordingly, Chart 3.4 reveals 
that mortgage lending is still less than 15 percent of both total loans and new loans 
granted. 
 
Another unusual feature of Chinese bank‟s balance sheets is the fact that although there 
are marked differences between the different types of bank, almost all of the liabilities 
are deposits, which accounted for approximately 89 percent of total liabilities in 2003. 
This figure was even higher in SOCBs (at92 percent) but much less in JSCBs (at 79 
percent). A closer examination of these deposits also reveals that retail depositors were 
the main financers of the banking system. In contrast, corporate deposits represented 
only about one third of total liabilities (see Tables 3.2, 3.3; and, 3.4).  
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                       Chart 3.3 Asset Structure 
 
                     Chart 3.4 Compositions of New Loans 
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                   Table 3.2 Asset structure of banking sector 
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                   Table 3.3 Liability Structure of the Banking Sector 
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                Table 3.4 Sources and uses of bank financing 
 
 
3.3.4 Poor asset quality 
  
In common with other transition economies, another feature of Chinese banks is the 
poor quality of their assets. The ratio of NPLs to total loans was 20 percent in 2003 (see 
Table 3.5), well above international standards. However, it was even larger before the 
Chinese authorities started their restructuring (in excess of 30 percent in 1997 according 
to the CBRC). To place the size of the Chinese banks bad debts into some sort of 
perspective the NPL to total loans ratio in Europe was only 3.1% percent on 2003. The 
problem facing Chinese banks was also compounded by the fact that provisioning, as a 
percentage of non-performing loans, was similarly well below international standards, 
at around 22 percent, compared with 67.4 percent in Europe during 2003.  
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The underlying reasons for the poor quality of Chinese bank assets were soft-budget 
constraints when lending to SOEs and a weak credit culture, which permeated the entire 
banking system. In fact, the latter consideration explains why NPLs relating to small 
and medium size enterprises (SMEs), and household lending were particularly high 
compared with international standards. Finally, capitalization in Chinese banks was also 
low. Accordingly, the solvency ratio, calculated according to Basel II formula, was only 
6.73 percent in 2003 (as shown in Chart 3.5) and the ratio of equity to assets was 4.3 
percent. These ratios were, therefore, approximately at the same levels as before the 
reforms commenced. Net interest margins (NIMs) reveal a similar profile but also 
remained at relatively high levels throughout reflecting the lack of any real competition 
in the China‟s financial markets. Relatively high levels of interest income also reveal 
that most of the bank‟s business is interest bearing financial intermediation rather than 
fee based investment banking. (see Table 3. 6, which shows the evolution of the basic 
indicators of bank performance for each group of banks). 
           Table 3.5 Reported NPLs in Chinese financial system 
 
Source: Bofit (2004), Ernst & Young (2004), Ping (2003) and Pei & Shirai (2004). 
June 2003 annual GDP. 
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               Chart 3.5 Solvency ratio and equity/assets ratio 
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             Table 3.6 Selected Indicators for the performance 
 
3.3.5 Poor profitability 
 
Chinese banks are not very profitable. In 2003 the return on average equity (ROAE) of 
the banking system was 3.05% (see Chart 3. 6), and the return on average assets 
(ROAA) was 0.14%. Once again, this is well below international standards. For 
example, in Europe the banks had 9.87 percent ROAE and 0.41 percent ROAA during 
the same year. 
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                      Chart 3. 6 ROAA and ROAE 
 
 
 
The main reason for the low profitability of Chinese banks seems to be the poor quality 
of the underlying assets. Operating income, as a percentage of total assets, for example, 
is only slightly lower for Chinese banks compared to European banks (2.22 percent 
compared to 2.3 percent in 2003, as shown in Chart 3.7). In contrast the other measures 
of Chinese bank efficiency, such as, pre-provision profits relative to the number of 
employees, etc, generally rank below European banks (see Chart 3.8). However, 
Chinese banks have a much lower non-interest income relative to European banks At 
first glance, it is interesting to find that the efficiency of Chinese banks, measured by 
the cost to income ratio, is better at 51.68 percent compared to 60.39 percent for the 
European banks, however, this clearly reflects the low wages in China compared to 
Europe. 
 
The difference in profitability is, therefore, mainly explained by the much larger 
amounts of provisions and write-offs, stemming from the very low asset quality. In fact, 
provisions and write-offs reduced the Chinese banks‟ net income to 11.7 percent of 
pre-provision profits in 2003, compared to 43.6% for European banks. Tables 3.2, 3.3 
and 3.7 depict the evolution of assets, liabilities and income and expenditure for the 
different types of Chinese banks. 
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Nevertheless, low levels of profitability also reflect the lack of any real competition 
within China‟s financial markets. In this respect there is no imperative or evidence of 
any concerted effort to improve efficiency or use pricing as a strategic tool to generate 
increases in market share. Similarly, the business of these banks is predominately 
commercial lending, which is generally accepted as being less profitable that its 
counterpart investment banking. In this respect the balance sheets of China‟s banks are 
distinctive compared to those in more developed economies because of their lack of off 
balance sheet activities and very low levels of fee income. 
 
            Chart 3.7 Operating Income/Assets and Cost to income 
 
 
      
    Chart 3.8 Net interest Income and net non-interest income/Operating Income 
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       Table 3.7 Income and expenditure structure of the banking sector 
 
 
   
3.3.6 Weak corporate governance 
 
The root cause of weak corporate governance in Chinese banks is undoubtedly 
excessive government intervention, which stops banks making loans in accordance with 
market criteria. This is particularly true for SOCBs that lack the basic attributes of a 
profit making bank. They do not have clearly identifiable owners and until very recently 
had no Board of Directors. They also have no mechanism for monitoring the actions and 
performance of management. In fact, like all Chinese companies, they only have an 
external board of supervisors, which monitors conformity with banking law and 
regulations but this board has no role in the governance or oversight of bank 
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management. Banks are accountable only to the government (usually the Ministry of 
Finance) and disclosure requirements are minimal. Moreover, bank management has 
been traditionally selected from the ministerial system and has remained subject to the 
close control of the party.  
 
Unlike SOCBs, Joint Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs) have a public listing and, 
therefore, their management has a higher commitment to shareholder value. 
Nevertheless because of their large participation in the capital of most of these 
institutions JSCBs are still influenced by local governments and government-controlled 
enterprises. JSCBs have, nevertheless, introduced some improvements in the procedure 
for granting credit and risk management. Some of the largest City Commercial Banks 
(CCBs) are in a similar position to JSCBs, but the small CCBs still resemble urban 
credit cooperatives. These credit cooperatives are still subject to direct control from 
local governments and, therefore, they tend to be characterized by even weaker 
governance that SOCBs.  
 
3.3.7 Poor institutional framework of banking system  
 
The final main characteristic of the Chinese banking system is its poor institutional 
framework. This is characterized by rather “loose” regulation and supervision, 
particularly, as regards enforcement. Furthermore, the regulatory bodies, as well as the 
central bank, are dependent on the party‟s decisions. This lack of enforcement partly 
explains why there has been only very limited improvement in the corporate governance 
structures of Chinese banks. Additional considerations are the total absence of a 
bankruptcy law or a national credit bureau. The national payment system is similarly 
unorganized and does not have a centralized structure.  
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3.4 Steps taken in banking reform  
 
As with other transitional economies, the reform of the Chinese banking system started 
with an institutional shake-up. The first, and most important step in this respect, 
occurred in 1984 and involved the replacement of a mono bank system with a 
multi-tiered system in which the central banking functions were separated from the 
other forms of banking. The second step was the separation of commercial banking 
activities from those specifically orientated towards economic development. To this end, 
policy lending banks were established in 1994 and effectively took responsibility from 
the SOCBs for development projects. A new Commercial Banking Law was also 
approved in 1995 to regulate the commercial banks. In the third step, the People‟ Bank 
of China (PBC) was strengthened through a new charter in 1995. This charter 
established the PBCs three main areas of responsibility: monetary stability, banking 
supervision, and oversight of the payment system. The new charter, however, did not 
grant the PBC independence from the State Council. Subsequently in 2003, 
responsibilities for monetary policy and banking supervision were separated with the 
creation of the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). 
 
In addition to the institutional shake-up, China‟s banking reforms have been based upon 
three main pillars: (i) bank restructuring, through the cleaning up of NPLs, and 
recapitalization; (ii) reducing government interference in the system, through quantity 
and price liberalization, and opening the markets to more foreign competition; and (iii) 
improved regulation and supervision. 
  
3.4.1 Restructuring 
  
Bank restructuring has probably been the most important pillar because it has attempted 
to resolve the problem of poor asset quality and low capitalization. Although there have 
been some measures aimed at credit cooperatives, bank restructuring has mainly 
focused on SOCBs. The restructuring process itself has come in three waves with two 
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clearly differentiated steps: first a capital injection and then a reduction in NPLs. 
 
THE THREE RESTRUCTURING WAVES FOR SOCBS 
 
The first wave started in 1998, with an injection of the equivalent of USD 33 billion into 
the four SOCBs. The operation started with a reduction in the reserve requirement, 
which released liquidity and allowed the banks to acquire government paper. The 
government also matched these purchases with injections of additional capital into the 
SOCBs. This operation was followed a year later by the transfer –at book value– of 
USD 170 million worth of NPLs from the four SOCBs to the four newly created AMCs 
(AMCs). 
 
The second wave started in December 2003 with 22.5 billion USD capital injections 
into the two best performing SOCBs, namely, the China Construction Bank (CCB) and 
the Bank of China (BOC). These injections came directly from the country‟s official 
international reserves via the transfer of rights of ownership of US government bonds. 
These have not, however, been converted into Rimini (RMB) yet because of imposed 
restrictions. At the time, the bank‟s existing capital was mainly used to provision or 
write-off the equivalent of 23.4 billion USD in NPLs. Accordingly, this operation led to 
a very marginal increase in capitalization but asset quality improved substantially.  
 
In June 2004, the equivalent of 33.7 billion USD in NPLs was auctioned from CCB and 
BOC to the AMCs at 50 percent of face value. Cynda, the most active AMC won the 
auction by promising a 30% recovery rate. In addition, CCB and BOC both increased 
their Tier II capital by issuing subordinated debt for the equivalent of 12.1 billion USD. 
Finally, the part public listing of these two banks took place in the second half of 2005 
and a state-owned investment company was created at the time to organize the listing. 
The Chinese authorities believed that this move would diversify ownership and improve 
management quality in these banks In fact, just prior to the official listing the Bank of 
America acquired a 9 percent stake in CCB (amounting to 2.5 billion USD). This was 
 57 
followed by an additional 1 billion USD stake in CCB by Singapore‟s state-owned 
financial holding company, Temasek. 
 
The third restructuring wave commenced in April 2005 with the injection of 15 billion 
USD into the Industrial Commercial Bank (ICB). Like the second wave, these funds 
came from the official international reserves. Although the share of NPLs in ICB is 
much larger than in the previously restructured banks, only 9 billion USD of the 
previous capital was used to provision NPLs while the remaining 6 billion was retained 
in equity (i.e., total equity is now 30 billion USD). The restructuring continued in June 
2005 with the sale of 85.5 billion USD worth of NPLs to AMCs and the issuance of 
12.1 billion USD in subordinated debt. At the time of writing, ICB also plans to be 
publically listed in 2006 or possibly 2007. 
 
It has been estimated that under these three waves, by 2004 approximately 20 to 24% of 
GDP was injected into the Chinese banking system, either as capital or as a means of 
getting NPLs off the balance sheets of banks. 
 
THE NPLS‟ DISPOSAL 
 
As previously mentioned, the Chinese authorities established a number of AMCs where 
NPLs from SOCBs could be transferred, and their staff seconded to gain experience. 
AMCs are legally independent agencies with a very broad mandate, namely, collecting 
NPLs and then either restructuring them or converting them into equity. The AMCs can 
issue bonds and can borrow from financial institutions in order to pay for the NPLs. 
They are also in charge of restructuring SOEs and recommending companies for listing 
(Pei & Shirai, 2004). 
 
The original idea was to assign one AMC to each SOCB. This idea was initially 
preferred because at first the average size of NPLs seemed small and as the clients were 
widely dispersed, recovering NPLs was judged to be relatively cumbersome. However, 
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the specialization of SOCBs in this way meant that economies of scale were somewhat 
limited and, therefore, the separate model quickly evolved into an auction system under 
which AMCs make competitive bids to receive additional NPLs. 
 
In the first restructuring wave, each AMC received NPLs from its respective SOCB at 
face value for a total amount equivalent to 8% of GDP (see Table 3.8 below). The 
AMCs financed this by the issuance of a 10 year bond with an annual 2.25% coupon. 
This accounted for 83 percent of the purchase price and the remaining 17 percent was 
purchased in cash. In the second restructuring wave, auctions were used to transfer 
NPLs and the highest bidding AMC, in terms of recovery value, was Cynda. In the third 
wave, the NPLs of ICBC were transferred to Huarong one of the AMCs. This was 
financed by the issue of a bond to cover the full face value of the loans with no specific 
maturity at an annual fixed interest rate of 3%. In this case the Ministry of Finance 
seems to have taken the responsibility for covering ant financial shortfall.  
 
Excluding the third wave, which is still ongoing, the amount of NPLs, which have been 
restructured or disposed of, is around 50% of total loans transferred. Out of these 
restructured (resolved) loans, only 20% of their nominal value has been cashed, which 
implies that only 10% of the nominal value of the transferred NPLs has been recovered. 
Moreover, only a marginal part of these NPLs has been securitized or purchased by 
foreign investors.  
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              Table 3.8 AMCs disposal of NPLs at March 2005 
 
 
OTHER RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS 
 
The other restructuring steps taken by the Chinese authorities relate to the smaller 
financial institutions. Credit cooperatives, as well as Trust and Investment Corporations, 
underwent a period of consolidation from 2000 to 2002 through closures and mergers at 
the provincial level. In August 2003, given the undercapitalization of rural cooperatives 
and their inability to rejuvenate the rural economy, additional measures were introduced 
and extended to most Chinese provinces. In particular, credit cooperatives were given 
specific milestone objectives which, if complied with, would allow them to receive 
additional capital injections, as well as, tax-breaks and subsidies, from the PBC or the 
local government. At the time of writing (2006), the amount of government funds 
injected into credit cooperatives is around 10 billion USD.  
 
In the next few years, the corporate governance structures, ownership and management 
efficiency of credit cooperatives will come under the microscope. However, in the 
longer-term, the objective is to consolidate the credit cooperatives to no more than 
2,000 (from over 32,000 at end-2004), arriving at an appropriate level of capitalization 
and providing sufficient credit to the rural sector. 
 
In parallel with the credit cooperatives, the CBRC has also announced that it would 
move ahead with the reform of other types of financial institution, including policy 
banks and AMCs. Regarding AMCs, foreign firms will eventually be allowed to 
compete with and ultimately purchase stakes in China‟s AMCs. 
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3.4.2 Financial liberalization 
  
Financial liberalization is another important pillar of bank reform in China. Having been 
a planned economy for so long, government intervention in the Chinese banking system 
was very pronounced and in certain respects this is still the case. Liberalization efforts 
have incorporated a number of different facets, namely, the introduction of market 
practices in the banking system; the liberalization of interest rates; opening up the 
Chinese economy to foreign competition; and, the liberalization of exchange rate 
controls. 
 
INTRODUCING MARKET PRACTICES 
 
Reducing government intervention in the banking system started in the 1990s. An 
important step in this respect was the reduction of the reserve requirements from 20 
percent to 8 percent in 1998 and eventually to 6 percent in 1999. In addition, the 
remuneration on excess reserves was reduced in order to discourage banks from 
hoarding liquid assets and develop a more dynamic approach to managing their assets. 
This has resulted in a steady reduction in bank liquid assets although they still remain at 
relatively high levels (see Table 3.2 above). 
 
In parallel with these changes, SOCBs were given more responsibility for their lending 
decisions and some of their credit quotas were removed. Another important step was 
taken in 1999, when government interference in commercial lending was forbidden (at 
least in formal terms) and private capital was allowed to enter JSCBs and CCBs. 
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INTEREST RATE LIBERALIZATION 
 
Interest rate liberalization is another important element of China‟s efforts to increase the 
role of market forces in an endeavor to arrive at an efficient allocation of resources. It is 
also a prerequisite for increasing the competitiveness of financial institutions, 
introducing market-based monetary instruments and improving the monetary 
transmission mechanism. The approach towards interest rate liberalization has been 
gradual and is not yet complete. Regarding the sequence of these changes, interest rates 
in the money markets and bond markets were initially liberalized and this was followed 
by the gradual liberalization of interest rates on bank loans and subsequently deposits.  
 
The first measure was taken in 1996, when interest rates in the inter-bank market were 
liberalized. The following year, interest rates in the bond repo (repurchase agreement) 
market were freed from controls and the issuing rate of government bonds started to be 
determined by market forces in 1998. Attempts to remove controls on foreign currency 
lending rates and large-value foreign currency deposit rates commenced in 2000.  
 
A corridor for domestic currency transactions was established as early as 1996 for RMB 
loans and gradually widened until the upper limit was lifted in October 2004. The only 
exceptions in this respect were the credit cooperatives. In 1999, interest rates on 
long-term large-value RMB deposits started to be liberalized on a gradual basis. In 
October 2004 the lower limit on the interest rate of all RMB deposits was lifted but the 
upper limit remained (Table 3.9 below, offers additional details on the liberalization of 
interest rates). The PBC has similarly announced additional measures, such as, 
eliminating the upper limit for interest rates on RMB loans to credit cooperatives and 
abolishing the existing lower limit on lending rates for all institutions; In addition, the 
PBC intends to eliminate the upper limit for all RMB deposits and liberalize interest 
rates on small value foreign currency deposits (with maturity of less than one year). 
Closely aligned to these proposed changes, the PBC has also announced the 
introduction of market-based monetary policy instruments. 
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The liberalization of the ceiling on lending rates and the floor on deposit rates implies 
that there is no limit on the size of the spread on lending and deposits but there is a clear 
lower limit on deposit rates. The difference between the reference lending rate and 
deposit rates is about 330 basis points (Chart 3.9 below) and offers a safe margin for 
banks to maintain a relatively high net interest margin. 
 
At the same time, having increased quite dramatically in the first phases of reform, 
nominal and real interest rates on bank deposits and bank loans eventually began to fall. 
However, in late 2004, real lending rates started to increase once again, mostly as a 
consequence of China‟s more restrictive monetary policy. Nevertheless, they still 
remained relatively low at under 4 percent (Chart 3.10 below). 
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                 Table 3.9 Interest rate liberalization process 
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                    Chart 3.9 Lending and deposit rates 
 
 
 
                     Chart 3.10 Real interest rates on loans  
 
 
 65 
OPENING UP TO FOREIGN COMPETITION 
 
A crucial milestone in the financial liberalization process was the conclusion of the 
negotiations for China‟s accession to the WTO in late 2001. These negotiations 
committed China to opening up its banking system to foreign affiliates by the end of 
2006. In reality, however, the approach followed by the Chinese government has been 
very gradual and cautious. Initially, foreign banks were only allowed to carry out 
foreign-currency transactions. Subsequently, foreign banks were authorized to offer 
local currency services to foreign enterprises and individuals, albeit with geographical 
restrictions (starting with the richest regions). They also had to adhere to high minimum 
capital requirements and tight prudential controls compared with international standards 
(see Table 3.10 below). 
 
In 2003, the Chinese wholesale market in domestic currency was opened to foreign 
competitors in a relatively large number of provinces. It is envisaged, however, that by 
the end of 2006 foreign banks will be able to offer a comprehensive range of banking 
services in local currency in all of the provinces to Chinese households. In addition, the 
Chinese authorities have recently announced measures to facilitate the entry of foreign 
bank affiliates, such as, lifting the ban on opening no more than one branch per year and 
reducing the minimum set up capital requirements for the establishment of new 
branches. Since signing the WTO agreement in 2001 foreign bank branches have 
increased from 157 to 192 by 2004 and the number of representative offices also 
increased from 184 to 223. Most of these foreign banks originate from Asia, i.e. 
predominately from Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong).  
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Table 3.10 Timetable for opening the financial sector under WTO commitments 
 
 
Although the WTO commitments do not deal directly with foreign entities acquiring 
stakes in Chinese bank, the Chinese authorities have increases the limit on foreign 
ownership from 15% to 20% of total capital for a single investor and to 25% for joint 
participations. This move probably reflects the need for additional capital and 
experienced bank management. Accordingly, twelve foreign banks have already 
invested in Chinese domestic banks but their participation is generally low (See Table 
3.11) 
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                  Table 3.11 Foreign bank acquisitions 
 
 
Source: Financial Times, Bank scope, He & Fan (2004) and CBRC. 
 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION 
 
Capital account liberalization has been even more gradual and remains more incomplete 
than the other parts of the liberalization process. Although more details are offered in 
Table 3.12 and Table 3.13, in essence, the situation is such that capital inflows are more 
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liberalized than outflows. FDI, portfolio outflows and even the repayment of credit 
operations need to be authorized by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE). This consideration together with the fact that resident transactions in foreign 
currency are strongly regulated, explains why Chinese institutions, including banks, 
have limited foreign exchange positions. However, this appears to be changing and they 
have increased very quickly over the last few years, (see Table 3.14 below). Accordingly, 
Chinese banks are long in foreign currency, with net foreign assets equivalent to 6.1 
percent of GDP in 2003, whilst corporate enterprises were short with net foreign 
liabilities equivalent to 10.8 percent in the same year. 
 
           Table 3. 12 Current situations on financial openness 
 
 
Source: CBRC. 
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               Table 3.13 Steps in financial account liberalization 
 
 
Source: CBRC. 
Table 3.14 China: foreign currency exposures of financial and corporate sectors 
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3.4.3 Regulation and Supervision 
 
The liberalization and restructuring measures have incorporated improvements in 
regulation. In 1995 the PBC assumed responsibility for the capital adequacy 
requirements and prudential ratios for all of the commercial banks. The PBC introduced 
five-tier international loan classification in 2002 but they were not compulsory. This 
was because the PBC lacked sanctioning power and its regulatory and supervisory 
functions were still decentralized. In fact, the bulk of the work of bank regulation and 
prudential control was assumed by local offices, which reported to the local 
government. 
 
However, with the establishment of the CBRC in 2003 several improvements took place. 
Firstly, the five-tier loan classification system was enhanced and made fully compulsory 
for all banks by the end of 2005. Secondly, capital adequacy became central to 
controlling the banking system: after an evaluation of the compliance with the Basel 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, the 8% minimum capital adequacy 
ratio, defined in Basel I terms, was introduced together with a 4% minimum total capital. 
The intention was that these ratios would be fully complied with by 2007. Thirdly, 
risk-based supervision started to be introduced through a new CAMEL-type Risk 
Assessment System, which uses both quantitative and qualitative criteria for capital, 
asset quality, management competence, liquidity and profitability. For the time being 
this system is being applied only to JSCBs. Fourthly, related-party lending has been 
limited. This is fairly important given the concentration of lending in the corporate 
sector and large SOEs. Fifthly, enforcement has improved –although to a much lesser 
extent– since the CBRC has started to impose sanctions for infractions of regulatory 
rules. Finally, the CBRC has embarked on a large program to conduct on-site and 
off-site inspections. 
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Tentative efforts have been made to improve bank corporate governance structures, 
through the creation of shareholder boards with outside directors and there are now 
formal rules on the disclosure of information, particularly for listed banks. In particular, 
bank balance sheets and income statements have now got to be published and must 
contain prescriptive detailed information, which has to be audited. The CBRC, itself, is 
similarly increasing its transparency through the publication of individual bank data, 
including NPLs. 
  
3.5 An assessment of the banking reform and possible impact 
 
From the information above, there is no doubting the commitment of the Chinese 
authorities to bank reform and the measures taken appear to be in the right direction. 
However, these measures could be more far reaching and several important ones are 
arguably missing, especially, those relating incentives. 
 
3.5.1 Bank restructuring  
  
To date, the restructuring process has improved the quality of bank assets but bank 
capitalization remains relatively weak. For example, the solvency ratio (calculated 
according to Basel I) was only 6.73 percent in 2003 and the ratio of equity to assets 
remained at levels comparable to those just before the reforms started (4.3 percent in 
2003). The capital injections carried out by the government in 1998 (33 million USD) 
had an immediate and positive impact on the equity to assets ratio of the banking system 
(increasing from 4.54 percent in 1997 to 6.03 percent in 1998) but this ratio has 
subsequently fallen to below the 1997 levels. This is because, in the second 
restructuring wave, most of the capital injection was directed to improving asset quality 
and the third wave has involved relatively few additional funds. Moreover, there has 
been very little private or public capital raised. In 2004, however, the situation has 
started to improve with the restructuring of the SOCBs. 
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The CCB and BOC have received sufficient public funds to maintain adequate solvency 
levels; measured in Basel I terms (see Chart 3.11 below). However, the ICB and to a 
greater extent ABC still suffer from low solvency ratios, higher levels of NPLs and very  
low provisions for bad and doubtful debts. Alicia, Sergio and Daniel (2005) estimated 
the capitalization levels of these two SOCBs that are required in order to reach the 2005 
solvency and asset quality targets of the Chinese authorities. These amounted to 150 
billion USD (or the equivalent of 9.7 percent of 2004 GDP). This estimate assumes that 
AMCs recovery rate for NPLs is replicated in ICB and ABC (see Table 3.15 and 3.16). 
Another consideration to take into account is that the capital injected into SOCBs in the 
second and third wave was in USD. Accordingly, this implies a potentially considerable 
exchange rate risk, particularly, when considers the distinct probability of a large RMB 
appreciation. 
 
Chart 3.11 and Table 3.15 also indicate that there is considerable variation in NPLs 
between the different categories of Chinese banks. For example, the Agricultural Bank 
of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China have significantly greater 
NPLs compared to the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank. To a large 
degree these differences reflect the problems China has experienced in the rural sector, 
especially, in Western China, where large state subsidies have created inefficiencies in 
production. Similarly, the high levels of NPLs in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China‟s are as a result of large government projects. In this respect, government backed 
projects have been generally supported without having being appropriately assessed 
using prudent business lending criteria. The implicit assumption has been that if the 
projects fail they will be bailed out by the government. This consideration also explains 
why the agricultural bank and the industrial and commercial banks have significantly 
smaller loan loss reserves compared to the Bank of China and the China Construction 
Bank. 
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                  Chart 3.11 NPLs ratio and Solvency ratio 
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     Table 3.15 Government cost of recapitalization of ICBC and ABC 
 
 
 
Source: Alicia, Serge & Daniel (2005). 
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               Table 3.16 Estimated recapitalization needs of JSCBs 
 
 
Source: Alicia, Sergio & Daniel (2005). 
 
Regarding asset quality, the three waves of restructuring have reduced NPLs in three of 
the four SOCBs (see Table 3.17 below). This welcome development, however, needs to 
be seen in the context of very rapid loan growth. In fact, apart from the government 
injections, the improvement in asset quality is mainly explained by the increase in the 
denominator (bank loans), as shown in Chart 3.12, below. 
 
                    Table 3.17 NPL ratio in each SOCB 
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                  Chart 3. 12 Non-Performing Loans on SOCBs 
 
 
However, there are a number of reasons to believe that these new loans will end up as 
NPLs. In the first instance, the criteria for granting loans have not undergone any radical 
change. This is because the banks‟ ownership structures have remained largely 
unchanged and the reform of SOEs still has a long way to go. Moreover, the reported 
NPL ratio for loans extended after 2000 is only 2.5 percent, i.e. dramatically lower than 
the NPL ratio for older loans. Any slow-down of the economy –particularly if this was 
abrupt– would convert many of these loans into NPLs. The total amount of NPLs in the 
financial system, i.e., loans that have been transferred to the AMCs but not recovered) 
has not fallen very much since (for example, the AMCs have disposed of about one 
third of the NPLs transferred to them).  
 
The is due to several factors: AMCs are evaluated in terms of recovery value rather than 
the speed of recovery; the poor legal framework under which they operate is not 
conducive to promoting and encouraging efficiency; and, there is a lack of market 
instruments to dispose of NPLs. An additional concern is that only the best assets have 
been sold and this raises doubts about the recovery capacity of AMCs in the medium to 
long term. Similarly, the way in which asset disposal has been designed raises concerns 
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for SOCBs profitability and possibly their solvency. This is because the AMCs –which 
are formally independent institutions–, have purchased NPLs at a 50 percent discount 
but sometimes these purchases have taken place at face value. However, the crucial 
Apoint is that they are obtaining a much lower rate of recovery. If government support 
for AMCs was withdrawn at some point in the future these agencies would find it 
virtually impossible to pay for the principal on the bonds, which are now held on the 
balance sheets of the SOCBs. In fact any withdrawal of government support would 
bring into question the servicing of these bonds. 
  
3.5.2 The Liberalization process 
 
Although government interference has been reduced during the liberalization process, it 
is still substantive compared to most other countries. Moreover, competition is still 
weak, particularly amongst the largest banks. This is due to several factors. For example 
price and quantity controls have not been fully lifted and the opening up of the banking 
system to foreign competition has been slow. Foreign competition is essentially limited 
to wholesale business and despite the WTO commitments (in 2006) this will continue to 
change gradually for the foreseeable future. The country‟s huge size will also hinder any 
progress in making the system more competitive. Direct private investment in Chinese 
banks remains limited and foreign investors have relatively draconian limitations on 
their stake holdings in banks. 
 
Economic growth and, in particular, the high investment rate, implies that there is an 
enormous demand for project finance and this suggests that there is ample opportunities 
for all types of banks to become engaged in this business. The current upper limit on 
deposit rates limits competition for deposits, particularly, those that are highly sensitive 
to the rate of return. Similarly, the excessive liquidity of the banking system inhibits 
competition to such an extent that even the anticipated full liberalization of deposit rates 
might not be sufficient to increase competition. 
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Regarding the liberalization of the capital account, the relatively small percentage of 
banks engaged in foreign currency transactions limits (at least for the time being) 
foreign exchange risks. However, as the economy continues to grow and become more 
open foreign exchange risks and the whole question of foreign exchange policy will 
become an important issue. This consideration is further emphasized by the fact that 
Chinese have relatively no experience in managing and hedging foreign exchange risks. 
In this respect, the Chinese banking system is looking for guidance in the form of 
market structures and legal requirements, and the acquisition of experienced foreign 
manager to promote a sustainable foreign exchange policy. 
 
3.5.3 Regulation and supervision 
  
Considering the starting point, considerable progress has been made in improving the 
regulation and supervision of the Chinese banking system. The authorities have 
attempted to adopt Basel I and adhere to a minimum capital reserve of 8 percent for all 
banks. However, it has struggled to introduce a level playing field for all banks and 
there have been questions being about the practicality of imposing a minimum capital 
adequacy ratio of 8 percent for all commercial banks. This is important because making 
provisions for Non Performing Loans (NPLs), i.e. bad and doubtful debts have a direct 
effect on the capital position of the bank. In essence, the bank should offset bad debt 
against taxable profits. The provision, therefore, reduces the short term profitability of 
the banks but by transferring the provision to capital, the ability of the bank to meet 
losses from bad debts is increased. In this respect banks or banking systems with high 
levels of NPLs typically should have relatively low levels of profitability and 
proportionately higher levels of capital adequacy. The provision will also reduce the 
value of loans recorded in the bank‟s balance sheet. As such, loan-loss provisions are 
typically one of the first quantitative indicators of deterioration in loan quality and, at 
the same time, a key contributor to fluctuations in bank profits and capital. 
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 In the absence of large scale injections of new capital, it has been virtually impossible 
for ABC, the credit cooperatives and even some of the JSCBs to comply with this 8 
percent requirement, let alone exceed this minimum amount. As previously mentioned 
(Alicia, et al, 1995) the remaining two SOCBs would have required somewhere in the 
region of 150 billion USD and the credit cooperatives and city commercial banks 
around 12 billion USD (around 9 billion USD for the former and 3 for the latter). 
Regarding the JSCBs, it has been estimated that at least 19 billion USD would have 
been needed to reach a capital to assets ratio similar to that of BOC and CCB, namely, 
6% percent (details on this estimate can be found in Table 3.15). 
 
To compound these problems the Central Bank of China was a member of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel II, 2004). Accordingly, it is fully committed 
to the international convergence of capital measures and capital standards and to the 
adoption of the three pillars under Basel II (Basel II, 2004). In essence, Basel II 
commits banks to providing a more sophisticated approach to setting capital 
requirements, which reflects their specific risk profile. Basel II also seeks to retain the 
same overall amount of capital in the system but to permit its redistribution by risk. 
More specifically, pillar I continues the commitment to a minimum 8 percent minimum 
capital reserve ratio and pillars II and III introduce an additional supervisory review 
process and an element of so-called market discipline.  
 
One of the main objectives behind the strengthening of regulation and supervision was 
to introduce of a more systematic approach towards risk control. Although it is difficult 
to draw conclusions from the available evidence to-date, there are two facts that are 
difficult to reconcile with an improvement in risk management. First, under Basel I loan 
pricing by SOCBs does not appear to have changed despite the liberalization of interest 
rates. Most loans are still contracted at, or even below, the PBC‟s benchmark rate. 
Second, bank lending has continued to grow rapidly (even if it has decelerated recently) 
but there has not been a substantial change in the profile of borrowers: traditional 
sectors, such as, infrastructure projects, continue to be an important part of new lending 
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(over 20 percent, as shown in Chart 3.3 above). New sectors, particularly housing, are 
growing fast, but they still account for a relatively small share of outstanding lending. 
Moreover, the attempts to improve corporate governance have not shown any clear 
results so far. The recently created shareholder boards are still in their infancy and the 
dominance of the state still biases decisions taken by bank managers. These 
observations strongly suggest that Chinese banks are ill-equipped to adopt Basel II. In 
other words, despite the fact that the Chinese government has committed itself to 
adopting the second and third pillars, it is still struggling to adopt Basel I. 
 
3.6 General assessment of bank performance 
 
Since the commencement of the banking reforms there has been no clear improvement 
in overall bank performance. This is also the case of JSCBs, which were generally 
regarded as a proto type for bank reform. 
 
As already mentioned, the most promising developments have materialized in the form 
of improvement in the quality of bank assets but to some extent, this improvement is 
partially explained by the upsurge in new lending. However, a positive signal has been 
the increase in the amount of provisions. This has been facilitated by government‟s 
recapitalization programs but it is pertinent to note that it is still insufficient to cover 
NPLs (see Chart 3.13 below). Developments in solvency have been less encouraging: 
and the capital to asset ratio for the banking system as a whole has remained virtually 
unchanged since the beginning of the reforms (see Chart 3.14 below). More concerning 
is the fact that JSCBs have reduced their capital to asset ratios. This concern is 
compounded by the fact that they have relatively little Tier II capital. The problem has 
undoubtedly been caused by fast asset growth (nearly three times faster than the average) 
without any recourse to additional capital. 
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              Chart 3.13 Percentage change in loan loss reserve  
                      to gross loans by type of institution 
 
                         
                        Chart 3.14 Equity to assets 
  
 
 
Finally, profitability measured in terms of ROA/E, has generally declined from the 
already low levels that existed at the commencement of the reforms. This has certainly 
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been the case for JSCBs as shown in Chart 3.15 below. There are, however, some 
positive aspects to the decline in bank profitability, namely, the decline in the rate of 
inflation and real interest rates and the increases in the level of provisions (García 
Herrero, Gavilá & Santabárbara, 2005). In the case of JSCBs, ROA/E has fallen, despite 
their low capital to asset ratio and their relatively low cost to income ratio. This is 
because they have experienced a reduction in interest income in an endeavor to achieve 
a higher market share. In this respect, Graph 3.1 below identifies the main factors 
behind the declining trend of ROAE. In summary, the reforms of the Chinese banking 
system have not brought sizeable benefits so far except for the improvements in the 
quality of asset and doubts persist about the continued build-up of NPLs. This 
pessimistic assessment is valid not only for SOCBs, but also for JSCBs, and for the 
banking system as a whole. In the case of JSCBs, the poor performance might be due to 
the limited amount of private ownership. It could be that it is perhaps too early to judge 
the outcomes of the banking reforms but there remains the nagging doubt that the steps 
taken so far have not been bold enough and that more radical measures are needed.                    
                     
                      Chart 3.15 Return on equity 
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              Graph 3.1 Contribution to the ROAE growth rate 
 
 
 84 
3.7 Conclusion   
 
The chapter has reviewed the development and evolution of the Chinese banking system 
and in particularly, the institutional settings. The chapter has also provided an 
assessment of the financial reforms and their impact on bank performance. From what 
has been discussed above, it can be concluded that China‟s banking reforms have made 
significant improvements, but the process of reform is still far from complete. The 
Chinese banking sector is still characterized by poor asset quality, low profitability and 
weak corporate governance. All of these factors have contributed to the low efficiency 
of the Chinese banking industry and this has detracted from economic growth. In 
particular, the banking sector has accumulated large amounts of NPLs and new bad 
debts are still being incurred.  
 
In this respect, the situation in China is not unlike those encountered in the transitional 
economies of Central Europe. During the transition from central planning to 
market-orientation, both the state-owned and private banks have extended credit to 
inefficient, monopolist, state-owned enterprises and public projects. Political 
considerations in China are such that local authorities force or influence banks to 
finance economically unsound construction projects or newly-formed enterprises, which 
have been approved by the planning authorities.  
 
As the Chinese economy moved toward a market-orientated philosophy, with an 
emphasis on liquidity and profitability, many state-owned enterprises failed to adapt to 
the new challenges. The traditional emphasis on production quotas orientation meant 
that they were insensitive to customer needs. State-owned banks have also had problems 
in embracing competition. Moreover, they have been hampered by non-payment or 
delinquent loans to other state-owned enterprises. Loans to private enterprises have not 
resolved these problems for the state owned banks and business cycles and 
often-inappropriate macroeconomic measures have contributed further to the banks' bad 
debts.  
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      Chapter Four Non-performing Loans in Chinese Banks 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 has discussed how banking reform has played an important role in China‟s 
overall efforts to transform a centrally planned economy into a market-oriented 
economy. Although the banking sector has undergone remarkable changes over this 
period, deep-seated structural problems relating to asset quality, capital adequacy and 
profitability continue to pose a challenge to the sector. Moreover, as Chapter 3 has 
revealed these problems persist despite China‟s accelerated reform of the banking sector 
during the past ten years. Since China‟s financial industry is dominated by the SOCBs, 
addressing these factors must begin with these institutions. One of the most important 
issues faced by these institutions is the presence of a large number of NPLs and the 
resultant capital inadequacy of SOCBs. Therefore, considerable focus has already been 
placed on addressing the accumulated NPLs problem-both bad loans inherited from the 
past and new loans that will deteriorate and eventually be classified as bad loans. In 
order to resolve these problems, the government has instituted some measures that were 
briefly introduced in Chapter 3. For example, the government injected a large amount of 
capital into the SOCBs and established AMCs to resolve the NPLs of SOCBs. However, 
although the NPLs of SOCBs have been declining, the amounts have not changed that 
much in recent years (Alicia & Daniel, 2005). In addition, the NPLs of other financial 
institutions have worsened since the late 1990s. Therefore, one of the most important 
challenges facing China is how to resolve the NPLs problems and enhance the 
competitiveness of it domestic banking system.  
 
This chapter accordingly reviews and discusses the problem of NPLs in the Chinese 
banking sector. It provides an insight into the size of the problem and discusses how 
NPLs can have a negative effect not only on the banks but the economy as a whole. The 
chapter also provides some insight into the extant theoretical literature the principal 
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causes of the NPLs. Whenever possible appropriate empirical evidence is provided to 
emphasis and support the discussion. The Chinese experience of dealing with NPLs is 
also compared with experiences in the US and Central European transition economies. 
The chapter concludes by explaining what the Chinese government is doing to resolve 
the problem. 
  
4.2 NPLs definitions  
 
A NPL is a loan that is either in default or close to being in default. Many loans become 
non-performing after being in default for 3 months, but this can depend on the contract 
terms. The IMF defines NPLs in the following way: “A loan is nonperforming when 
payments of interest and principal are past due by 90 days or more, or at least 90 days of 
interest payments have been capitalized, refinanced or delayed by agreement, or 
payments are less than 90 days overdue, but there are other good reasons to doubt that 
payments will be made in full.” 
 
The classification of NPLs is closely connected to bank loan classification systems. The 
Chinese Banking sector has used a four-category loan classification system for a long 
time. Under this system, the classification of loans consists of „normal‟, „past due‟, 
„idle‟ and „bad‟. The last three categories are recognized as NPLs. The classification is 
based on actual loan performance and whether the repayment of the principle and 
interest has been delayed. For example, those loans with repayments that have been 
delayed for more than one year would be classified as idle. Those delayed for a shorter 
period would be put into past-due, and those not repaid are regarded as bad. However, 
this approach underestimated the seriousness of NPLs because it did not include high 
risk loans that were still paying interest and were not yet overdue (Lardy, 1998). 
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The internationally accepted five-category classification system was eventually adopted 
by the PBC in 1999. This system classifies bank loans as: „pass‟, „special-mention‟, 
„substandard‟, „doubtful‟ and „loss‟, with the last three categories being recognized as 
NPLs. The five-category system is arguably superior to the one outlined above because 
it classifies bank loans according to their inherent risks. 
 
Apart from dividing bank loans into different types of classification, there are still some 
other differences between the four-category and the five-category classification systems. 
For example, under the five-category system, a substandard class refers to assets in 
which the “borrower may be able to cover the principle and the interest in full from 
their normal operating income, and some losses may be incurred”. However, loans for a 
borrower with financial difficulties could be classified as normal under the 
four-category system provided the banks continued to provide loan facilities. The old 
four-category classification, therefore, enabled banks to report an underestimated 
amount of NPLs by continuing to provide new loans to insolvent firms and allowing 
them to repay the old loans. This practice effectively involved “making new loans to 
pay back old loans” and, therefore, postponed the eventual resolution of the problem.  
  
4.3 The magnitude of NPLs in Chinese banks 
  
Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has paid increased attention to the 
problem of NPLs in banks. The main reason is that the proportion of NPLs in Chinese 
banks is very high, even compared with that in crisis-affected East Asian economies.  
In 1998, the Governor of the PBC, for the first time, disclosed data relating to NPLs in 
SOCBs. According to Alicia and Daniel (2004), the NPL/total loans ratio reached 25% 
at the end of 1997, of which past due loans constituted 15%, past-due loans beyond 2 
years 8%, and bad loans 2%. Table 4.1 presents the 1997-2003 data relating to NPLs for 
the SOCBs. It should be noted that all of the data are classified according to the 
four-category classification system with the exception of 2002 and 2003. 
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                   Table 4.1 Reported NPLs and NPLs ratio in SOCBs 
   Source: Alicia & Daniel (2004). 
 
The data released on NPLs is, however, likely to underestimate the NPL problem. Four 
main reasons can be postulated to explain why this is the case. Firstly, the central bank 
did not adopt the international five-category loan classification until 1999. As 
mentioned earlier, the four-category classification system allowed banks to underreport 
the true amount of NPLs by making new loans to pay back old loans. This effectively 
meant that banks could manipulate the absolute level of NPLs reported on their balance 
sheets. Secondly, the estimations for NPLs were mostly based on bank samples rather 
than comprehensive surveys and this practice, once again, tended to underestimate the 
level of NPLs. Thirdly, the accounting and auditing systems, particularly, those before 
2002 were not very transparent. Bank accounting and auditing practices had severe 
shortcomings and external auditing was not a common practice. In addition to NPLs, 
banks often had substantial non-performing assets that were not reported. Therefore, 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
NPLs 
(USD 
billions 
155 75 198 196 213 245 232 
Total loans 
(USD 
billions) 
620 753 793 786 850 968 1,139 
NPLs ratio 
(as percent 
of total 
loans) 
25.0 10,0 25.0 24.9 25.1 25.3 20.4 
NPL (as 
percent of 
GDP) 
17.2 7.9 20 18.2 18.4 19.8 17 
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collecting reliable data was (and still is) an extremely difficult task. Fourthly, another 
consideration that tended to under state NPLs was the fact that interbank and trust 
lending was reported in bank balance sheets as „other items‟. Therefore it was difficult 
to ascertain specific details relating to this type of lending 
 
Furthermore, there are several apparent anomalies in Table 4.1 that need to be 
highlighted. The ratio of NPLs to total loans in 1998 is just 10 percent but this looks 
odd given that the NPLs ratio of SOCBs exceeded more than 25 percent in the other 
years. Pei & Shirai (2004) suggest that the 10 percent figure was used by the authorities 
simply because no special measures were introduced in 1998. Therefore, the data was 
manipulated to justify any lack of positive action by the authorities. However, it is more 
than likely that the NPL ratio (as with the other years) reached about 25 percent in 1998. 
Pei & Shirai (2004) also argue that the NPL data for 1999 is unreliable. For example, 
they cite the case of the SOCBs, which transferred RMB 1.4 trillion of NPLs to the four 
AMCs in 1999. The PBC unambiguously stated that this transfer enabled the NPL ratio 
of the SOCBs to be reduced to 10 percent but this adjustment is not reflected in the 
official data. 
 
Based on the NPL data released by the government, there was a wide range of different 
estimates for the NPL ratios. Some commentators questioned the accuracy of the 
government data and argued that the NPL/total loans ratios should be much higher. For 
example, Lawrence (2004) estimated that the NPL/total loans ratios for the SOCBs was 
39 percent in 1999 and 29.2 percent in 2000. Foreign research institutions and credit 
rating agencies have also come to the similar conclusions. Goldman Sachs, for example, 
asserted that a more stringent and internationally accepted classification system would 
show that China‟s banking sector had one of the highest NPL levels in Asia, ranging 
from 30 to 60 percent of outstanding bank loans. Moody‟s Investors Service also 
estimated that the NPL ratio of SOCBs was in the range of 35-70 percent in 1996, while 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter estimated that the ratio of SOCBs was 36 percent in 1998 
(Lawrence, 2004). 
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To make matters worse, despite writing-off substantial amounts of bad debts in recent 
years, the amount of NPLs in Chinese banks has not declined. This is mainly due to the 
increasing amount of outstanding loans and the unsatisfactory performance of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The profitability of the SOCBs, therefore, declined 
consistently in the 1990s because of the large amount of NPLs. Accordingly, prior to the 
East Asian financial crises, the average reported profit to asset ratio (ROA) for the 
SOCBs was only 5.6 percent (Bartel& Huang, 2000). If unconnected interest payments 
are excluded from the revenue side of the financial accounts, most SOCBs, except the 
BOC, would have reported financial losses (Li, 1998). By the time of the East Asian 
crises, the average capital-adequacy ratio was only 4.4 percent, which was lower than in 
1994 and much lower than that required by China‟s Commercial Bank Law (Lardy, 
1998). This explains why in 1998, the Chinese government recapitalized the banks to 
raise their capital-adequacy ratio to 8 percent in line with the Basel Accord.  
 
In addition to these considerations, the loan loss reserves were also very low. For 
example, in 1996, the loan loss reserves were 0.6 and 0.5 percent of outstanding loans 
for CCB and ABC, respectively, while the official target for commercial banks was a 
loan loss reserve of 1 percent of outstanding loans (Lardy, 1998). Reserves of this 
magnitude are clearly insufficient to cover the bad loans reported in the banks‟ balance 
sheets. Given that the usual recovery rate for NPLs is less than 25 percent in other 
transition economies, unrecoverable bad debts held by the SOCBs were probably in 
excess of 20 percent. This means that the SOCBs were technically insolvent.  
 
4.4 The negative effects of NPLs on Chinese banks 
 
Despite the recapitalization of Chinese banks in 1998 and the sale of 20 percent of their 
NPLs to AMCs in 1999, the Chinese government has not resolved the root cause of the 
NPLs problem. The OECD estimates that it will cost China 29 percent of GDP to reduce 
NPLs to 10 percent of outstanding loans and raise capital adequacy ratios to 
internationally-accepted levels of 8 percent. The cost could rise to 58 percent of GDP if, 
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as seems likely, actual NPL ratios turn out to be higher and recovery rates lower. There 
is no doubt that the large amounts of NPLs on Chinese banks‟ balance sheets have 
extremely serious implications for the economy and the performance of the banks 
themselves. These associated problems and their effect on the banks are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
4.4.1 Decreasing bank profitability 
 
In basic terms, NPLs reduce interest income and the write-off and provisions for NPLs 
simultaneously increases costs. This clearly has a direct and adverse affect on bank 
profitability. Before the government injected capital into SOCBs in 1998, the average 
profit margin of the “big four” from 1995 to 1997 was only 0.25 percent and the trend 
for profits was predicted to deteriorate further (Yu & Yuan, 1999). At the same time, 
the profitability of the ten new commercial banks was 1.70 percent and showed an 
increasing trend (see Table 4.2). This was because the newly created commercial banks 
had very low NPL levels compared with SOCBs.  
 
     Table 4.2 Profits margin of banks in China (percentage): from 1995 to 1997 
 1995 1996  1997 average 
The big four 0.35 0.32 0.12 0.26 
Ten new commercial 
banks 
1.68 1.60 1.82 1.70 
City commercial banks Not available 2.00 0.91 1.46 
Foreign banks in China  0.73 0.61 0.67  0.67 
Source: Yu & Yuan (1999). 
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4.4.2 Decreasing capital adequacy 
  
The increase in NPLs effectively reduced bank capital and made banks technically 
insolvent. As Li (1998) pointed out, the average capital adequacy ratio was only 4.4 
percent before the East Asian financial crisis, much lower than the 8 percent required by 
China‟s Commercial Law (Lardy, 1998). In 1998, the Chinese government recapitalized 
the banks in order to raise their capital adequacy ratio to 8% in line with the Basel 
Accord. However, by 2002 among China‟s four state-owned commercial banks, only 
the Bank of China had a capital adequacy ratio above 8%. Moreover, it was argued by 
Liu (2001) that the four SOCBs might have had negative capital if NPLs were taken 
into account. These problems were compounded by the fact that even though the return 
on assets of SOEs had dropped sharply, state banks continued to provide them with loan 
scale facilities.  
  
4.4.3 Deteriorating bank creditworthiness 
 
The accumulation of large NPLs has had a serious and adverse affect on the 
creditworthiness of Chinese banks, as evidenced by the downgrading of Chinese 
financial institutions by foreign credit rating agencies. For example, Moody‟s rated 
China‟s average bank financial strength as “D” in 1999. This was far worse than any of 
the other countries being rated at the time, except for Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Russia. Standard & Poor Credit-Wire also argued that because of the 
adverse macro-economic environment, poor asset quality and increased write-offs, 
Chinese financial institutions had only limited ability to improve its credit standing. 
Even after the government injected additional capital into the SOCBs in 1998 and 2003, 
Standard & Pours still rated China‟s four SOCBs and eleven JSCBs financial strength at 
less than A. Amongst these banks, the highest rating of BB+ was given to the Bank of 
China, which carried the least amount of NPLs. 
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4.4.4 Adverse selection of bank and firm managers 
   
The building of a market economy normally requires the creation of markets, 
market-oriented enterprises, and a wide range of institutions and business practices to 
support them. For markets to function well there must be a robust entry in and 
disciplined exit from markets to ensure that the most efficient and innovative procedures 
are those that operate in the markets. 
 
However, in China‟s banking sector, the presence of NPLs on banks‟ balance sheets 
distorts the incentives for both banks and SOEs. It was argued by Enrico (1993) that 
large amounts of NPLs frequently lead to the adverse selection of bank and firm 
managers. Adverse selection in economics refers to a market process in which bad 
results occur due to information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, thus the “bad” 
products or customers are more likely to be selected. In the Chinese banking industry, 
lenders are forced to consider so-called “workout loans” when borrowers lose access to 
financial markets. This involves obtaining new loans from existing creditors to continue 
servicing outstanding debt (Xie, 1992). The distortion of the lending decision is most 
extreme in situations where the bank is so heavily exposed to a borrower that it would 
fail if the workout loans were not made available. In this case, the bank might be willing 
to make a loan provided there is some chance -however negligible- that the workout 
loan will succeed. To some extent, this consideration reduces the pressure on company 
managers, because they know that the banks will try to keep on lending to them for as 
long as possible. However, it can also detract from efficient management practices in 
borrowing entities. In China, this problem is compounded by the fact that this form of 
adverse selection emanates from the implicit and sometimes the explicit instruction of 
government (Xie, 1994). 
 
Bank passivity in enforcing loan contracts and their willingness to grant new loans to 
loss-making enterprises has fostered an unhealthy reliance of SOEs on state banks. This 
has reduced the willingness and ability of SOEs to adjust their production to changing 
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demands and respond to market signals. Perhaps more serious, however, is the attitude 
of some SOEs that they are not under any legal obligation to repay bank loans. 
  
4.4.5 Potential bank failure and financial contagion 
 
Historically, the accumulation of NPLs has been one of the direct causes of bank 
failures. In the US, for example, loan losses dominated the major bank failures from 
1934 to 1983. In China, the huge amount of NPLs has already made the SOCBs 
technically insolvent. They are relying on government support and the public‟s 
confidence in them has deteriorated. Given the significant role of the four SOCBs in the 
Chinese banking system, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that if the problem of 
NPLs cannot be effectively resolved, it will eventually lead to the failure of the SOCBs. 
 
If a bank does not have the ability to raise sufficient liquidity through the sale of assets, 
it may lead to default and eventually bank failure. The interconnectedness of the 
banking system is such that it might also frighten depositors from other banks and there 
could be a run on the banking system. The resultant bank run is a classical symptom of 
a full-blown domestic financial crisis.  
 
Illiquid banks are also more vulnerable to contagion transmitted from abroad and this 
consideration will become increasingly important as the Chinese economy continues to 
open its doors to the outside world. In addition, because of the Chinese banks‟ 
preference for lending to unprofitable SOEs, this may lead to a low productivity of 
investment and a greater concentration of risk. The bias towards SOEs also restricts the 
expansion of the private sector and small and medium sized enterprises, and this can 
result in slower economic growth and a greater risk of financial crisis (Enrico, 1993). 
This latter point has been emphasized by economists, such as, Lardy (1998) and Lau 
(1999) who have argued that large amounts of NPLs extended by China‟s SOCBs to 
unprofitable SOEs threaten a crisis in the banking system and could damage the entire 
economy. 
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In essence, therefore, a sound banking system is essential for the development of 
efficient financial markets. In turn, efficient markets are crucial for ensuring the 
effectiveness of a market-oriented economy. Excessive bad debts also reflect inefficient 
bank management and more importantly can lead directly to financial crisis. 
  
4.4.6 Economic slowdown 
 
A strongly performing financial sector has a major influence on the performance of the 
overall economy, by mobilizing domestic and foreign savings, and efficiently allocating 
these funds to investment opportunities in the real economy. A sound financial sector 
also provides a mechanism for efficiently allocating risks and spreading financial losses 
that inevitably arise from economic activities. Therefore, a sound financial sector is a 
basic requirement for a country‟s economic and political stability. These considerations 
are self evident from the financial crises in emerging markets, such as, the Asian and 
Argentinean financial crisis. These crises demonstrated how a weak banking system 
could damage the economy as a whole.  
 
This is particularly important in China where the financial system is dominated by 
bank-centric financing.  Accordingly, Chinese banks are the key providers of funds to 
industry and commerce. It follows, therefore, that if the NPLs problem leads to bank 
failure it will adversely affect other business and eventually the whole economy. This 
has been shown to be the case in the failure of the Guangdong International Trust and 
Investment Corporation (GITIC) in 1999, which led to a liquidity crisis spreading across 
China‟s financial sector.  
 
Even if NPLs do not result in bank failure they can still have a negative impact on the 
real economy. For example, the stress placed on the banking sector in the 1997 
Southeast Asian financial crisis contributed directly to the 1998 economic slowdown in 
China. Moreover, it was pointed out by John, Hali & Prakash (1999) and Nixson & 
Walter (2002) that the large amounts of NPLs, combined with the Southeast Asian 
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financial crisis, caused tensions not only in the banking sector but also in the Chinese 
government. In the aftermath of this crisis, Chinese banks became cautious about 
increasing lending, and many projects were not financed. 
 
4.4.7 Summary 
 
In summary, the NPL problem has been a major obstacle that has prevented the SOCBs 
from becoming genuine commercial banks. Huge amounts of NPLs eroded Chinese 
banks‟ profitability, which resulted in a down grade of their credit worthiness. NPLs 
also effectively stopped banks from granting new loans to the real economy and this 
detracted from economic growth. However, perhaps more serious, was the fact that they 
impeded the establishment of a market economy in China.  
  
4.5 Causes of non-performing loans in Chinese banks-the theoretical framework 
 
Large amounts of NPLs can create significant financial problems for banks and, 
therefore, researchers have attached great importance to understanding the causes of 
NPLs. In general, the theoretical literature identifies three causes or categories of NPLs: 
1) principal-agent problems; 2) moral hazard issues due to low levels of capital; and, 3) 
failure of market discipline.   
 
4.5.1 Principal–Agent Problems 
  
The first explanation for the high level of NPLs asserts that bank managers have little 
incentive to monitor borrowers or select appropriate projects. Prior to 1984, the only 
bank in China was the PBC. It was designed simply as a mechanism to transfer savings 
from households to state enterprises. In 1984, China established the four SOCBs and 
since then the government has attempted to increase the efficiency of the financial 
system by encouraging banks to adopt a more commercial orientation. However, bank 
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managers often lack the necessary skills to engage in effective project selection, and 
pressures to make loans for social and personal purposes remain high. In addition, 
China‟s weak legal system and framework makes it very difficult to collect 
non-performing loans. Lenders therefore, do not always expect their loans to be repaid 
and this consideration has reduced the incentives for bank managers to monitor loans 
and select appropriate projects. 
 
Political interference is another reason as to why banks can lack incentives to engage in 
appropriate project selection (Liu, 2001; Victor, 2004). For example, a very important 
reason in the build-up of NPLs in China is the government‟s reliance on policy lending 
to support social projects that are incapable of earning a commercial return. Although 
direct credit quotas on bank lending were abolished in 1996, the SOCBs were still 
allocated quotas to match lending to favored infrastructure projects financed by special 
bonds issued in 1998. This means that the government has implicitly sent mixed 
messages to bank managers and this has inhibited the development of a strong credit 
culture.  
 
In China banks and firms receive different incentives from the government to engage in 
non profitable or inappropriate behavior. In some cases, this can be construed as 
outright corruption. For example, it has been argued by Lau (1999) that Chinese firms 
have diverted loans to third parties and for speculation in the real estate and stock 
markets. In other cases, banks and firms have been encouraged to make risky 
investments because the government will absorb or guarantee the losses. Accordingly, 
the Asian Development Bank (1999) has argued that banks have fewer incentives to 
monitor loans because of implicit government guarantees while firms may feel they are 
freed from their obligation to repay. Similarly, Hawkins and Turner (1999) note that 
loan quality suffers when loan officers are rewarded on the basis of the volume of loans 
without sufficient attention to risk (see also, Diamond, 1991; and, Cole, 1998). The 
government has attempted to solve these problems by separating loan origination from 
loan approval. The 1996 Bank Law also makes lending officers and senior management 
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responsible for new loans that turn bad. Nevertheless, there still appears to be 
significant weaknesses in bank management and practice that allows these problems to 
continue. 
 
4.5.2 Moral hazard 
 
The second explanation is concerned with moral hazard and relates to the very essence 
or fundamental aspect of banking activities. There is no theory of banking but like all 
firms banks exist because they have certain comparative advantages and exclusivity. 
Banks operate in imperfect markets where information asymmetries are prevalent and 
banks effectively exploit these imperfections by collecting as much information as 
possible on actual and potential customers. This information confers exclusivity and 
comparative advantages on the banks and forms the basis for prudent lending. It follows, 
therefore, that the extent to which this information is inaccurate or untrue undermines 
the ability of banks to make good lending decisions and detracts from efficient banking. 
In this respect moral hazard, which refers to the possibility of unscrupulous customers 
providing inaccurate or misleading information to the banks in order to obtain loans, is a 
potentially important problem. This can be a particularly acute problem in emerging 
economies were bribery and corruption can be rife and were accurate and reliable 
information on customers and potential borrowers can be difficult (if not impossible) to 
obtain. These problems can also be compounded in situations where the banks believe 
that they will be bailed out by government and customers think that it does not really 
matter if they repay their loans.   
 
These considerations can also be compounded by well intended policies. For example, a 
financial system which offers "rescue packages" could encourage borrowers and lenders 
to undertake low-quality or high-risk investments, thereby, increasing the likelihood of a 
crisis. In a NPLs situation, moral hazard implies that banks which are technically 
insolvent lose the incentive to price new loans accurately, thus leading to financial 
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losses. The Asian Development Bank argued that NPLs may perpetuate a culture of 
non-repayment and risk seeking behavior on the part of banks. Enrico (1993) has 
similarly argued that banks have a perverse incentive to fund former debtors like SOEs 
even though they are less efficient and more risky than private firms. This leads to lower 
productivity of investment and a greater concentration of risk. Moreover, the expansion 
of more efficient private firms is delayed, leading to a slower recovery and a greater risk 
of financial crisis. Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Cole (1998), Cooper and Ross (2002), 
etc have articulated similar views and argued that in the presence of an implicit 
guarantee banks may invest in risky projects that have low expected returns. 
 
Soft budget constraints are another example of moral hazard. The term Soft Budget 
Constraints (SBC) was first introduced by Kornai (1980) and refers to the situation 
when a firm is not particularly concerned with financial losses and always expects to be 
bailed out by the government or a third party. SBC occur when an organization cannot 
meet its financial obligations and would cease operations without support. Conversely, 
if a firm is allowed to fail, then it is said to have a hard budget constraint. If another 
third party, such as a bank or the government, is willing to pay the financial obligations 
of the firm, then the firm is said to have a soft budget constraint. Kornai (2001) has 
argued that soft bank credit was the most common form of support for firms in 
transition economies. He even argued that the proportion of NPLs can be used as an 
indicator of the “softness” of budget constraints in transition economies.  
 
In the SBC literature, a prominent strand about the causes of SBC emphasizes the 
dynamic commitment problem, which derives from the Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) 
model. In this model, banks cannot distinguish between good and bad projects before 
the lending decision is made (ex ante). It is only after the bank has made the loan, that it 
learns whether a project is good or bad. However, because sunken costs have already 
been incurred and cannot be recovered, it becomes optimal to refinance bad projects 
after the lending transaction is completed (ex-post). As a result, inefficient firms are 
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allowed to continue operations. Although not explicitly stated, this model also implies 
that some fraction of loans will be non-performing. Other advocates of this model 
include Bonin and Schaffer (1995), Schaffer (1998), Bergloff and Roland (1998), and 
Qian and Roland (1998). 
 
In China, the Soft budget Constraints of SOCBs are widely cited as a major cause of the 
non-performing loan problem. A lack of hard budget constraints on banks leads to the 
failure of the banks to impose hard financial constraint on the borrowers (Lu, 
Thangavelu & Hu, 2004). In addition, the government adopted a paternalist policy 
towards business (particularly the SOE business). These considerations provided the 
basis of SCB, and led to the development and accumulation of NPLs. For example, in 
mid-1990, the banking reform started to transform major state banks in China into 
commercial banks. Meanwhile, banks and financial institutions with plural ownership 
structures quickly expanded their market shares. In this transition, however, it is not 
unusual that the central government explicitly or implicitly encourages banks to extend 
credit beyond prudent levels in order to achieve targeted economic growth rates (Zhang, 
1999). The resultant discrepancy between the realized credit supply and the equilibrium 
credit supply constitutes banks‟ loan losses. Local governments have also from time to 
time, pressed the banks to lend money to loss-making SOEs in order to avoid rising 
unemployment.  
 
Government intervention or interference in bank‟s lending decisions could take place 
either before the lending decision is made (ex-ante) or after the transaction is completed 
(ex-post). With regard to ex-ante interference, until 1994 Chinese banks were obliged to 
make policy loans, which were granted out of policy or political considerations. The 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (1998) estimated that these policy loans 
accounted for 35 percent of total loans made by the SOCBs in the first half of the 1990s. 
This is important because policy loans are well known for their low quality compared to 
commercial loans (CASS, 1999; Xu and Lu, 2001). Moreover, Chinese state banks 
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constantly use policy lending as an excuse for their poor lending record (Lu, 
Thangavelu & Hu, 2001; Zhang, 1999). The Chinese government has also intervened in 
the ex post credit market and bailed out troubled SOEs or SOCBs. Government bailouts 
can take various forms, such as, the restructuring of ailing SOEs, the takeover of 
non-performing loans, and deliberate delays in the closure of insolvent financial 
institutions. Such bailout activities may reduce the banks‟ incentive to improve lending 
and lead to moral-hazard (Xu and Lu, 2001; Lu, Thangavelu & Hu, 2001). 
 
In addition to government intervention low quality lending may also arise from “insider 
control”, which refers to a situation managers obtains information about a firm and use 
this information to obtain personal gain at the expense of shareholders‟ interests. The 
term also incorporates the capture of substantial control rights by the managers or 
workers in former state-owned enterprises (Aoki, 1995). Li (1999) goes on to explain 
how excessive insider (manager) control of a firm can aggravate the problems 
associated with soft budget constraints (SBC). Li has also pointed out that when 
management is protected from downside risk, it could be to their advantage to resist the 
liquidation of an existing asset or even propose inefficient projects. In China‟s state 
banks, the insider control problem occurs when bank managers are granted control 
rights of the bank‟s fund but do not take full responsibility for the consequences of their 
decisions (Zhang, 1999). This has happened since 1994 as the state banks have been 
granted more autonomy in lending decisions, while the government (as the owner) has 
exercised less direct control over management (Xu & Lu, 2001)  
 
The SBC literature also includes some discussion about how to harden budget 
constraints (Kornai, Eric & Gerard, 2003; and, Kornai, Masskin, & Roland, 2003). 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), for example, have argued that the privatization of the 
banks or the decentralization of credit may harden budget constraints. Qian and Roland 
(1998) similarly suggest that the devolution of decision making from central to local 
governments can have the same affect. Berglof and Roland (1998) have also suggested 
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that such a development would facilitate better project screening. Policy institutions 
have likewise implicitly emphasized the importance of hardening budget constraints. 
Accordingly, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank have urged China to improve 
corporate governance, enhance bank supervision, and tighten lending requirements. 
 
However, there are still a number of problems associated with traditional approaches to 
SBC and the resultant non-performing loans. First of all, they tend to downplay the 
social and economic consequences of economic restructuring and see political motives 
as lacking legitimacy. For example, the OECD (2002) argued that non-economic 
considerations distort the pricing of credit in China and that public ownership makes it 
difficult for financial institutions to exercise effective financial discipline and observe 
prudential norms. As such, traditional approaches do not place sufficient emphasis on 
employment and social stability as legitimate policy goals. In this respect, it is important 
to note that state owned enterprises in China employ approximately half of total 
non-farm labor and produce about one third of industrial output. The Chinese 
government recognizes that many SOEs are inefficient and should be given improved 
incentives through restructuring. However, massive restructuring would have significant 
costs in the form of higher unemployment. Beyond the direct cost of joblessness, 
massive unemployment could also result in serious political unrest. In China, many 
social services are provided through state owned enterprises. For example, health care, 
housing, and pensions are all traditionally provided to workers by their employers. 
Attempts aimed at hardening budget constraints without due attention being paid to the 
provision of social services could, therefore, reduce productivity and exacerbate the 
problems associated with unemployment.  
  
The fact that NPLs arise from government‟s desire to minimize the excess burden of 
taxation introduces another aspect of moral hazard. Lawrence (2004), for example, has 
argued that government has two competing policy goals: promoting employment and 
reducing the excess burden of taxation. The government is effectively trying to identify 
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a strategy that can support employment with a minimum spend. The government, 
accordingly, aims to implement discriminating taxes that induce firms to hire labour at 
minimum cost. 
 
It is a fact of life, however, that firms have more information than the government about 
the quality of their potential investments and likely profits. This suggests that they do 
not need subsidies to remain in business but, nevertheless, they do have an incentive to 
report negative profits in order to receive government subsidies. In order to resolve this 
problem, the government can either provide a subsidy to all firms or require them to 
publish audited accounts. This will place the government in a better position to know 
which firms to support and subsidize.  
 
Akerlof (1978) has argued that default also serves as a method for identifying needy 
firms, i.e. those firms that could not hire labour in the absence of a subsidy. Accordingly, 
firms that have positive profits repay their loans and do not receive support but firms 
with negative profits receive a payment equal to the difference between the lending rate 
and their return on investment. The identification of needy firms and the tailoring of 
subsidies to meet the needs of these firms are, therefore, at the centre of efficient 
allocation of scarce resources within a given economy and reducing unemployment at 
minimum cost (Fair, 1971; Akerlof, 1978).  
 
As discussed earlier, implicit government guarantees and a high level of NPLs 
encourage banks to invest in risky projects with low expected returns. Recapitalization 
of banks may reduce their incentives to take risk and this could clearly reduce the level 
of NPLs. However, if NPLs are used by the government to boost employment at 
minimum cost, recapitalization of banks can be regarded as removing a constraint on 
the resources available to the banking system. In this respect, the recapitalisation of the 
Chinese banks might increase NPLs in the longer term. This is true in transition 
economies like China that are politically and economically fragile.  
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4.5.3 The failure of market discipline 
  
The third explanation for high levels of NPLs is the failure of market discipline. Lane 
(1992) described market discipline as:”financial markets providing signals that lead 
borrowers (i.e. banks) to behave in a manner consistent with their solvency. Lane also 
went on to highlighted the conditions required for market discipline to be successful, 
namely, competitiveness of capital markets; availability of information on the 
borrower‟s outstanding liabilities; no expectation of bailout; and the borrower‟s ability 
and willingness to respond to market signals provided by interest rate changes. Failure 
in any of these conditions will lead to the failure of market discipline. 
 
Market discipline can be signalled either by depositors, equity holders and debt holders. 
Accordingly, a classic example of the market disciplinary process is the signalling of 
excessive risk taking by the bank by one of the aforementioned stakeholders. In this 
respect, Liu (2001) has argued that it can be regarded as a mechanism to curb 
unsustainable lending, which can lead directly to NPLs. Lardy (1998) in developing this 
argument has also claimed that market discipline is also conducive to better controls and, 
therefore, a more rigorous monitoring of the borrower. The key point of this is that if 
market discipline works effectively, credit will be hardened and hence unsustainable 
borrowing can be effectively curbed.  
  
In the Chinese situation, budget constraints were not hardened and public money 
continued to be readily available, thus market discipline did not work effectively. The 
soft budget constraint and the failure of market discipline in both SOCBs and SOEs 
meant that loss-making activities were financed and this resulted in large amounts of 
NPLs. Another aspect of market discipline is that the owners of the banks, i.e. equity 
investors and even subordinated debt holders, can impose an element of discipline on 
banks by selling their investments when they believe that the bank is behaving 
imprudently or taking excessive risks. In the instance of equity investors they also have 
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the option of voting at general meetings and could pass a motion of no confidence if 
they believed that the management was acting recklessly. However, in China the stock 
exchange and capital markets are still in their infancy and, therefore, lack the 
sophistication to impose this kind of action. Similar, depositors, especially, those who 
are active in the interbank markets could impose some form of discipline on banks by 
removing deposits from banks that were perceived as high risk but as with the capital 
markets China‟s interbank markets are not sufficiently developed for this to happen in 
any meaningful way. Market discipline is also hampered by the prevalent culture in 
China, which still believes that the government will safety net the banks, i.e. bail them 
out, even in the face of imprudent management.  
  
4.5.4 Summary 
 
The three categories of literature discussed above shed some light on the causes of 
NPLs in Chinese banks. SBC imposed on both banks and enterprises reduce the 
incentives for bank managers to select efficient lending projects. Government 
guarantees provides the basis for both the principle-agent and the moral hazard 
problems and also result in large amounts of NPLs. In addition, the failure of market 
discipline can lead to unsustainable borrowing in the form of lending to unprofitable 
businesses. This section on the causes of NPLs has also explained how public finance 
considerations are also conducive to increasing levels of non-performing loans. 
  
4.6 Causes of NPLs in Chinese banks-the empirical analysis 
 
In order to empirically investigate the causes of bank NPLs in China, it is important to 
recognize that, unlike Eastern and Central European countries, most of the NPLs in 
Chinese banks did not exist prior to the pre-reform era (Lin. et al, 2010). Instead, they 
were mainly created after the reform began and were a result of the government‟s 
efforts to transform the country‟s economic system. The causes of NPL problem in 
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Chinese banking sector are systematic in the sense that they emanate from China‟s state 
bank-dominated financial system and the fact that the financial system is bank-centric. 
Other considerations include the soft credit culture regarding SOEs, i.e. so-called policy 
loans; the administrative controls on bank practices; weak internal controls/corporate 
governance structures within the banks (Lu and Yao, 2009).  
 
The Chinese banking system is characterized by bank-centric finance. Bank 
lending-often directed by government policy-dominates business finance, and bank 
deposits dominate household investment (Jia, 2007). A bank-centric finance system can 
easily lead to NPLs because whenever the economy slows down and the level of 
consumption decreases, company profitability usually declines and the incidence of non 
repayment of bank debt increases. This is supported by the World Bank‟s Globe 
Economic Prospects Report (2000). The report pointed out that the ratio of NPLs to 
GDP in bank-centric finance economies are typically higher than that in other countries 
suffering from a financial crisis. The domination of the Chinese financial system by the 
big four state banks also limits competition. Moreover, lending decisions, especially, 
policy loans are influenced by the government policy and political considerations. In 
this respect, Lardy (1998) somewhat pertinently defines policy loans in China as loans 
extended at the behest of the governmental authorities at the centre or local levels rather 
than as a result of normal commercial bank decision-making.  
 
These policy loans are either for developing or subsidizing loss-making SOEs. 
Accordingly, Lardy (1998) has argued that they are largely responsible for SOEs‟ 
irresponsiveness to market signals and lack of dynamism. To make matters worse 
because banks are subject to government interference in their lending activities, the 
development of appropriate lending to small business enterprises has been delayed.  
 
China‟s bank centric financial system has meant that banks must play an important role 
in the collection of deposits and the allocation of loans (Victor, 2004).This 
consideration, together with the central bank‟s inability to use indirect monetary policy 
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instruments, has resulted in largely ineffective direct administrative controls being 
applied to commercial banks activities in the form of credit plans and interest rate 
controls, etc. These direct controls have detracted from the development of appropriate 
risk management technique and banks have extended loans largely at the behest of 
political leaders. In this respect direct controls and government interference have also 
deflected from managerial expertises in the banks and Chinese banks lack familiarity 
with asset and liability management techniques. They are also characterised by 
inadequate accounting standards that render the measurement of performance and the 
control of risk extremely difficult. Substandard information systems, inappropriate 
internal incentives systems, and poor institutional structures and legal frameworks 
compound the problems. Large amounts of NPLs were also created via lending under 
credit plans or government instructions (Liu, 2001). Furthermore, the PBOC‟s failure to 
introduce appropriate prudential supervision and bank regulation until the mid-1990s 
was another important reason in explaining the emergence of China‟s NPLs.  
  
4.7 The main strategies for dealing with NPLs and their relevance to China 
  
The accumulation of NPLs is not a problem unique to China. NPLs have been a serious 
problem in the banking sectors of America, Japan and Central Eastern European 
countries. Governments throughout the world have, therefore, been addressing the 
problem of NPLs and three basic policies can be discerned: (1) bank closure; (2) bank 
regulation; and, (3) bank restructuring. 
 
4.7.1 Bank closure 
 
In any industry, individual firms can be allowed to fail. Allowing the weakest to fail can 
increase the overall efficiency of an industry by eliminating excess capacity. This 
rationale applies to the banking industry and suggests that banks with high levels of 
NPLs should be allowed to fail. However, Hawkins and Turner (1999) have pointed out 
that bank failure may undermine the public‟s confidence in banks generally and 
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provoke a generalized bank run. A bank failure infects other healthy and sound financial 
institutions via the payment system, the inter-bank loans market and the bank deposit 
market. Moreover, bank closure may disrupt credit relationships between banks and 
their borrowers and lead to a “credit crunch”. These considerations explain why 
medium-sized and large-sized banks are rarely allowed to fail. Liu (2001) pointed out 
that in “Asian crisis countries” the authorities have a tendency to close small banks and 
many countries follow a more-or-less explicit policy of not letting any bank go bankrupt. 
Lardy (1998) argued that banking reform in transition economies must be based on the 
rehabilitation of existing banks and the entry of new banks or some combination of 
these two. In China, the SOCBs domination of the financial and economic system 
implies that their closure would have a potentially disastrous affect on the economy and 
the financial sector. To some extent, these considerations explain why the Chinese 
government is willing to rehabilitate existing banks by capital injections.  
 
4.7.2 Bank Regulation 
  
Regulatory forbearance has also been used to deal with bank NPLs. Regulatory 
forbearance is premised on the assumption that banks would be able to gradually 
recapitalize themselves through reinvestment of their profits. The World Bank‟s World 
Development Report (1996), focusing on the problems of transition economies, favours 
forbearance policies that “promote self-help for banks to encourage them to build up 
their capital base, allowing banks to grow out of their bad debt problems.”  
 
Regulatory forbearance was widely used to deal with bank NPLs in the Asian financial 
crisis. It mainly included tightening of the rules for loan provisioning and the 
observance of minimum capital requirements. Forbearance provides banks with time to 
restructure and mobilize new capital, and, therefore, potentially avoids aggravating 
credit supply problems. However, in China, regulatory forbearance is not applicable. 
This is because although the 1995 Commercial Banking Law required commercial 
banks to conform to the 8% capital adequacy ratio requirement within a designated time, 
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the capital to asset ratio of the SOCBs showed a decreasing tendency during the period 
from 1995 to 1997. It, therefore, became clear to the Chinese government that 
regulatory forbearance was not working and that restructuring the banking system was a 
more viable option. Consequently in 1998, it injected RMB 270 billion into the SOCBs 
in order to strengthen their capital bases. In addition, during 1999 four AMCs were 
established to take over NPLs from the SOCBs.  
 
4.7.3 Bank restructuring 
 
Bank restructuring is an important strategy that many governments throughout the 
world have used to deal with NPLs. Xi (2001) has argued that a banking system saddled 
with large amounts of NPLs would have to maintain an excessively cautious lending 
policy, which could result in a credit slowdown. However, in instances where banks are 
technically insolvent, allowing them to continue operating without restructuring them 
can create market distortions and lead to moral hazard. Bank restructuring can facilitate 
the rollover of maturing foreign loans and new private investment and, therefore, it can 
be crucial to economic recovery (Hawkins & Turner, 1999). In the Chinese situation, 
however, bank restructuring and SOEs restructuring should take place simultaneously. 
This is because a large proportion of bank loans are made to SOEs and restructuring in 
the form of hard budget constraints would introduce some form of discipline.  
 
The last section has revealed that bank closure, regulation and bank restructuring are the 
main policies available to governments for dealing with NPLs. Iinternational experience 
has also shown that setting up centralized asset management can also be as appropriate 
method for dealing with NPLs. Two types of agencies can be identified: rapid asset 
disposition agencies and long term restructuring agencies. In this respect, the Resolution 
Trust Company (RTC) experience in the U.S. and the banking sector reforms in Central 
European transition economies are useful in providing some insight into these agencies.  
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4.8 International experiences for dealing with non-performing loans 
 
4.8.1 The RTC experience in the United States and its relevance for China 
  
Ely (1996) pointed out that the RTC was set up as a rapid asset disposal agency in 1989 
to resolve bad loans from the portfolios of failed Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls). 
The assets transferred amounted to $465 billion or about 8.5% of total financial sector 
assets and approximately 8.5% of GDP in 1989. The RTC was set up as a temporary 
federal agency intended to operate until 1996 and it completed its work in 1995. During 
its operating time, the RTC relied primarily on private sector contractors to evaluate, 
manage and sell many of the assets. According to Klingebiel (1999), the RTC acquired 
both performing and non-performing assets and the level of NPLs reached only 3% of 
total banking sector assets at the height of the U.S. crisis. Furthermore, about 50% of 
the assets were real estate loans and mortgages while 35% were cash and other 
securities. Accordingly, many of the transferred assets were either good or could be sold 
fairly quickly through bundling, securitization, and auctions in the global capital 
markets (Glassman, 1998). An effective management structure also allowed the RTC to 
collect almost one-third of the transferred assets thereby reducing significantly the 
amount to be sold. There are, therefore, several favorable factors that influenced the 
RTC‟s operations. First, the RTC was able to contract out the disposal of assets to 
private sector agents who had the necessary skills and expertise. Second, as mentioned 
above, the amount of assets transferred was a relatively small percentage of overall 
financial assets and many of these were performing at the time; and, third, the assets 
could be bundled and securitized for quick sale in global capital markets. However, a 
comparison between the Chinese and U.S. situations reveal several important 
differences.  
 
For example, the RTC was established to deal with mainly real estate loans from S&Ls 
that had been shut down or merged with other banks. Hence, the flow of new bad loans 
from the originating financial institutions was not a problem in the U.S. In China, the 
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loans transferred to AMCs were made by SOCBs to their SOE clients and they continue 
to have ongoing financial relations with each other. Accordingly, the flow problem of 
preventing new bad loans becomes a prominent concern. Another consideration is that 
in the U.S., a large portion of the transferred loans were performing but this is not the 
case in China. Moreover, in China the asset market is thin suggesting that debt/equity 
swaps rather than the sale of assets is more appropriate. The RTC also used outside 
consultants to manage and dispose of the bad debts. However, in China, the availability 
of outside expertise is limited and, therefore, emphasis must be placed on attracting and 
retaining competent staff for AMCs. These differences make the experiences of other 
transition countries more relevant than that of the U.S.  
  
4.8.2 Bank restructuring in Central Europe and its relevance for China 
   
China‟s efforts to transform itself from a centrally planned to a market economy 
suggests that it is appropriate to compare the efforts of the Chinese government with 
those of other transition economies, such as, Hungary，Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Confronted with the decline of communism in central Europe these countries embarked 
on similar structural changes and to this extent provide some useful insights that are 
relevant to China‟s experience. 
 
Before examining these countries in detail it is perhaps appropriate to note that the 
Asian or so-called “tiger” economies, such as Thailand, Japan and Malaysia, etc were 
confronted by an entirely different set of problems, which culminated in the Asian Crisis 
in the late 1990s. Although the Asian crisis resulted in unprecedented high levels of 
NPLs the principle causes were quite different and can be attributable to excessive and 
unsustainable lending to the private and commercial sector property markets.  
 
Immediately preceding this crisis the Japanese authorities were tackling a NPL problem, 
which resulted from the bursting of the so-called “bubble economy” in 1990. Japan‟s 
economy has still not got back to sustainable growth and the major reason for this has 
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been the government‟s delay in introducing appropriate measures for dealing with NPLs. 
For example, it was not until 1993 that Japan launched the Co-operative Credit 
Purchasing Company to purchase NPLs and 1996 before the Housing Loan 
Management Company to deal with the problems of house related NPLs. In some 
respects the Japanese government believed that the economy would eventually 
experience an up -turn and consequently delayed remedial policy actions. When it 
became clear that economic recovery was not going to happen without some sort of 
impetus, the government provided large scale public funds to financial institutions. 
However, incredibly this did not materialize until 1998, i.e. some eight years after the 
bubble burst!    
 
In contrast many of the East Asian countries learned lessons from Japan and when the 
Asian crisis occurred in 1997 they quickly addressed the problem of NPLs. For example, 
South Korea immediately injected large amounts of public funds into financial 
institutions and Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia quickly followed suit by 
consolidating the banking sector by a series of bank mergers. Some governments closed 
down unviable financial institutions and the South Korean and Indonesian governments 
provided guarantees on deferred external bank debts in agreements with foreign banks. 
All of the countries involved in the Asian crisis with the support of the International 
Monetary Fund maintained a policy of not bailing out corporate debt. In this respect it is 
clear that the Asian crisis was not precipitated by a desire to transform the economy but 
rather because of excessive and uncontrolled lending. 
  
The Central European countries can now be examined and contrasted with the efforts of 
the Chinese authorities to transform the economy:  
 
(1) Poland 
 
In Poland, financial restructuring was the preferred option in trying to resolve its bad 
debts (Gray & Holle, 1996). The World Bank supported a program of bank-led 
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enterprise restructuring based on the notion that the major banks had sufficient 
information about their SOE clients to decide whether to restructure them or simply 
wind them up. The main instrument used to restructure loans in Poland was the 
debt-equity swap and this option was generally chosen by the weaker banks. 
Accordingly, weak banks with no expertise in restructuring large companies acquired 
ownership stakes in equally weak corporate clients. In addition, new bank credit was 
provided to failing enterprises in about a third of the cases surveyed by Gray and Holle 
(1997). In this respect, Bonin and Leven (2000) found that new credit extended to three 
large military-industrial clients exceeded the total amount of bank recapitalization. It, 
therefore, left the banking system with more, rather than less, exposure to theses clients. 
Poland‟s reform program accordingly strengthened the relationship between banks and 
their undesirable clients. However, it did provide much needed breathing room for the 
weak SOEs and postponed more painful restructuring. 
 
(2)  Hungary 
 
The combined recapitalization and privatization strategy provided Hungary with the 
strongest banking sector out of all the transition countries (Bonin and al, 1998). Initially, 
Hungary pursued a policy of privatizing state banks by selling controlling shares to 
strategic foreign investors. Such sales required recapitalization of the banks to make the 
combination of current net worth and franchise value attractive to a foreign investor. 
However, the recapitalized banks were still servicing bad clients. Moreover, the first 
recapitalization was not sufficient and, therefore, a second recapitalization with more 
liquid instruments was successfully introduced. 
 
The Hungary experience emphasizes the importance of achieving independent 
governance both from the state and from undesirable clients (Kornai, 1986). The 
Hungarian bank with the most exposure to loss-making SOEs was Magyar Hitel Bank 
(MHB). Prior to searching for a strategic foreign investor but after recapitalization, 
MHB‟s loan portfolio was divided into good and bad assets and a special department 
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was created to work with the “bad” clients in an attempt to recover some of the loans. 
Only the “good” bank was privatized: this transaction attracted a strategic foreign 
investor who increased the bank‟s capital (Farkas, 1999).  
 
The Hungarian experience illustrates the wisdom of separating bad and good clients. 
This is potentially a very important lesson for China in its reform of the banking sector. 
Although privatizing the SOCBs by selling them to foreign investors is not a viable 
strategy for China at present, it might be appropriate at some point in the future. The 
Hungarian government‟s commitment to no further bank bailouts is also a fundamental 
lesson that China could take on board.  
 
(3)  The Czech Republic 
 
The Czech Republic had a financial structure similar to China‟s with a relatively high 
ratio of bank loans to GDP. Moreover, the loans and deposits markets were dominated 
by state owned banks. It has been estimated that it cost the Czech Republic almost 30% 
of GDP to restructure its banks. This made the Czech clean-up the most expensive 
restructuring program in Central Europe (Bonin, Kálmán, István and Paul, 1998). At the 
beginning of the banking reforms in 1990, a centralized hospital bank known as 
Konsolidacni Banka (KnB) was created to restructure the loans of SOEs. Although these 
loans and a comparable amount of their deposits were transferred to KnB, the SOEs still 
remained with their parent banks and new loans continued to be granted. However, 
approach did not resolve the root cause of bad loans problem in root and it also failed to 
improve the strength of the domestic banking system.  
 
The Czech experience indicates that transferring bad loans from all banks to a single 
centralized hospital bank does not resolve the incentive problem if the client remains 
attached to the original SOCBs. In addition, the big banks were not independent from 
the government since the state-retained majority or near majority stakes in all of them.  
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(4)  Summary 
 
There are several key points that China can learn from the Central European transition 
economies. In the first instance, preventing the creation of new NPLs is more important 
than getting rid of the existing bad loans. Separating bad clients from good clients in 
banks that are being restructured appears to be a viable strategy. The government‟s 
commitment to no further bank bailouts after a once-off recapitalization encourages 
banks to focus on credit risk management policies  
 
4.9 Dealing with NPLs in China 
 
As discussed above, bank restructuring is the most viable option available to China in 
dealing with NPLs. Quite a lot of change has already taken place under the auspices of 
the banking reform in China (Lu and Yao, 2009; Shih, et al, 2006; and, DaCosta, 2002) ). 
One of the most significant changes is the NPL resolutions. Government involvement in 
NPL resolutions in China takes various forms. From the mid-1990s, the Chinese 
government began to separate commercial lending from policy lending. It established 
three policy banks to handle all policy-related lending, in the belief that wasteful 
lending to failing companies from the four commercial banks would decline and that 
internal and external competition would intensify.  
 
Since the previous Premier Minister Zhu Rongji took control of the financial reforms, a 
number of measures have been put forward to deal with NPLs and to guard against risks 
in the banking system (Lin and Li, 2010). These included (1) injecting equity to 
recapitalize state-owned banks; (2) compelling banks to adopt international standards 
when classifying NPLs; (3) requiring banks to make loans on a commercial basis; (4) 
forbidding local governments to interfere with the lending decision of banks; (5) the 
creation of the four AMCs to take over and liquidate the NPLs from the “Big Four” 
SOCBs; and; (6) debt equity swaps. Within these measures, the following three are 
considered to be the most important. 
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4.9.1 Bank recapitalization 
 
Since the big four banks are fully state-owned banks and their profitability is generally 
low, it is very difficult for them to raise new capital and improve their capital adequacy. 
The problem of capital inadequacy has also been compounded by the incidence of high 
levels of NPLs. In order to promote recapitalization and foreign ownership, in 1998 the 
government injected Y270 billion in capitals to SOCBs through the issuance of bonds 
and by reducing reserve requirements. The PBC also lowered the reserve requirement 
imposed on customers‟ deposits from 13% to 8% and removed an excess reserve 
requirement of 7%, which was introduced in 1992. This reduction has enabled SOCBs 
to invest in government bonds issued for recapitalization (Mo, 1999). These measures 
increased the level of capital adequacy of SOCBs and had an immediate and positive 
impact on the equity to assets ratio of the banking system. In 2003 and 2005, two other 
tranches of capital were injected into the SOCBs. These injections helped SOCBs to 
improve their capital adequacy further and thus maintain adequate solvency levels. 
  
4.9.2 Asset Management Company 
 
In order to deal with NPLs, the Chinese central government established four AMCs in 
1999 Each of these AMCs had a capitalization of 10 billion Yuan and their remit was to 
acquire the NPLS of the four SOCBs as follows: Cinda was to acquire the assets of 
CCB; Great Wall was associated with ABC; Oriental was associated with BOC; and, 
Huarong with ICBC. The details are shown in Table 4.3 below.  
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                         Table 4. 3 Details of AMCs 
AMC Cinda Huarong Geart Wall Orient Total 
Time of establishment 04/1999 10/1999 10/1999 10/1999  NA 
Related SOCBs CCB  ICBC  ABC BOC  NA 
Total Asset (1999) 22,011  35,399  22,759  9,103  89,277 
NPLs removed 3,730  4,077  3,458  2,674  13,939 
Capital  100  100  100  100  400 
Central Bank Lending  0  947  3,450  1,074  5,479 
Financial Bonds 3,730  3,130  0  1,600  8,460 
Source: Websites of AMCs 
Note: RMB 80 billion of the NPLs received by Cinda were removed from the State 
Development Bank. 
 
These AMCs are based on the American RTC model and they remain under the 
supervision of the PBC, with guidance provided by the State Securities Supervisory 
Committee of China and the Ministry of Finance. Although the AMCs are tasked with 
receiving, managing, and disposing of NPLs transferred directly from their affiliated 
parent SOCBs, they are still wholly owned by the central government and not the bank. 
They are effectively government-sponsored agencies with a limited life of 10 years. 
Their major activities have been restricted primarily to transferring debts contracted 
before 1995 (Ma & Ben, 2002). Regarding the measures for dealing with the transferred 
NPLs the AMCs have used two approaches. One is to conduct debt-equity swap on 
behalf of firms (largely SOEs) that are relatively better performing; and, the other is to 
directly deal with NPLs of firms that are unlikely to survive (Watanabe, 2000).  
 
As to the overall performance of AMCs, Ernst & Young (2003) – the leading financial 
advisor to China‟s major banks and AMCs- conducted a report about NPLs in China. 
This report pointed out that at the time of the AMCs‟ being established, they received 
RMB1, 394 billion (US$168 billion) in NPLs. This transfer was financed by the 
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issuance Y850 billion worth of bonds and borrowings totallingY550 billion from PBC.  
In 2001, which was their first operational year, the AMCs resolved NPLs totaling 
RMB124.5 billion and in the following year they resolved RMB141.7 billion. However, 
the four AMCs have only resolved 22 percent of the total assets they acquired from their 
respective associated SOCBs.  
 
As to the individual performances of the four AMCs (MO, 1999), Huarong has the 
highest cash recovery ratio. Its first portfolio bulk sale has produced some results and a 
second bulk sale was packaged for sale by Ernst & Young. Huangrong‟s true challenge 
is to maintain its current recovery rate when benchmarked against itself and /or other 
AMCs. Orient acquired the least number of NPLs from its parent bank-BOC, but it has 
achieved the highest accumulative asset recovery ratio among all of the four AMCs. 
Cinda‟s cache of non-performing assets consists of both NPLs and settled assets backed 
by real estate collateral. These assets types tend to attract significant interest from 
investors. Therefore, Cinda consistently ranks first in terms of disposition performance 
and recovery rate. Great Wall has the highest NPL disposition amount, but the lowest 
cash recovery ratio. The NPLs in Great Wall were originally transferred from ABC, 
whose main creditors had numerous small accounts scattered throughout China‟s rural 
areas. A moderately lower cash recovery rate is, therefore, to be expected.  
 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provides information about the amounts and percentages of NPLs 
disposed of by the AMCs in 2001 and 2002. It is obvious that with the exception of 
Great Wall, the other three AMCs‟ disposal of NPLs increased from 2001 to 2002. 
However, only Orient and Great Wall experienced an increase in relative terms as 
depicted by the percentage figures for NPLs. 
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                Figure 4. 1 The amount of NPLs disposed 
                   
 
Source: 2003 Annual Review: Non-performing loan in China, Ernst & Young (2003).  
                 Figure 4.2 The percentage of NPLs disposed 
 
Source: 2003 Annual Review: Non-performing loan in China, Ernst & Young (2003). 
 
In addition, the government tried to attract foreign capital and foreign institutions to 
help AMCs. Following the successful experience of the RTC in auctioning off NPL 
assets in the United States, China Huarong AMC carried out the first auction to foreign 
investors in November 2001. Huagrong has also signed a cooperation agreement with 
the Korean Asset Management Cooperation (KAMC) to explore the securitization of 
NPLs (Yang, 2002). Orient also developed a series of tax motivated sales to U.S. 
investors who can benefit from a unique tax structure which allows investors a tax 
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write-off for the difference between the asset purchase price and the book value of these 
loans. Cinda has also started to assess the market for Asset Backed Securities (ABS) 
and is looking at some form of securitization of their portfolios.  
  
4.9.3 Debt-equity swaps 
  
In addition to AMCs, the government introduced debt-equity swaps to deal with NPLs. 
The debt-equity swaps procedures involve the following measures. The State Economic 
and Trade Commission (SETC) investigate SOEs and makes recommendations to the 
relevant AMC. The conditions for such a recommendation appear stringent, namely, that 
the enterprise must have the necessary management skills, competent managers, good 
accounting standards and operate in a competitive environment. In reality, however, the 
enterprises were mostly state-owned enterprises that had been established without any 
external/owner money and the liabilities consisted exclusively of loans. 
 
The AMCs purchased the principal and interest of the enterprise from the relevant 
SOCBs based on the enterprises book value. The purchase can improve the SOCBs 
financial position because large amounts of NPLs are taken off the SOCBs balance 
sheets. Once the AMCs have purchased the NPLs from the SOCBs, they arrange 
debt-equity swaps and sign contracts with purchasing enterprises. However, these 
contracts will only be effective after being approved by the State Economic and Trade 
Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the PBC and the State Council. An explicit part 
of these arrangements is that the AMCs are also supposed to encourage the enterprises 
to improve their management skills and introduce more efficient corporate governance 
structures that are conducive to obtaining a public listing. 
 
Shirai & Pei (2004) pointed out that by the end of 2000; the AMCs had performed 
debt-equity swaps totalling RMB 341 billion in respect of 587 enterprises. The 
enterprises in question had reduced the ratio of their liabilities, from 73 to 50 percent. In 
addition, 80 percent of the enterprises performing debt-equity swaps moved from a 
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deficit to surplus position. However, despite this success, the impact of debt-equity 
swaps was not as successful as expected. This was because the enterprises made little 
progress in reforming their internal management structures and obtaining public listings.  
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the NPLs problem in the Chinese banking sector. Both the 
seriousness and the negative effect of NPLs in China have been identified and discussed 
In particular this chapter has provided a theoretical literature review on the underlying 
causes of NPLs and its application in China. This review will help to identify the main 
research themes and associated research questions. As such, it will form the basis for 
the interview topics and questionnaire design. This will be discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter, which focuses on the research methods. 
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                Chapter Five Research Methodology  
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the methods used to gather empirical data on the causes of NPLs 
in Chinese banks and the measures have been taken to deal with them. The bank 
population, sample population and respondent populations are described in this chapter, 
as well as the research methods used to analyze the data.  
 
5.2 Research methods 
 
There are a range of alternative research methods, which are discussed in the literature. 
Generally speaking, they consist of qualitative and quantitative methods. The choice of 
the most appropriate method for the researcher has to be based on the type of research 
being undertaken. Accordingly, Jankowicz (1991) stated that the best method is the one 
that is considered to be the most appropriate to the nature and objectives of the research. 
Quantitative research can be construed as a research strategy that emphasize 
quantification in the analysis of data while qualitative research can be regarded as a 
research strategy that typically emphasizes words rather than the quantification of the 
data (Bryman and Bell, 2003)  
 
Table 5.1 outlines the differences between quantitative and qualitative research in terms 
of three distinct philosophical approaches; and, Table 5.2 illustrates the differences in 
the emphasis between qualitative and quantitative methods.  
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Table 5.1 Fundamental differences between quantitative research and qualitative 
research strategies 
 Quantitative research  Qualitative research 
Principal orientation to the 
role of theory in relation to 
research 
Deductive; testing of 
theory 
Inductive; generation of 
theory 
Epistemological 
orientation 
Natural science model; in 
particular positivism 
Interpretivism 
Ontological orientation Objectivism Constructionism 
Source: Bryman and Bell (2003). 
Table 5.2 The difference in emphasis in qualitative versus quantitative methods 
Qualitative methods Quantitative methods 
* emphasis on understanding * emphasis on testing and verification  
*focus on understanding from 
respondent/informant‟s point of view 
*focus on facts and/ or reasons for social 
events 
*interpretation and rational approach *logical and critical approach 
*observations and measurements in 
natural settings 
*controlled measurement 
*subjective „inside view‟ and closeness to 
data 
*objective „outside view‟ distant from 
data 
*explorative orientation *hypothetical-deductive; focus on 
hypothesis testing 
*process oriented *result oriented 
*holistic perspective * particularistic and analytical 
*generalization by comparison of 
properties and context of individual 
organism 
*generalization by population 
membership 
Source: Reinhardt and Cook (1979).  
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Having reflected on the differences described in the above tables, it was decided to 
adopt a qualitative research method between. There are, however a range of available 
choices when conducting qualitative research, such as, interviews, questionnaires, 
experiments, observations, field research, focus discussion groups, etc (Dey, 1993).  
Each method has its own distinct advantages relative to the others and it is difficult and, 
perhaps, just as important, incorrect to claim that any one method is better than another. 
For example, interviews (both face-to-face and telephone) are regarded by some 
researchers as a better method of collecting data than questionnaires. However, there 
can sometimes be time constraints on the researcher that make the latter a more 
appropriate method of collecting data. Similarly, the size of the data base and/or the 
costs involved in collecting the data might determine that interviews are less appropriate 
than questionnaires In general terms, however, face to face interviews can be less 
expensive and the response rates seem to be better than telephone interviews and 
questionnaires when dealing with smaller data sets (Warwick & Lininger, 1975).  
 
There is no doubt that field research can provide very rich data and can be relatively 
inexpensive. The method is particularly suitable in areas where the theory is sparse or 
highly abstract. For example, focus discussion groups can extract information from 
group interactions and discussions to produce data and additional insights into a 
particular subject. The results can provide a diversified range of responses, which form 
the basis on which to formulate further discussions and draw conclusions (Lewis, 1995). 
In some instances, observations are considered to be more appropriate in getting 
appropriate data and reducing subjectivity. Similarly, in some instances a variety of 
techniques, sometimes combining both qualitative and quantitative methods, can be 
used to collect and analyze data. This so-called triangulation can be used to strengthen 
the findings of the research. For example, interviews can be used to identify key themes 
or issues in the research and/or to inform the design of the questionnaire.  
 
In this research, two research methods were considered to be applicable: face-to-face 
interviews and questionnaires. Interviews are a more personal form of research method 
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than questionnaires and involve the interviewer working directly with the interviewees. 
In this respect they are a good research method for getting in-depth and comprehensive 
information. This is especially the case when the information is personal or very 
detailed or of a technical nature. Personal interviews, however, can sometimes be very 
expensive and because of the “one-to-one nature” they can also be very time 
consuming.  
 
Interviews can assume different formats and typically incorporate structured interviews, 
semi structured interviews and unstructured interviews. The structured interview allows 
little room for deviation and the interviewer tends to record responses against a 
predetermined coding system (Fontana and Frey, 1998). Accordingly, there is little or no 
scope for probing, and two-way interaction between the researcher and the interviewee 
is limited. This approach was not used in this research because one of the main 
objectives was to identify recurrent themes and patterns in what is a relatively under 
researched area. In contrast, unstructured interviews allow the interviewee to ask 
questions based on the interviewee's responses. Accordingly, they can be used in a 
flexible way to pursue new or different ideas that have been raised by the interviewees. 
The major drawback with unstructured interviews, however, is that because each 
interviewee may be asked a different series of questions, they tend to lack the reliability 
and precision of structured interviews.  
 
Semi-structured interviews are effectively a half way house between these two extremes. 
Accordingly, they are conducted within a fairly open framework which allow for 
focused conversation and two-way communication. Somewhat crucially, therefore, they 
can be used both to give and receive information. Semi structured interviews normally 
commence with more general questions or topics but the semi-structured nature of the 
interviews provides sufficient flexibility to allow new questions to be introduced. These 
questions may emanate either form the interviewee or the interviewer and can be 
pursued or discounted by the interviewer depending on their relevance to the aims of the 
research. The interviewer in a semi-structured interview would typically have a topic 
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guide incorporating a framework of themes to be explored. Having regard for the scope 
and aims of this study, face to face semi structured interviews were thought to be 
appropriate because they would permit the researcher to probe relevant issue in more 
depth and allow the discussion to deviate away from the topic guide.  
 
5.3 Different Phases of the Research 
 
Research methodology is regarded as the foundation of good scientific research. 
Accordingly, in this study, an adaptation of Saunders‟ (1997) three-phase approach was 
used. This phased approach is shown in figure 5.1.  
                Figure 5.1 Three-phase research methodologies  
Stage one                   Stage two                   Stage three     
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Saunders (1997) and 
Author.   
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In essence the first stage incorporated: the identification of the three research questions 
or themes. In order to provide insight into the research questions a comprehensive range 
of associated questions were then constructed from the extant literature and the 
interview topic guides and questionnaire were designed and piloted. The second stage 
involved the modification of the interview schedule and questionnaire and the necessary 
arrangements were made for conducting the field research. In the third and final stage 
the findings were analyzed and the policy implications and conclusions of the research 
were drawn. The following sections provide a more detailed insight into these stages. 
 
5.3.1 Face to face interviews 
  
The interviewer had a topic guide that included a number of semi structured interview 
question. These questions related to three main research themes that had been identified 
from the extant literature and experiences of China‟s banking reforms The three main 
research themes consisted of: 1) managers‟ lack of incentives when selecting projects, 2) 
the affect that government guarantees and interference had on the banks; and, 3) the 
measures taken to deal with non-performing loans. Six interviews were conducted with 
senior representatives of six Chinese banks These banks included the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the Bank of China, the 
Agriculture Bank of China, The State Development Bank, and Citic Bank. The 
interviews were composed of both close-ended and open ended questions and the main 
issues related to the above mentioned three themes. 
 
5.3.2 Questionnaires design 
Questionnaires are generally regarded as an inexpensive method of gathering data but 
they are useful when dealing with large data sets. In this respect, they are sometimes the 
only feasible way to obtain data that facilitates meaningful statistical analysis. Moreover, 
there are a number of advantages associated with questionnaires. For example, they can 
be sent to a wide range of respondent and this method also allows respondents to 
 128 
complete the questionnaire at their own convenience. However, there are some 
disadvantages, such as, the possibility of low response rates and they are not the best 
method for obtaining detailed information.  
The issue of the high costs associated with questionnaires can sometimes be reduced by 
using an email or an internet survey. However, although electronic questionnaires can 
be cost effective and have the additional advantage of being a fast method of 
distribution, the demographic profile of the internet user is not necessarily 
representative of the general population. Accordingly, this method of distribution can 
introduce an element of response bias into the analysis. 
 
In order to achieve a good response rate and minimize response bias, attention was also 
focused on the content and phrasing of the questions and the general appearance of the 
questionnaire. The guidelines for the construction of an effective questionnaire 
suggested by Tull and Hawkins (1997); Dillman (1978); Sekaran (1992); and Neuman 
(1994) have therefore, been followed. With regard to question content, Tull and 
Hawkins (1997) identified five major considerations. For each question, the researcher 
must ascertain: (1) whether there is a need for the data, (2) whether the question will 
produce the anticipated information, (3) the ability of the respondent to answer 
accurately, (4) the willingness of the respondent to answer accurately, and (5) the 
potential for external events to bias the answer.  
 
Regarding question phrasing, the primary concern is to ensure that the respondents and 
the researcher assign exactly the same meaning to each of the question. Tull and 
Hawkins (1997) identified the following issues in question phrasing: Are the words, 
singularly and in total, understandable to the respondents? Are the words biased in any 
respect? Are all the alternatives involved in the questions clearly stated? Are any 
assumptions implied by the question clearly stated? And what frame of reference is the 
respondent being asked to assume? 
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According to Sekaran (1992), not only is it important to address issues of wording and 
measurement when designing a questionnaire, it is also necessary to pay attention to 
what the questionnaire looks like in order to minimize biases and measurement errors. 
The appearance of the questionnaire may even affect the recipient‟s decision to respond 
(Dillman, 1978). Tull and Hawkins (1997) have argued that the questionnaire must be 
designed so that the respondent can easily move from one question to the next. In 
self-administered questionnaires, of the type used in this research, appearance is an 
important variable in securing co-operation from respondents.  
 
In sequencing the order of the questions in the questionnaire, the study, therefore, tried 
to adhere to the four ordering principles under the total design method (Dillman, 1978). 
The principles are derived on the basis of increasing respondents‟ motivation and 
building their confidence in completing the questionnaire. The four ordering principles 
are: 
(1) Sequence the questions in descending order of usefulness and importance. 
(2) Group the questions that are similar in content or question type together. 
(3) Build a sense of flow and continuity throughout the questionnaire by taking 
advantage of the cognitive ties that respondents are likely to make among groups of 
questions. 
(4) Position the questions that are most likely to be difficult to answer after those that 
are less likely to be difficult.     
5.3.3 Data source 
 
The data source for the interviews has already been discussed and was based on the six 
banks mentioned above, namely, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the 
China Construction Bank, the Bank of China, the Agriculture Bank of China, The State 
Development Bank, and Citic Bank. The questionnaires were distributed through email 
to five types or categories of bank in China. These five categories of bank included 1) 
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state-owned commercial banks, 2) policy banks, 3) joint-stock commercial banks, 4) 
city commercial banks; and, 5) foreign banks. 
 
Specifically, they included the following sixteen banks: 1) the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), 2) the China Construction Bank (CCB), 3) the 
Bank of China (BOC), 4) the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), 5) the State 
Development Bank (SDB), 6) the Bank of Communications (BOC1), 7) the China Citic 
Bank (CCB), 8) the China Everbright Bank (CEB), 9) the China Industrial Bank (CIB), 
10) the China Merchants Bank (CMB), 11) the China Min Sheng Bank (CMSB), 12) the 
Shanghai Pu Dong Development Bank (SPDDB), 13) the Changsha City Commercial 
Bank (CCCB), 14) ABN AMRO Bank (AAB), 15) Standard Chartered Bank (SCB); and. 
16) Fuji Xerox Industrial Development (FXID).  
 
5.3.4 Research objectives 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the research has five research objectives, 
which can be summarized as follows: (1) to identify the factors that resulted in the 
accumulation of large amounts of NPLs in China‟s banks; (2) to evaluate whether 
managers lack appropriate incentives for project selection and ascertain whether this is a 
main contributory factor behind the accumulation of NPLs in Chinese banks; (3) To 
evaluate whether government guarantees and interference is a main contributory factor 
behind the accumulation of NPLs in Chinese banks; (4) to evaluate the various 
measures that have been taken to deal with NPLs in Chinese banks.; and, (5) to make 
policy recommendations for improving the NPLs situation in China. 
   
5.3.5 Research Questions/Themes 
 
In addressing these research objectives, three research questions or research themes, 
which have already been discussed, were generated as follows: 1) managers‟ lack of 
incentives when selecting projects, 2) the affect that government guarantees and 
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interference had on the banks; and, 3) the measures taken to deal with non-performing 
loans. These three themes provided the framework for the interview topic guide and also 
the design of the questionnaire. The questionnaire accordingly consisted of three 
sections, which addressed these three main themes and the individual questions were 
designed to address the five main objectives of the research. 
  
5.3.6 Field survey planning  
 
The field survey extended from July 2006 to November 2007 and was divided into the 
interview stage and the questionnaire stage. As previously stated the field survey 
covered different categories of Chinese banks, i.e. state-owned commercial banks, 
policy banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks and foreign banks 
and they were chosen because they provided a representative sample of the Chinese 
banking sector.  
 
The interviews were conducted with senior managers from the various banks, as 
discussed above. A letter of introduction was written on university headed notepaper 
(see appendices 1 and appendices 2) for the interviews and was used to get access to 
these banks. These letters legitimized the research by introducing the researcher and 
explained the main objectives of the research. The letter also emphasized that any 
information obtained would be treated in confidence and with sensitivity.  
 
The six interviewees consisted of senior managers (one from each study bank) and were 
selected from credit and loan assessment departments, and risk control departments. 
These two departments were thought to be the most relevant in terms of having some 
insight into the problem of NPLs in China. They were conducted in four state-owned 
commercial banks (ICBC, CCB, BOC and ABC), one policy bank (SDB) and one 
joint-stock commercial bank (CB) and extended from July 2006 to September 2006. As 
part of planning the interviews, the researcher made phone calls to ascertain a 
convenient time for the interviews. The questionnaires, which had been changed and 
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amended in the light of the interview results, were then subsequently sent out by email 
together with the letter of introduction.  
  
5.4 Methods 
 
5.4.1 Interviews 
 
Some of the interview questions consisted of closed end questions and utilize a simple 
likert-scale, but most of them were open or free-answer type questions (see appendix 3). 
The chief advantage of this open type of question is the freedom it gives to respondents 
but they can also be difficult to analyze (Oppenheim, 1966). 
 
Prior to the field work, the interview questions (like the questionnaire) were first 
translated into Chinese, the native language of the research population (see appendix 4).  
This translation process was done by the researcher further checked by another doctoral 
student at Loughborough Business School. In addition, the interview questions were 
tested by conducting several pilot interviews with managers at the Changsha City 
Commercial bank. The pilot interviews provided useful insights into how the interviews 
could be improved. In particular, they were useful in determining how long the 
interviews would take (approximately one hour). The researcher wrote down and 
checked answers to the questions when and after the interview was conducted. 
 
In order to arrange the interviews, the letter of introduction was sent out and friends and 
acquaintances were also used to get access to senior managers in the study banks. Four 
interviews were conducted during working hours and another two were conducted after 
working hours. All of the interviews were recorded and the interviewees agreed to the 
banks being named. Table 5.3 provides detailed information about the six interviewees. 
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              Table 5.3 Interviews with managers of six Chinese banks 
Bank name Bank ownership Department and Manager 
Position 
Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC) 
State-owned 
Commercial Banks 
-Risk Management Department 
-Department Manager 
China Construction Bank 
(CCB) 
State-owned 
Commercial Banks 
-Credit Administration    
Department 
-General Manager 
Bank of China (BOC) State-owned 
 Commercial Banks 
-Corporate Banking Department 
- Customer Manager 
Agriculture Bank of China 
(ABC) 
State-owned  
Commercial Banks 
-Asset Disposal Department 
-Department manager 
The State and 
Development Bank (SDB) 
 Policy Bank -Credit Administration 
Department 
-Senior Manager 
Citic Bank (CB) Joint-stock 
Commercial Bank 
-President of Chongqing Citic 
Bank 
Source: Author (Field Work). 
 
5.4.2 Questionnaires 
 
The questionnaire was designed and based on the guidelines suggested by Tull and 
Hawkins (1997); Sekaran (1992), Neuman (1994) and Dillman (1978). The objective of 
the questionnaire was to obtain the perceptions and views of bank managers about the 
principal causal factors behind NPLs in Chinese banks. In addition, it also attempted to 
obtain information on the measures taken to deal with non-performing loans. In order to 
have a clear and objective questionnaire, it was pre-tested within Changsha City 
Commercial Bank. The final questionnaire was then amended in the light of the pilot 
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feedback and then distributed to the sample population. To be consistent with the 
interview schedule, the questionnaire also consisted of three sections, which reflected 
the main research themes of the thesis. 
 
The questions were close-ended questions and used a 7 point Likert scale as follows: 
strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly disagree, 
disagree, strongly disagree. A blank space was also provided at the end of each question 
and section for any additional comment. As with the interviews, the questionnaire was 
translated into Chinese, the native language of the research population (see appendix 5) 
and then back into English by the researcher and a doctoral student at Loughborough 
University Business School. The English translation was then compared with the 
original English version to ascertain if there were any substantive differences. This 
process resulted in a number of changes being made to the final version of the 
questionnaire. In order to test the appropriateness of the questions and any other 
ambiguities, the questionnaire was piloted by distributing it to staff at the Changsha City 
Commercial Bank. This process also resulted in a number of minor changes being made 
to the definitive questionnaire prior to distribution.  
 
The questionnaire consisted of the three categories (see appendix 6), as discussed 
already. The first category was concerned with managers‟ lack of incentives when 
selecting projects and consisted of 22 questions. The second category was concerned 
with government guarantees and interference and consisted of 28 questions. These two 
categories were designed to analyze the effects these consideration have on NPLs in 
Chinese banks. The third category was concerned with the measures taken to deal with 
NPLs and consisted of 14 questions. This category was designed to explore the 
perception about the effectiveness of the measures already being taken for dealing with 
NPLs. In addition, the questionnaire also contained a section at the back, which was 
designed to obtain socio-demographic information on the respondents. 
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It was recognized that some of the questions were politically sensitive and that 
respondents were being asked to comment on the efficiency of their bank and its 
processes. It was, therefore, important to consider the effect of response bias amongst 
the respondents and try and ameliorate this as much as possible. Accordingly, it was 
decided to use a seven-point Likert scale and use the additional points to identify the 
nuances on some of the more sensitive questions. 
 
Before distributing questionnaires, potential respondents were contacted by the letter of 
introduction and tacit agreement obtained that they would be willing to participate in the 
questionnaire. In this respect, the first step was to establish contact with influential 
individuals working at credit or risk management departments in the main banks. To 
make this task more manageable, it was decided to restrict the study to Beijing and 
Shanghai. This decision was crucial because social connections in China are very 
important in obtaining access to Chinese enterprises. By restricting the scope of the 
study in this way, the researcher could, therefore, capitalize on her social network to full 
affect.  
 
One hundred and sixty questionnaires, which consisted of 5 pages in the Chinese 
version, were distributed by email. Subsequently, follow-up emails and phone calls were 
made to the respondents to further explain the purpose of the study and ask them for 
their help in completing the questionnaires. Those managers that felt that had 
insufficient knowledge to complete the questionnaire were encouraged to forward the 
questionnaire to other more suitably qualified managers within their respective banks. 
Personal contacts within the banks were used to obtain e-mail addresses and these 
personal contacts helped in the follow up process. This process eventually resulted 
in145 questionnaires being returned, a response rate of 90.6 percent. The questionnaire 
sample was very representative of the Chinese banking sector and as Table 5.4 
illustrates the response rate from each of the banks was very good. In fact most of the 
banks recorded a 100 percent response rate and this probably reflected the fact that the 
general managers in each of the study banks were personally involved with the 
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questionnaire. 
                Table 5.4 Responses from the study banks 
Bank 
Name 
Distributed Received No 
Response 
Response 
  Rate  
Industrial and Commercial  
Bank of China 
    10    10    0   100% 
China Construction Bank     10    10    0   100% 
Bank of China     10    10    0   100% 
Agricultural Bank of China     10    10    0   100% 
State Development Bank     10    10    0   100% 
Bank of Communications     10    10    0   100% 
China Citic Bank     10    10    0   100% 
China Everbright Bank     10    10    0   100% 
China Industrial Bank     10    10    0   100% 
China Min Sheng Bank     10    3    7   30% 
China Merchants Bank     10    10    0   100% 
Shanghai Pu Dong  
Development Bank 
    10    8    2   80% 
ABN AMRO Bank     10    10    0   100% 
Standard Chartered Bank     10    4    6   40% 
Fiji Xerox Industrial  
Development 
    10    10     0   100% 
Changsha City  
Commercial Bank 
    10    10    0   100% 
Total     160    145    15   90.6% 
Source: Author (field work). 
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5.5 Questionnaire tools 
 
Most of the data collected from the questionnaires were either based on nominal or 
ordinal scales which are generally regarded as appropriate for non-parametric methods. 
Under these conditions ordinal or rank scale is appropriate because it is essentially 
concerned with categorizing responses in a „natural order” according to the following 
criteria: strongly agree, slightly agree, agree neutral, disagree, slightly disagree, and 
strongly disagree. In contrast a nominal scale would be appropriate where the scale is a 
scale of measurement consisting of a set of categories which cannot be arranged in a 
natural order, i.e., where objects are either identical or totally different. For example, 
nationality, gender, geographic area, and social class (Diamantopoulos, and 
Schlegelmilch, 1997). Specifically the analysis in this study used the following 
techniques: 
 
Frequency: The non-parametric data was analyzed using Univariate analysis-description. 
Univariate analysis-description consists of: frequency distribution (absolute frequencies, 
relative frequencies, and cumulative frequencies); measures of central tendency (mean, 
media, and mode); measures of dispersion/variability (range, variance, and standard 
deviation) (Diamantopoulos, and Schlegelmilch, 1997). Frequency distribution 
interpretation is greatly enhanced when percentages are available and percentage 
analysis in turn depend to a large extent on using cross tabulation which facilitates a 
more in depth analysis of the data. 
 
5.6 Interviews tools 
  
As there is no consensus or commonly accepted view on the analysis of qualitative data, 
there has tended to be a proliferation of alternatives approaches (Morse, 1994). This can 
be problematic in so much as it has resulted in a range of different strategies for dealing 
with data (Tesch, 1990; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Dey, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 
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1994). Some of these approaches are highly structured or formalized were as others rely 
on the subjective interpretation of researchers (Saunders, et al, 2007). The one thing that 
they all have in common, however, is that they all try to condense highly complicated 
and context-bound information into a format, which although simplified, is readily 
understood and informative (Easterby-Smith, et al, 2003).  
 
Regarding the procedures for analyzing qualitative data of the sort associated with 
interviews, the thesis adopted the approach advocated by Saunders, et al (2007). 
Saunders et al (2007) have identified and discussed a range of procedural activities, 
which they categorized into the following three stages: categorisation; unitising data; 
and, recognizing relationships and developing appropriate themes and emergent patterns. 
The stages are discussed in more detail, as follows: 
 
Categorization involves classifying information into meaningful categories, which may 
be derived directly from the data or a previously developed theoretical model. Gahauri 
and Gronhaug (2005), argue that qualitative researchers categorise data during the 
process of coding and this involves naming or giving labels to instances of phenomena 
found in the data. Saunders et al (2007) make the point that the identification of 
categories will be inherently guided by the purpose of the research questions and 
objectives. In this respect Strauss and Corbin (1998) and King (2004) have suggested 
that there are three main ways of deriving names/labels for categories: utilizing terms 
that emerge from the data; using actual terms used by participants/interviewees (“in 
vivo”); and deriving terms used in the extant literature and theory. In this research the 
categories were derived predominately from the extant literature but recurring terms and 
actual terms used by the interviewees were also utilized.  
 
Having identified the broad categories, the next stage in the analysis is the unitizing of 
the data, i.e. the attachment of relevant parts of data to appropriate categories (Saunders, 
et al, 2007). These units can consist of a number of words, a line of transcript, 
sentence/sentences, a paragraph or any such part of a text that fits the category (Miller. 
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1986; and, Miles and Huberman 1984 and 1994). In analyzing the interviews the 
researcher, therefore, labeled or attached units of data to appropriate categories. To 
facilitate this process the researcher labeled units of data with the appropriate category 
in the margin on the interview transcript. This approach was useful because it was 
possible to identify the source for each unit of data contained in the interviews. 
 
This approach was also conducive to the next stage of the analysis, which is the 
identification of key themes and emergent patterns within the data (Dey, 1993; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; and Yin, 2003) As with most other examples of qualitative 
research, the researcher refined and refocused the main themes (Dey, 1993) in an 
endeavour to more specifically match them to the research objectives and research 
questions of the thesis. In turn, this was extremely useful in terms of the subsequent 
design of the research questionnaire 
 
5.7Conclusion  
 
Having presented the research methods the next four chapters present and discuss the 
findings of the field work. Accordingly, chapter 6 presents the results and findings 
relating to the interviews. The remaining chapters (7-9) then discuss the findings 
relating to each of the three main research themes. 
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                    Chapter Six Interview Analysis      
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results of six interviews with senior managers of Chinese 
banks. The details of the six interviewees are shown in Table 6.1, which reveals that the 
interviewees all had direct experience of lending within their own banks. The 
interviewees were also representative of a fairly wide range of banks and included 
state-owned commercial banks, policy banks and joint-stock commercial banks. The 
interviews consisted of closed and open-ended questions (See Appendix 7) and were 
used to identify the main themes of the research and help design the questionnaire. The 
main subjects covered in these interviews are summarized in Appendix 7 and relate to 
three broad areas: bank manager‟s lack of incentives when selecting and lending to 
projects, government guarantees and interference, and the measures introduced for 
dealing with NPLs in Chinese banks. 
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              Table 6.1 Interviews with managers of six Chinese banks 
Source: Author. 
   
6. 2 Bank manager’s lack of incentives when selecting and lending to projects  
  
6.2.1 Problems associated with project selection 
 
With the exception of CCB, the remaining five banks, ICBC, BOC, ABC, SDB and CB 
had clearly defined project selection systems. The researcher found that ICBC had a 
three-step project selection mechanism. Firstly, the enterprise, i.e. the potential borrower, 
must provide a report prepared by the local designing institution. These institutions are 
government organizations, which are responsible for writing objective reports on the 
feasibility of the loan proposal. Secondly, the enterprise has also to apply for 
Bank name Bank ownership  Department and Manager Position 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) State-owned Commercial 
Banks 
-Risk Management Department 
-Department Manager 
China Construction Bank (CCB)    State-owned 
   Commercial Banks 
-Credit Administration Department 
-General Manager 
Bank of China (BOC)    State-owned 
   Commercial Banks 
-Corporate Banking Department 
- Customer Manager 
Agriculture Bank of China (ABC)    State-owned  
  Commercial Banks 
-Asset Disposal Department 
-Department manager 
The State and Development Bank (SDB)   Policy Bank -Credit Administration Department 
-Senior Manager 
Citic Bank (CB)   Joint-stock Commercial Bank -President of Chongqing Citic Bank 
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agreement/support documentation from the local government. On the assumption that 
the documentation is satisfactory, the lending manager would then investigate the 
enterprise and write a report for consideration by the bank‟s central branch and it‟s 
credit examination committee.  
 
This procedure is captured by the following extract from the interview with the ICBC 
manager: 
 
 “If an enterprise applies for a loan, the first step is that it should provide a report 
created by the local designing institution. This report is used to establish whether the 
proposal is feasible or not. The enterprise should then send this report to the Economy 
and Trade Committee or the Development and Reform Committee in the local 
government. If the Committee agrees to the investment, it will provide an agreement or 
support document. This document is very important because banks will not make loans 
to enterprises without local government’s support. After these two steps, the bank will 
again assess the project and create a report. The aim of this report is to ascertain 
whether there is a viable market for the enterprises products, whether there is sufficient 
plant and machinery and whether the enterprise can make enough profit to pay back the 
bank loan. If this report is positive the bank will support the proposal. However, 
provincial branches can only make loans up to a pre specified amount and, therefore, if 
the amount exceeds this limit authority to grant the loan must be obtained from a 
central branch office. In central branch office, the credit analysis department and risk 
control department are responsible for approving and monitoring loans. If they agree to 
finance the loans, they will send a report together with any accompanying 
documentation to the Credit Examination Committee for final approval.”  
 
BOC‟s project selection mechanism is similarly based on three steps, but it is slightly 
different from ICBCs. First of all, the bank will investigate the enterprise. The 
investigation will incorporate an analysis of the financial performance of the enterprise 
and the bank will make an assessment of its corporate governance structures and ability 
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to provide adequate collateral in the form of mortgages, etc to the lending bank. 
Secondly, the bank will make an assessment of the feasibility of the project according to 
the information collected. Finally, the enterprise will be assessed by reference to the 
client rating report, which is provided by the central branch. Credit managers are in 
charge of approving loans and can make the final decision. However, as mentioned 
above, this is subject to a satisfactory client report from the central branch. The 
interviewee explained the client rating report as follows: 
 
 “The client rating report is researched by the central branch of BOC. It provides 
information and databases about different clients. These databases mainly compare the 
client’s financial profile with industrial norms and averages within their sector. The 
information includes information relating to total fixed assets, credit rating, default rate, 
and so on.”  
 
The interviewee from ABC emphasized that when selecting projects, the bank is more 
likely to choose high-technology projects with higher potential returns and profits. 
There are, however, demanding requirements /procedures for loan applications and 
strict regulations apply for selecting projects and clients. In particular emphasis is 
placed on financial performance, the experience of the enterprise managers and the 
viability/potential of the market. 
  
In contrast to the above mentioned banks, SDB is not a state-owned commercial bank 
but rather is one of only three policy banks in China. Its project selection decisions are 
made under the auspices of the state‟s industry development policy. The process of 
project selection is divided into credit rating and project assessment. Accordingly, SDB 
will assess the project by ascertaining the strength of the potential market and the 
associated cash flows of the enterprise. The government‟s policy and stated intention in 
the industrial sector in question will also be taken into account in determining whether 
to provide financial support for the project. SDB will then consider the credit analyst‟s 
assessments before making a decision. The interviewee at SDB stated that:  
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“The government will guide banks to select projects. Generally speaking, SDB 
cooperates with the government to select projects that are related to good infrastructure 
construction or country construction that the government aims to develop. At the same 
time, SDB provides training to managers in advanced credit skills and methods of 
controlling risk.” 
 
CB is a joint-stock commercial bank and, therefore, different from the other banks in 
that it is not influenced by government to the same extent. In conjunction with the 
marketing department, the central branch produces an annual credit guide, who 
identifies specific industrial sectors and clients that are to be given preference. Branches 
are then expected to focus their lending activities on these industries and clients.  
  
Proposals are assessed and rated according to a Moody‟ credit rating system by 
managers at branch level and a report is then prepared for the credit and auditing 
committee, which makes the lending decision. In the event that there is a disagreement 
within the credit and auditing committee, the Director of Risk Management, i.e. the 
chairman of the committee, has the final say. The interviewee from CB stated that:  
 
“Within the Credit and Auditing Committee, if the Director of Risk Management does 
not agree with the project, the loans will be refused. Even if all of the other committee 
members agree with the project, if the director of risk management does not agree, the 
loan will not be granted.” 
 
Although ICCB followed a similar process of project selection, the interviewee 
mentioned that some of the regulations were too vague and, therefore, gave too much 
freedom to lending managers. The ICCB interviewee said that: 
 
“We will consider which industry this project belongs to, what is the recent development 
of this industry and what are the prospects for this industry. We also set up regulations 
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to control or restrict the behaviors of the managers who are in charge of project 
selection. However, some of these regulations are not clear enough.‟‟ 
 
This finding raises the possibility that regulations, which do not adequately control the 
behavior of manager‟s, could make them more disposed to select risky projects and 
increase the incidence of NPLs.  
 
In addition, the ICBC interviewee identified the following considerations as problematic. 
Firstly, the report provided by the designing institution does not always accurately 
reflect the real condition/ status of the enterprise. Generally speaking, the chosen design 
institution is familiar with the industry and is responsible for writing a report on the 
feasibility of the proposal. However, the interviewee claimed that it is possible for the 
enterprise to bribe staff in these institutions and ask them to write favorable reports, 
which do not reflect the true facts of the case. Secondly, interpersonal relationships are 
very important in determining whether government officials support lending proposals 
and this raises another potential problem, as stated by the interviewee: 
 
 “The government’s agreement or support document is very important in helping an 
enterprise getting loans from banks. However, government officials are not always 
familiar with the enterprises themselves. They have no ideas about the performance of 
the enterprise including market shares and profits. The government officials always 
listen to the enterprise leaders’ words and do not make supporting decisions based on 
their own investigation. Therefore, if an enterprise leader has a good relationship with 
the government officials, this enterprise can easily get support from the government, 
even if this project might not be good enough to get support.” 
 
Thirdly, the ICBC interviewee claimed that the government is more concerned with 
increasing economic output and places too little emphasis on efficiency:  
 
“The government focuses on scale economy. It cares too much about the amount of 
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production rather than the efficiency of the enterprise. That is because government 
officials aim to have achievement in their own posts. Therefore, they support some 
low-efficient enterprises.” 
 
Finally the interviewee claimed that there were some problems associated with ICBCs 
internal credit risk assessment. Specifically, he claimed that managers responsible for 
credit risk assessment were not always sufficiently experienced or qualified:  
 
“They do not have enough knowledge and information about the performance of the 
enterprise. On some occasions, the report they provide for credit analysis is just a copy 
of what the enterprise provides to them.”  
 
The considerations raised by the interviewee from ICBC explain why lending decisions 
can sometimes be poor and, therefore, they could be important causal factors behind the 
high levels of NPLs in China. What is not clear from the interviewee‟s comments is to 
what extent these considerations are generic. However, as the remainder of this chapter 
will reveal the question of suitably qualified and experienced lending managers would 
appear to be a widespread problem in Chinese banking. Similarly, to the extent that 
government guarantees and interference is an important consideration in bank lending, 
the criticisms levied at government officials could also be an important consideration in 
explaining poor lending decisions and high levels of NPLs.   
 
6.2.2 Lack of project selection skills 
 
In all of the banks in the interview sample, the credit administration or risk management 
departments were ultimately responsible for “big ticket” projects or large amounts of 
bank finance. Generally speaking, branch managers could make lending decisions on 
relatively small loans but the interviewees from ICBC and CCB considered that branch 
managers had insufficient skills to make consistently good lending decisions. The 
interviewee from CCB argued that even so-called specialist credit managers, working in 
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the credit analysis department, did not have good enough qualifications and lacked 
appropriate skills and experience: 
 
 “For example, in credit analysis department, there are just several managers. However, 
they have to do investigations into many different industries in order to provide reports 
about the possibility of making loans to different projects. Sometimes they are not 
familiar with these industries and therefore the reports they provide are not always 
reliable and accurate. What banks could do is to recruit employees from different 
majors or with different backgrounds rather than just from finance, accounting, 
investment and economics related majors. These employees can be particularly 
responsible for a certain industry that they are familiar with. Therefore, the reports 
provided can be more reliable for assessment.”  
 
Moreover, he argued that this general lack of expertise and experience largely explained 
why branch managers did not have greater autonomy in project selection and why 
lending decisions were taken only after extensive consultation within the bank. 
 
The interviewee from CCB, similarly, emphasized that although there were no formal 
mechanism within the bank for encouraging or restricting the behavior of lending 
managers there was a culture of consultation with superiors and collective decision 
making. As above, this process of consultation derived from concerns about the lack of 
expertise and qualifications amongst lending managers. Moreover, this concern was 
heightened by the distinct possibility that bad lending decisions could lead to loss of 
employment. This was captured by the following statement: 
 
“For example, managers have more obligations than the rewards they can get. In some 
branch banks, when a loan is proven to be non-performing or nearly non-performing, 
the manager approving this loan should be responsible for it and try all his best to 
collect this non-performing loan until it is totally paid back. Otherwise, the manager’s 
salary will be deducted and even more seriously, he or she might loss the job.”  
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6.2.3 Managers’ lack of strong incentives 
 
The interviewees expressed a wide range of responses on the lack of incentives for 
managers to select the best projects.  
 
The ICBC and CCB interviewees had similar opinions and agreed that the lack of 
adequate incentives was an important explanatory factor behind large NPLs. However 
the interviewees from BOC, ABC and SDB were non-committal on this subject. The 
interviewee from CB strongly disagreed with the idea that inadequate management 
incentives were a major explanatory reason and argued that NPLs mainly result from 
policy risk and market considerations: 
  
“The government’s macro-economic control policy might make a few corporations in 
some industries negatively affected. Or some corporations fail in an increasingly fierce 
market competition because of their bad management or wrong decisions.”  
 
The interviewees from ICBC and CCB believed that managers lacked incentives 
because of considerations relating to inadequately qualified lending managers, moral 
hazard, government guarantees and the bank‟s reward and penalty regulations. The 
ICBC interviewee, for example, claimed that managers are inclined to lend to inefficient 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) because they know that any losses will be absorbed by 
the government. Moreover, within ICBC, there were no rewards (and, therefore, no 
incentives) for making good loans. However, there are penalties for managers who 
make decisions, which lead to non-performing loans. Accordingly, salaries could be 
reduced and even more seriously poor decision making can lead to loss of employment.  
 
The interviewee from CCB pointed out that prior to the mid-1990s, managers within 
CCB did not have the power to make loans nor did they have responsibility for 
monitoring loans once they were granted. In essence their primary responsibility was 
simply to pass on their recommendations to the central branch and credit committee. 
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This detracted from efficient project selection and increased moral hazard: 
 
 “Bank managers could get “grey money/ income” from borrowers. Therefore, they had 
intention to consider their own interests rather than banks’ interests. Bank managers’ 
moral hazard was more likely to happen because they did not need to be responsible for 
loans they had made.” 
 
However, since the mid-1990s practice within CCB has changed and managers are now 
more responsible for loan approval. This has brought more commitment to the interests 
of the bank and reduced the pursuit of self interest amongst managers: 
 
 “For example, if some of the loans turn out to be non-performing, they need to collect 
them back. Otherwise, the managers will be penalized in the form of salary deduction or 
being laid-off.  If the loans turned out to be good and paid back on time, the managers 
who are in charge of these loans may get reward in different forms and even be 
promoted.”  
 
The interviewee from BOC claimed that government policy is the main explanatory 
reason for the lack of incentives:  
 
“In China, banks are closely connected to the government. Once the government makes 
some lending guidance, policy, banks have to follow them without any hesitation. That is 
because we are state-owned.”  
 
Similarly, the interviewee from ABC argued that the lack of incentive is the result of a 
long term centrally-planned economy in China:  
 
“Under a planned economy regime, the government sets credit or loan scale targets. In 
order to finish the task, banks make loans to some inefficient SOEs and sometimes make 
loans to nearly bankrupt SOEs to service their old loans. Because both the enterprises 
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and banks are state-owned, managers do not have enough sense of responsibility and 
incentives to select good projects or customers. Even if the borrowers do not pay back 
the money to banks on time, managers do not have a sense of responsibility to collect 
them back.” 
 
The interviewee from SDB claimed that the nature of the bank‟s ownership structure, i.e. 
because it is entirely state owned, was the main explanatory reason in explaining the 
lack of incentive amongst lending managers. 
  
6. 2.4 Reward and penalty regulations 
 
Reward and penalty regulations were perceived as being potentially important in 
providing incentives for managers‟ by all six interviewees. However, there was no clear 
discernable pattern amongst the different types of bank. For example, within ICBC, 
CCB, and SDB there are no reward mechanisms for managers who make good lending 
decisions. However, there are penalties if managers make poor decisions that result in 
non-performing loans. As pointed out by the ICBC interviewee, this penalty mechanism 
can encourage managers to adopt good lending practices and select good-quality 
projects. However, in some instances, it can be counterproductive by making managers 
too cautious or perhaps too conservative when making loans. 
 
In contrast, BOC takes a more flexible approach to rewards and penalties. Rewards are 
used but they are mainly based on branch rather than individual performance. Within 
ABC rewards and penalties are based on the performance of individuals. Staff bonuses 
are paid to staff that consistently perform well but staff who underperform have their 
salary reduced. 
 
6.2.5 Measures to Improve Manager’s Incentives 
 
All the interviewees claimed that their respective banks had introduced a wide range of 
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measures to improve manager‟s incentives and encourage them to select profitable 
projects and make good lending decisions. Nevertheless, the interviewee from ICBC 
suggested that banks should place more emphasis on the recruitment of qualified 
employees and endeavor to improve credit risk assessment skills. He also went on to 
claim that banks should also try and reduce the influence of government and strengthen 
manager‟s sense of responsibility.  
 
Most of these issues were also mentioned by the CCB interviewee who also suggested 
that manager‟s incentives could be improved (in state owned banks) by reducing 
government interference and going public, as follows:  
 
“Through public listing, more diversified public investors are attracted and involved in 
bank corporate governance. It helps to reduce government interference. The 
government has decided the fastest way to improve the industry is to sell strategic stakes 
to foreign operators who will not only re-capitalize them but also introduce world-class 
management and practices.” 
 
The CCB interviewee suggested that additional management responsibility could be 
engendered by the application of penalties. He further claimed that penalties can 
encourage managers to select good projects because their own interests and those of the 
bank would be more closely aligned. This idea of a combination of incentives and 
penalties (and better training) was also supported by the interviewees from BOC, ASBC, 
CB and ABC. For example, the interviewee from ABC stated that: 
 
“Banks should provide managers with more training. For example, they can input them 
with more law and modern finance related knowledge. At the same time, bank 
managers’ sense of responsibility can be improved through increased or decreased 
salary.” 
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The interviewee from SDB, whilst agreeing with the above, raised some rather different 
points and claimed that it is important to separate the selection of possible lending 
opportunities from the process of loan approval. Such a division would be more 
conducive to strengthening bank risk management and control. Specifically, it would 
allow managers with responsibility for loan selection to focus more on relationship 
banking and leave those with responsibility for loan approval free to concentrate on the 
business case. The SDB interviewee also suggested that such an approach is more 
conducive to pricing loans more accurately because it would be based on a better 
knowledge of the customer/enterprise. 
 
6.2.6 Government and political influences  
 
The interviewees from ICBC, CCB, BOC and CB agreed that government and political 
considerations greatly influenced manager‟s decisions in the selection of projects. The 
interviewee from BOC argued that the government will guide and to some extent dictate 
bank policy on the granting and control of loans. Banks are an important part of a 
government‟s macroeconomic policy and, therefore, it is not unusual to see interest rate 
policies and quantitative controls applied through the banking system. The interviewee 
from CCB recognized, however, that this can affect the performance and profitability of 
the banks: 
 
“For example, nowadays, customers’ demand for loans is tremendous due to the rapid 
development of the Chinese economy. However, according to the government’s credit 
policy, the amount of loans is limited. Managers’ incentive to select good customers or 
projects is very important because banks will make much more profits if they do so.” 
 
Similarly, the interviewee from ABC argued that in a centrally planned economy such as 
China‟s, government has far more influence than in most western or market orientated 
economies. In China the government directly guides banks in terms of their lending 
decisions. In a market-oriented economy, however, banks are much more independent 
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and can make their own lending decisions and react more flexibly to changes in the 
market. The interviewee in CB admitted that, even in a non state bank, government and 
political considerations had some influence on project selection. However, in contrast to 
the other banks, the interviewee from SDB claimed that government and political 
considerations did not have a negative effect on bank lending. Rather the interviewee 
argued that government cooperated well with SDB and guided the bank in selecting 
good projects.  
 
The interviewee from CCB provided some additional and interesting insights into this 
question by asserting that the extent of government and political influence depended on 
the different ownership structures of the banks. In essence, he claimed that as banks 
diversified ownership they had a tendency to pursue their own corporate goals rather 
than the policy aims of government:  
 
“In city commercial banks, local government normally is the biggest shareholder and 
these banks are normally established under the local government’s guidance and 
support. Therefore, local government’s policy will directly interfere with city 
commercial banks’ lending decisions. Managers do not have independent rights to 
select projects on many occasions. However, the ownership structure of joint-stock 
commercial banks are more diversified. These banks consider more about their own 
profits and efficiency rather than the government’s political goals. Joint-stock 
commercial banks are less influenced by government’s political decisions.” 
 
6.2.7 Poor bank performance 
 
The lack of management incentives in the selection of projects was generally believed 
to have a negative effect on bank performance. For example, the interviewee from 
ICBC claimed: 
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“Bank managers’ lack of incentives to select good projects can probably lead to no 
repayment of principal and interests, increasing financial losses and reduced profits. In 
the meantime, banks have to make higher loan loss provisions if these projects turn out 
to be bad.” 
 
The interviewees expressed slightly different perspectives on the question of incentives 
but they were all in agreement about their importance. For example, the interviewee 
from CCB emphasized that the lack of incentives can lead to “ineffective lending 
decisions and decreased bank profits”. Likewise the CB and ABC interviewees claimed 
that lending manager‟s incentives are fundamental to a bank‟s performance and are an 
important reason behind large amounts of NPLs in China. 
 
6.2.8 The significance and importance of social relationships 
  
Social relationships, i.e. relationships with bank customers, politicians and policy 
makers, were regarded by some of the interviewees as an important aspect of bank 
lending, especially, in a country like China. The interviewees from CCB and ICBC 
emphasized this importance and made particular reference to government and political 
considerations. In addition they also stressed the importance of social networks and the 
wealth structure within China for securing bank loans. They also stressed the growing 
importance of the banker-customer relationship. The following extract from the 
interview with the manager from CCB succinctly captures these points: 
 
“While the Chinese economy has been transferring from a planned economy to a 
market-oriented economy, the market is also transferring from a seller’s market to a 
buyer’s market. In the past, if the borrowers or enterprises wanted to get loans from 
banks, they had to keep a good relationship with bank managers. Otherwise, they could 
not get access to loans sometimes. Therefore, bank managers usually made loans to 
those borrowers that had built up relationships with them. However, this situation has 
completely changed nowadays. Borrowers or customers are regarded as “God”. Bank 
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managers have to keep a good relationship with customers or borrowers on their own 
initiatives. Therefore they can attract more depositors and make loans to good quality of 
customers.”  
 
The CCB interviewee emphasized that the wealth structure within China means that a 
very small proportion of people have the majority of wealth. Therefore, it is also 
important to build up relationships with the very wealthy in order to attract and retain 
their business.  
 
The interviewee from BOC agreed with these points and emphasized the importance of 
relationship banking in improving the quality of lending, especially, when lending to 
business enterprises. The interviewee argued that this approach is highly conducive to 
high levels of profitability and lower levels of NPLs. The interviewee from ABC, 
similarly, stressed the importance of relationship banking but also emphasized that 
provided the vested interests of banks and their employees are closely aligned, staff will 
not allow relationships to override other considerations in making the lending decision. 
The SDB interviewee expressed a similar viewpoint and claimed that social 
relationships are important, however, they are not the only determining factor in project 
selection: 
 
 “As to a small project, a credit manager might have a good relationship with the 
borrower. He might prefer to lend to this borrower but will, nevertheless, write a 
financial report based on the facts of the case. As to a big project, the whole committee 
makes decisions together. Relationships are far less important on this occasion. 
However, there is no denying that relationship sometimes helps giving more accurate 
and reliable information than financial report. That is because the financial report 
might not be accurately written. In addition, long-time cooperation relationship 
sometimes helps borrowers getting easy access to loans.” 
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The interviewee from CB also placed the importance of social and interpersonal 
relationships in perspective by stating that it was the credit committee that made the 
ultimate lending decisions. 
 
6.2.9 Summary 
 
The majority of interviewees claimed that they had clear project selection mechanisms 
within their banks. It was also interesting to find that they regarded relationship banking 
and social networking, in particular, as highly conducive to making good lending 
decisions. However, they identified lack of management incentives, government 
interference, poorly qualified staff and a range of moral hazard issues, as major causes 
of poor quality lending. These considerations resulted in inappropriate project selection, 
financial losses and poor bank performance and were considered to be important factors 
in explaining high levels of NPLs in Chinese banks  
  
6. 3 Government interference and guarantees  
  
6.3.1 Increased levels of NPLs 
 
The interviewees from ICBC, CCB, BOC and ABC were all in agreement that 
government interference and guarantees were important factors in explaining the large 
amounts of NPLs in China. Only the interviewee from SDB, i.e. the policy bank, held a 
neutral position on this question. Both the interviewees from ICBC and CCB argued 
that government interference can easily lead to increased policy lending, i.e. lending 
that is supported by the government because it is regarded as being conducive to 
economic development.  
 
Moreover, an emphasis on policy lending can lead to an increase in NPLs as explained 
by the interviewee from ICBC: 
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“The government needs to direct banks to make policy lending for its own interests. For 
example, the city of Changsha (the capital of Hunan province) aimed to construct more 
roads for city expansion in 2000. The local government should have supported the 
project financially using government revenue. However, the local government was in 
deficit at that time and, therefore, it turned to Changsha City Commercial Bank (CCCB) 
for help. Since the local government owned a majority of CCCB shares, CCCB had no 
option but to finance the project in order to get other types of support from the local 
government in the future. However, after the roads were constructed, the local 
government was still in deficit and could not repay CCCB. This led to a large amount of 
NPLs within the bank.” 
 
Most of the interviewees claimed that moral hazard is another consideration that helps 
to explain the accumulation of NPLs in China. For example, an implicit government 
guarantee, such as, a comfort letter or a commitment of government funds, may 
encourage banks to invest in risky ventures or projects that have low returns. As the 
interviewee from ABC pointed out, under these circumstances there is less incentive to 
assess risk and select good projects because of the ostensible backing of government.  
  
Nevertheless, most of the interviewees agreed that government‟s influence over banks, 
including state and policy banks, has been gradually reducing. The interviewee from 
CCB explained this point as follows:  
 
“Government guarantees exerted a greatly influence on Chinese banks in the past, 
particularly ICBC. This might explain why ICBC has a very high NPLs ratio compared 
with other banks. However, this situation has changed. We cannot say that government 
guarantees have no influences on bank’s lending decisions any more but we can say that 
government’s influences on banks have been gradually reduced. Nowadays, Chinese 
banks try to learn from international experiences to reform their banking system. 
Information disclosure and transparency have been updated to a higher level. 
Government’ control over banks becomes weaker and weaker. The government also 
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realized that it is better not to interfere with banks too much because this could 
adversely affect economic development.” 
 
The point about learning from international banks was also mentioned by the 
interviewee from CCB who also went on to emphasize the importance of collecting 
reliable information. As the quotation below shows, however, the problem of collecting 
accurate data is not only a symptom of a China‟s developing economy but also 
reflective of China‟s bureaucratic culture:  
 
“For example, although financial information has to be more transparent, it still can be 
misleading and sometimes even wrong. Information infrastructures have not been well 
established yet. Databases and other information sources are being established but they 
are still far from being standard. Managers do not have enough advanced skills to 
estimate the potential risk of projects. In addition, the financial markets are not highly 
developed. This is different from western countries where financial markets have 
already developed to a mature stage. Apart from economic factors, the relationship 
culture and bureaucracy is dominant in Chinese society. This is a very important reason 
that we call “culture factors”.” 
 
In contrast to these opinions the interviewee from CB did not think that government 
guarantees were an important explanatory factor behind the accumulation of large NPLs. 
Rather, this interviewee claimed that NPLs were largely a result of market risks and, 
therefore, some enterprises were bound to fail and become insolvent in a competitive 
environment.  
  
6.3.2 The purpose of government guarantees and interference 
 
Regarding the purpose of government guarantees and interference in bank lending, the 
six interviewees emphasized both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, 
the ICBC interviewee emphasized that government guarantees and interference can 
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support inefficient or technically insolvent SOEs, thereby, safeguarding employment. 
Moreover, by supporting insolvent or inefficient SOEs, the government can provide 
them with valuable time to improve and become profitable: 
 
“Since SOEs used to employ a large number of workers, if the government do not 
support technically insolvent SOEs with financial aid, these enterprises may go 
bankrupt and lots of employees will be laid off, which can lead to rising unemployment 
and social instability. However, if the government helps these low-efficient enterprises 
with financial support, these enterprises will-survive and may well become 
competitive.” 
  
The ICBC interviewee also emphasized some of the more negative aspects of 
government interference, especially, the fact that government is understandably too 
concerned with political considerations and, therefore, focuses too much on broad 
economic targets, such as, GDP growth. The interviewee from CCB similarly argued 
that government‟s primary concern in granting guarantees to policy banks was to 
develop macro-economic policies through policy lending. However, he also recognized 
that government support was conducive to SOE reform and improved efficiency:  
  
“Government guarantee used to be extremely important in policy banks. The 
government aims to develop national macro economy through policy lending. It also 
aims to support SOEs reform. Government guarantee supports those enterprises to get 
access to loans and they can develop their production with more financial aid. In the 
past, these enterprises were totally owned by the State and they worked on a very 
low-efficiency basis. The government urges banks to make policy lending to help these 
enterprises and survive in an increasingly competitive market. If the government did not 
do this they would go bankrupt and, a large number of employees would be laid off. This 
will cause social instability and many political problems.” 
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The interviewee from BOC also agreed with these claims but also emphasized the 
important role of government in setting regulations to direct bank lending. These 
government directions are crucial in supporting and restricting the development of a 
certain industries. 
 
Despite the different motives and purposes behind government interference and 
guarantees, all of the interviewees were in agreement that the main objective was to 
support poorly-performing SOEs, and develop specific industrial sectors: The following 
quote from the interviewee from SDB encapsulates these sentiments: 
 
“Government guarantee and interference in China mainly aims to establish new public 
facilities and infrastructure projects, support key enterprises’ technological 
advancement, develop rural areas and other poor areas in form of tax deduction, and 
develop the economy in western areas like Tibet. Central government cooperates with 
the local government through policy lending and aims to develop prior industry policy 
and strategy, and direct banks to lend to superior and profitable industries like heavy 
industry and information technology industry.” 
  
6.3.3 Poor-performing SOEs and inefficient bank lending 
  
There was general consensus amongst the interviewees that government interference 
was now less of a problem in China. Nevertheless, the ICBC interviewee claimed that 
government guarantees are not always conducive to efficient lending and can lead to an 
increase in bank credit risk. However, he also recognized that without government 
support many SOEs would simply fail to obtain finance and collapse: 
  
“Government interference and guarantee influence banks’ lending decisions. Sometimes 
banks come across a huge risk because of selecting projects supported by the 
government. However, government guarantee may help some very poor-performing 
enterprises get loans from banks and support them re-survive. It is also possible that the 
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government supports some bad projects because of enterprise leaders’ wrong words.” 
 
A similar view was expressed by the CCB interviewee who also stressed the benefits of 
government interference for the broader macro economy:  
 
“Government guarantee has both positive and negative effects on both banks and 
enterprises. For example, the government interferes with banks’ lending decisions and 
this does increase their losses. In China, four state-owned commercial banks account 
for the majority of bank assets and deposits. Before listing on the market, the State has a 
lot of control over them. In addition, government guarantee is extremely important to an 
enterprise. With government support, the enterprises will have many benefits such as 
low-interest loans, tax reduction, policy support and etc. Otherwise, it will be difficult 
for an enterprise to get loans without government support. In particular, small and 
middle-sized enterprises are very difficult to enter the loan market. They have to keep 
good relationships with the government in order to get support. However, this situation 
has already changed to some extent. For example, for those strong small and 
middle-sized enterprises, the government will support and encourage them if they turn 
out to have good performance or make enough profits. This will boost the development 
of the local economy. Therefore, the government is very powerful and influential in 
China, either for banks or for enterprises.” 
 
The BOC interviewee emphasized the moral hazard aspect of government guarantees to 
banks and enterprises, and claimed that it can lead to poor lending practices, especially, 
in terms of pricing loans. He also mentioned that sometimes bank loans supported by 
government were misdirected by the enterprise and used for purposes other than what 
was stated in the proposal to the bank. This consideration implies that banks have poor 
control mechanisms for monitoring government supported loans and this can lead to an 
increase in NPLs: 
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“They lose the incentives to price the loan accurately and instead they make lending 
decisions for the consideration of their own interests, because they know the 
government will absorb the losses. Some enterprises managers even use the loans for 
speculation on the Stock Exchange or the real estate. In the past, a large amount of such 
risky loan turned out to be NPLs in the end.” 
 
The BOC interviewee suggested that policy risk is another important factor. In this 
respect he argued that in order to adjust the macro economy, the government may adopt 
policies that require banks to reduce lending to specific industries. This could well lead 
to the collapse of businesses that the banks have large exposures to and result in NPLs. 
The interviewee from ABC claimed that this consideration is magnified when the banks 
are also being encouraged to financially support loss-making SOEs through policy 
lending.  
 
The interviewee from CB, the publically owned joint stock bank, had quite different 
views compared to the other interviewees and claimed that within his bank a 
government guarantee did not necessarily mean that a loan would be granted. This 
implies that prudent lending practices are applied and although a government guarantee 
would be taken into account, it is only one of several considerations. This claim also 
suggests that within CB government guarantees have less bearing on NPLs. 
 
Although the four interviewees from the state-owned commercial banks expressed pros 
and cons relating to government interference they were, for understandable reasons, 
non-committal when pressed on whether it led directly to inefficient lending within their 
banks. However, reflecting on the above comments it seems reasonable to infer that this 
is, at the very least, a distinct possibility.  
 
6.3.4 The necessity of government guarantees and interference  
  
With regard to whether government guarantees are necessary or not, the interviewee 
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from SDB argued strongly that in the past, government guarantees were crucial in 
supporting the development of a planned economy. Moreover, they are still important in 
China‟s emerging market orientated economy because of structural weaknesses in 
financial and capital markets. The interviewee from CCB also emphasized this point as 
follows:  
 
“Although markets play a very important role in economic activities, they have their 
own weaknesses. It is important for the government to interfere with economic activities 
and make up for these weaknesses. It is difficult to separate government interference 
from market in economic activities.” 
 
The interviewees from ICBC, BOC and CB expressed fairly neutral attitudes towards 
the necessity of government guarantees. However, the ABC interviewee argued that 
although government guarantees and interference can support the development of 
certain industries, it can also misdirect the banks‟ lending policies. For example, 
government might well set banks targets for lending to specific industries. However, 
when government policy changes the banks could still have a significant exposure to 
these industries. Moreover, the banks cannot always stop lending to specific enterprises 
immediately or at the whim of government. In addition, the banks themselves might 
have strategic plans regarding the development of their loan portfolio and have a vested 
interest in nurturing long term relationships with their customers. 
 
Most of the interviewees explained that the main form of government interference is 
based on oral promises or guarantees, i.e. so-called Letters of Comfort. The only 
exception was ABC, the agricultural bank, which obtained government guarantees 
backed by some form of tangible security, either in the form of a mortgage or a financial 
commitment from the government. The interviewees (apart from ABC) also discussed 
some of the measures that their banks have taken to reduce the impact of government 
interference. In this respect, the interviewee from ICBC summed up what had happened 
in most state owned commercial banks: 
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“We have taken some measures to reduce the influences of government interference. For 
example, we have conducted personnel and administrative reform. Staff within ICBC is 
now directly administrated by the central branch in Beijing rather than the local 
government. In the past, the local government was responsible for not only supervising 
banks in their region but also had the power to promote bank staff and managers. 
However since 2000, responsibility for the promotion of ICBC staff now rests with the 
central branch of ICBC. This change has greatly reduced the government’s control over 
the bank. We also have far more independence in the selection of customers and the 
granting of loans.” 
 
The interviewee from CCB suggested that government interference in banks could be 
reduced even further by attracting more investors and shareholders through public 
listings. In addition, diversified ownership would also provide the shareholders with the 
right to comment on the management of the banks: 
 
“More and more banks are listed on the market and three of the SOCBs have now been 
listed on the HongKong Stock Exchange. SOCBs aim to reduce government 
shareholding through public listing. They want to attract the public and foreign 
investors to buy their shares. The government should not exclusively control SOCBs 
although it still holds a majority of their shares.” 
 
The interviewee from CCB also suggested that government should play a more 
important role in the supervision and regulation of banks but should interfere less 
directly in bank lending. The interviewee also claimed that the move towards a 
market-oriented economy would eventually result in greater market efficiency and 
reduce the need for government interference. The interviewees from ICBC and BOC 
also expressed similar views and the latter interviewee expanded on how a move 
towards a market economy would reduce government interference. In this respect, he 
claimed that the development of China‟s financial and capital markets would result in 
better products and provide customers with more choice: 
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“Creating new and advanced financial products will give customers more choices to get 
financial support and select financial services. It will be useful to reduce the 
government’s too much administrative interference.” 
 
As mentioned earlier, the interviewee from CB tended to adopt a different stance 
compared to the other interviewees and stated that government guarantees had little 
influence on bank lending at CB. Somewhat interestingly, the interviewee also stated 
that within CB there were specific regulations prohibiting the granting of loans based 
primarily on government guarantees.  
 
6.3.5 The importance of social relations  
 
With regard to social ties and interpersonal relationships, all of the interviewees agreed 
that this was a very important factor, especially, in developing relationships between 
government institutions and the bank. Moreover, the interviewee from BOC emphasized 
that relationships were becoming, if anything, more important as the Chinese economy 
developed. He also suggested that the importance of relationships in obtaining and 
granting credit, is something that is readily recognized not only by the banks but by the 
government and bank customers alike 
 
The ICBC interviewee agreed that relationships were important but suggested that they 
should not be allowed to justify or exclusively form the basis for loans to inefficient 
projects. ICBC also provided some insight into the nature of these relationships and 
how they are built-up; stating that they take different forms and includes long-term 
commercial cooperation, leader-employee relationships, and relationships with friends 
and relatives, etc. This interviewee also pointed out the importance of developing 
professional relationships through social activities, such as, club memberships and 
playing golf, etc. The interviewee from SDB stated they could also be developed 
through travelling together and meeting at conferences. He also claimed that the 
importance of relationships to the granting of credit also derives from the fact that 
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complicated social relationships are a fundamental part of Chinese culture (so-called 
“Guanxi”). 
  
6.3.6 Reasons behind the accumulation of NPLs 
  
The interviewees mentioned a wide range of explanatory factors behind NPLs in China 
but most of these can be traced back to-the government, the banks or the enterprises 
themselves 
 
The interviewee from ICBC claimed that NPLs were a direct result of weak corporate 
governance structures in banks. For example, he claimed that ICBC did not have a good 
loan approval system and this problem was compounded by the poor education and 
credit skills of the managers. He also pointed out that under the current Chinese socialist 
regime, the government can and does directly interfere with bank lending decisions. A 
large amount of so-called policy loans are, therefore, made by the banks to 
accommodate government economic policy and these can result in NPLs. The ICBC 
interviewee claimed that the development of relationship banking can result in better 
lending decisions and better margins for the banks. However, the banks are only just 
beginning to realize the importance of having close relationships with their customers.  
 
In the past corruption and fraud was an important contributory factor in NPLs but the 
situation has got better. The following quote from the ICBC interview captures this 
succinctly: 
 
“Some private enterprises bribe bank credit managers and apply for loans. Once they 
successfully get access to loans, they cancel the enterprises and take the loans with 
them. The bosses of the enterprises and bank managers share the money after that. This 
happened quite often before the 1990s. We call this “financial crime”. At that time, bank 
employees did not need to be responsible for their defaults and behaviors. Banks did not 
have a good supervision and regulation framework. However, this situation has 
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changed a lot nowadays.” 
 
The ICBC interviewee also pointed out that circumstances of a borrower can change 
and referred to this as market risk. Therefore, once a facility has been granted it is very 
important for the bank to control and monitor the customer: 
 
“For example, some loans are not risky at the beginning when they are made. However, 
2 or 3 years later, the market preference has changed. The products do not have market 
potential. We call this “market risk”. Or sometimes, after a good team leader (senior 
manager) of the enterprise changes, the new leader is incapable of leading the 
enterprise. The enterprise begins to operate on a low-efficient basis. Another case is 
that credit managers are responsible for loan approval and have rights to supervise 
them. When new credit managers are incapable of supervising these loans, potential 
risks may increase.”  
 
The interviewee from CCB reiterated the earlier points about poorly qualified and 
inexperienced staff and the problems associated with accessing data. Similarly, the 
interviewee from BOC focused on the previously mentioned moral hazard issues and 
claimed that enterprise managers sometimes obtained bank loans and government 
support under false pretences. In particular, bank loans were not used in the way that the 
banks or government anticipated or were led to believe. Instead, they were used for 
other speculative purposes, which substantially increased the credit risks. 
 
The interviewee from ABC emphasized how the activities of the government permeate 
almost every aspect of China‟s commercial life. In this respect, he argued that the 
government must take a large part of the responsibility for poor lending decisions in 
banks and the large amounts of NPLs. He also stressed that since the mid 1990s the 
major state-owned banks in China had begun a process of transformation into 
commercial banks with diversified ownership structures and greatly expanded markets. 
Nevertheless, despite this transformation, the government still exerts considerable 
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influence on bank lending. Specifically, in order to achieve economic targets, he 
claimed that government explicitly encourages banks to grant credit beyond the limits 
dictated by prudent lending.  
 
The interviewee from ABC also claimed that because China was in many respects a 
developing country, its legal structures (and markets) were still not properly developed. 
Consequently, Chinese banks lacked the legal recourse to enforce repayment of debts in 
the courts. This problem is also compounded by the high incidence of fraud, the 
emerging usage of credit cards and the difficulties associated with simply verifying 
customer information: 
 
“Mortgage lending, car lending, personal housing lending substantially increase in 
recent years and it contributes to a very rapid bank credit growth. Some people provide 
banks with illusive identification, income statements and some other unreal information 
to get access to different forms of loans and credit. Once the loans turn out to be 
non-repayable, the banks have no real information to chase up the borrower. Apart from 
this, another phenomenon appears in recent years. With the rapid development of 
Chinese economy, credit card has been more widely used than before, although it is still 
not as popular as in developed countries. Some people hold several credit cards with 
different banks or apply for credit card with illusive identification. They use one credit 
card to pay for another credit card. These behaviors also result in bank NPLs.” 
 
The interviewee from SDB focused on the political regime and the centrally planned 
economy in China. In addition, he also claimed that the unevenness of economic 
development throughout China was another important reason behind the large incidence 
of NPLs. The interviewee stated that: 
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“Some poor areas can easily get funding from banks with government support or 
directly from the government. However, some of these projects are not as productive as 
expected because these areas are short of skills, information and professionals. In the 
more developed areas, some investors show a lot of interests in borrowing from banks to 
speculate on the property market or stock exchange. Once the economy slows down or 
the government suddenly makes policy changes, these investors are severely affected 
and have no ability or no available cash to pay back the loans.” 
 
The interviewee from SDB also pointed out that economic cycles may negatively affect 
some industries more than others. Similarly, some regions of China might be less 
affected by economic recession than others. In this respect, market risk and policy risk 
cannot always be gauged or quantified with any degree of accuracy. 
 
In the interviewee from CBs opinion the most important factor for the accumulation of 
NPLs has come from the market itself and he highlighted corporate failure and the 
government‟s economic development strategies as being the most important reasons. 
However, he also identified the bank‟s poor internal credit risk management: 
 
“Some banks relax the credit assessment of corporations and place too much reliance 
on government guarantees. They lower the requirements and conditions of collateral or 
mortgages when making loans that have government guarantees. This can easily 
facilitate soft control and impose no constraints on corporations. In the earlier stage of 
economic development in China, the government’s control over macro-economy was 
very powerful. Too much government interference made a lot of NPLs occur at that time. 
The credit standing of the society and its citizens has to be improved. Some companies 
have no intention to pay back their loans. Apart from these, banks’ internal management 
and risk control also need to be improved to a higher level.” 
 
6.3.7 Summary 
 
All of the SOCB interviewees believed that government guarantees and interference 
were important considerations in explaining the huge accumulation of NPLs in China‟s 
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banks. They emphasized that government interference has a large influence on the 
performance and operation of business enterprises and banks. However, somewhat 
interestingly, none of the study banks supported the view that government guarantees 
and interference can easily lead to inefficient lending in the current economic regime.  
Instead they suggested that it was more likely in a centrally planned economy and in 
this respect, although it had been an issue in the past, its effect on bank lending was 
getting less of a problem. Moreover, the interviewees from SDB and ABC claimed that 
their respective banks had taken actions to reduce reliance on government guarantees 
and interference. 
 
Social /personal connections were, once again, emphasized by all of the interviewees as 
a key factor in developing relationships between government institutions and banks. 
Rather interestingly, all of the study banks agreed that government guarantees and 
interference can lead to the sort of moral hazard, principal agent and soft budget 
constraint problems, which were mentioned in the literature review. 
 
Somewhat crucially, most of the interviewees believed that government guarantees and 
interference were largely responsible for the large amount of bank NPLs. However, as 
mentioned above, this problem is not as important as before and all of the interviewees 
were in agreement on the benefits of government interference and guarantees in 
supporting SOEs and other forms of business enterprise in a rapidly changing economy. 
 
6. 4 Measures for dealing with NPLs 
 
6.4.1 Methods introduced to resolve the problem of NPLs 
  
The measures taken to deal with NPLs, inter alia, include improved debt collection 
procedures, debt equity swaps, making realistic provisions for bad and doubtful debts, 
etc and the majority of interviewees believed that they will be effective in reducing the 
problem. However, the interviewee from ICBC argued that the measures taken to deal 
with NPLs simply support the banks. In this respect, they tend to perpetuate the problem 
without addressing the root cause. The following quote from the interviewee from CCB 
captures this point: 
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“These measures have only a temporary positive effect on reducing NPLs in Chinese 
banks. However, they do not solve the root cause of the problem. Too much relationship 
loans make the situation different from western countries.” 
 
The interviewee from ICBC pointed out that the main methods taken to deal with NPLs 
focuses on AMCs i.e. AMCs that have expertise in managing bad and doubtful debts. In 
addition, resort has also been made to loan loss provisions, debt collection and 
debt-equity swaps: 
 
“There are different ways of dealing with NPLs. Bad assets and NPLs in the four 
SOCBs are mainly taken off by AMCs. These four AMCs are connected to each of the 
SOCBs. The bad assets taken from SOCBs are normally secured by mortgages and other 
forms of collateral. When enterprises cannot repay their loans, AMCs takes these bad 
assets from the SOCBs and sells them on the market. However, because these assets are 
not very good the AMCs have to sell them at a big discount. In other words, AMCs sell 
loans at below book value. This constitutes a large financial loss for the state.” 
 
The interviewee from ICBC continued to explain how his bank makes provisions and 
collect debts as follows: 
 
“The normal way of dealing with NPLs is to make loan loss provisions. In our normal 
operation, we have to make around 3% of total loans as loan loss provisions in order to 
reduce the credit risk and make up the potential losses. This will reduce banks’ profits 
but any bank has to do so. When NPLs occur, banks will try their best to collect the 
loans and the managers that used to be in charge of these loans will be responsible for 
this. Their salaries and positions will be negatively influenced by the outcome of these 
efforts.” 
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On the question of debt equity swaps the ICBC interviewee stated: 
 
“Another method that banks recently used to deal with NPLs is that the banks transform 
the loan in to equity, which we call a debt-equity swap. The enterprise does not need to 
pay interests anymore and this will substantially reduce their costs and lessen their 
financial burden. It gives the enterprise a good opportunity to get out of difficulties and 
make profits.” 
 
The ICBC interviewee claimed that these sort of measures had reduced the banks‟ NPLs 
ratios and increased their operating profits. They also helped both the business 
enterprises and the banks to reduce their financial burdens. In addition, more recently 
the banks have injected more capital into their businesses by obtaining public listings. 
 
The interviewee from CCB emphasized the importance of an effective internal risk 
assessment system and credit rating system for reducing the likelihood of 
non-repayment of debt. The interviewee went on to claim that once a customer defaults, 
the bank has the right to freeze or stop the borrowers‟ bank accounts until the loan is 
repaid. If these actions do not result in repayment of debt, the bank can transform the 
debt into equity, sell the mortgaged assets of the enterprise or resort to court action and 
have it declared bankrupt: 
 
“Banks can also negotiate and bargain with the enterprise about whether it can pay 
back the debt in form of its assets if it does not have enough money to pay back. In 
recent years, AMCs were set up to deal with NPLs. Asset securitization including 
debt-equity swaps have also become more popular.” 
 
The CCB interviewee also suggested that NPLs could be reduced by banks taking a 
more hands on/advisory role with their business customers. He also claimed that banks 
have a vested interest in doing this because by reducing NPLs the banks would improve 
their profitability and strengthen their balance sheets. 
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The interviewee from BOC pointed out that debt restructuring under a debt equity swap 
is also a very effective method of dealing with NPLs because it can encourage or even 
force the enterprises (especially SOEs) to undertake changes that make them more 
efficient. He also suggested that banks should create more financial products in order to 
diversify their risks and endeavor to create better team work within their respective 
organizations. 
 
The ABC interviewee identified a number of ways for reducing NPLs but somewhat 
interestingly, claimed that bank was essentially supportive of businesses that had 
potential but were experiencing short term difficulties:  
 
“When NPLs occur, we will try to collect and claim back these loans initiatively. If this 
is not successful, the bank will take over the borrowers’ mortgages or assets. Or if the 
borrower is an enterprise and the bank estimates that this enterprise has a potential 
ability to make profits in the future with more financial aids, the bank may continue to 
financially support the enterprise with interest rate reduction. If all these methods do 
not work out, we have to write off these NPLs as losses.” 
 
The interviewee from SDB supported this approach and claimed that the bank 
sometimes extended repayment dates or reduced interest rates. If the enterprise still 
could not repay the loan, the bank would sometimes continue to extend facilities 
provided the enterprise had the potential to make profits. The tax authority, in the form 
of tax incentives, also encourages some investors to invest in enterprises that have profit 
potential. However, the SDB interviewee emphasized that debt restructuring is still the 
most effective way of dealing with NPLs. 
 
The interviewee from SDB also mentioned that NPLs would be reduced by nurturing an 
efficient banking system and introducing appropriate bank regulations: 
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“The reform of the banking system still remains a priority in China. A clear corporate 
structure and appropriate regulations should be established. We also need to recruit 
more high-qualified employees since improved risk assessment skills are urgently 
needed in all Chinese banks.” 
 
The interviewee from CB reinforced most of the points made by the other interviewees 
but emphasized that these measures were crucial not only in reducing NPLs but also 
minimizing systemic risk. 
 
6.4.2 The public listing of banks 
 
A public listing is a relatively new measure taken by banks in recent years. All of the 
interviewees agreed that a public listing improved the corporate governance of Chinese 
banks. The interviewees CCB, BOC and SDB emphasized this point and argued that 
public listings introduced a new stakeholder, i.e. shareholders, who had a potentially 
powerful say in the internal management of the banks. Similarly, banks will be more 
strictly supervised by regulation committees and investors on the Stock Exchange. In 
other words, the interviewees argued that external investors via a public listing 
introduced an element of market discipline on banks that hitherto had been missing. The 
public listing of SOCBs also requires them to operate more like companies rather than 
agents of the government. Moreover, to the extent that the share price will reflect the 
performance of the bank, this will encourage banks to improve their performance.  
 
The interviewees from ICBC, SDB and CB had similar views and claimed that the main 
motivation for SOCBs to obtain public listing was so that they could generate additional 
capital, and improve their capital adequacy and asset liability ratios. At the same time, 
they all recognized that the banks would incur greater pressure from outside investors to 
improve efficiency and profitability. However, this pressure was regarded as a positive 
consideration because it would force banks to place more emphasis on controlling risk 
and reduce NPLs. 
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The interviewees from CCB, BOC and ABC also argued that a public listing was a 
positive step in the right direction. In particular, it was highly conducive to greater 
efficiency, greater transparency and better supervision. It also had the additional 
potential to attract foreign investors into the banking system. As the interviewee from 
CCB stated: 
 
“The main objective of banks’ public listing on the Stock Market is to realize better 
performance. Recently, three SOCBs were listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
Through public listing, they aim to improve their information disclosure and 
transparency and strengthen their supervisions. Public listing can improve the level of 
transparency on banks’ financial reports. For example, before public listing, a lot of 
“grey income” and “grey expenses” were not reported in the financial report. This 
increased banks’ potential risk. After public listing, more information is required to be 
disclosed and financial information should be more transparent. In addition, these 
banks also want to raise more capitals and gain higher reputation through public listing. 
Particularly, SOCBs listing aims to attract more foreign investors to buy their shares, 
and therefore these investors have rights to supervise SOCBs. It will give SOCBs more 
pressures to improve their management level and performance, and push them to 
operate on a higher international level. We treat it as a very good external impetus for 
Chinese banking sector reform.” 
 
The attraction of foreign investors into the Chinese banking sector was mentioned as an 
important consideration by all of the interviewees. This is not too surprising because 
under the World Treaty Organization‟s (WTOs) regulations, China‟s financial markets 
were required to be fully open to foreign investors by 2006. The government, therefore, 
decided that the fastest way to improve the industry was to sell strategic stakes to 
foreign operators. Such a move would not only attract new capital but also introduce 
world-class management and practices into Chinese banks. 
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However, somewhat interestingly, the interviewee from ICBC deferred from this view 
and regarded it as an essentially short term phenomenon that was primarily motivated 
by short term profits: 
 
“SOCBs listing will only attract foreign investors within a short period of time. This is 
particularly the case for foreign investors that keep their minds just for speculation on 
capital markets. And most likely, these foreign investors rush up to buy the shares only 
for speculative purpose.” 
 
6.4.3The market for NPLs in China 
 
The majority of interviewees argued that the market for NPLs in China is not attractive 
to foreign investors. The interviewees from CCB and ABC even questioned whether 
such a formal market actually existed. Moreover, they both argued that the lack of a 
strong legal framework was a major impediment to any future developments. The 
interviewee from SDB, however, claimed that a market was beginning to emerge but 
that it required a formal legal framework if it was to develop further. He stated that: 
 
“A mature NPLs market has not been built up yet in China. Foreign investors do not 
show interests in a market that lacks strong legal regulation and clear auction 
procedures. They probably think that the Chinese banks have a relatively weak ability to 
control NPLs or prevent bad assets from accumulating.” 
 
The interviewee from CB similarly claimed that there were some foreign investors 
interested in purchasing Chinese NPLs. He argued that the advantage for these investors 
was that they could participate in the activities and management of some very important 
Chinese companies. From the Chinese perspective, the enterprises could use the 
expertise and management skills of the foreign investors to turn a technically insolvent 
company into a profitable one. In this respect, it is interesting to note that a number of 
investment banks, such as, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have recently 
negotiated to purchase discounted NPLs from the AMCs.  
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6.4.4 Summary 
 
With regard to the measures aimed at reducing NPLs in Chinese banks, it is perhaps 
pertinent to note that the interviewee from ICBC did not think that they would resolve 
the NPLs problem because they did not address the root cause of the problem. However, 
the other interviewees were more optimistic and emphasized the potential of AMCs, 
debt restructuring under debt-equity swaps, improved credit assessment and better 
control of loans. In particular, the interviewees were quite bullish about debt 
restructuring but also emphasized the need for regulatory reform of the banking system.  
 
The emergence of pubic listings was also regarded as another very good way of 
improving the NPLs situation. Not only do they facilitate the raising of additional 
capital but the attraction of foreign investors will also introduce potentially better 
management practices into banks. The emergence of shareholders will also help to 
introduce an element of market discipline in the banking system and facilitate better 
regulation of the banking system. The question as to whether foreign investors will be 
interested in investing in Chinese bank‟s problem loans was less clear. At present it is 
one of the options that the government is trying to encourage. However, not all of the 
interviewees were convinced that foreign investors would be attracted to NPLs because 
effectively they are bad loans.  
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the findings of interviews with six senior managers currently 
working in Chinese banks. The analysis shows that management‟s lack of incentives for 
appropriate project selection combined with government interference were very 
important contributory reasons behind the large amount of NPLs in Chinese banking. In 
general, the interviewees remained optimistic about the methods for resolving the 
problem but recognized that there are some significant challenges still facing the 
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Chinese authorities. The issues raised in the interviews together with the literature 
survey formed the basis for designing the questionnaire, which formed the next stage in 
the research. 
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Chapter Seven Managers’ Lack of Incentives for Appropriate Project Selection 
  
As mentioned in the research methods chapter, responses to the questionnaire were 
measured using a seven-point Likert scale. The questionnaire was divided into two main 
sections. The first section consists of three parts: part one consists of twenty two 
questions about bank manager‟s lack of incentives for appropriate project selection. 
This is followed in part two by a series of twenty seven questions on government 
interference and guarantees; and, part three, which is on measures for dealing with 
NPLs in China, consists of sixteen questions.  
 
The second section of the questionnaire comprises just one part and consists of a series 
of questions aimed at obtaining socio/economic and biographic information from the 
respondents.  
 
This chapter, therefore, commences with an analysis of the socio/economic and 
biographic data of the questionnaire respondents and then presents the findings relating 
to manager‟s lack of incentives for appropriate project selection. Chapters 8 and 9, 
respectively, then present the findings relating to government guarantees and 
interference and measures taken to deal with non-performing loans.  
 
7.1 Profile of Respondents 
 
Out of the 160 questionnaires that were sent out 145 were returned and useable, i.e. a 
response rate of just over 90.6 %. Table 7.1 shows that out of the 145 respondents, 62 
percent were males and 38 percent were females. The majority of the respondents (75%) 
were between 22-35 years old; 22 percent were between 36-45 years old and just nearly 
3 percent were between 46-60 years old (Table 7.2).  
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Table 7.1: Gender Profile 
Gender Male  Female Total 
Frequency 90 55 145 
percentage 62% 38% 100% 
 
 Table 7.2: Age Profile 
Age 22-35 years 36-45 years 46-60years Total 
Frequency 109 32 4 145 
percentage 75% 22% 3% 100% 
 
Table 7.3 provides information on the employment history of the respondents and 
reveals that almost half of them (48%) had been working for less than 5 years in their 
current positions; 28% had been working between 5 to 10 years; and, another 24 percent 
had been working for more than 10 years. Regarding salary, Table 7.4 shows that more 
than half of the respondents (55%) had salaries between 60,000 and 100,000 RMB per 
year; 29 percent had salaries less than 60,000 RMB per year and 16 percent had salaries 
more than 100,000 RMB per year. 
Table 7.3: Employment Profile 
Working history Less than 5 
years 
5 to 10 years More than 
10 years 
Total 
Frequency 70 41 34 145 
percentage 48% 28% 24% 100% 
             
                           Table 7.4: Salary Profile  
Salary Less than 
60,000 
60,000-100,000 More than 
100,000 
Total 
Frequency 42 80 23 145 
percentage 29% 55% 16% 100% 
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Table 7.5, which provides information on the educational background of respondents, 
reveals that the majority of the respondents (61%) had a university degree; 32 percent 
had a postgraduate degree and just 7 percent had no university qualifications. Table 7.6 
also reveals that 57% of these respondents were bank managers and 5 percent were 
senior bank managers. The remaining 38% were either bank clerks or bank officers, (i.e., 
the position between clerk and manager) or individuals engaged in support services, 
such as, the provision of I.T. services, marketing and publicity, etc.   
 
              Table 7.5 Education Profile 
Education 
background 
University 
degree 
Postgraduate 
degree 
Less than 
university 
degree 
Total 
Frequency 88 46 11 145 
Percentage 61% 32% 7% 100% 
 
Table 7.6 Job Profile 
positions Bank 
managers 
Senior bank 
managers 
others Total 
Frequency 83 7 55 145 
percentage 57% 5% 38% 100% 
 
Having provided some background information on the profile of the questionnaire 
respondents, the reminder of this chapter addresses the lack of incentives for managers 
when selecting projects. Initially, the findings for all of the banks are discussed and 
some general conclusions are drawn. This is followed by an analysis of each bank and, 
where appropriate, comparisons are made between the sample banks. 
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7.2 Managers’ Lack of Incentives for Appropriate Project Selection 
 
7.2.1 An Analysis of All the Sample Banks  
  
Project selection and approval in all banks 
 
With regard to the questionnaire (See Appendix 6), part one of the first section focuses 
on bank managers‟ lack of incentives to select projects in Chinese banks. As such, it 
facilitates the following broad conclusions: Table 7.7, which analyses the responses to 
question 1-4, reveals that the majority of respondents believed that the behavior of 
managers when selecting projects can be effectively controlled by appropriate 
regulations (Q1). Similarly, the table also shows that the majority of respondents also 
believed that their respective banks had clear processes for loan approval (Q2).  
 
China is emerging quickly as a major economic power and the role of government in 
directing this emergence is critical to its success. Specifically, government support for 
particular projects is a potentially important determinant of whether or not a project is 
selected for financial support by banks. Accordingly, the third question attempts to 
throw some light on the extent to which government support is influenced by 
interpersonal relationship and social ties. As Table 7.7 shows 60 percent of respondents 
believe that interpersonal relationships and personal ties are important. In other words, 
contacts and social networks are important considerations in obtaining the support of 
government. The fourth question, examined the usefulness of bank documentation in 
credit risk assessment. The detailed responses to this question are shown in Table 7.7 
and reveal that 71 percent of respondents believed that information relating to the 
project is accurately reflected in the documentation.  
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               Table 7.7   Project selection and approval in all banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Project Selection Regulation 
Can Control Manager‟s 
Behavior in Selecting Projects 
1(0.7%) 9(6.2%) 25(17.2%) 13(9.0%) 15(10.3%) 62(42.8%) 20(13.8%) 145(100%) 
2Banks have a clear loan 
approval process 
0(0%) 2(1.4%) 7(4.8%) 18(12.4%) 13(9.0%) 74(51%) 31(21.4%) 145(100%) 
3Relationships and social ties 
influence government‟s 
support for projects 
1(0.7%) 11(7.6%) 10(6.9%) 36(24.8%) 38(26.2%) 43(29.7%) 6(4.1%) 145(100%) 
4Credit Risk Documentation 
Reflect the Real Facts of the 
Project 
0(0%) 8(5.5%) 14(9.7%) 20(13.8%) 38(26.2%) 55(37.9%) 10(6.9%) 145(100%) 
   
 
Bank managers’ qualification, skills and competency in all banks  
 
Question 5 relates to information about the qualifications and skills of credit managers 
in the sample banks. As Table 7.8 shows, that the vast majority (83 percent) of 
respondents believed that credit managers in their respective banks are highly qualified 
and skilled. It was not surprising, therefore, to find that in response to question 6, 53.8 
percent of respondents believed that credit managers are competent and capable when 
selecting projects. Despite this endorsement of the skills and competences of credit 
managers, Table 7.8 also reveals that only 53.8 percent of respondents believed that 
credit managers had autonomous powers in the selection of projects and 15.9 percent 
either disagreed or expressed no opinion (Q7). This could be indicative of internal 
control systems within banks. In this respect, it is not unusual to find that individual 
credit managers have limits imposed on the size of loans they can independently 
sanction. This limit is normally determined by the seniority of the credit manager. 
However, for large projects, usually above a predetermined limit, many banks have a 
credit committee, which effectively has the final say on large projects. 
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     Table 7.8 Bank managers: qualification, skills and competency in all banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5Project selection managers 
are highly qualified and highly 
skilled 
1(0.7%) 6(4.1%) 16(11.0%) 30(20.7%) 44(30.3%) 40(27.6%) 8(5.5%) 145(100%) 
6 Credit managers are 
competent and capable in 
project selection 
2(1.4%) 23(15.9%) 19(13.1%) 23(15.9%) 31(21.4%) 39(26.9%) 8(5.5%) 145(100%) 
7Credit managers have 
autonomous powers in 
selecting projects 
2(1.4%) 23(15.9%) 19(13.1%) 23(15.9%) 31(21.4%) 39(26.9%) 8(5.5%) 145(100%) 
 
Personal ties and government/social considerations in all banks  
 
Table 7.9, which details the responses to question 8 and 9 shows that, nearly half of the 
respondents agreed that personal ties influence their banks‟ lending decisions. Similarly, 
in response to question 9, 70 percent either disagreed or expressed no opinion on the 
assertion that lending decisions are independent of government and social considerations. 
These findings suggest, therefore, that government or political considerations have a 
strong influence on bank lending decisions in China and that these decisions can be also 
be predicated on personal contacts and social networks.  
                        
 Table 7.9 Bank lending in all banks: the influence of personal ties and 
government/social considerations 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
8 Personal ties influence 
banks‟ lending decisions 
1(0.7%) 25(17.2%) 13(9.0%) 36(24.8%) 39(26.9%) 21(14.5%) 10(6.9%) 145(100%) 
9 Lending decisions are 
independent of government 
and social considerations 
6(4.1%) 32(22.1%) 28(19.3%) 35(24.1%) 19(13.1%) 19(13.1%) 6(4.1%) 145(100%) 
 
 
Bank managers’ incentives for project selection in all banks  
 
The responses to question 10-13 are shown in Table 7.10 and reveal that a large number 
of respondents (47.6 percent) disagreed with the assertion that bank managers have no 
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incentives to price loans accurately (Q10). These incentives might typically manifest 
themselves in the form of performance related pay or penalties in the form of lost 
promotion opportunities or even loss of employment. Conversely, some banks do not 
appear to have any incentives aimed at providing incentives to price loans accurately. 
This was revealed by the 26.9 percent of respondents who agreed with the assertion. 
What was surprising; however, were the 25.5 percent who expressed no opinion on this 
subject. It was anticipated that banks would either provide incentives or they would not. 
The unexpected amount of respondents who expressed no opinion on this important 
matter might be reflecting respondent‟s sensitivities with the subject or genuine 
confusion about the policy of their banks.   
 
Question 11 addressed a closely related issue, namely, bank manager‟s incentives to 
monitor loans. The responses to this assertion reveal that 70.3 percent of respondents 
disagreed with the assertion that bank managers have no incentives to price loans 
accurately. This suggests that despite the proliferation of high bad debts in China, banks 
manager believe that there are clear incentives to monitor loans. There would appear, 
therefore, to be far more emphasis in the form of incentives, on the monitoring and 
control of loans compared to their pricing. This might also be reflecting that other 
considerations, such as, government influence and social connections, are more 
important than pricing.   
 
Despite China‟s track record on bad debts, Table 7.10 reveals that 73.8 percent of 
respondents disagreed with the assertion that borrowers have no incentives to repay 
loans (Q12). These incentives could take the form of bankruptcy and insolvency 
legislation. Conversely, the responses might be implicitly implying that the majority of 
loans are fully secured on the assets of the projects. This interpretation is broadly 
supported by the answers to question 13, which shows that 45.5 percent of respondents 
believed that the legal framework was sufficiently robust to support the effective 
monitoring of loans. However 26.2 percent expressed no opinion on this assertion and 
28.3 percent agreed that a weak legal framework prevents them from monitoring loans. 
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These latter responses might be reflecting the fact that the laws relating to insolvency 
and security, etc are relatively recent introductions into China. Similarly, expatriates 
working in “foreign bank” in China will almost certainly have experience of Western 
laws in their home countries, which they judge to be more efficient. 
 
               Table 7.10 Bank managers‟ incentives in all banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
10 Managers within banks 
have no incentives to price 
loans accurately 
7(4.8%) 44(30.3%) 18(12.4%) 37(25.5%) 20(13.8%) 11(7.6%) 8(5.5%) 145(100%) 
11 Managers with banks have 
no incentives to monitor loans 
27(18.6%) 58(40.0%) 17(11.7%) 14(9.7%) 14(9.7%) 14(9.7%) 1(0.7%) 145(100%) 
12 Borrowers within the bank 
have no incentives to repay 
loans 
29(20.0%) 54(37.2%) 24(16.6%) 14(9.7%) 13(9.0%) 10(6.9%) 1(0.7%) 145(100%) 
13 A weak legal framework 
prevents the bank from 
monitoring loans 
7(4.8%) 39(26.9%) 20(13.8%) 38(26.2%) 26(17.9%) 13(9.0%) 2(1.4%) 145(100%) 
 
Rewards and penalties in all banks 
 
Performance and financial reward was addressed by question 14-19 and are reported in 
Table 7.11. The table reveals that 73.2 percent of respondents believe that financial 
reward should depend on the performance of individuals. However, the responses to 
question 16 suggest that only 51.7 percent agreed that financial rewards motivated bank 
managers to select good projects. Similarly, Table 7.11 also shows that in response to 
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question 15, only 43 percent admitted that penalties in form of non-promotion and loss 
of employment were imposed on individuals because of bad lending decisions. These 
findings suggest that performance payments and bonuses, etc are not as prolific in 
China as in Westernized banking systems. However, the majority of respondents believe 
that bonuses or some form of performance related pay should be paid. 
 
The responses to question 17 reveal that 46.8 percent of respondents believed that 
penalties in the form of non-promotion and loss of employment made them 
uncomfortable when selecting projects. However, 32.4 percent disagreed with this 
assertion and 20.7 percent expressed no opinion. This suggests that individual banks 
have different policies on “penalties” in the selection of projects. However, an 
alternative interpretation could be that government influence and social considerations 
are so important that the question of penalties imposed internally by individual banks 
for bad project selection, is not appropriate.   
 
Despite this latter interpretation, the responses to question 18 reveals that 68.3 percent 
of respondents did not think that political interference by the government acts as a 
disincentive for lending managers when selecting projects. However, a fairly substantial 
31.7 percent agreed that policy lending influenced the bank‟s decision or expressed no 
opinion on the subject. Once again, this might be indicative of different policies within 
different categories or types of Chinese banks. 
 
Regarding the question as to whether the Chinese government‟s lending policies 
influences bank lending, the responses to question 19, once again, reveal a mixed 
response. For example, virtually the same number of respondents either agreed or 
disagreed with the assertion and almost a quarter (24.8 percent) expressed no opinion.   
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               Table 7.11 Reward and Penalty regulation in all banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
14Financial reward should 
depend on the performance of 
individuals 
1(0.7%) 9(6.2%) 7(4.8%) 22(15.2%) 42(29.0%) 50(34.5%) 14(9.7%) 145(100%) 
15 Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment  are imposed on 
individuals in the bank because 
of bad lending decisions 
1(0.7%) 29(20.0%) 11(7.6%) 42(29.0%) 28(19.3%) 30(20.7%) 4(2.8%) 145(100%) 
16Financial rewards motivate 
managers in the bank to select 
highly-profitable projects 
4(2.8%) 20(13.8%) 16(11.0%) 30(20.7%) 33(22.8%) 36(24.8%) 6(4.1%) 145(100%) 
17Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment make managers in 
the bank uncomfortable  when 
selecting projects 
 
4(2.8%) 35(24.1%) 8(5.5%) 30(20.7%) 25(17.2%) 34(23.4%) 9(6.2%) 145(100%) 
18 Managers in the bank lack 
incentives to select projects 
because of political 
interference by the government 
8(5.5%) 55(37.9%) 36(24.8%) 17(11.7%) 13(9.0%) 12(8.3%) 4(2.8%) 145(100%) 
19 Policy lending always 
influences the bank‟s lending 
decisions 
36(24.8%) 19(13.1%) 36(24.8%) 37(25.5%) 15(10.3%) 0(0%) 2(1.4%) 145(100%) 
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The effect of rewards and penalties in performance in all banks  
 
Table 7.12, which relates to questions 20-22, shows that 57.2 percent of the respondents 
believe that bank performance is improved by management incentives to select good 
projects (Q20). However, 18.6 percent disagreed with this assertion and 24.1 percent 
expressed no opinion. It was, therefore, not that surprising to find that 45.4 percent of 
respondents believed that financial rewards improved their performance (Question 
21).What was interesting, however, were the 41.4 percent who expressed no opinion on 
this assertion. This suggests either that these respondents do not receive financial 
incentives or that they remain unsure about whether such incentives are conducive to 
improving their performance.  
 
The responses relating to the last question (Q22) on manager‟s incentives are shown in 
Table 7.12, which reveals that the majority of respondents agreed with the assertion that 
penalties influence performance. Accordingly, 76.6 percent agreed that the possibility of 
non-promotion or loss of employment influenced individual performance. This clearly 
indicates that although financial incentives might not be completely pervasive within 
the Chinese banking sector, the real possibility of loss of employment and reduced 
promotion opportunities was an important factor in determining the performance of 
individuals.   
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                    Table 7.12 Bank performance in all banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
20 Managers‟ incentives to 
select good projects improve 
the performance of the bank 
0(0%) 9(6.2%) 18(12.4) 35(24.1%) 46(31.7%) 35(24.1%) 2(1.4%) 145(100%) 
21 Financial rewards improve 
bank performance  
2(1.4%) 9(6.2%) 8(5.5%) 60(41.4%) 27(18.6%) 34(23.4%) 5(3.4%) 145(100%) 
22 Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment influence the 
performance 
0(0%) 6(4.1%) 7(4.8%) 21(14.5%) 23(15.9%) 67(46.2%) 21(14.5%) 145(100%) 
 
7.2.2  Summary of Analysis of all the Sample Banks 
 
The majority of bank managers believe that their lending behavior and practices are 
adequately controlled by internal regulations within their respective banks and that they 
have clear internal processes for approving loans. The majority of respondents also 
agree that documentation relating to projects accurately reflects the real facts of the 
proposal. Nevertheless, there was overwhelming evidence that social ties and 
interpersonal relationships are very important in obtaining government support and that 
this had a significant influence on the lending decision in all of the selected banks.  
 
Most of the respondents agreed that bank managers in their respective banks are highly 
qualified and competent in the selection of projects. However, despite this finding only 
a relatively small percentage felt that credit managers had autonomous powers in the 
selection of projects. Almost half of the respondents agreed that personal ties, i.e. social 
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and political networks, had an influence on their banks‟ lending decisions. More 
importantly, over two-thirds of respondent claimed that lending decisions were 
determined by government and social considerations. It was, therefore, no surprise to 
find that the overwhelming majority agreed that government policy influenced their 
respective bank‟s lending decisions    
 
On the subject of penalties and rewards, most respondents felt that penalties were more 
effective than rewards in influencing the performance of managers. This finding could 
be reflecting the fact that not all of the sample banks have performance related pay or 
bonus policies. However, despite the influence of the Chinese government in the 
lending decision, the majority of respondents did not think that political interference 
detracted from individual managers‟ incentives to select appropriate projects. In fact, the 
majority of the respondents claimed that bank performance could be improved by 
management incentives in the form of financial rewards. 
 
7.3 Analysis of Individual Banks 
 
7.3.1 State-owned Commercial Banks 
 
Project selection and approval in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Table 7.13 focuses on project selection and approval from the perspective of 
commercial banks. The questionnaire revealed that government regulation relating to 
project selection in state-owned commercial banks is important because it can influence 
and in some respects form a basis for controlling managers‟ behaviors in the selection of 
projects (Q1). The table also shows that the vast majority of respondents (85 percent) 
agreed that the process of approving loans in their banks was clear (Q2) and 72 percent 
believe that the documents used in credit risk assessment accurately reflected the 
tangible facts relating to the projects (Q4). However, more than half of the respondents 
(58 percent) believed that government support for projects was influenced by social ties 
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and relationships with government officials (Q3). This raises the distinct possibility that 
project selection is not always based on the tangible merits of individual cases but on 
the arguably more dubious considerations relating to how important the proposer is in 
terms of connections with government and political backing. 
 
     Table 7.13 Project selection and approval in state-owned commercial banks  
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Project Selection Regulation 
Can Control Manager‟s 
Behavior in Selecting Projects 
1(2.5%) 4(10.0%) 4(10.0%) 1(2.5%) 2(5.0%) 19(47.5%) 9(22.5%) 40(100%) 
2Banks have a clear loan 
approval process 
0(0%) 2(5.0%) 0(0%) 2(5.0%) 0(0%) 17(42.5%) 17(42.5%) 40(100%) 
3Relationships and social ties 
influence government‟s support 
for projects 
1(2.5%) 2(5.0%) 1(2.5%) 13(32.5%) 7(17.5%) 15(37.5%) 1(2.5%) 40(100%) 
4Credit Risk Documentation 
Reflect the Real Facts of the 
Project 
0(0%) 2(5.0%) 4(10.0%) 5(12.5%) 6(15.0%) 17(42.5%) 6(15.0%) 40(100%) 
 
Bank managers’ qualifications, skills and competency in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Table 7.14 focuses on questions 5-7 (inc) and examines the skills competences and 
decision making powers of bank managers in state-owned commercial banks. The table 
reveals that despite the influence of government officials, bank managers responsible 
for making decisions are more than adequately qualified. This is supported by the fact 
that 55 percent of respondents believed that project selection within their banks was 
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done by highly qualified and highly skilled managers (Q 5). It was, therefore, hardly 
surprising that 67 percent of respondents agreed that credit managers were competent in 
selecting projects (Q6). Despite this overwhelming endorsement of the skill and 
competence of project selection managers, 55 percent of respondents did not think that 
they had autonomous powers in the selection of projects (Q7). This could be reflecting 
the corporate governance structures in state-owned commercial banks, were lending 
decisions above a certain level are ratified by a credit committee consisting of senior 
bankers. However, it could also be reflecting the earlier response that the selection of 
projects can be determined and influenced by political and social considerations. To 
some extent this could also reduce the imperative amongst bank managers to make 
decisions based on objective financial and economic information and, to this extent; it 
could indirectly reduce the incentives for appropriate project selection.  
 
 Table 7.14 Bank Managers in State-Owned Commercial Banks: Skills, Competence 
and Autonomous Powers 
Statement 
:Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
 
:Disagree 
(percentage) 
 
:Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
 
:Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
 
:Slightly 
agree  
(percentage) 
 
 Agree 
(percentage) 
:Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
 
5 Managers are highly 
qualified and highly skilled 
0(100%) 7(17.5%) 3(7.5%) 8(20%) 5(12.5%) 10(25%) 7(17.5%) 40(100%) 
6 Managers are competent in 
selecting  projects 
0(0%) 3(7.5%) 5(12.5%) 5(12.5%) 11(27.5%) 9(22.5%) 7(17.5%) 40(100%) 
7 Managers have autonomous 
powers in selecting projects 
0(0%)  8(20.0%) 6(15.0%) 8(20.0%) 5(12.5%)  7(17.5%) 6(15.0%) 40(100%) 
 
 
 
 194 
Personal, government and social ties in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Having established that government officials are influenced by relationships and social 
ties with project proposers, it was interesting to find in Table 7.15 that 63 percent of 
respondents did not think that lending decisions within their respective banks were 
influenced by social ties (Q 8). This response is totally in accord with the view that bank 
managers are highly qualified and competent in making lending decisions. Nevertheless, 
an equal proportion of respondents did not think that lending decisions in their banks 
were independent of government and social considerations (Q9) and this finding 
supports the response to question 3. Taken together, however, the responses to questions 
3 and 9 could be indicative of tensions faced by bank managers when making lending 
decisions.  
 
Table 7.15 The influence of personal, government and social ties in state-owned 
commercial banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
8 Personal ties influence banks‟ 
lending decisions 
1(2.5%) 8(20%) 4(10%) 12(30%) 7(17.5%) 
 
5(12.5%) 
  
3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
9 Lending decisions are 
independent of government 
and social considerations 
0(0%) 12(30%) 6(15%) 7(17.5%) 4(10%) 7(17.5%) 4(10%) 40(100%) 
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Bank manager’s incentives in state-owned commercial banks 
 
When discussing the pricing and monitoring of loans, Table 7.16 shows that the 
majority of respondents disagreed with the assertion that managers in their banks have 
no incentives either to price loans accurately (Q10) or to control them once they had 
been granted (Q11). These responses, once again, underlines the view that the bank 
managers are professional in the granting and subsequent control of loans. Regarding 
the borrowers the majority of respondents (78 percent) did not agree with the statement 
that borrowers had no incentives to repay loans (Q12). Moreover, 52 percent of 
respondents did not believe that a weak legal framework prevented their banks from 
adequately monitoring loans (Q13). This was an interesting response bearing in mind 
the relative infancy of China‟s insolvency laws and their reluctance to take security in 
the form of legal mortgages, etc.    
      Table 7.16 Bank managers‟ incentive in state-owned commercial banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
10 Managers within banks 
have no incentives to price 
loans accurately  
2(5.0%) 17(42.5%) 6(15.0%) 9(22.5%) 2(5.0%) 3(7.5%) 1(2.5%) 40(100%) 
11 Managers with banks have 
no incentives to monitor loans 
6(15.0%) 20(50.0%) 4(10.0%) 2(5.0%) 2(5.0%) 5(12.5%) 1(2.5%) 40(100%) 
12 Borrowers within the bank 
have no incentives to repay 
loans 
11(27.5%) 16(40%) 4(10%) 3(7.5%) 0(0%) 5(12.5%) 1(2.5%) 40(100%) 
13 A weak legal framework 
prevents the bank from 
monitoring loans 
1(2.5%) 15(37.5%) 5(12.5%) 8(20%) 4(10%) 6(15%) 1(2.5%) 40(100%) 
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Rewards and penalties in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Table 7.17 contains information on the empirical findings relating to financial rewards 
and penalties. The table reveals that 75 percent of respondents agreed that financial 
rewards in state-owned commercial banks are based on individual performance (Q 14). 
Not surprisingly, this performance related pay influenced the bank managers lending 
decisions and 60 percent claimed that financial rewards motivated them to select 
highly-profitable projects (Q16).Performance related pay was not the only consideration 
influencing lending decisions as almost half of respondents admitted that penalties in 
the form of non-promotion or loss of employment were also imposed for making bad 
lending decisions (Q15). In this respect, it was interesting to note that 73 percent of 
respondents either agreed or expressed no opinion on the question as to whether these 
penalties made them “uncomfortable” when selecting projects (Q17). 
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                       Table 7.17 Financial reward and penalty regulation 
In state-owned commercial banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
14 Financial reward should be 
based on an individual‟ 
performance 
1(2.5%) 3(7.5%) 2(5.0%) 4(10%) 8(20.0%) 15(37.5%) 7(17.5%) 40(100%) 
15 Penalties in  the form of non- 
Promotion or loss of Employment 
are Imposed on individuals  
because of bad lending decisions 
1(2.5%) 9(22.5%) 2(5.0%) 11(27.5%) 5(12.5%) 10(25.0%) 2(5.0%) 40(100.0%) 
16 Financial reward motivates 
managers in my bank to select 
highly-profitable projects 
2 (5.0%) 0(0%) 8(20%) 6(15%) 7(17.5%) 12(30%0 5(12.5%) 40(100%) 
17 Penalties in form of non-pro 
Motion or loss of employment  
Make managers in my bank  
Uncomfortable when selecting  
projects 
2(5.0%) 8 (20%) 1( 2.5%) 8(20%) 10(25%) 9(22.5%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
18 Managers in the bank lack  
Incentives to select projects  
Because of political interference 
By the government   
2(5.0%) 19(47.5%) 4(10%) 3(7.5%) 6(15.0%) 3(7.5%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
19 Policy lending always  
Influences the bank‟s lending  
Decisions   
2(5%) 9(22.5%) 9(22.5%) 3(7.5%) 5(12.5%) 8(20%) 4(10%) 40(100%) 
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In light of these results it was not surprising to find that 70 percent of bank managers 
disagreed or expressed no opinion with the assertion that they lacked incentives to select 
projects because of political interference by the government (Q18). However, a 
significant proportion (43 percent) admitted that the government‟s official policy on 
lending always influenced lending decisions in their banks (Q19). It was clear, therefore, 
that government provides a working framework, for lending decisions within 
state-owned commercial banks, which prioritizes certain economic sectors and types of 
project.  
 
The effect of rewards and penalties in performance in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Table 7.18 reveals that working within this government framework, there is general 
agreement that incentives and financial rewards are conducive to improving the 
performance of the banks (Q20) and those of the individuals (Q21). This is can be 
shown in Table 7.18. Similarly, there was also tacit recognition that penalties in the form 
of non-promotion or loss of employment also influence individual performance (Q22). 
In many respects, therefore, the government provides a lending framework or plan, 
which is determined by macro economic conditions and the economic development 
needs of China. Within this framework individual banks provide a range of incentives to 
encourage and promote efficient lending by bank managers. 
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         Table 7.18 Bank performance in state-owned commercial banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
20 Managers‟ incentives to 
select good projects improve 
the performance of the bank 
0(0%) 3(7.5%) 4(10%) 5(12.5%) 10(25%) 15(37.5%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
21 Financial rewards improve 
bank performance  
0(0%) 2(5.0%) 1(2.5%) 8(20.0%) 9(22.5%) 15(37.5%) 5(12.5%) 40(100%) 
22 Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment influence the 
performance 
1(2.5%) 6(15.0%) 3(7.5%) 6(15.0%) 4(10%) 13(32.5%) 7(17.5%) 40(100%) 
  
7.3.2 Joint-stock commercial banks  
 
Project selection and approval in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Table 7.19 shows that more than half of the respondents believed that the regulation of 
project selection controlled and influenced the behavior of managers (Q1). As with 
state-owned commercial banks, the vast majority of the respondents (82 percent) agreed 
that the process of approving loans is clear (Q2) and more than half of them believed 
that government support for specific projects was influenced by social ties (Q3). What 
was really interesting; however, were the 25 percent of respondents who had no opinion 
on this question. Whether this simply reflected a lack of knowledge/opinion about the 
question, i.e. apathy, or whether it was a reflection of the potential sensitivity of the 
subject remains a mute point. As was found with state-owned commercial banks, almost 
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the same percentage of respondents in joint stock commercial banks (77 percent) 
believed that the documentation used in credit risk assessment accurately reflected the 
real facts relating to projects (Q4). 
 
      Table 7.19 Project selection and approval in joint-stock commercial banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Project Selection Regulation Can 
Control Manager‟s Behavior in 
Selecting Projects 
 
0(0%) 2(3.3%) 16(26.2%) 5(8.2%) 4(6.6%) 29(47.5%) 5(8.2%) 61(100%) 
2Banks have a clear loan approval 
process 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 11(18.0%) 6(9.8%) 35(57.4%) 9(14.8%) 61(100%) 
3Relationships and social ties 
influence government‟s support 
for projects 
0(0%) 7(11.5%) 6(9.8%) 15(24.6%) 13(21.3%) 15(24.6%) 5(8.2%) 61(100%) 
4Credit Risk Documentation 
Reflect the Real Facts of the 
Project 
0(0%) 2(3.3%) 4(6.6%) 8(13.1%) 20(32.8%) 24(39.3%) 3(4.9%) 61(100%) 
 
Bank managers’ qualifications, skills and competency in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Regarding the education and general competences of bank managers in joint stock 
banks, Table 7.20 reveals that 79 percent of respondents believed that project selection 
managers were highly qualified and skilled (Q5) and 73 percent agreed that credit 
managers are both competent and capable in project selection (Q6). However, what was 
striking were the contrasting responses to question 7 by state-owned and joint stock 
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commercial banks. In the later banks, Table 7.20 shows that the vast majority of 
respondents (72.1 percent) asserted that credit managers had autonomous powers in the 
selection of projects. In contrast the corresponding response in state-owned banks was 
only 55 percent, thus reflecting the undoubted influence that government has in the 
selection of projects in state owned bank. 
 
Table 7.20 Bank Managers in joint-stock commercial banks: Skills, Competence and 
Autonomous Powers 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree  
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5Bank managers are highly 
qualified and highly skilled 
0(0%) 1(1.6%) 1(1.6%) 11(18.0%) 21(34.4%) 23(37.7%) 4(6.6%) 61 (100%) 
6Bank managers are competent 
in selecting  projects 
0(0%) 0(0%) 3(4.9%) 13(21.3%) 17(27.9%) 27(44.3%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
7Bank managers have 
autonomous powers in 
selecting projects  
1(1.6%) 0(0%) 4(6.6%) 12(19.7%) 12(19.7%) 30(49.2%) 2(3.3%) 61 (100%) 
 
Personal, government and social ties in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
The responses to question 8, which related to the influence of social and personal ties on 
lending, also revealed a marked difference between state owned and joint stock banks. 
Accordingly, in state-owned commercial banks, social ties were considered to be 
influential in making lending decisions by 37.5 percent of respondents. However, Table 
7.21 reveals that in joint-stock commercial banks, 52.5 percent of respondents agree 
with this assertion. The responses to question 9 also suggest that personal ties are more 
important than government and social considerations.  
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Table 7.21 The influence of personal, government and social ties in joint-stock 
commercial banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
8 Personal ties influence banks‟ 
lending decisions 
0(0%) 12(19.7%) 6(9.8%) 11(18.0%) 18(29.5%) 10(16.4%) 4(6.6%) 61（100%） 
9 Lending decisions are 
independent of government 
and social considerations 
3(4.9%) 10(16.4%) 9(14.8%) 20(32.8%) 7(11.5%) 11(18.0%) 1(1.6%) 61（100%） 
 
Table 7.22 shows that there is a general disagreement that bank managers have no 
incentives to price loans accurately and a significant 4.9 percent were in strong 
disagreement (Q10). Similarly, the majority disagreed with the assertion that bank 
managers have no incentives to monitor loans (Q11) or that borrowers have no 
incentives to repay loans (Q12). The responses to question 13 were comparable to those 
from state owned banks with 41 percent disagreeing with the assertion that a weak legal 
framework prevents their banks from monitoring loans; however, a substantial 36 
percent expressed no opinion.  
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Table 7.22 Bank managers‟ incentives in joint-stock commercial banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
10Managers within banks have no 
incentives to price loans 
accurately  
3(4.9%) 19(31.1%) 6(9.8%) 17(27.9%) 9(14.8%) 5(8.2%) 2(3.3%) 61(100%) 
11 Managers with banks have no 
incentives to monitor loans 
14(23.0%) 23(37.7%) 6(9.8%) 8(13.1%) 6(9.8%) 4(6.6%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
12 Borrowers within the bank 
have no incentives to repay loans 
10(16.4%) 26(42.6%) 6(9.8%) 8(13.1%) 9(14.8%) 2(3.3%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
13 A weak legal framework 
prevents the bank from 
monitoring loans 
1(1.6%) 16(26.2%) 8(13.1%) 22(36.1%) 10(16.4%) 3(4.9%) 1(1.6%) 61 (100%) 
 
Rewards and penalties in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
As to financial rewards and penalties, Table 7.23 reveals that the majority of 
respondents agreed with the assertion that financial rewards should be based on an 
individual‟s performance (Q14) and that rewards motivate managers to select 
highly-profitable projects (Q16). However, it was interesting to note that in contrast to 
state owned banks, only 41 percent admitted that penalties in the form of non-promotion 
or loss of employment are imposed in instances of bad lending decisions (Q15) and that 
there was nothing to suggest that these penalties made managers uncomfortable when 
selecting projects (Q17). In this respect, the results are clearly suggesting that the 
penalties for bad lending decisions are more rigorously applied in state owned banks 
than joint stock banks. In other words, the public sector appears to be more stringently 
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controlling the activities of lending managers than the private sector. 
      Table 7.23 Reward and penalty regulation in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
14 Financial reward should be 
based on an individual‟ 
performance 
2(3.3%) 3(4.9%) 14(23%) 21(34.4%) 17(27.9%) 0(0%) 4(6.6%) 61(100%) 
15 Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment are imposed on 
individuals because of bad 
lending decisions                   
0 (0%) 11(18%) 2(3.3%) 23(37.7%) 18(29.5%) 6(9.8%) 1(1.6%) 61(100.0%) 
16 Financial  reward motivate  
managers in my bank to select 
highly-profitable projects 
1(1.6%) 3(4.9%) 5(8.2%) 11(18.0%) 14(23.0%) 24(39.3%) 3(4.9%) 61(100%) 
17 Penalties in form of non 
Promotion or loss of  
Unemployment when  
Selecting projects 
1(1.6%) 13(21.%) 5(8.2%) 16(26..2%) 7(11.5%) 16(26.2%) 3(4.9%) 61(100%) 
18 Managers in the bank lack 
incentives to select projects 
because of political 
interference by the government 
4(6.6%) 25(41.0%) 17(27.9%) 10(16.4%) 3(4.9%) 1(1.6%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
19Policy lending always 
influences the bank‟s lending 
decisions       
3(4.9%) 12(19.7%) 15(24.6%) 15(24.6%) 6(9.8%) 9(14.8%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
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Table 7.23 also shows that the majority of joint stock respondents disagreed with the 
statement that managers lacked incentives to select projects because of political 
interference by the government (Q18) and 74 percent disagreed or expressed no opinion 
on the assertion that policy lending always influences lending decisions in their banks 
(19). These responses clearly underline the ostensible autonomy and freedom from 
government interference that joint stock banks have in the selection of projects.  
 
The effect of rewards and penalties in performance in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
As to the performance of the banks, Table 7.24 shows that respondents from both state 
owned and joint stock banks were broadly in agreement. For example, more than half of 
the respondents in joint stock banks believed that incentives for managers to select good 
projects improved the overall performance of the banks (Q20) and they similarly 
believed that financial rewards improved the individual performance of managers (Q21). 
However, just to reiterate an earlier point: as with the case with state-owned commercial 
banks, there was evidence to suggest that penalties for poor performance influences 
performance. In the aftermath of the recent credit crunch and the furor over bank 
bonuses these findings are interesting. 
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           Table 7.24 Bank performance in joint-stock commercial banks  
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
20 Managers‟ incentives to 
select good projects improve 
the performance of the bank 
0(0%) 1(1.6%) 3(4.9%) 25(49.0%) 18(29.5%) 13(21.3%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
21 Financial rewards improve 
bank performance  
0(0%) 1(1.6%) 5(8.2%) 8(13.1%) 17(27.9%) 28(45.9%) 2(3.3%) 61(100%) 
22 Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment influence the 
performance 
1(1.6%) 7(11.5%) 6(9.8%) 21(34.4%) 14(23%) 12(19.7%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
 
7.3.3 City commercial banks 
 
Project selection and approval in city commercial banks 
 
As with the other study banks, Table 7.25 shows that there was general agreement with 
the assertion that the regulation of project selection can control the behavior of 
managers (Q1) and that the process of approving loans was clear (Q2). None of the city 
commercial bank respondents denied that the support of government officials was 
influenced by interpersonal relationships (Q3) and there was general agreement that 
documents used in credit risk assessment accurately reflected facts of the projects (Q4).  
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        Table 7.25   Project selection and approval in city commercial banks  
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Project Selection Regulation 
Can Control Manager‟s 
Behavior in Selecting Projects 
0(0%) 1(10%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 10(100%) 
2 Banks have a clear loan 
approval process 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 3(30%) 10(100%) 
3 Relationships and social ties 
influence government‟s support 
for projects 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 7(70%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
4 Credit Risk Documentation 
Reflect the Real Facts of the 
Project 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 3(30%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Bank managers’ qualifications, skills and competency in city commercial banks 
 
Table 7.26 reveals that half of the respondents believed that project selection managers 
were highly qualified (Q5) and 80 percent believed that credit managers were 
competent and capable in the selection of projects (Q6). Although 60 percent of 
respondents agreed that credit managers have autonomous powers in selecting projects, 
40 percent either disagreed or expressed no opinion (Q7). This suggests that, as with 
state-owned banks, either the question is a sensitive issue or there is some more 
pragmatic explanation and that some form of control is exerted by a credit committee 
overseeing lending decisions. A credit committee might typically oversee all lending 
decisions or lending above a certain level. Conversely, junior managers might have to 
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have their lending decisions sanctioned by their immediate superior. 
Table 7.26 Bank managers in City Commercial Banks: Skills, Competence and 
Autonomous Powers 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree  
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5 Bank managers are highly 
qualified and highly skilled 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 3(30%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
6 Bank managers are 
competent in selecting projects 
0 (0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
7 Bank managers have 
autonomous powers in 
selecting projects  
0(0%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Table 7.27 shows that none of the respondents disagrees that personal ties influence 
banks‟ lending decisions. The majorities of the respondents neither agree nor disagree 
that banks‟ lending decisions are influenced by government and social ties in city 
commercial banks while 30 percent of the respondents still slightly agree with this 
assertion. It proves that government and social ties are slightly important in city 
commercial bank and it is probably because that the local government has control over 
city commercial banks. 
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Table 7.27 The influence of personal, government and social ties in city commercial 
banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree  
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
8Personal ties influence banks‟ 
lending decisions 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
9Lending decisions are 
independent of government 
and social considerations 
2(20%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Bank managers’ incentives in city commercial banks 
 
A surprising high number of respondents in city commercial banks (26 percent) believe 
that managers have no incentives to price loans accurately (Q10). Nevertheless, none of 
the respondents strongly agreed with the assertion that bank managers have no 
incentives to monitor loans (Q11) or those borrowers have no incentives to repay loans 
(Q12). However, half of the respondents agreed that a weak legal framework prevented 
their bank from monitoring loans. What was surprising was the 36.1 percent also neither 
agreed nor disagreed with this assertion (Q13).  
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          Table 7.28 Bank managers‟ incentives in city commercial banks  
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
10Managers within banks have 
no incentives to price loans 
accurately  
1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
11Managers with banks have 
no incentives to monitor loans 
5(50%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
12Borrowers within the bank 
have no incentives to repay 
loans 
6(60%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
13 A weak legal framework 
prevents the bank from 
monitoring loans 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 4(40%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Reward and penalties in city commercial banks 
 
As Table 7.29 shows, all of the respondents believed that financial reward should be 
based on an individual‟s performance within the bank (Q14). However, although there 
was no strong agreement with the assertion that penalties in form of non-promotion and 
loss of employment are imposed on individuals who make bad lending decisions bad 
lending, 50 percent either agreed or slightly agreed. The remaining 50 percent expressed 
no opinion on this subject and this might be implying that they have no direct 
experience of this sanction or any awareness of its existence within the bank (Q15). 
Moreover, although this finding was in direct contrast to that in state- owned banks, it 
was broadly comparable to that in joint stock commercial banks. 
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Table 7.29 also reveals that respondents in city commercial banks were not motivated 
by financial rewards to select highly profitable projects. In fact only 50 percent slightly 
agreed with the assertion and the remainder either slightly disagreed or expressed no 
opinion (Q16). However, a slightly higher number of respondents (70 percent) agreed 
that penalties make managers uncomfortable when selecting projects (Q17). 
Accordingly, there is tentative evidence to suggest that in city commercial banks, 
penalties are more effective than rewards in determining and influencing bank 
managers‟ behavior when selecting projects. 
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        Table 7.29 Reward and penalty regulation in city commercial banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
14Financial reward should 
based on an individual‟s 
performance  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
15Penalities in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment are imposed on 
individuals because of bad 
lending decisions  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 2(20%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
16 Financial rewards motivate 
managers in the bank to select 
highly-profitable projects  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 2(20%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
17 Penalties make managers 
uncomfortable when selecting 
projects. 
1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 4(40%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
18Managers in the bank lack 
incentives to select projects 
because of political 
interference by the government  
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 2(20%) 4(40%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10 (100%) 
19 Policy lending always 
influences the bank‟s lending 
decisions 
0(0%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 2(20%) 3(30%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Table 7.29 also shows that only 30 percent of the respondents slightly disagreed or 
expressed no opinion with the assertion that managers lack incentives to select projects 
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because of political interference by government (Q18). This implies that political 
interference in city commercial banks is quite pervasive. In this respect, it is interesting 
to note that 20 percent of the respondents expressed no opinion on the question of 
policy lending on the bank‟s lending decisions (Q19).  
The effect of rewards and penalties in performance in city commercial banks 
Somewhat predictably, Table 7.30 shows that, in accord with the other banks, there was 
general agreement that managerial incentives to select good projects improve the 
performance of their bank (Q20). Accordingly, 60 percent believed that financial 
rewards improved individual performance (Q21). This response is in direct contrast to 
that in question 16, which implied that managers are not motivated by financial rewards. 
Although the two questions are slightly different, there is an element of contradiction. A 
possible explanation might be that respondents are embarrassed to admit that they are to 
some degree motivated by money. Finally, in response to question 22, 50 percent of 
respondents agreed that penalties in form of non-promotion and loss of employment 
also influenced their performance.     
            Table 7.30 Bank performance in city commercial banks  
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
20 Managers‟ incentives to 
select good projects improve 
the performance of the bank 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
21Financial rewards improve 
bank performance  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 4(40%) 3(30%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
22 Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment influence the 
performance 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 3(30%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
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7.3.4  Policy banks 
 
Project selection and approval in policy banks 
 
It was not surprising to find that 60 percent of respondents in policy banks (see Table 
7.31) believed that regulations on project selection controlled and determined the 
behavior of management when selecting projects (Q1). However, what was surprising 
was the finding that compared to the banks already discussed, fewer respondents (50 
percent) agreed with the assertion that that the process of approving loans is clear (Q2). 
Bearing in mind that these policy banks are responsible for implementing government 
policy on project development and taking into account the response to question 1 
(above), this response was unexpected. Ceteris Paribas, one would have expected that 
high levels of control and clear guidelines in the approval of loans would have gone 
hand in hand but apparently this was not the case in policy banks. There was strong 
agreement that social ties influence governments decision as to whether or not to 
support a project (Q3) and the majority of respondents believed that documents used in 
credit risk assessment reflect the real facts about the projects (Q4). Upon reflection the 
emphasis on social ties in project selection might explain why respondents in policy 
banks felt that the process for approving loans was unclear. This would certainly be the 
case if project selection and approval was predominately based on social networks and 
political consideration rather than financial and business case consideration. 
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  Table 7.31 Project selection and approval in policy banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Project Selection Regulation 
Can Control Manager‟s 
Behavior in Selecting Projects 
 
0 (0%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 4(40%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
2Banks have a clear loan 
approval process 
0(0%) 4(40%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 2(20%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
3Relationships and social ties 
influence government‟s support 
for projects 
0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 7(70%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
4Credit Risk Documentation 
Reflect the Real Facts of the 
Project 
0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
 Bank managers qualifications, skills and competency in policy banks 
 
As Table 7.32 shows, the majority of respondent claimed that bank managers in their 
banks were not highly qualified (Q5) and that credit managers were generally not 
competent and capable in project selection (Q6).Similarly, the responses to question 6, 
reveal only slight rather than strong agreement and this might be reflecting the lack of 
clarity in approving loans. This interpretation gains even more credence in the light of 
responses to question 7, which revealed that 90 percent of respondents did not think that 
credit managers had autonomous powers in the selection of projects.  
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          Table 7.32 Bank managers in policy banks: skills, competency and 
Autonomous powers  
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree  
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5 Bank managers are highly 
qualified and highly skilled 
0(0%) 1(10%) 8(80%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
6Bank managers are competent 
in selecting projects 
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
7Autonomous powers in 
selecting projects  
0(0%) 9(90%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Personal government and social ties in policy banks 
 
The findings in Table 7.33 are supported further by the finding in Table 7.33, which 
reveal that 60 percent of respondents believed that social ties influence lending 
decisions (Q8). Similarly, all of the respondents disagreed with the assertion that 
lending decisions in their bank are independent of government and social considerations 
(Q9). 
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 Table 7.33 The influence of personal, government and social ties in policy banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree  
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
8Personal ties influence banks‟ 
lending decisions 
0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 2(20%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
9Lending decisions are 
independent of government 
and social considerations 
0(0%) 7(70%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Bank managers’ incentives in policy banks 
 
Table 7.34 shows that the majority of respondents disagreed with the assertion that bank 
managers have no incentives to accurately price and monitor loans (Qs 10 and11). 
However, 60 percent disagreed that borrowers have no incentives to repay their loans 
(Q12). These responses are broadly comparable to those in the other banks already 
discussed but what was different was the response to question 13 was different. This 
revealed that 70 percent of respondents believed that a weak legal framework prevented 
their bank from monitoring loans. Once again, a possible interpretation for this finding 
might be found in the government‟s emphasis on interpersonal relationships and social 
ties and the consequential lack of clarity in loan approval procedures. 
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             Table 7.34 Bank managers‟ incentives in policy banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
10 Managers within banks 
have no incentives to price 
loans accurately  
0 (0%) 5(50%) 3(30%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
11Managers with banks have 
no incentives to monitor loans 
0(0%) 4(40%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
12Borrowers within the bank 
have no incentives to repay 
loans 
0(0%) 2(20%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
13A weak legal framework 
prevents the bank from 
monitoring loans 
0(0%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Rewards and penalties in policy banks 
 
Regarding reward and penalties regulation, Table 7.35 reveals that a high number of 
respondents (80 percent) believe that financial reward should be based on individual 
performance (Q14). However, 40 percent disagreed with the assertion that penalties in 
form of non-promotion or loss of employment are imposed on individuals when they 
make bad lending decisions (Q15).   
 
In this respect, the responses from policy banks are in accord with those from the other 
banks already discussed. As mentioned earlier these response do seem to place emphasis 
on a bonus system for good practice but apparently abdicate responsibility when things 
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go wrong. However, in contrast to the other banks, none of the respondent in policy 
banks believed that financial rewards motivated managers to select highly-profitable 
projects (Q16) and none of them believed that penalties in form of non-promotion and 
loss of employment made managers uncomfortable when selecting projects (Q17). 
These findings, accordingly, provide tentative evidence to suggest that the control of 
managers in policy banks, specifically, in terms of the sanctions that can be taken 
against them for poor and substandard work are not that apparent. The findings also 
suggest that in this respect, policy banks are distinctly different from state owned 
commercial banks were penalties (and the threat of sanctions), etc are more discernable. 
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            Table 7.35 Reward and penalty regulation in policy banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
14 Financial reward should be 
based on an individual‟ 
performance 
0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
15Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or los of 
employment are imposed on 
individuals because of bad 
lending decisions                   
0(0%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
16 Financial reward motivates 
managers in the bank to select 
highly-profitable projects 
0(0%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
17 Penalties in form of non 
promotion or loss of 
unemployment when Selecting 
projects 
1(10%) 2(20%) 4(40%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
18Managers in my bank lack 
incentives to select projects 
because of political 
interference by the government 
1(10%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
19Policy lending always 
influences my bank‟s lending 
decisions 
0(0%) 3(30%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) `0(0%) 10(100%) 
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The lack of penalties or sanctions for bad lending might be the price that mangers in 
policy banks pay for effectively implementing government policy and, perhaps in some 
instances seeing their decisions overridden by political and social considerations. This 
interpretation would certainly explain why 60 percent of respondents believed that 
managers lacked incentives to select projects because of political interference by the 
government (Q18) and government policy on lending (Q19).  
 
The effect of rewards and penalties in performance in policy banks 
 
In this respect, it was interesting to find that in Table 7.36 that 80 percent of respondents 
either disagreed or expressed no opinion on the assertion that managers‟ incentive to 
select good projects improves the performance of the bank (Q20). Similarly, none of the 
respondents believed that financial rewards improved the performance of the bank (Q21) 
and none of them believed that penalties influenced their own performance (Q22). 
                   Table 7.36 Bank performance in policy banks  
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
20 Managers‟ incentives to 
select good projects improve 
the performance of the bank 
0(0%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
21Financial rewards improve 
bank performance  
0(0%) 4(40%) 5(50%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
22Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment influence the 
performance 
0(0%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
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7.3.5 Foreign banks 
 
Project selection and approval in foreign banks 
 
Table 7.37 shows that more than half of the respondents in foreign banks believed that 
regulations relating to the selection of projects can control and influence management 
behavior in the selection of projects (Q1). The majority of respondents claimed that the 
process of approving loans was clear (Q2) and 54 percent believed that the support of 
government officials for projects was influenced by interpersonal relationship and social 
ties (Q3). These findings were broadly in line with those relating to the other banks 
discussed so far. However, the responses to question 4 revealed that only 46 percent 
believed that documents used in credit risk assessment reflected the real facts about the 
projects.  
 
The finding that credit documentation in foreign banks does not adequately reflect the 
real facts relating to projects could be true but it does raise a number of possible 
alternative interpretations. For example, if most of the respondents are expatriates, it 
could be that respondents believe that documentation used in credit assessment is not as 
good as that used in the foreign banks home country. Conversely, if most of the 
respondents are Chinese nationals with relatively recent experience of working in 
domestic banks in China, there may be an element of believing that domestic bank 
documentation is better. 
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             Table 7.37 Project selection and approval in foreign banks  
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Project Selection Regulation 
Can Control Manager‟s 
Behavior in Selecting Projects 
 
0(0%) 1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 6(25.0%) 4(16.7%) 8(33.3%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
 2Banks have a clear loan 
approval process 
0(0%) 0(0%) 3(12.5%) 3(12.5%) 3(12.5%) 13(54.2%) 2(8.3%) 10(100%) 
3Relationships and social ties 
influence government‟s support 
for projects 
0(0%) 1(4.2%) 3(12.5%) 7(29.2%) 9(37.5%) 4(16.7%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
4Credit Risk Documentation 
Reflect the Real Facts of the 
Project 
0(0%) 3(2.5%) 5(20.8%) 5(20.8%) 4(16.7%) 6(25.0%) 1(4.2%) 10(100%) 
 
Bank managers’ qualifications, skills and competency in foreign banks 
 
Another interesting response was the finding, shown in Table 7.38 that 58.4 percent of 
respondents either do not agree or expressed no opinion on the assertion that managers 
are highly skilled and highly qualified in their banks (Q5). Moreover, a relatively small 
percentage of respondents (58.3%) agreed that credit managers were competent and 
capable in project selection and 42.7 percent either disagreed or expressed no opinion 
on the assertion (Q6). These finding are, once again, slightly out of step with those 
relating to the other banks and this raises the possibility that there is some tension or 
conflict within these foreign banks. This tension might have its source in the fact that 
these foreign banks employ both expatriates and Chinese nationals. Moreover, foreign 
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banks have only been operational in China over a relatively short period. Accordingly, 
the findings might be indicative of organizations going through rapid organizational and 
cultural change. 
 
The responses to question 7, however, are more in line with those of the other banks and 
reveal that 58.4 percent of respondents either disagreed or expressed no opinion on the 
assertion that credit managers in their bank had autonomous powers in selecting 
projects. As before, this could be indicative of internal corporate governance structures 
that impose some form of control on the actions of individual managers. Alternatively, it 
could be reflecting the influence of government policy on the domestic lending policy 
of banks. It must also be borne in mind that these possibilities are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and elements of both could be influencing these findings. 
 
Table 7.38 Bank managers in foreign banks: skills, competency and autonomous powers  
Statement 
Strongly 
disagreed 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5Bank managers are highly 
qualified and highly skilled  
2(8.3%) 4(16.7%) 4(16.7%) 4(16.7%) 6(25%) 4(16.7%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
6Bank managers are competent 
in selecting projects  
1 (4.2%) 1(4.2%) 8(33.3%) 5(20.8%) 5(20.8%) 4(20.8%) 0(16.7%) 24(100%) 
7Bank managers have 
autonomous powers in 
selecting projects  
1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 6(25.0%) 3 (12.5%) 3(33.3%) 8(8.3%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
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Personal, government and social ties in foreign banks 
 
Table 7.39 reveals that 58 percent of bank managers believed that lending decisions are 
influenced by social ties and interpersonal relationship (Q8). It was also interesting to 
note the high number of respondents (83 percent) who either disagreed or expressed no 
opinion on the assertion that lending decisions are independent of government and 
social considerations (Q9). Once again, this is potentially reflecting the influence of 
government in terms of guiding and implementing economic policy within China.  
 
     Table 7.39   The personal, government and social ties in foreign banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree  
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
8Personal ties influence banks‟ 
lending decisions 
0(0%) 4(16.7%) 2(8.3%)  4(16.7%) 5(20.8%) 6(25.0%) 3(12.5%) 24(100%) 
9Lending decisions are 
independent of government 
and social considerations 
1(4.2%) 1(4.2%) 10(41.7%) 8(33.3%) 2(8.3%) 1(4.2%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
 
Bank managers’ incentives in foreign banks 
 
Table 7.40 reveals that 54 percent of respondents in foreign banks disagreed with the 
statement that bank managers have no incentives to price loans accurately (Q10). 
However, what was interesting, were the 21 percent of respondents who strongly agreed 
with this assertion. This raises the possibility of tensions or conflicts within foreign 
banks that were alluded to earlier. The majority of respondents disagreed or expressed 
no opinion on the statement that bank managers have no incentives to monitor loans 
(Q11). A high number of respondents (79 percent) were in general disagreement with 
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the assertion that borrowers have no incentives to repay loans (Q12) and 71 percent 
disagreed with the assertion that a weak legal framework prevents their banks from 
monitoring loans (Q13). Accordingly, although there is some evidence of conflict and 
government influence within foreign banks, there is also a feeling that the legal 
structure is sufficient to control lending and ensure repayment.  
 
            Table 7.40 Bank managers‟ incentives in foreign banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
10 Managers within banks 
have no incentives to price 
loans accurately  
1(4.2%) 2(8.3%) 3(12.5%) 7(29.2%) 4(16.7%) 2(8.3%) 5(20.8%) 24(100%) 
11 Managers with banks have 
no incentives to monitor loans 
2(8.3%) 7(29.2%) 3(12.5%) 3(12.5%) 5(20.8) 4(16.7) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
12 Borrowers within the bank 
have no incentives to repay 
loans 
2((8.3%) 7(29.2%) 10(41.7%) 2(8.3%) 2(8.3%) 1(4.2%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
13 A weak legal framework 
prevents the bank from 
monitoring loans 
5(20.8%) 6(25.0%) 6(25.0%) 3(12.5%) 2(8.3%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
 
Rewards and penalties in foreign banks  
 
As shown by Table 7.41 33.3 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that 
financial reward should be based on individual performance (Q14) and 58.3 percent 
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agreed that penalties in form of non-promotion or loss of employment were imposed on 
individuals because of bad lending (Q15). In this respect, the foreign banks appear to 
have a reasonable balance between rewarding good performance and the use of 
sanctions for bad lending. Bearing in mind this finding it was, therefore, not surprising 
to find that 58.3 percent of respondents believed that financial rewards motivated 
managers to select highly-profitable projects (Q16). 
 
What was surprising, however, was the finding that in relation to question 14, 33.3 
percent of respondents expressed no opinion on the assertion. This finding might be 
indicative of the previously mentioned tensions within foreign banks. However, it could 
be reflecting the fact that respondents believe they are already, recommended 
subjectively, or that rewards should reflect the performance of the banks as a whole, 
rather than the individual. Table 7.41 also shows that the majority of the respondents 
disagree that managers in the bank lack incentives to select projects because of political 
interference by the government. This is probably because those foreign banks are not 
controlled by the government and therefore are less influenced by political interference. 
In Table 7.41, there are diversified answers about policy lending influences the bank‟s 
lending decisions. 
 
A significant number of the respondents (87 percent) disagreed with the view that 
political interference by the government detracted from manager‟s incentives to select 
projects (Q18) and almost half of the respondents did not think that policy lending 
always influenced lending decisions (Q19). 
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             Table 7. 41:  Reward and penalty regulation in foreign banks 
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
14Financial reward should be 
based on an individual‟ 
performance 
3(12.5%) 1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 8(33.3%) 5(20.8%) 3(12.5%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
15Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or los of 
employment are imposed on 
individuals because of bad 
lending decisions              
0(0%) 5(20.8%) 2(8.3%) 3(12.5%) 3(12.5%) 10(41.7%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
16 Financial reward motivates 
managers in the bank to select 
highly-profitable projects 
1(4.2%) 5(20.8%) 0(0%) 4(16.7%) 4(16.7%) 7(29.2%) 3(12.5%) 24(100%) 
17 Penalties in form of non 
promotion or loss of 
unemployment when selecting 
projects 
0(0%) 6(25.0%) 0(0%) 4(16.7%) 4(16.7%) 6(25.0%) 4(16.7%) 24(100%) 
18 . Managers 
18 Managers in the bank lack 
incentives to select projects 
because of political 
interference by  the 
government  
1(4.2%) 9(37.5%) 11(45.8%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 1(4.2%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
19 policy lending always 
influences the bank‟s lending 
decisions  
1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 3(12.5%) 4(16.7%) 7(29.2%) 4(16.7%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
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A significant number of the respondents (87 percent) disagreed with the view that 
political interference by the government detracted from manager‟s incentives to select 
projects (Q18) and half of the respondents did not think that policy lending always 
influenced lending decisions (Q19).  
 
The effect of rewards and penalties in performance in foreign banks  
 
As with state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city 
commercial banks, Table 7.42 shows that there was general consensus amongst 
respondents that incentives provided to bank managers to select good projects improved 
the performance of foreign banks (Q20) and that financial rewards improved individual 
performance (Q21). Therefore, it was not that surprising to find that penalties in form of 
non-promotion or loss of employment were generally deemed to influence individual 
performance (Q22). 
 
                Table 7.42 Bank performance in foreign banks  
Statement  
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percent age) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
20 Managers‟ incentives to 
select good projects improve 
the performance of the bank 
0(0%) 1(4.2%) 1(4.2%) 6(25.0%) 6(25.0%) 8(33.3%) 2(8.3%) 24(100%) 
21 Financial rewards improve 
bank performance  
0(0%) 2(8.3%) 1(4.2%) 3(12.5%) 1(4.2%) 15(62.5%) 2(8.3%)  24(100%) 
22 Penalties in the form of 
non-promotion or loss of 
employment influence the 
performance 
0(0%) 1(4.2%) 2(8.3%) 4(16.7%) 2(8.3%) 10(41.7%) 5(20.8%) 24(100%) 
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7.3.6 Summary of the Analysis of the Different Sample Banks 
 
With the exception of commercial banks and city commercial banks, the majority of 
respondents in the other banks did not think that credit managers had autonomous 
powers in the selection of projects. Bearing in mind that state-owned commercial banks 
and policy banks are controlled by the government this finding was not entirely 
unexpected. In the remaining banks internal corporate governance structures relating to 
the control of lending typically have credit committees, which oversee lending decisions. 
Moreover, it is not unusual for individual managers to have caps or limits imposed on 
their lending. Lending beyond these limits must be approved either from a more senior 
manager or from a credit committee.  
 
Regarding reward and penalties, the findings established that these were important in 
state-owned commercial banks and foreign banks. It was interesting to find that rewards 
were more effective than penalties in joint-stock commercial banks but in city 
commercial banks penalties were far more effective. In contrast, neither reward nor 
penalties were particularly effective in policy banks and this almost certainly reflected 
the pervasive influence of government in the lending decisions. 
 
The influence of government also explain why the majority of respondents in policy 
banks either disagreed or expressed no opinion on the assertion that incentives to select 
good projects improved the performance of their bank. The respondents in policy banks 
were also different compared to the other banks in so much as a high proportion claimed 
that a weak legal framework prevented their bank from monitoring loans. In this respect, 
they seemed to be claiming that more specific guidance in the form of a clear law would 
facilitate the control of bank lending.  
 
In contrast to the other banks, a much smaller percentage of respondents in foreign 
banks felt that documents used in credit risk assessment adequately reflected the real 
facts about the projects. Similarly, this group of respondents did not feel (or did not 
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express an opinion) that bank managers in their bank were highly skilled or highly 
qualified. This finding might be reflecting the tensions that exist within foreign banks 
that are staffed by domestic and foreign staff. It was also interesting to note that 
respondents in these banks did not believe that political interference acted as a 
disincentive for lending managers in the selection of projects. 
 
The next chapter presents the findings and discusses the results relating to government 
guarantee and interference.  
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            Chapter Eight Government Guarantees and Interference 
 
This chapter analyses and discusses the findings relating to the second part of the study 
questionnaire and focuses on the role of government, referred to as government 
interference, and guarantees. As in the previous empirical chapter the discussion 
commences with an analysis of all the sample banks and then goes onto examine the 
individual banks in the sample. 
  
8.1 An analysis of All the Sample Banks  
 
Government guarantees and interference in bank lending in all banks 
 
The majority of respondents (73 percent) either disagreed or expressed no opinion on 
question 1 (Table 8.1), which relates to the assertion that government interference leads 
to increased policy lending in their bank. In response to question 2, Table 8.1 reveals 
that 49 percent agreed that government interference increased policy risk in their banks. 
Accordingly, 35.2 percent of respondents agreed with the assertion that government 
interference and guarantees lead to inefficient lending decisions in their bank (Q3). It 
was, therefore, not surprising to find that only 19.3 percent (Q4) believed that 
government guarantees and interference helped their bank to make effective lending 
decisions. The findings in the last two questions revealed relatively high frequencies for 
“don‟t know” (24.8 percent for Q3 and 40.7 percent for Q4) and this could be indicative 
of differences between the individual banks or an element of political sensitivity in 
truthfully answering these questions. 
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     Table 8.1 Government guarantees and interference in bank lending in all banks 
Statement  Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Government interference 
leads to increased policy 
lending in the bank  
1(0.7%) 34(23.4%) 31(21.4%) 40(27.6%) 16(11.0%) 19(13.1%) 4(2.8%) 145 (100%) 
2Government interference and 
guarantees increases policy 
risk in the bank          
1(0.7%) 21(14.5%) 19(13.1%) 33(22.8%) 45(31.0%) 22(15.2%) 4(2.8%) 145(100%) 
3Government interference and 
guarantee lead to inefficient 
lending decisions in the bank 
2(1.4%) 24(16.6%) 32(22.1%) 36(24.8%) 21(14.5%) 24(16.6%) 6(4.1%) 145(100%) 
4Government interference and 
guarantee help my bank to 
make effective lending 
decisions  
3(2.1%) 25(17.2%) 30(20.7%) 59(40.7%) 19(13.1%) 7(4.8%) 2(1.4%) 145(100%) 
 
Government guarantee and non-performing loans in all banks 
 
On the question of NPLs the findings were more robust. For example, Table 8.2 reveals 
that 42.8 percent of respondents disagreed with the assertion that government 
guarantees and interference result in substantial amounts of non-profitable lending and 
non-performing loans. Similarly, the majority of respondents (Q6, 57.2 percent) 
disagreed with the idea that government guarantees and interference are important 
explanatory reasons for the accumulation of NPLs in their bank.  
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      Table 8.2 Government guarantee and non-performing loans in all banks 
Statement  Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5Government interference and 
guarantees result in a large 
amount of non-profitable 
lending and non-performing 
loans in the bank 
2(1.4%) 43(29.7%) 17(11.7%) 32(22.1%) 33(22.8%) 15(10.3%) 3(2.1%) 145(100%) 
6Government interference and 
guarantees are considered to 
be important reasons for the 
accumulation of 
non-performing loans in the 
bank  
6(4.1%) 47(32.4%) 30(20.7%) 25(17.2%) 25(17.2%) 8(5.5%) 4(2.8%) 145(100%) 
 
In this respect, although there was a general (albeit tentative) view that government 
guarantees and government interference was not conducive to lending efficiency within 
banks, there was no overwhelming evidence to suggest that this had any great bearing 
on the incidence of non-performing loans.   
 
Objectives and aims of government guarantees and interference in all banks 
 
On the question (Q7) of the impact of government guarantees and interference on 
state–owned enterprise reforms, Table 8.3 reveals that 42.1 percent of respondents 
thought that they were conducive to reform. This positive attitude towards government 
was also self evident in the findings relating to question 8. These results revealed that 52 
 235 
percent of respondents believed that government guarantees and interference were 
aimed at increasing economic growth through the policy lending of banks. However, 
only 28 percent (Q9) agreed with the assertion that one of the main goals of government 
guarantees and interference with bank lending is to reduce unemployment. In contrast, 
(Q10) shows that nearly half of the respondents (48.9 percent) believed that the main 
goal of government guarantees and interference with bank lending is to maintain social 
stability. It was not surprising, therefore, to find that 54 percent agreed with the 
assertion that government officials have political reasons for interfering with bank 
lending policies (Q11). 
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Table 8.3 Objectives and aims of government guarantees and interference in all banks 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
7Government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
support state-owned 
enterprises reforms 
3(2.1%) 19(13.1%) 23(15.9%) 39(26.9%) 40(27.6%) 18(12.4%) 3(2.1%) 145(100%) 
8The government aims to 
increase economic growth 
through policy lending by 
banks 
0(0%) 13(9%) 21(14.5%) 36(24.8%) 50(34.5%) 22(15.2%) 3(2.1%) 145(100%) 
9One of the main goals of 
government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
is to reduce unemployment 
2(1.4%) 26(17.9%) 36(24.8%) 41(28.3%) 26(17.9%) 11(7.6%) 3(2.1%) 145(100%) 
10One of the main goals of 
government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
is to maintain social stability 
1(0.7%) 18(12.4%) 12(8.3%) 43(29.7%) 30(20.7%) 35(24.1%) 6(4.1%) 145(100%) 
11Government officials have 
political reasons for 
interfering with bank lending 
policies 
2(1.4%) 16(11.0%) 7(4.8%) 41(28.3%) 39(26.9%) 35(24.1%) 5(3.4%) 145(100%) 
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Bank lending to state-owned enterprises in all banks 
 
On the issue of bank lending, it was not surprising to find that 72.3 percent of 
respondents disagreed with the assertion that their banks prefer to make loans to 
inefficient state-owned enterprises backed by government guarantees (Q12, Table 8.4). 
Nevertheless, in response to question 13, Table 8.4 reveals that 43.4 percent of bank 
respondents agreed that their banks preferred to lend to state-owned enterprises rather 
than non-state-owned enterprises. In light of these findings it was, therefore, interesting 
to find that 52.4 percent of respondents disagreed with the assertion that 
poorly-performing state-owned enterprises are an important explanatory reason for the 
large amount of NPLs in their banks (Q14).Moreover, Table 8.4 shows that 51 percent 
of respondents disagreed with the statement that loans made to state-owned enterprises 
are more likely to result in inefficient lending by their bank (Q15). 
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           Table 8.4 Bank lending to state-owned enterprises in all banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12The bank prefers to make 
loans to inefficient 
state-owned enterprises under 
government guarantee 
16(11.0%) 73(50.3%) 16(11.0%) 20(13.8%) 9(6.2%) 10(6.9%) 1(0.7%) 145(100%) 
13The bank is more likely to 
lend to state-owned 
enterprises rather than 
non-state-owned enterprises 
6(4.1%) 24(16.6%) 22(15.2%) 30(20.7%) 25(17.2%) 33(22.8%) 5(3.4%) 145(100%) 
14Poor-performing 
state-owned enterprises are an 
important explanatory reason 
for the large amount of 
non-performing loans in the 
bank 
3(2.1%) 34(23.4%) 39(26.9%) 34(23.4%) 26(17.9%) 9(6.2%) 0(0%) 145(100%) 
15 Loans made to state-owned 
enterprises are more likely to 
result in inefficient lending in 
the bank 
0(0%) 34(23.4%) 40(27.6%) 35(24.1%) 25(17.2%) 10(6.9%) 1(0.7%) 145(100%) 
 
Government guarantees and bank lending practices in all banks 
 
Table 8.5 reveals that 33.1 percent of the respondents disagreed with the assertion (Q16) 
that relationships would be better without the current level of government guarantees 
and interference. However, 38.6 percent expressed no opinion and 28.3 percent agreed 
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with it. The responses to question 17 are similar in so much as 31.7 percent disagreed 
with the statement that government guarantees and interference detract from good 
lending practices in their bank. However, 42.1 percent expressed no opinion and 26.3 
percent agreed with the statement.  
 
In pursuing this question of government guarantees and bank lending, question 18 
( Table 8.5 ) focuses on government interference and guarantees, and tries to ascertain 
the extent (if any) that they detract from a careful evaluation of the financial 
considerations of lending proposals. In this respect, it was interesting to note that 26.3 
percent of respondents agreed with the assertion. However, 42.1 percent expressed no 
opinion and 31.7 percent disagreed with it. The responses to question 19, relate to the 
possibility that government guarantees and interference detract from the bank‟s internal 
rules and guidelines on prudent business lending. The findings reveal that 37.2 percent 
of respondents agreed with this assertion and an almost identical proportion (37.9 
percent) disagreed. However, once again a high proportion of respondents expressed no 
opinion on this subject (24.8 percent). Question 20 focuses on whether government 
helps banks to make effective lending through its macro-economic policies. As Table 
8.5 shows, however, although 57.2 percent of respondents agreed with this assertion 
42.8 percent expressed no opinion. 
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           Table 8.5 Government guarantee and bank lending in all banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
16 The relationships between 
government and the bank 
would be better without the 
current level of government 
interference and gurarantees 
2(1.4%) 26(17.9%) 20(13.8%) 56(38.6%) 15(10.3%) 23(15.9%) 3(2.1%) 145(100%) 
17Government interference 
and guarantees detract from 
good lending practices in the 
bank 
1(0.7%) 23(15.9%) 22(15.2%) 61(42.1%) 24(16.6%) 14(97%) 0(100%) 145(100%) 
18Government interference 
and guarantees detract from 
careful evaluation of the 
financial considerations in a 
lending proposal of the bank 
1(0.7%) 28(19.3%) 12(8.3%) 49(33.8%) 32(22.1%) 18(12.4%) 5(3.4%) 145(100%) 
19Government interference 
and guarantees detract from 
the bank‟s internal rules and 
guidelines on prudent business 
lending 
0(0%) 36(24.8%) 19(13.1%) 36(24.8%) 37(25.5%) 15(10.3%) 2(1.4%) 145(100%) 
20 The government helps the 
bank to make effective lending 
through macro-economic 
policies 
0(0%) 9(6.2%) 18(12.4%) 35(24.1%) 46(31.7%) 35(24.1%) 2(1.4%) 
 
145(100%) 
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The role of government and central bank in all banks 
 
As Table 8.6 shows, in response to Question 21, only 13.1 percent disagreed with the 
assertion that government plays an important role in bank lending and 45.4 percent 
agreed with the assertion. However, once again, a very high 41.4 percent expressed no 
opinion with regard to this question. 
 
The responses to question 22 reveal that 76.6 percent of respondents believed that the 
Central Bank should concentrate on the supervision and regulation of banks and only 
8.9 percent disagreed. However, in response to question 23, Table 8.6 shows that 62.4 
percent of respondents agreed that government should provide more guidance on what it 
considers to be prudent lending.   
           Table 8.6 The role of government and central bank in all banks 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
21The government plays an 
important and positive role in 
lending to business by the 
bank  
2(1.4%) 9(6.2%) 8(5.5%) 60(41.4%) 27(18.6%) 34(23.4%) 5(3.4%) 145(100%) 
22The Central Bank should 
concentrate on supervision 
and regulation of bank 
behaviors  
0(0%) 6(4.1%) 7(4.8%) 21(14.5%) 23(15.9%) 67(46.2%) 21(14.5%) 145(100%) 
23Governement should 
provide more guidance on 
what it considers to be prudent 
business lending  
0(0%) 8(11.4%) 2(5.5%) 30(20.7%) 47(22.4%) 48(33.1%) 10(6.9%) 145(100%) 
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Banker-customer relationships in all banks 
 
Question 24 relates to the assertion that bank-government relationships are influenced 
by personal contacts. In response to this question, Table 8.7 shows that 45.6 percent of 
respondents agreed with the assertion, thereby, emphasizing the importance of direct 
and personal relationships between bank representatives and government officials.  
However, what was surprising was the 34.5 percent of respondents also expressed no 
opinion on this question. Table 8.7 also reveals that although 71.7 percent of 
respondents agreed with the assertion that banker-customer relationships are important 
in choosing projects (Q25). In this respect, the strength of opinion was slightly stronger 
than that relating to relationships with government officials. Responses to Question 26 
reveal even stronger support, with 78.6 percent of the sample agreeing that 
banker-customer relationships are important in attracting business to the bank.   
               Table 8.7 Banker-customer relationships in all banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree  
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree  
(percentage) 
Agree  
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree  
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
25Bank-government 
relationships are influenced by 
personal contacts and 
relationships  
1(0.7%) 16(11.0%) 12(8.3%) 50(34.5%) 39(26.9%) 20(13.8%) 7(4.9%) 145(100%) 
26Bank-government 
relationships are important in 
choosing projects in the bank  
2(1.4%) 5(3.4%) 12(8.3%) 22(15.2%) 49(33.8%) 46(31.7%) 9(6.2%) 145(100%) 
27Banker-customer 
relationships are important in 
attracting business customers 
to my bank 
0(0%) 4(2.8%) 5(3.4%) 22(15.2%)                                                    44(30.3%) 60(41.4%) 10(6.9%) 145(100%) 
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Factors that impact upon non-performing loans in all banks 
 
Question 27 relates to the impact that a range of considerations have on the level of 
non-performing loans. The considerations include: the social and political regime; too 
much government interference and guarantees; lack of managerial autonomy; weak 
credit risk management; poor performing state-owned enterprises; soft credit culture; 
loans based on personal contacts (relationship loans); and, others. Taking each of these 
considerations in turn, Table 8.8 reveals that 53 percent of respondents agreed that the 
social and political regimes are an important explanatory reason for NPLs in China 
(Q27.a). However, once again, a relatively high 24.1 percent expressed no opinion on 
this issue. With regard to the question of government interference (Q27.b), 40.1 percent 
agreed that too much government interference and the granting of guarantees had a 
major impact on the amount of non-performing loans. However, 31.7 percent expressed 
no opinion on this assertion and 25.6 percent disagreed with it.   
 
On the relationship between NPLs and the lack of managerial autonomy (Q27c), it was 
perhaps not that surprising to find that 56.5 percent of respondents disagreed that it was 
an important explanatory reason. However, 31 percent of respondents agreed that lack 
of managerial autonomy was an important reason behind the level of non-performing 
loans. This implies that in some banks or perhaps at certain levels of bank management 
there was an element of concern (or resentment) at the lack of management freedom in 
making lending decisions. However, it was interesting to find that 42.1 percent of 
respondents disagreed with the assertion that weak credit management was a major 
explanatory reason behind NPLs (Q27.d). In fact only 22.8 percent agreed with this 
assertion but a surprisingly high 23.4 percent expressed no opinion.    
 
Regarding the question as to whether the poor performance of state-owned enterprises 
had a major impact on non-performing loans, the results were somewhat mixed (Q27,e). 
For example, 40.7 percent of respondents agreed with the assertion but a similar 
proportion- 45.5 percent disagreed. It was also interesting to note that only 13.8 percent 
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expressed no opinion on this issue. Bearing in mind the spectacular performance of the 
Chinese economy it is perhaps surprising to find that a fairly high proportion of 
respondents believe that the poor performance of state owned enterprises is a major 
reason behind non-performing loans. However, despite the high incidence of “don‟t 
knows” or “no opinions” on many issues relating to the role of government and bank 
lending, there does appear to be a consensus amongst some respondents that 
government interference detracts from prudent lending. Moreover, the majority of 
respondents believe that central government should provide more guidance on what it 
considers to be prudent lending.  
 
The majority of respondents (51.7 percent) believed that a soft credit culture was a 
major explanatory reason for NPLs (Q27, f). However, 24.8 percent of respondents did 
not express an opinion on this issue. In this respect, it was interesting to see that 
relationship loans, i.e. loans based on personal contacts, were also regarded as a major 
contributory factor by 47.5 percent of respondents (Q27,g). However, there were a 
relatively high proportion of respondents (25.5 percent) who expressed no opinion on 
this particular aspect of non-performing loans.  
 
However, there were a relatively high proportion of respondents who expressed no 
opinion on this particularly aspect of non-performing loans. 
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Table 8.8 The impact of different factors on non-performing loans accumulation in all 
banks  
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
27(a)The social and political 
regime 
0(0%) 19(13.1%) 14(9.7%) 35(24.1%) 34(23.4%) 37(25.5%) 6(4.1%) 145(100%) 
27(b)Too much government 
guarantee and interference 
2(1.4%) 22(15.2%) 13(9.0%) 46(31.7%) 24(16.6%) 35(21.4%) 3(2.1%) 145(100%) 
27(c)Lack of managerial 
autonomy 
7(4.8%) 38(26.2%) 37(25.5%) 18(12.4%) 26(17.9%) 14(9.7%) (3.4%) 145(100%) 
27(d)Weak credit risk 
management 
9(6.2%) 32(22.1%) 20(13.8%) 25(23.4%) 24(14.5%) 27(2.8%) 8(5.5%) 145(100%) 
27(e)Poorly-performing 
state-owned enterprises  
10(6.9%) 34(23.4%) 22(15.2%) 20(13.8%) 34(23.4%) 21(14.5%) 4(2.8%) 145(100%) 
27(f)Soft credit culture 8(5.5%) 15(10.3%) 11(7.6%) 36(24.8%) 39(26.9%) 28(19.3%) 8(5.5%) 145(100%) 
27(g)Loans based on personal 
contacts 
3(2.1%) 25(17.2%) 11(7.6%) 37(25.5%) 30(20.7%) 34(23.4%) 5(3.4%) 145(100%) 
          
8.2 Summary of Analysis of all the Sample Banks 
 
The analysis of government interference in bank loan provision, including government 
guarantees, resulted in a relatively high frequency of “neither agree nor disagrees”. This 
could simply be reflecting the fact that respondents have no opinion on the assertions or 
that they did not feel that they were of any significant importance. However, the 
assertions were derived from a thorough review of the literature and the identification of 
the key considerations that are shaping and influencing the development of banks in 
China. Accordingly, the results might be reflecting the fact that questions relating to 
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political and government interference might be a little too sensitive. If this is the case, 
respondents might be reluctant to express an opinion on these issues.   
 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the analysis has failed to show that government 
interference and the provision of government guarantees leads to inefficient bank 
lending. The majority of respondent also disagreed with the assertion that government 
interference had resulted in non profitable lending or the occurrence of non-performing 
loans. Moreover, although the questionnaire did not ask outright whether government 
interference was justified, the vast majority of respondents believed that government 
interference in bank lending was based on tangible considerations, such as, generating 
economic growth, and political and social stability. 
 
The analysis also revealed that most Chinese banks are inclined to lend to state owned 
enterprises. However, in trying to obtain insight into whether government interference 
detracted from good lending practice or a careful objective analysis of the proposal, the 
findings were inconclusive. This was because of the high incidence of respondents who 
expressed no opinion on these potentially important issues. 
 
The findings did, nevertheless, establish that government plays a positive and important 
role in bank lending to Chinese firms. However, the majority of respondents believed 
that the central bank should concentrate more on the regulation of the banking system 
and that government should be more prescriptive in terms of providing guidance on 
what is prudent lending. 
 
In terms of the considerations, which could have a major impact on NPLs in China, the 
findings failed to show that government interference was a major contributory factor. 
Once again, respondents failed to express a definitive opinion on this subject. However, 
managerial autonomy or the incidence of weak credit risk management procedures were 
not regarded as important contributory factors. In contrast, social and political 
considerations were regarded as important and this probably reflects the fact that 
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although China is growing at an unprecedented rate it is still an emerging economy. 
Accordingly, lending decisions are predominantly influenced by the need to maintain 
and promote political and social stability.     
 
8. 3Analysis of Individual Banks 
 
8.3.1 State-owned commercial banks 
  
Government guarantee and interference in bank lending in state-owned commercial 
banks 
 
The responses from state owned commercial banks were generally mixed. The findings 
relating to question 1, on whether government interference leads to increased policy 
lending (Table 8.9), revealed that 37.5 percent agreed that government interference 
leads to increased policy lending in their banks. However, 40 percent disagreed and 22.5 
percent expressed no opinion on this assertion. Question 2, which addressed the 
question as to whether government interference increased policy risk reveal that 52.5 
percent of respondents agreed with this assertion, 30.0 percent disagreed and a 
relatively small proportion (for this group of questions) - 17.5 percent, expressed no 
opinion. 
 
The question of whether government interference and guarantees are conducive to more 
effective lending decision was addressed by question 3. Table 8.9 shows that 37.5 
percent of respondents agreed with this assertion but 40 percent disagreed and 22.5 
percent expressed no opinion. Similarly, the responses to question 4 reveal that 40.0 
percent of respondents disagreed with the assertion that government interference and 
guarantees help the bank to make effective lending decisions. However, despite the 
similarity with the responses to question 3, slightly more respondents (25.0 percent 
expressed no opinion. 
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Table 8.9 Government guarantee and interference in bank lending in state-owned 
commercial banks 
Statement  Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Government interference 
leads to increased policy 
lending in the bank  
1(2.5%) 9(22.5%) 6(15.0%) 9(22.5%) 5(12.5%) 7(17.5%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
2Government interference and 
guarantees increases policy 
risk in the bank          
1(2.5%) 4(10.0%) 7(17.5%) 7(17.5%) 9(22.5%) 8(20.0%) 4(10.0%) 40 (100%) 
3Government interference and 
guarantee lead to inefficient 
lending decisions in the bank 
2(5.0%) 5(12.5%) 9(22.5%) 9(22.5%) 8(15.0%) 5(20.0%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
4Government interference and 
guarantee help my bank to 
make effective lending 
decisions  
0(0%) 9(22.5%) 7(17.5%) 10(25.0%) 7(17.5%) 5(12.5%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
 
As mentioned previously, the mixed responses to the questions relating to government 
interference and the provision of guarantees might be indicative of the fact that lending 
decisions can be quite complex and a range of different considerations have a bearing 
on the eventual decision. However, the findings might be indicative of the sensitivity of 
questions relating to government involvement, especially, in state-owned banks. 
Alternatively, it could be that a significant number of respondents simply do not have an 
opinion on these matters. 
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Government guarantee and non-performing loans in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Question 5 posed the assertion that government interference and guarantees result in 
non-profitable lending and non-performing loans and as Table 8.10 reveals, although 
32.5 percent agreed with this assertion, 40 percent disagreed and a significant 27.5 
percent expressed no opinion. Question 6, addressed the same issue but it was worded 
slightly differently. Accordingly, in response to the assertion that government 
interference and guarantees are considered to be important reasons for the accumulation 
of non-performing loans, 35 percent of respondents agreed (Table 8.10). Moreover, 
although the same proportion of respondents expressed no opinion (17.5 percent), only 
47.5 percent disagreed. 
 
Table 8.10 Government guarantee and non-performing loans in state-owned commercial 
banks  
Statement  Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5Government interference and 
guarantees result in a large 
amount of non-profitable 
lending and non-performing 
loans in the bank 
0(0%) 13(32.5%) 3(7.5%) 11(27.5%) 8(20.0%) 4(10%) 1(2.5%) 40(100%) 
6Government interference and 
guarantees are considered to 
be important reasons for the 
accumulation of 
non-performing loans in the 
bank  
1(2.5%) 11(27.5%) 7(17.5%) 7(17.5%) 6(15.0%) 4(10%) 4(10%) 40(100%) 
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Objectives and aims of government guarantee and interference in state-owned 
commercial banks 
 
Table 8.11 reveals that 42.5 percent of respondents agree that reform of state owned 
enterprises are determined by government interference and guarantees (Q7). However, 
30.0 percent disagreed and 27.5 percent expressed no opinion on this issue. 
   
In response to the assertion that the government intends to increase economic growth 
through policy lending by the banks (Q 8), Table 8.11 shows that 45 percent agreed. 
However, 35 percent expressed no opinion and 20.0 percent disagreed. It was, therefore, 
surprising to find (although consistent with the findings relating to all of the banks) that 
in response to question 9, only 25 percent of respondents believed that one of the main 
aims of government interference and guarantees was to reduce unemployment (Table 
8.11). This response undoubtedly reflects the sheer magnitude of this problem and, 
therefore, the government tends to avoid making this goal an explicit policy objective. 
In contrast, the findings relating to question 10, shown in Table 8.11, reveal that 45 
percent of respondents agreed that one of the main goals of government interference and 
guarantees is to maintain social stability. Bearing in mind the sheer size of the Chinese 
population social stability is very important and this would appear to be re-affirmed by 
the findings. In response to question 11, which asserts that government officials have 
political reasons for interfering with bank lending policies, Table 8.11 shows that 52.5 
percent of respondents agreed with this assertion but 25 percent disagreed and 22.5 
percent expressed no opinion. This question was deliberately non-specific in the sense 
that it did not specify what these political reasons were but the findings do support the 
view that the government has political motives for interfering with bank lending. 
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Table 8.11 Objectives and aims of government guarantee and interference in 
state-owned commercial banks 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
7Government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
support state-owned 
enterprises reforms 
0(0%) 6(15.0%) 6(15.0%) 11(27.5%) 12(30.0%) 5(12.5%) 0(0%) 40(100%) 
8 The government aims to 
increase economic growth 
through policy lending by 
banks 
0(0%) 4(10.0%) 4(10.0%) 14(35.0%) 13(32.5%) 3(7.5%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
9 One of the main goals of 
government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
is to reduce unemployment 
2(5.0%) 11(27.5%) 5(12.5%) 12(30.0%) 7(17.5%) 3(7.5%) 0(0%) 40(100%) 
10 One of the main goals of 
government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
is to maintain social stability 
1(2.5%) 6(15.0%) 3(7.5%) 12(30.0%) 12(30.0%) 5(12.5%) 1(2.5%) 40(100%) 
11 Government officials have 
political reasons for 
interfering with bank lending 
policies 
2(5.0%) 6(15.0%) 2(5.0%) 9(22.5%) 13(32.5%) 6(15.0%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
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Lending to state-owned enterprises by state-owned commercial banks 
 
The majority of respondents from state-owned commercial banks (57.5 percent) did not 
believe that their banks preferred to make loans to state-owned enterprises under 
government guarantees (Q12, Table 8.12). This finding also implies that loans are made 
under prudent lending guidelines. This also implies that lending decisions are made 
more on the basis of the business case rather than on whether the loan is collateralized 
by a government guarantee. Nevertheless, as table 8.12 shows 42.5 percent believed that 
their bank is more likely to make loans to state-owned enterprises rather than 
non-state-owned enterprises (Q13). Once again, this is indicative of prudent business 
lending, possibly reflecting that ceteris paribus, less risk is associated with state-owned 
businesses.  
 
Moreover, 40 percent of respondents believe that poor-performing state-owned 
enterprises are not an important explanatory reason for the large amount of NPLs in 
state-owned commercial banks (Q14). The responses to question 15 similarly reveal that 
62.5 percent of managers disagreed with the notion that loans made to state-owned 
enterprises are more likely to result in inefficient lending. 
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Table 8.12 Bank lending to state-owned enterprises in state-owned commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12The bank prefers to make 
loans to inefficient 
state-owned enterprises under 
government guarantee 
4(10.0%) 18(45.0%) 1(2.5%) 7(17.5%) 7(17.5%) 2(5.0%) 1(2.5%) 40(100%) 
13The bank is more likely to 
lend to state-owned 
enterprises rather than 
non-state-owned enterprises 
4(10%) 3(7.5%) 8(20%) 8(20%) 7(17.5%) 8(20%) 2(5%) 40(100%) 
14Poorly-performing 
state-owned enterprise are an 
important explanatory reason 
for the large amount of 
non-performing loans in the 
bank 
0(0%) 10(25.0%) 6(15.0%) 12(30%) 9(22.5%) 3(7.5%) 0(0%) 40(100%) 
15Loans made to state-owned 
enterprises are more likely to 
result in inefficient lending in 
the bank  
0(0%) 14(35%) 11(27.5%) 7(17.5%) 5(12.5%) 2(5.0%) 1(2.5%) 40(100%) 
 
Government guarantees and bank lending practices in state-owned commercial banks 
 
The next question (Q16), shows in Table 8.13, examined the idea that the relationship 
between state-owned commercial banks and government would be better with less 
government interference and guarantees. The findings reveal that 45 percent of 
respondent disagreed with this assertion. This finding strongly suggests that the 
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relationship between government and state-owned commercial banks is not adversely 
affected by government interference and guarantees. 
 
However, when the questionnaire tried to obtain more specific information about 
government interference and actual lending decisions, the results were more mixed. For 
example, regarding whether government interference and guarantees detracted from 
good lending practice (Q17), Table 8.13 reveals that 37.5 percent disagreed with the 
assertion. However, it was interesting to find that 32.5 percent agreed with it and 30 
percent expressed no opinion. Similarly, on the related question (Q18) as to whether 
government interference and guarantees detracted from a careful evaluation of the 
financial considerations in a loan proposal, 35.0 percent disagreed with the assertion but 
27.5 percent agreed and 37.5 percent expressed no opinion. What was surprising 
however was the response to question 19, shown in Table 8.13.This revealed that 
opinion was equally divided between in response to the assertion that government 
interference and guarantees detracts from the bank‟s internal rules and guidelines on 
prudent business lending. This might be indicative of how lending practices can vary 
within state-owned commercial banks. To some extent, this might, therefore, be 
reflecting variations in the quality of management within these banks but as mentioned 
before. This might be indicative of the sensitivity of the issues raised by these questions. 
The responses to question 20, which are less sensitive, reveal that the majority of 
respondents (70 percent) believe that the government‟s macro-economic policies are 
conductive to effective lending. Moreover, only 7.5 percent of respondents disagreed 
with the assertion. 
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Table 8.13 Government guarantee and bank lending practices in state-owned 
commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
16 The relationships between 
government and the bank 
would be better without the 
current level of government 
guarantees 
1(2.5%) 11(27.5%) 6(15.0%) 10(25.0%) 8(20.0%) 4(10.0%) 0(0%) 40(100%) 
17Government interference 
and guarantees detract from 
good lending practices in the 
bank 
1(2.5%) 11(27.5%) 3(7.5%) 12(30.0%) 8(20.0%) 5(12.5%) 0(0%) 40(100%) 
18Government interference 
and guarantees detract from 
careful evaluation of the 
financial considerations in a 
lending proposal of the bank 
1(2.5%) 10(25.0%) 3(7.5%) 15(37.5%) 3(7.5%) 6(15.0%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
19Government interference 
and guarantees detract from 
the bank‟s internal rules and 
guidelines on prudent business 
lending 
0(0%) 11(27.5%) 5(12.5%) 8(20.0%) 7(17.5%) 7(17.5%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
20The government helps the 
bank to make effective lending 
through macro-economic 
policies  
0(0%) 1(2.5%) 2(5.0%) 9(22.5%) 9(22.5%) 17(42.5%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
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The role of government and the Central bank in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Table 8.14 shows that 68 percent of respondents agreed government plays an important 
and positive role in lending to business by their banks (Q21). In addition, there was 
general agreement that the central bank should concentrate on the supervision and 
regulation of banks (Q22) and provide more guidance on what it considers to be prudent 
business lending (Q23). These responses emphasize the importance of the Central Bank 
and the government in bank lending. 
 
Table 8.14 The role of government and the central bank in state-owned commercial 
banks  
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
disagree nor 
agree 
(percentage)  
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
21The government plays an 
important and positive role in 
lending to business by the 
bank 
1(2.5%) 2(5.0%) 0(0%) 10(25.0%) 10(25.0%) 15(37.5%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
22The Central Bank should 
concentrate on the supervision 
and regulation of bank 
behaviors  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(15.0%) 4(10.0%) 23(57.5%) 7(17.5%) 40(100%) 
23Government should provide 
more guidance on what it 
considers to be prudent 
business lending  
0(0%) 1(2.5%) 1(2.5%) 7(17.5%) 11(27.5%) 14(35.0%) 6(15.0%) 40(100%) 
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Banker-customer relationships in state-owned commercial banks 
 
As to the relationships between government and banks, Table 8.15 shows that nearly 
half of bank managers claimed that this relationship is influenced by personal contacts 
and relationships (Q24). Rather interestingly, a large proportion (87 percent) agrees that 
the banker-customer relationship is an important consideration in choosing projects in 
their banks (Q25). This finding is supported by the fact that the same percentage of 
respondents claimed that banker-customer relationships are important in attracting 
business customers to their banks (Q26). 
 
    Table 8.15 Bank-customer relationships in state-owned commercial banks 
Statement 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
24Bank-government 
relationships are influenced by 
personal contacts and 
relationships  
 1(2.5%) 5(12.5%) 6(15.0%) 9(22.5%) 6(15.0%) 7(17.5%) 6(15.0%) 40(100%) 
25Banker-customer 
relationships are important in 
choosing projects in the bank 
0(0%) 1(2.5%) 1(2.5%) 3(7.5%) 11(27.5%) 18(45.0%) 6(15.0%) 40(100%) 
26Banker-customer 
relationships are important in 
attracting business customer to 
the bank 
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(2.5%) 4(10.0%) 9(22.5%) 19(47.5%) 7(17.5%) 40(100%) 
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Factors that impact upon non-performing loans in state-owned commercial banks  
 
Regarding the impact of different factors on NPLs in state-owned commercial banks, it 
was not surprising to find that 70 percent of respondents consider that social and 
political regimes have a major impact on the level of NPLs (Q27.a, Table 8.16). Nearly 
half of the respondents claimed that too much government interference and government 
guarantees were the main explanatory reason behind NPLs (Q27.b). Regarding question 
27 (c), Table 8.16 reveals that 40 percent of respondents believed that a lack of 
managerial autonomy in their banks contributed to non-performing loans. Weak credit 
risk management was also considered to be important by half of the respondents 
(Q27.d). Poorly-performing state-owned enterprises were similarly regarded as 
important as was the soft credit culture and loans based on personal contacts. All of 
these factors are regarded as being an important impact on NPLs accumulation in 
state-owned commercial banks. However, the social and political regimes were regarded 
as being the most important considerations. 
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Table 8.16 The impact of different factors on the level of non-performing loans 
accumulation in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Statement  Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
27(a)The social and political 
regime 
0(0%) 5(12.5%) 1(2.5%) 6(15.0%) 7(17.5%) 16(40.0%) 5(12.5%) 40(100%) 
27(b)Too much government 
interference and guarantee 
1(2.5%) 7(17.5%) 3(7.5%) 10(25.0%) 4(10.0%) 12(30.0%) 3(7.5%) 40 (100%) 
27(c)Lack of managerial 
autonomy  
1(2.5%) 9(22.5%) 9(22.5%) 5(12.5%) 5(12.5%) 7(17.5%) 4(10%) 40(100%) 
27(d)Weak credit risk 
management 
1(2.5%) 5(12.5%) 8(20.0%) 6(15.0%) 6(15.0%) 10(25.0%) 4(10.0%) 40(100%) 
27(e)Poor-performing 
state-owned enterprises 
1(2.5%) 4(10.0%) 8(20.0%) 8(20.0%) 7(17.5%) 10(25.0%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
27 (f)Soft credit culture 1(2.5%) 3(7.5%) 5(12.5%) 12(30.0%) 5(12.5%) 11(27.5%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
27(g)Loans based on personal 
contacts (relationships) 
1(2.5%) 3(7.5%) 5(12.5%) 12(30.0%) 7(22.5%) 9(22.5%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
 
8. 3.2 Joint-stock commercial banks 
  
Government guarantees and interference in bank lending in joint-stock commercial 
banks 
 
Table 8.17 reveals that in joint-stock commercial banks, 59 percent of respondents did 
not believe that government guarantees and interference led to increased policy lending 
in their banks (Q1). However, half of the sample believed that government guarantees 
and interference increased policy risks in their banks (Q2). As to whether government 
 260 
interference leads to inefficient lending (Q3), the sample was almost equally divided 
with 39 percent agreeing with the assertion and 36 percent disagreeing. In this respect, it 
was also interesting to note that 24.6 percent of respondent expressed no opinion on this 
question. 
Table 8.17 Government guarantees and interference in bank lending in joint-stock 
commercial banks 
Statement  Strongly 
disagree  
(percentage) 
Disagree  
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree  
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
1Government guarantees and 
interference lead to increased 
policy lending decisions in the 
bank 
0(0%) 16(26.2%) 20(32.1%) 15(24.6%) 5(8.2%) 5(8.2%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
2Government guarantee and 
interference increase policy 
risk in the bank  
0(0%) 10(16.4%) 6(9.8%) 15(24.6%) 23(37.7%) 7(11.5%) 0(0%) 61 (100%) 
3Government guarantee and 
interference lead to inefficient 
lending decisions in the bank 
0(0%) 11(18.0%) 11(18.0%) 15(24.6%) 9(14.8%) 13(21.3%) 2(3.3%) 61(100%) 
4Government guarantee and 
interference help banks to 
make effective lending 
decisions  
0(0%) 8(13.1%) 14(23.0%) 27(44.3%) 10(16.4%) 2(3.3%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
 
With regard to question 4, only 20 percent of respondents agreed with the assertion that 
government guarantees and interference encourages or is conducive to effective lending 
decisions by banks.  
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Government guarantees and non performing loans in joint stock commercial banks 
 
Table 8.18 shows that 30 percent of respondents believed that government guarantees 
and interference resulted in a large amount of non-profitable lending and NPLs in their 
banks (Q5). However, the vast majority either disagreed or expressed no opinion on this 
subject suggesting either that they do not have an opinion or any substantive knowledge 
on the subject, or that the issue is considered politically sensitive. 
 
A similarly response profile was revealed by question 6 with approximately 70 percent 
of bank managers either disagreeing or expressing no opinion on the assertion that 
government interference and guarantees were important explanatory reasons for NPLs 
in joint-stock commercial banks. As with question 5, the same sort of explanatory 
reasons can be proffered for this response pattern. 
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Table 8.18 Government guarantee and non-performing loans in joint-stock commercial 
banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
5Government interference and 
guarantees result in a large 
amount of non-profitable 
lending and non-performing 
loans in joint-stock 
commercial banks 
 
1(1.6%) 21(34.4%) 10(16.4%) 11(18.0%) 14(23.0%) 4(6.6%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
6 Government interference 
and guarantees are considered 
to be important reasons for the 
accumulation of 
non-performing loans in 
joint-stock commercial banks 
 
1(1.6%) 19(34.4%) 14(16.4%) 11(18.0%) 13(21.3%) 3(4.9%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
 
Objectives and aims of government guarantees and interference in joint-stock 
commercial banks 
Table 8.19 reveals that 40.9 percent of respondents believed that government guarantees 
and interference with bank lending support the reform of state-owned enterprises. 
However, 31 percent disagreed with this assertion and almost 28 percent expressed no 
opinion (Q7). Similarly, 39 percent agreed that the government aims to increase 
economic growth through policy lending while 31 percent disagreed with the assertion 
(Q8).  
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Table 8.19 also reveals that the vast majority of respondents did not believe that the 
main goal of government interference in bank lending is to reduce unemployment (Q9) 
but rather surprisingly most of the respondents believed that government interference is 
conducive to maintaining social stability (Q10). Regarding the issue of whether 
government officials have political reasons for interfering with bank lending, the 
responses to question 11 shows that 49.2 percent of respondents believe that 
government officials have political reasons for interfering with bank lending policies. 
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Table 8.19 The objectives and aims of government guarantee and interference in 
joint-stock commercial banks 
 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
7Government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
support state-owned 
enterprises reform 
3(4.9%) 7(11.5%) 9(14.8%) 17(27.9%) 19(31.1%) 6(9.8%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
8The government aims to 
increase economic growth 
through policy lending by 
bank 
0(0%) 4(6.6%) 15(24.6%) 18(29.5%) 16(26.2%) 7(11.5%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
9One of the main goals of 
government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
is to reduce unemployment 
0(0%) 11(18.0%) 18(29.5%) 17(27.9%) 9(14.8%) 5(8.2%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
10One of the main goals of 
government guarantee and 
interference with bank lending 
is to maintain social stability 
0(0%) 6(9.8%) 6(9.8%) 15(24.6%) 11(18.0%) 22(36.1%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
11Government officials have 
political reasons for 
interfering with bank lending 
policies 
0 (0%) 6(9.8%) 4 (6.6%) 21 (34.4%) 5(8.2%) 24 (39.4%) 1(1.6%) 61 (100%) 
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Lending to state-owned enterprises by joint-stock commercial banks  
 
Table 8.20 shows that a high number of bank managers (approximately 80 percent) 
disagreed with the assertion that their banks prefer to make loans to inefficient 
state-owned enterprises under government guarantees (Q12). Moreover, there is no 
evidence to suggest that joint-stock commercial banks are more likely to lend to 
state-owned enterprises rather than non-state-owned enterprises (Q13). However, the 
responses to question 14 reveal that a small but significant number of managers (31.2 
percent) agreed that poorly-performing state-owned enterprises are an important 
explanatory reason for the large amount of NPLs in their bank (Q14). However, 
respondents did not believe that loans made to state-owned enterprises are more likely 
to result in inefficient lending in their banks (Q15). These findings seem to indicate that 
state-owned enterprises are not a primary explanatory reason for the accumulation of 
NPLs in joint-stock commercial banks.  
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Table 8.20 Bank lending to state-owned enterprises in joint-stock commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree  
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12The bank prefer to make 
loans to inefficient 
state-owned enterprises under 
government guarantees 
4(6.6%) 35(57.4%) 10(16.4%) 9(14.8%) 2(3.3%) 1(1.6%) 0(100%) 61(100%) 
13The bank is more likely to 
lend to state-owned 
enterprises rather than 
non-state-owned 
Enterprises   
0(0%) 13(21.3%) 5(8.2%) 19(31.1%) 16(26.2%) 8(13.1%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
14Poor-performing 
state-owned enterprises are an 
important explanatory  
reason for the large amount of 
non-performing loans in the 
bank   
0(100%) 13(21.3%) 14(23.0%) 15(24.6%) 14(23.0%) 5(8.2%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
15Loans made to state-owned 
enterprises are more likely to 
result in inefficient lending in 
the bank  
4(6.6%) 35(57.4%) 10(16.4%) 9(14.8%) 2(3.3%) 1(1.6%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
 
Government guarantees and bank lending practices in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
In table 8.21, the responses to question 16, reveal that approximately half of the 
respondents expressed no opinion on the assertion that the relationship between 
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joint-stock commercial banks would be better without the government guarantees and 
interference. Similarly, the responses to question 17 reveal that 30 percent of 
respondents expressed no opinion on the assertion that government interference and 
guarantees detracts from good lending practices. However, the remaining respondents 
were broadly speaking equally divided in either agreeing or disagreeing with the 
assertion.  
 
The incidence of “no opinion” was even greater with question 18, which tried to 
ascertain whether government interference/guarantees detracted from a careful 
evaluation of the financial considerations in a lending proposal. Accordingly, 52.5 
percent of respondents expressed no opinion on this assertion. The point behind this 
question was to find out whether reliable collateral in the form of government 
guarantees deflected lenders from making an accurate and robust evaluation of the 
financial strength of the lending proposition. In other words, if the lenders know that in 
the event of a loan failing, the government guarantee would effectively bail the banks 
out, do they take a more relaxed or lenient approach to the lending proposition. In this 
respect, there is no obvious reason why the responses should have been so non 
committal, unless of course, the question was perhaps a little too politically sensitive.  
 
The response to question 19, which relates to internal rules on prudent business lending, 
revealed a similar response profile, albeit less extreme, with 42.6 percent of respondents 
expressing no opinion. However, a significant 46 percent of respondents agreed that the 
government helps their banks to make effective lending through macro-economic 
policies. 
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Table 8.21 Government guarantee and bank lending practices in joint-stock commercial 
banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
16The relationship between 
government and the bank 
would be better without the 
current level of government 
guarantee and interference 
0(0%) 8(13.1%) 7(11.5%) 31(50.8%) 6(9.8%) 9(14.8%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
17 Government guarantee and 
interference detract from good 
lending practices in the bank 
1(2.5%) 11(27.5%) 3(7.5%) 12(30.0%) 8(20.0%) 5(12.5%) 0(100%) 61(100%) 
18Government interference 
and guarantees detract from 
careful evaluation of the 
financial considerations in a 
lending proposal     
0(100%) 6(9.8%) 8(13.1%) 32(52.5%) 8(13.1%) 7(11.5%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
19Government guarantee and 
interference detract from 
banks‟ internal rules and 
guidelines on prudent business 
lending  
0(0%) 6(9.8%) 6(9.8%) 26(42.6%) 17(27.9%) 5(8.2%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
20 The government helps my 
bank to make effective lending 
through macro-economic 
policies  
0(0%) 4(6.6%) 13(21.3%) 16 (26.2%) 14(23.0%) 14(23.0%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
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The role of government and the Central Bank in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Table 8.22 reveals that 46 percent of respondents believe that the government plays an 
important and positive role in lending to businesses by their banks (Q21). A surprisingly 
large proportion of respondents (80 percent) believed that the Central Bank should 
concentrate on the supervision and regulation of banks and 16.4 percent expressed no 
opinion on the assertion (Q22). However, in response to question 23, 38 percent of bank 
managers agreed that government should provide more guidance on what it considers to 
be prudent business lending.  
 
Table 8.22 Banks should play an important and positive role in bank lending and bank 
behaviors in joint-stock commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
agree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
21The government plays an 
important and positive role in 
lending to business by bank 
0(100%) 4(6.6%) 13(21.3%) 16(26.2%) 14(23.0%) 14(23.0%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
22The Central Bank should 
concentrate on the supervision 
and regulation of bank behaviors 
0(100%) 2(3.3%) 1(1.6%) 10(16.4%) 16(26.2%) 22(36.1%) 10(16.4%) 61(100%) 
23The Government should 
provide more guidance on what it 
considers to be prudent business 
lending 
0(100%) 3(4.9%) 6(9.8%) 29(47.5%) 8(13.1%) 15(24.6%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
 
 
 
 270 
Banker-customer relationships in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Table 8.23 reports the findings of the questionnaire on banker relationships. The table 
shows that in response to question 24, almost 50 percent of respondents agreed that 
personal relationships influence the bank-government relationship and 67.2 percent 
agreed that the bank-customer relationship is important when choosing projects (Q25). 
Moreover, 78.7 percent of respondents believed that this relationship is important in 
attracting business customers to their banks (Q26). 
 
    Table 8.23 Bank-customer relationships in joint-stock commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
disagree nor 
agree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
24Bank-government 
relationships are influenced by 
personal contacts and 
relationships 
0(0%) 4(6.6%) 2(3.3%) 25(41.0%) 20(32.8%) 9(14.8%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
25Banker-customer relationships 
are important in choosing 
projects in banks 
2(3.3%) 1(1.6%) 7(11.5%) 10(16.4%) 16(26.2%) 22(36.1%) 3(4.9%) 61(100%) 
26Banker-customer relationships 
are important in attracting 
business customers to banks 
0(0%) 1(1.6%) 2(3.3%) 10(16.4%) 12(19.7%) 33(54.1%) 3(4.9%) 61(100%) 
 
Factors that impact upon non-performing loans in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Regarding the different factors that impact on NPLs, Table 8.24 reveals that 45.9 
percent of respondents believe that the social and political regime has a major impact on 
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the level of NPLs (Q27a). However, only 9.8 percent believe that government 
guarantees and interference with bank lending was a key factor (Q27b). In contrast, 49.2 
percent believe that NPLs were exacerbated by a lack of managerial autonomy in their 
banks (Q27c) and 57.4 percent regarded weak credit risk management as an important 
factor (Q27d). However the respondents tended to disagree with the assertion that 
poorly performing state-enterprises had an important impact on non performing loans 
(Q27e). Accordingly, only 24.6 percent agreed and 36.1 percent disagreed with 39.3 
percent expressing no opinion.  
 
Nevertheless, a fairly large proportion of bank managers (62.3 percent) agreed that the 
soft credit culture in state-owned enterprises was a main factor behind NPLs (Q27f) and 
83.7 percent believed that personal contacts were a main factor (Q27g). These findings 
were broadly in accordance with those of state-owned commercial banks and suggest 
that the soft credit culture in China and the reliance on personal relationship when 
making the lending decision were the main reasons behind large amount of NPLs in 
joint-stock commercial banks. 
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Table 8.24 The impact of different factors on non-performing loans accumulation in 
joint-stock commercial banks  
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
27(a)The social and political 
regime 
1(1.6%） 8（13.1%） 2（3.3%） 22（36.1%） 15（24.6%） 13（21.3%） 0( 0%） 61（100%） 
27(b)Too much government 
guarantee and interference 
16（26.2%） 11（18.0%） 10（16.4%） 18（29.5%） 5（8.2%） 0（0%） 1(1.6%） 61（100%） 
27(c)Lack of managerial 
autonomy 
0（0%） 10（16.4%） 3（4.9%） 18（29.5%） 13（21.3%） 13（21.3%） 4（6.6%） 61（100%） 
27(d)Weak credit risk 
management 
0（0%） 9（14.8%） 7（11.5%） 10（16.4%） 25（41.0%） 8（13.1%） 2（3.3%） 61（100%） 
27(e)Poorly-performing 
state-owned enterprises  
5（8.2%） 5（8.2%） 12（19.7%） 24（39.3%0 10（16.4%） 0（0%） 5（8.2%） 61（100%） 
 
27(f)Soft credit culture 0（0%） 9（14.8%） 1（1.6%） 13（21.3%） 15（24.6%） 21（34.4%） 2（3.3%） 61（100%） 
27(g)Loans based on personal 
contacts 
0（0%） 1（1.6%） 3（4.9%） 6（9.8%） 23（37.7%） 27（44.3%） 1（1.6%） 61（100%） 
 
8. 3.3 Policy banks 
 
Government guarantees and interference in bank lending in policy banks 
 
In contrast to state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks, Table 
8.25 shows that 60 percent of respondents agreed with the assertion that government 
interference and guarantees lead to increased policy lending (Q1), however opinion was 
equally divided as to whether it increased policy risk (Q2). These findings reflect the 
fact that policy banks were established to make policy loans with the guidance of 
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government. Table 8.25 also shows that a high number of bank managers (70 percent) 
believed that government guarantees and interference lead to inefficient lending 
decisions in their bank (Q3). Accordingly, 70 percent expressed no opinion on the 
assertion that government guarantees and interference help their bank to make effective 
lending decisions. Nevertheless, 30 percent disagreed with this assertion (Q4).These 
findings reveal that loans made by policy banks are not always effective even when they 
are made with the guidance of government.  
 
Table 8.25 Government guarantees and interference in bank lending in policy banks 
Statement  Strongly 
disagree  
(percentage) 
Disagree  
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree  
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
1Government guarantees and 
interference lead to increased 
policy lending decisions in the 
bank 
0(0%) 3(30%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 10(100%) 
2Government guarantee and 
interference increase policy 
risk in the bank  
0(0%) 3(30%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 10 (100%) 
3Government guarantee and 
interference lead to inefficient 
lending decisions in the bank 
0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 5(50%) 1(10%) 10(100%) 
4Government guarantee and 
interference help banks to 
make effective lending 
decisions  
0(0%) 1(10%) 2(20%) 7(70%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 
  
0(0%) 10(100%) 
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Government guarantees and non-performing loans in policy banks 
  
Table 8.26 reveals that only 20 percent of bank managers (Q5) believed that government 
guarantees and interference resulted in a large amount of non-profitable lending and are 
responsible for the accumulation of NPLs. However, a significant 50 percent disagreed 
with this assertion and 30 percent expressed no opinion. These findings were broadly in 
accordance with the findings relating to question 6 and appear to suggest that 
respondents believe that the government is not a major contributory factor behind the 
accumulation of NPLs in policy banks.  
 
   Table 8.26 Government guarantees and non-performing loans in policy banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
5Government interference and 
guarantees result in a large 
amount of non-profitable 
lending and non-performing 
loans in banks 
 
0(0%) 3(30%) 2(20%) 3(30%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
6Government interference and 
guarantees are considered to 
be important reasons for the 
accumulation of 
non-performing loans in banks 
 
0(0%) 3(30.0%) 1(10.0%) 4(40%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
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The objective and aims of government guarantees and interference in policy banks  
 
In response to question 7, 50 percent of respondents expressed no opinion on the 
assertion that government interference and guarantees supported state-owned enterprise 
reform. Similarly, 60 percent expressed no opinion on the relationship between 
economic growth and policy lending (Q8) and an even higher proportion- 70 percent, 
expressed no opinion on the relationship between government guarantee and the level of 
unemployment (Q 9). Moreover, in contrast to respondent in the other sample banks, 
only 20 percent of respondents believed that one of the main objectives of government 
interference is to maintain social stability (Q10). Similarly, 70 percent of respondents 
did not believe that government officials have political reasons for interfering with bank 
lending policies (Q11).  
 
Accordingly, the findings relating to policy banks on the aims of government guarantees 
and interference with policy banks appear to be somewhat different compared to those 
in the other sample banks. In particular, there was a very high incidence of “neither 
agree nor disagree”. As we have seen before in the analysis questions which can be 
regarded as politically have had a tendency to be answered in this manner. However, 
what is striking with the policy bank respondents is the sheer extent to which the 
respondents answered in this non-committal way.   
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Table 8.27 the objectives and aims of government guarantees and interference in policy 
banks 
Statement  Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
7Government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
support state-owned 
enterprises reform 
0(10%) 1(10%) 2(20%) 5(50%) 2(20%) 0(100%) 0(100%) 10(100%) 
8The government aims to 
increase economic growth 
through policy lending by 
bank 
0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 3(30%) 0(100%) 0(100%) 10(100%) 
9One of the main goals of 
government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
is to reduce unemployment 
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
10One of the main goals of 
government guarantee and 
interference with bank lending 
is to maintain social stability 
0(0%) 2(20%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
11Government officials have 
political reasons for 
interfering with bank lending 
policies 
0(0%) 1(10%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 10(100%) 
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Lending to state-owned enterprises by policy banks 
 
In contrast to state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks, Table 
8.28 reveals that the respondents in policy banks believed their banks prefer to make 
loans to state-owned enterprises under government guarantee (Q12). Moreover, 90 
percent of the managers believed that policy banks are more likely to make loans to 
state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises (Q13). Despite the findings 
shown in Table 8.28, this is probably because loans by policy banks are made under the 
guidance of government, which is trying to promote and develop the macro economy. 
On this assumption, therefore, it is not surprising to find that these loans are made to 
support state-owned enterprises.   
 
In response to question 14, 70 percent of managers disagreed with the assertion that 
poorly-performing state-owned enterprises are an important explanatory reason for the 
large amount of NPLs in policy banks. Similarly, 60 percent of the respondents do not 
think that loans made to state-owned enterprises are more likely to result in inefficient 
lending (Q15). This is interesting, because it is a matter of fact in China that 
state-owned enterprises are not a main contributor to NPLs in policy banks. 
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          Table 8.28 Bank loans to state-owned enterprises in policy banks 
Statement  Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12 The banks prefer to make 
lending to state-owned 
enterprises under government 
guarantee 
0(100%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
13 The banks are more likely 
to make loans to state-owned 
enterprises rather than 
non-state-owned enterprises 
0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 9(90%) 0(0%) 10 (100%) 
14Poorly-performing 
state-owned enterprises are an 
important explanatory reason 
for the large amount of 
non-performing loans in the 
bank 
0(0%) 2(20%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10 (100%) 
15Loans made to state-owned 
enterprises are more likely to 
result in inefficient lending in 
the banks   
0(0%) 2(20%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 090%) 10(100%) 
 
Government guarantees and bank lending practices in policy banks 
 
As to the relationship between the government guarantees and bank lending practices in 
policy banks, Table 8.29 reveals that 60 percent of respondents expressed no opinion on 
the assertion that the relationship between the government and the bank would be better 
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without the current level of government interference (Q16). Similarly, 70 percent 
expressed no view on the assertion that government guarantees and interference detract 
from good lending practices (Q17). However, it was interesting to observe that the 
majority of respondents believed that government guarantees and interference detracted 
from a careful evaluation of the financial considerations in a lending proposal (Q18) and 
that it also detracted from the bank‟s internal rules and guidelines on prudent business 
lending (Q19). Similarly, all of the respondents disagreed with the assertion that the 
government helps policy banks to make effective lending through its macroeconomic 
policies (Q20). 
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   Table 8.29 Government guarantee and bank lending practices in policy banks  
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
16 The relationship between 
government and the bank 
would be better without the 
current level of government 
interference and guarantees 
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
17 Government guarantee and 
interference detract from good 
lending practices in policy 
banks 
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
18Government guarantee and 
interference detract from 
careful evaluation of the 
financial considerations in a 
lending proposal 
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 3(30%) 3(30%) 1(10%) 10(100%) 
19Government guarantee and 
interference detract from the 
bank‟s internal rules and 
guidelines on prudent business 
lending 
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 5(50%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
20 The government helps my 
bank to make effective lending 
through macro-economic 
policies 
0(0%) 8(80%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
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The role of government and central bank in policy banks 
 
Table 8.30 shows reveals that all of the respondents agreed with the assertion that the 
government plays an important and positive role in lending to business (Q21). However, 
60 percent of respondents expressed no opinion about whether the central bank should 
concentrate on the supervision and regulation of banks (Q22) and a similar proportion 
expressed no opinion on whether the government should provide more guidance on 
what it considers to be prudent business lending (Q23).  
 
      Table 8.30 The role of government and central bank in policy banks 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
21The government plays an 
important and positive role in 
lending to business by bank 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 8(80%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
22 The Central Bank should  
concentrate on the supervision 
and regulation of bank 
behaviors 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 10 (100%) 
23Government should provide 
more guidance on what it 
considers to be prudent 
business lending 
0(100%) 0(100%) 0(100%) 6(60%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
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Banker-customer relationships in policy banks 
 
Table 8.31 shows that the majority of respondents (70 percent) agreed with the view that 
the relationship between policy banks and government is influenced by personal 
contacts and relationships (Q24). In particular, it was both reassuring and in accordance 
with responses from the other sample banks to find that 90 percent of them believe that 
the bank-customer relationship is very important when choosing projects (Q25). In this 
respect, it was a little surprising to find that 60 percent of respondents expressed no 
opinion on the assertion that the bankers-customers relationship is very important in 
attracting business customers to their bank (Q26). Nevertheless, the findings appear to 
support the opinion that banker-customers relationships are very important in policy 
banks. 
  Table 8.31 Bank-customer relationships in policy banks  
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(Percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
disagree nor 
agree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
24Bank-government 
relationships are influenced by 
personal contacts and 
relationships 
0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
25Banker-customer 
relationships are important in 
choosing projects in banks 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 8(80%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
26Banker-customer 
relationships are important in 
attracting business customers 
to banks 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
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Factors that impact upon non-performing loans in policy banks 
 
As table 8.32 shows, the vast majority of respondents (80 percent) believe that the 
social and political regime in China has a major impact on the level of NPLs in policy 
banks (Q27a) and 70 percent believe that large amounts of NPLs results from too much 
government interference (Q27b). These are interesting finding bearing in mind the 
respondents tendency to express “no opinion” when confronted with questions relating 
to the government or questions, which had a degree of political sensitivity.    
 
In contrast to the state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks, 
only 10 percent consider lack of managerial autonomy to be an important factor (Q27c) 
but 40 percent agreed that weak credit risk management was an important explanatory 
reason for NPLs in policy banks (Q27d) In accordance with question 14,which is shown 
in Table 8.28, 80 percent of respondents did not believe that poorly-performing 
state-owned enterprises are a main contributory factor in non-performing loan (Q27e) 
but 80 percent of managers believed the soft credit culture was important (Q27f). In 
contrast only 20 percent considered relationship loans to be important (Q27g). These 
finding appear to be consistent and, in particular, confirm that the results are broadly 
consistent across all of the questions relating to policy banks. 
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                 Table 8.32 The impact of different factors on 
Non-performing loans accumulation in policy banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
27 (a) The social and political 
regime 
0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27(b)Too much government 
guarantee and interference 
2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27(c)Lack of managerial 
autonomy 
0(0%) 3(30%) 5(50%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27 (d) Weak credit risk 
management 
1(10%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27(e)Poorly-performing 
state-owned enterprises  
0(0%) 4(40%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27(f) Soft credit culture 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27(g) Loans based on personal 
contacts 
0(0%) 2(20%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
8.3.4 City commercial banks 
 
Government guarantees and interference in bank lending in city commercial banks 
 
Table 8.33 reveals that 90 percent of respondents in city commercial banks, expressed 
no opinion on the assertion that government guarantee and interference lead to 
increased policy lending (Q1) but 40 percent claimed that government guarantees and 
interference increased policy risk in their bank (Q2) but 50 percent believed that it did 
not lead to inefficient lending (Q3). In response to the assertion that government 
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guarantees and interference help the bank to make effective lending decisions, all of the 
respondents expressed no opinion (Q4). This might have been reflecting political 
sensitivities but it could also be indicative of the fact that respondents simply did not 
have a clear answer to this question.  
   Table 8.33 Government guarantees and interference in city commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Government guarantee and 
interference lead to increased 
policy lending in banks 
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 9(90%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
2Government guarantee and 
interference increase policy 
risk in their bank 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
3Government guarantee and 
interference lead to inefficient 
lending decisions in their bank 
0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 3(30%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
4Government interference  
and guarantees help my bank 
to make  effective lending 
decisions 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Government guarantees and non-performing loans in city commercial banks 
 
Table 8.34 shows that 50 percent of the bank managers in the sample disagreed with the 
assertion that that government guarantees and interference resulted in a lot of 
non-profitable lending and NPLs in city commercial banks and 30 percent expressed no 
opinion (Q5). This is probably because city commercial banks are mainly controlled by 
local government and a large amount of these loans are guaranteed by government. It 
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follows, therefore, that the question was highly sensitive and also explains why all of 
the respondents disagreed with the view that government is responsible for the 
accumulation of NPLs in their bank (Q6). 
 
Table 8.34 Government guarantees and non-performing loans in city commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
5Government interference and 
guarantees result in a large 
amount of non-profitable 
lending and non-performing 
loans in banks 
 
0(0%) 3(30%) 2(20%) 3(30%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
6Government interference and 
guarantees are considered to 
be important reasons for the 
accumulation of 
non-performing loans in banks 
0(0%) 6(60%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
The objective and aims of government guarantees and interference in city commercial 
banks 
 
Table 8.35 reveals that 90 percent of respondents either disagreed or expressed no 
opinion on the assertion that government guarantees and interference with bank lending 
support the reform of state-owned enterprises (Q7). However, 90 percent of respondents 
believe that government aims to increase economic growth through policy lending by 
banks (Q8). It was interesting to find that vast majority of respondent expressed no 
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opinion on whether the government aimed to reduce the levels of unemployment (70 
percent) or help maintain social stability (60 percent) via interference with bank lending 
(Qs 9 and 10). Nevertheless, although 60 percent of the respondents expressed no 
opinion on the question of whether government officials have political reasons for 
interfering with bank lending, the remaining 40 percent agreed with the assertion (Q11). 
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Table 8.35 The objective and aims of government guarantees and interference in city 
commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
7Government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
support state-owned enterprises 
reform 
0(0%) 1(10%) 5(50%) 3(30%) 1(10%) 0(100%) 0(100%) 10(100%) 
8The government aims to 
increase economic growth 
through policy lending by bank 
0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 2(20%) 0(100%) 10(100%) 
9One of the main goals of 
government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending is 
to reduce unemployment 
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
10 One of the main goals of 
government guarantee and 
interference with bank lending is 
to maintain social stability 
0(0%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
11Government officials have 
political reasons for interfering 
with bank lending policies 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
 
Lending to state-owned enterprises in city commercial banks 
 
Table 8.36 reveals that the majority of bank managers disagreed (and 50 percent 
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strongly disagreed) with the assertion that their bank prefers to make loans to inefficient 
state-owned enterprises under government guarantee (Q12). Similarly, 90 percent 
slightly disagree with the view that their bank is more likely to lend to state-owned 
enterprises rather than non-state-owned enterprises (Q13). Table 8.36 also shows that 70 
percent disagree with the assertion that poorly-performing state-owned enterprises are 
an important explanatory reason for the large amount of NPLs in their bank (Q14) and 
90 percent “slightly” disagree that loans made to state-owned enterprises are more 
likely to result in inefficient lending in their bank (Q15).    
    Table 8.36 Bank loans to state-owned enterprises in city commercial banks 
Statement 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12 Banks prefer 
to make loans to inefficient 
state-owned enterprises under 
government guarantee 
5(50%) 1(10%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10 (100%) 
13 Banks are more likely to 
lend to state-owned 
enterprises rather than 
non-state-owned enterprises 
0(0%) 0(0%) 9(90%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
14Poor-performing 
state-owned enterprises are an 
important explanatory reason 
for the large amount of 
non-performing loans in banks 
0(0%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
15 Loans made to state-owned 
enterprises are more likely to 
result in inefficient in the bank 
0(0%) 0(0%) 9(90%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
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Government guarantee and bank lending in city commercial banks  
 
Table 8.37 shows that 90 percent disagree with the assertion that the relationship 
between city commercial banks and the government would be better without the current 
level of government guarantees and interference.Table 8.37 reveals 50 percent of the 
respondents slightly disagree In response to the assertion (Q17) that government 
guarantees and interference detract from good lending practices in their bank, 50 
percent disagreed but this was only “slight”. However, the level and intensity of 
disagreement towards the statement that government guarantees and interference detract 
from the bank‟s internal rules and guidelines on prudent business was distinctly stronger 
(Q18). However, all of the respondents claimed that the government helps the bank to 
make effective lending through macroeconomic policies (Table 8.37).  
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    Table 8.37 Government guarantee and bank lending in city commercial bank 
Statement Strongly 
disagreed 
(percentage) 
Disagree  
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
16The relationship between 
government and the bank 
would be better without the 
current level of government 
interference and guarantees 
0(0%) 0(0%) 9(90%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
17Government guarantee and 
interference detract from good 
lending practices in the bank 
0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 4(40%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
18Government guarantee and 
interference detract from the 
bank‟s internal rules and 
guidelines on prudent business 
lending 
0(0%) 5(50%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10 (10%) 
19 The government helps the 
bank to make  effective  
lending through 
macro-economic policies 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 8(80%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10 (10%) 
 
The role of government and central bank in bank lending in city commercial banks 
 
Table 8.38 examines the role of government and central bank in bank lending in city 
commercial banks. The analysis shows that half of the respondents believe that the 
government plays an important and positive role in lending to business but an equal 
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proportion expressed no opinion on this subject. However, there was almost a 
unanimous agreement on the assertions that the central bank should concentrate on the 
supervision and regulation of the banks (Q22) and that the government should provide 
more guidance on what it considers to be prudent business lending (Q23). 
 
Table 8.38 The role of government and central bank in bank lending in city commercial 
banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor  
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree  
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
21The government plays an 
important and positive role in 
lending to business by city 
commercial banks 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 2(20%) 10(100%) 
22The central bank should 
concentrate on the supervision 
and regulation of bank 
behaviors  
0(0%) 0(100%) 0(100%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 2(20%) 10(100%) 
23The government should 
provide more guidance on 
what it considers to be prudent 
business lending 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 3(30%) 1(10%) 1 0(100%) 
 
Banker-customer relationships in city commercial banks 
 
In contrast to the other sample banks already discussed, table 8.39 shows that only 30 
percent believed that bank-government relationships are influenced by personal contacts 
and relationships but there was a high proportion (50 percent) of respondents who 
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expressed no opinion (Q24). Similarly, although half of the respondents believe that 
banker-customer relationships are important in choosing projects in their bank 50 
percent expressed no opinion (Q25). However, the overwhelming majority of 
respondents (90 percent) agree that the banker-customer relationship is important in 
attracting business customer to their bank (Q26). Once again, as with the other sample 
banks, it is interesting to note that questions relating to the government or questions 
with a certain amount of “sensitivity” attracted no response from the respondents. 
 
        Table 8.39 Bank-customer relationships in city commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
24Bank-government 
relationships are influenced by 
personal contacts and 
relationships  
0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 5(50%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
25Banker-customer 
relationships are important in 
choosing projects in city 
commercial banks 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 4(40%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
26Banker-customer 
relationship is important in 
attracting business customer to 
the bank 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 7(70%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
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Factors that impact upon non-performing loans in city commercial banks 
 
Regarding the different factors that impact on the level of NPLs, table 8.40 reveals that 
that 80 percent believe that the social and political regime to be an important 
consideration (Q27a) while 70 percent of the respondents believed that too much 
government interference was a main explanatory in the accumulation of NPLs (Q27b). 
However, 80 percent of respondents disagreed with the assertion a lack of managerial 
autonomy was a main contributory factor (Q27c). Similarly, 50 percent of respondents 
did not believe that weak credit management was a principal cause (Q27d). An equal 
proportion (80 percent) did not believe that poorly performing state owned enterprises 
was important either (Q27e). However, 80 percent did lay the blame at the foot of a soft 
credit culture (27f) but denied that loans based on personal contacts were an important 
factor (Q27g). This is important because it suggests either that there is a need for more 
rigorous management control and discipline within the lending function or a greater 
need for more professional training of lending staff.   
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Table 8.40 The impact of different factors on non-performing loans accumulation in city 
commercial banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
27 (a) The social and political 
regime 
0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27(b)Too much government 
guarantee and interference 
2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27(c)Lack of managerial 
autonomy 
0(0%) 3(30%) 5(50%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27 (d) Weak credit risk 
management 
1(10%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27(e)Poorly-performing 
state-owned enterprises  
0(0%) 4(40%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27(f) Soft credit culture 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
27 (g) Loans based on 
personal contacts 
0(0%) 2(20%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
8.3.5 Foreign banks 
 
Government guarantees and interference lead to increased policy lending in foreign 
banks 
 
Table 8.41 reveals that 66.7 percent of respondents either disagree or express no opinion 
on the assertion that government interference leads to increased policy lending in their 
bank (Q1) and 54 percent disagree or expressed no opinion on the statement that 
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government interference increases policy risk in their bank. However, it was interesting 
to note that 45.8 percent actually agreed. In accordance with the other sample banks, 
87.5 percent of bank managers either disagree or express no opinion on the view point 
that government interference and guarantees lead to inefficient lending decisions in their 
bank (Q3). Moreover, over 70 percent of respondents disagree that government 
guarantee and interference help the bank to make effective lending decisions (Q4).  
 
These responses could be reflecting the sensitivity of the political considerations 
implicit in the statements. Alternatively, they could be indicating that government 
guarantees and interference do not affect lending decisions in foreign banks to any 
significant degree, simply because they are not controlled by local government. 
Table 8.41 Government guarantee and interference lead to increased policy lending in 
foreign banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1Government guarantee and 
interference lead to increased 
policy lending in banks 
0(0%) 6(25.0%) 4(16.7%) 6(25.0%) 6(25.0%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 24 (100%) 
2Government guarantee and 
interference increase policy 
risk in their bank 
0(0%) 4(16.7%) 5(20.8%) 4(16.7%) 9(37.5%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
3Government guarantee and 
interference lead to inefficient 
lending decisions in their bank 
0(0%) 7(29.2%) 6(25.0%) 8(33.3%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
4Government guarantees and 
interference help the bank to 
make effective lending 
3(12.5%) 7(29.2%) 7(29.2%) 5(20.8%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
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decisions 
Government guarantees and non-performing loans in foreign banks  
 
Table 8.42 presents the findings relating government guarantees and interference in 
foreign banks. The responses to question 5, on the issue of whether it results in non 
profitable business and non performing loans, are extremely diverse. However, the 
majority of respondent agree with the assertion. In contrast, a large number of 83 
percent of the managers do not believe that government guarantees and interference are 
an important explanatory reason for the accumulation of NPLs in their bank (Q6). In 
this respect, this response is broadly in accordance with the other sample banks. 
    Table 8.42 Government guarantee and non-performing loans in foreign banks 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
5Government interference and 
guarantees result in a large 
amount of non-profitable 
lending and non-performing 
loans in banks 
 
1(4.2%) 6(25.0%) 2(8.3%) 2(8.3%) 4(16.7%) 7(29.2%) 2(8.3%) 24(100%) 
6Government interference and 
guarantees are considered to 
be important reasons for the 
accumulation of 
non-performing loans in banks 
 
4(16.7%) 8(33.3%) 8(33.3%) 3(12.5%) 1(4.2%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
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The objectives and role of government interference in foreign banks 
 
Regarding the objectives and role of government in foreign banks, the respondents had 
surprisingly very positive views. For example, table 8.43 reveals that 83.4 percent claim 
that government guarantees and interference with bank lending support state-owned 
enterprise reforms (Q7); 62.5 percent also agree that government aims to increase 
economic growth through policy lending by banks (Q8); and, 58.3 percent and 70.8 
respectively, agree that one of the main goals of government through guarantees and 
interference with bank lending, is to reduce unemployment (Q9) and maintain social 
stability (Q10). It follows, therefore, that 62 percent of respondents agree that 
government officials have political reasons for interfering with bank lending policies 
(Q11). These findings clearly reveal the positive attitude of foreign banks towards 
government initiatives. Moreover, because foreign banks are not controlled or 
influenced to the same degree as some of the other sample banks, the finding are 
arguably less biased and objective.  
 
Moreover, because foreign banks are not controlled or influenced to the same degree as 
some of the other sample banks. The finding are arguable less biased an objective. 
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 Table 8.43 The objectives and roles of government guarantee in foreign banks 
Statement Strongly 
disagreed 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
7Government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
support state-owned 
enterprises reform 
0(0%) 4(16.7%) 1(4.2%) 3(12.5%) 6(25.0%) 7(29.2%) 7(29.2%) 24(100%) 
8The government aims to 
increase economic growth 
through policy lending by 
bank 
0(0%) 4(16.7%) 1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 8(33.3%) 7(29.2) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
9One of the main goals of 
government guarantees and 
interference with bank lending 
is to reduce unemployment 
0(0%) 2(8.3%) 4(16.7%) 4(16.7%) 9(37.5%) 3(12.5%) 2(8.3%) 24(100%) 
10One of the main goals of 
government guarantee and 
interference with bank lending 
is to maintain social stability 
0(0%) 2(8.3%) 1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 5(20.8%) 8(33.3%) 4(16.7%) 24(100%) 
11Government officials have 
political reasons for 
interfering with bank lending 
policies 
0(0%) 3(12.5%) 1(4.2%) 5(20.8%) 6(25.0%) 8(33.3%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
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Bank loans to state-owned enterprises in foreign banks 
 
Table 8.44 shows that there is unanimous disagreement with the statement that foreign 
bank prefer to make loans to inefficient state-owned enterprises under government 
guarantee (Q12). Nevertheless, foreign banks are more likely to lend to state-owned 
enterprises rather than non-state-owned enterprises (Q13). There is also general 
disagreement with the assertion that poorly-performing state-owned enterprises are an 
important explanatory reason for the large amount of NPLs in their bank (Q14) and only 
16.7 percent of respondents agree that loans made to state-owned enterprises are more 
likely to result in inefficient lending in their bank (Q15). These statements, once again, 
strongly refute the idea that state-owned enterprises are the main explanatory factor 
behind NPLs.   
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           Table 8.44 Bank loans to state-owned enterprises in foreign banks 
Statement 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12Banks prefers to make loans 
to inefficient state-owned 
enterprises under government 
guarantee 
3(12.5%) 16(66.7%) 3(12.5%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
13Banks are more likely to 
lend to state-owned 
enterprises rather than 
non-state-owned enterprises 
2(8.3%) 7(29.2%) 0(0%) 3(12.50%) 1(4.2%) 8(33.3%) 3(12.5%) 24(100%) 
14Poor-performing 
state-owned enterprises are an 
important explanatory reason 
for the large amount of 
non-performing loans in banks 
3(12.5%) 9(37.5%) 7(29.2%) 5(20.8%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
15 Loans made to state-owned 
enterprises are more likely to 
result in inefficient in the bank 
0((0%) 7(29.2%) 5(20.8%) 8(33.3%) 3(12.5%) 1(4.2%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Government guarantees and lending practices in foreign banks 
 
Table 8.45 reveal that there was a wide range of opinions on the assertion that the 
relationship between government and the bank would be better without the current level 
of government interference and guarantee. However, only 16.7 percent of respondents 
disagreed and 50 percent agree with the statement (Q16). On the question as to whether 
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it detracted from good lending practices in the bank, 41.7 disagreed and only 16.7 
percent agreed with the statement (Q17), however, 41.7 percent agreed that it detracted 
from a careful evaluation of the financial considerations in a lending proposal (Q18). 
Despite this response, the vast majority of managers (58.3 percent) did not believe that 
government interference detracted from the bank‟s internal rules on prudent business 
lending (Q19). The final statement in table 8.44 focuses on the question as to whether 
the government helps foreign banks to make effective lending through macro-economic 
policies (Q20). However, only 33.4 percent of respondents agreed with the assertion and 
37.5 percent expressed no opinion. 
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        Table 8.45 Government guarantee and lending practices in foreign banks 
Statement  Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
16 The relationship between 
government and the bank 
would be better without the 
current level of government 
interference and guarantees 
1(4.2%) 3(12.5%) 0(0%) 8(33.3%) 1(4.2%) 8(33.3%) 3(12.5%) 24(100%) 
17 Government interference 
and guarantees detract from 
good lending practices in the 
bank 
0(0%) 4(16.7%) 6(25.0%) 10(41.7%) 3(12.5%) 1(4.2%) 0(0%) 24 (100%) 
18 Government guarantee and 
interference detract from 
careful evaluation of the 
financial considerations in a 
lending proposal of the bank 
0(0%) 5(20.8%) 2(8.3%) 7(29.2%) 7(29.2%) 2(8.3%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
19 Government guarantee and 
interference detract from my 
bank‟s internal rules and 
guidelines on prudent business 
lending  
0(0%) 8(33.3%) 6(25.0%) 8(33.3%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
20 The government helps my 
bank to make effective lending 
through macro-economic 
policies 
0(0%) 4(16.7%) 3(12.5%) 9(37.5%) 7(29.2%) 1(4.2%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
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The objectives and aims of Government and the Central Bank in Foreign Banks 
 
Table 8.46 shows that an equal proportion of respondents (29.2 percent) either disagreed 
or agreed with the statement that the government plays an important and positive role in 
lending to business by their bank and 41.7 percent expressed no opinion (Q21). 
However, 70.8 percent believe that the central bank should concentrate on the 
supervision and regulation of banks (Q22) and 79 percent agree that the government 
should provide more guidance on what it considers to be prudent business lending 
(Q23).  
 
Table 8.46 the objectives and aims of the government and the central bank in foreign 
banks 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
21 The government plays an 
important and positive role in 
lending to business  
1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 2(8.3%) 10(41.7%) 7(29.2%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
22The central bank should 
concentrate on the supervision 
and regulation of bank 
behavior  
0(0%) 3(12.5%) 0(0%) 4(16.7%) 2(8.3%) 13(54.2%) 2(8.3%) 24(100%) 
23The government should 
provide more guidance on 
what it considers to be prudent 
business lending 
0(0%) 3(12.5%) 1(4.2%) 1(4.2%) 8(33.3%) 10(41.7%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
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Banker-customer relationships in Foreign Banks 
 
Table 8.47 shows that the opinions and expressed views of the respondents from foreign 
banks were similar to the other sample banks on the importance of banker-customer 
relationships. Accordingly, 45.9 percent agree with the statement that bank-government 
relationships are influenced by personal contacts and relationships (Q24). Moreover, 
58.4 percent concur with the assertion that bank-customer relationships are important in 
choosing projects (Q25) and half of the respondents believed that banker-customer 
relationships are important in attracting business customer to their bank (Q26). 
 
           Table 8.47 Banker-customer relationships in foreign banks 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
24Bank-government 
relationships are influenced by 
personal contacts and 
relationships  
0(0%) 4(16.7%) 3(12.5%) 6(25.0%) 7(29.2%) 4(16.7%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
25Banker-customer 
relationships are important in 
choosing projects in banks 
0(0%) 3(12.5%) 4(16.7%) 3(12.5%) 10(41.7%) 4(16.7%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
26Banker-customer 
relationship is important in 
attracting business customer to 
the bank 
0(0%) 3(12.5%) 2(8.3%) 7(29.2%) 8(33.3%) 4(16.7%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
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Factors that impact upon non-performing loans in foreign banks 
 
Table 8.48 presents the findings relating to the factors that impact on NPLs and reveals 
that 45.9 percent of respondents consider that the social and political regime is an 
important explanatory factor (Q27a). In contrast, only 12.5 percent believe that too 
much government interference and guarantees is important (Q27b). This is probably 
because foreign banks are less under the control of local government. Another 
interesting finding was that only 4.2 percent believed that a lack of managerial 
autonomy was a main factor (Q27c) and only 8.3 percent believed that weak credit risk 
management was an important issue (Q27d). In this respect, the findings for foreign 
banks are different compared to the other sample banks and suggest that foreign bank 
have more autonomous power and stronger credit risk management relative to the other 
sample banks.  
 
In accord with the findings relating to the other banks, the vast majority of bank 
managers believe that poorly-performing state-owned enterprises (Q27e) and a soft 
credit culture (Q27f) were not an important factors in explaining the incidence of high 
levels of nonperforming loans in foreign banks. However, it was interesting to find that 
50 percent of respondents expressed no opinion on this latter factor. Finally, although 
45.8 percent of respondents believed that loans based on personal contacts 45.8 percent 
was not important, 37.5 percent believed that it was and 16.7 percent expressed no 
opinion. The findings, therefore, suggest that in foreign banks, factors, such as, the 
social and political regime and relationship loans are important considerations in 
explaining the accumulation of NPLs.  
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Table 8.48 The impact of different factors on the level of non-performing loans in 
foreign banks 
statement Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
27 (a)The social and political 
regime 
0(0%) 4(16.7% 3(12.5%) 6(25.0%) 7(29.2%) 4(16.7%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
27(b)Too much government 
guarantee and interference 
0(0%) 5(20.8%) 8(33.3%) 8(33.3%) 1(4.2%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
27 (c) Lack of managerial 
autonomy 
1(4.2%) 10(41.7%) 10(41.7%) 2(8.3%) 1(4.2%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
27 (d) Weak credit risk 
management 
2(8.3%) 14(58.3%) 6(25.0%) 0(0%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
27(e)Poorly-performing 
state-owned enterprises  
4(16.7%) 15(62.5%) 1(4.2%) 2(8.3%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
27 (f)Soft credit culture 2(8.3%) 5(20.8%) 1(4.2%) 12(50%) 2(8.3%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
27 (g) Loans based on 
personal contacts 
2(8.3%) 6(25.0%) 3(12.5%) 4(16.7%) 7(29.2%) 2(8.3%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
 
8.3.6 Summary of the analysis of the different sample banks 
 
The findings revealed that in state-owned commercial banks and policy banks 
respondents believe that government guarantees and interference lead to increased 
policy lending. In addition, a significant percent of respondents in these banks agree that 
government guarantees and interference increase policy risks. The probable explanation 
for these finding is that both state-owned commercial banks and policy banks are 
controlled by government.  
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Regarding the question of inefficient state-owned enterprises, the majority of 
respondents in the sample did not believe that their banks preferred to make loans to 
inefficient state-owned enterprises backed by government guarantees. Nevertheless, 
with the exception of joint-stock commercial banks, a significant percentage of 
respondents believed that their banks preferred to make loans to state-owned rather than 
non-state-owned enterprises.  
 
The next chapter concludes the empirical findings and examines the questionnaire 
results relating to the measures for dealing with NPLs in Chinese banks. As with the 
other empirical chapters the findings for the sample as a whole will be presented and 
discussed. This will then be followed by an analysis and discussion of the findings 
relating to the individual sample banks. 
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          Chapter Nine Measures for Dealing with Non-performing Loans  
 
This chapter analyses and discusses the findings relating to the third and final part of the 
questionnaire and focuses on the measures taken by Chinese banks for dealing with non 
performing loans. As in the previous empirical chapters, then discussion commences 
with an analysis of all the study banks and then goes onto examine the individual banks 
in the study sample. 
 
9.1 An Analysis of All banks  
  
Measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in all banks 
 
As revealed by the responses to question 1 in Table 9.1, the majorities of bank managers 
(77 percent) were optimistic and believed that the measures taken to deal with NPLs are 
effective. Taking each of these measures in turn, 57 percent agreed that AMCs can 
effectively resolve the problem of NPLs (Q2); 48 percent agree that debt-equity swaps 
can be effective (Q3) and 51 percent agreed that government capital injections can also 
be effective (Q4). 
 
The impact of public listing of banks in all banks 
 
When discussing the impact of public listings (Table 9.1), the responses to question 5  
reveal that a surprisingly high number of respondents (81 percent) agreed that a public 
listing by a bank encourages prudent lending by introducing an element of market 
discipline via accountability to shareholders. Accordingly, it was not surprising to find 
that 90 percent agreed that a public listing reinforced bank supervision and regulation 
(Q6); 67 percent agreed that it improved the financial performance of the bank (Q7); 
and, 79 percent agreed that risk management was also improved when a bank obtained a 
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public listing (Q8). 
 
       Table 9.1 Measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in all banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1. The measures taken to deal 
with non-performing loans 
0(0%) 5(3.4%) 14(9.7%) 15(10.3%) 45(31.0%) 60(41.4%) 6(4.1%) 145(100%) 
2 AMCs can effectively 
resolved the problem of 
non-performing loans 
3(2.1%) 12(8.3%) 15(10.3%) 33(22.8%) 36(24.8%) 36(24.8%) 10(6.9%) 145(100%) 
3Debt-equity swaps can 
effectively resolved the 
problem of non-performing 
loans 
3（2.1%） 19（13.1%） 7（4.8%） 47（32.4%） 41（28.3%） 19（13.1%） 9（6.2%） 145(100%) 
4Government capital 
injections can effectively 
resolve the problem of 
non-performing loans 
5（3.4%） 24（16.6%） 14（9.7%） 28（19.3%） 31（21.4%） 35（24.1%） 8（5.5%） 145（100%） 
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           Table 9.2 The impact of public listing of banks in all banks 
Statement 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5A public listing of a bank 
encourages prudent lending by 
introducing an element of 
accountability to shareholders  
1 (0.7%) 7(4.8%) 3(2.1%) 17(11.7%) 38(26.2%) 68(46.9%) 11(7.6%) 145(100%) 
6 A public listing of a bank 
reinforces its supervision and 
regulation 
1(0.7%) 4(2.8%) 3(2.1%) 6(4.1%) 31(24.1%) 76(52.4%) 24(16.6%) 145(100%) 
7 The financial performance 
of a bank is improved by a 
public listing 
0(0%) 6(4.1%) 6(4.1%) 38(26.2%) 29(20%) 54(37.2%) 12(8.3%) 145(100%) 
8 Levels of risk management 
are improved in a bank with a 
public listing 
1(0.7%) 4(2.8%) 6(4.1%) 21(14.5%) 45(31.0%) 56(38.6%) 12(8.3%) 145(100%) 
 
Foreign investors and public listing in all banks 
 
Despite these positive responses, Table 9.3 shows that 19 percent disagreed or expressed 
no opinion on the issue of whether foreign investors are attracted to banks with a public 
listing (Q9). Nevertheless, 42 percent agreed that foreign minority shareholders have a 
positive influence on the management of Chinese banks (Q10); and, 39 percent agreed 
that foreign shareholders purchased Chinese bank shares for essentially speculative 
purposes (Q11). 
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          Table 9.3 Foreign investors and public listing in all banks  
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
9Foreign investors are attracted 
to banks with a public listing  
0(0%) 2(1.4%) 3(2.1%) 
 
23(15.9%) 
 
38(26.2%) 61(42.1%) 18(12.4%) 145(100%) 
10Foreign minority shareholders 
have positive influences on the 
management of Chinese banks 
0(0%) 5(3.4%) 9(6.2%) 27(18.6%) 47(32.4%) 46(1.7%) 11(7.6%) 145(100%) 
11Foreign shareholders purchase 
Chinese bank shares for 
speculative purposes  
3(2.1%) 12(8.3%) 16(11.0%) 58(40.0%) 22(15.2%) 24(16.6%) 10(6.9%) 145(100%) 
 
 The market for non-performing loans of Chinese banks in all banks 
 
The final set of questions relate to the market for non performing loans of Chinese 
banks. As Table 9.4 reveals, the vast majority of respondents believed that the NPLs 
market in China is underdeveloped (Q12). In this respect an important explanatory 
reason was the weak legislative framework and 73 percent of respondents believed 
that it prevented banks from collecting payments relating to NPLs (Q13). It was not 
surprising, therefore, to find that a significant 84 percent of bank managers agreed that 
the NPLs market need to be regulated (Q14). Moreover, 54 percent believed that 
involving foreign investors in the NPLs market would be an important consideration in 
determining its future success (Q15). Finally, 46 percent of respondents agreed that 
foreign investors show a great deal of interest in the NPLs market (Table 9.4, Q16). 
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              Table 9.4 Non-performing loans market in China in all banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagreed 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12The non-performing loans 
market is underdeveloped in 
China 
2(1.4%) 11(7.6%) 9(6.2%) 23(15.9%) 37(25.5%) 47(32.4%) 16(11.0%) 145(100%) 
13A weak legislative framework 
prevents banks from colleting 
payments for non-performing 
loans 
1(0.7%) 11(7.6%) 8(5.5%) 19(13.1%) 48(33.1%) 42(29.0%) 16(11.0%) 145(100%) 
14The non-performing loans 
market needs to be regulated  
0(0%) 4(2.8%) 1(0.7%) 18(12.4%) 40(27.6%) 55(37.9%) 27(18.6%) 145(100%) 
15It is important for foreign 
investors to be involved in the 
non-performing loans market 
2(1.4%) 9(6.2%) 16(11.0%) 40(27.6%) 35(24.1%) 35(24.1%) 8(5.5%) 145(100%) 
16Foreign  investors have a 
great deal of interest in the 
non-performing loans market 
1(0.7%) 6(4.1%) 8(5.5%) 64(44.1%) 29(20.0%) 23(15.9%) 14(9.7%) 145(100%) 
 
9.2 Summary of Analysis of all the Sample Banks 
 
The findings for all of the banks reveal that the measures currently being taken by the 
government to alleviate the problem of NPLs, i.e. injections of government capital and 
debt equity swaps, etc, were both appropriate and effective. There was also a consensus 
of opinion that a public listing by a bank was conducive to prudent lending and better 
risk management because it introduced an element of market discipline and reinforced 
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bank supervision. However, the findings were inconclusive in terms of establishing 
whether foreign investors were attracted to banks with a public listing. Nevertheless, 
despite believing that foreign investors were attracted to Chinese banks for essentially 
speculative purposes there was general agreement that they had a positive influence on 
their management. The final major issue addressed by this chapter related to the market 
for NPLs and the findings revealed that this market was underdeveloped but that it had a 
great deal of potential in the future. In this respect, foreign investors could be major 
players in any future developments. However, before this could happen a legal 
framework would have to be developed and the market would have to be appropriately 
regulated. 
 
9.3 Analysis of individual banks 
  
9.3.1 State-owned commercial banks  
 
Measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Table 9.5 reveals that in state-owned commercial banks 78 percent of bank managers 
agreed with the assertion that the measures taken to resolve NPLs in their banks are 
effective (Q1). Accordingly, 50 percent agree that AMCs can effectively resolve the 
problem of NPLs (Q2); 58 percent agreed that debt-equity swaps are effective (Q3); and, 
45 percent also agreed that government capital injections into state-owned commercial 
banks can be an effective resolution to the problem of NPLs (Q4). 
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Table 9.5 Measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in state-owned commercial 
banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(parentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1The measures taken to deal with 
non-performing loans  
0(0%) 4(10%) 2(5.0%) 2(5.0%) 8(20.0%) 18(45%) 5(12.5%) 40(100%) 
2AMCs can effectively resolved 
the problem of non-performing 
loans  
0(0%) 2(5.0%) 8(20.0%) 10(25.0%) 14(35.0%) 3(7.5%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
3Debt-equity swaps can 
effectively resolve the problem 
of non-performing loans  
0(0%) 6(15.0%) 2(5.0%) 9(22.5%) 17(42.5%) 3(7.5%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
4Government capital injections 
can effectively resolve the 
problem of non-performing loans  
0(0%) 5(12.5%) 15(12.5%) 12(30.0%) 4(10.0%) 10(25.0%) 4(10.0%) 40(100%） 
 
Public listing of banks in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Regarding the influence of public listing of banks, Table 9.6 shows that 78 percent of 
the respondents agreed that a public listing of a bank encourages prudent lending 
practices by introducing an element of market discipline and accountability to 
shareholders (Q5). There was also general agreement (88 percent) that a public listing 
reinforces bank supervision and regulation (Q6); 75 percent agreed that it improved the 
financial performance of the bank (Q7); and, 78 percent also agreed that a public listing 
improved risk management (Q8). In this respect, it can be seen that bank managers in 
state owned commercial banks believed that a public listing has a very positive 
influence on banks both in terms of the quality of the management and financial 
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performance. 
        
         Table 9.6 Public listing of banks in state-owned commercial banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5A public listing of a bank 
encourages prudent lending by 
introducing an element of 
accountability to shareholders 
0(0%) 3(7.5%) 1(2.5%) 5(12.5%) 8(20.0%) 20(50.0%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
6A public listing of a bank 
reinforce its supervision ad 
regulation 
1(2.5%) 2(5.0%) 2(5.0%) 5(12.5%) 0(0%) 23(57.5%) 7(17.5%) 40(100%) 
7The financial performance of a 
bank is improved by a public 
listing 
0(0%) 4(10%) 1(2.5%) 5(12.5%) 8(20.0%) 18(45.0%) 4(10%) 40(100%) 
8 Levels of risk management are 
also improved in a bank with a 
public listing 
1(2.5%) 3(7.5%) 1(2.5%) 4(10.0%) 12(30.0%) 16(40.0%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) 
 
Foreign investors and public listing in state-owned commercial banks 
 
Table 9.7 reveals that 87 percent of respondents from the state-owned commercial banks 
believed that foreign investors are attracted to banks with a public listing (Q9) and 88 
percent agreed that foreign minority shareholders have a positive influence on the 
management of Chinese banks (Q10). However, only 25 percent agreed that foreign 
investors purchased Chinese bank shares for speculative purposes (Q11). Accordingly, 
the respondent from the state-owned commercial banks were generally more favorably 
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disposed to foreign investors compared to the analysis of “all the banks”.  
 
Table 9.7 Foreign investors and public listing in state-owned commercial banks  
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
9Foreign investors are attracted 
to banks with a public listing  
0(0%) 1(2.5%) 1(2.5%) 
 
3(7.5%) 
 
9(22.5%) 20(50.0%) 6(15.0%) 40(100%) 
10Foreign minority shareholders 
have positive influences on the 
management of Chinese banks 
0(0%) 0(0%) 2(5.0%) 3(7.5%) 10(25.0%) 20(50.0%) 5(12.5%) 40(100%) 
11Foreign shareholders purchase 
Chinese bank shares for 
speculative purposes  
2(5.0%) 6(15.0%) 8(20.0%) 14(35.0%) 2(5.0%) 6(15.0%) 2(5.0%) 40(100%) 
 
The market for non performing loans by state-owned commercial banks 
 
Table 9.8 reveals that 72 percent of respondents agreed that the NPLs market in China is 
underdeveloped (Q12) and 65 percent agreed that a weak legislative framework 
effectively hindered or prevented their bank from collecting payments on NPLs (Q13). 
It was, therefore, not surprising to find that the vast majority of respondents (83 percent) 
agreed with the assertion that the NPLs market needs to be more regulated (Q14). In 
addition, more than half of the respondents (57.5 percent) agreed that it was important 
for foreign investors to be involved in the NPLs market (Table 9.8, Q15). An identical 
proportion of respondents also agreed that foreign investor had an interest in the market 
(Q16). What was interesting about the responses to these last two questions, however, 
was the relatively high proportion of respondents who either disagreed or expressed no 
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opinion on the assertions. This might be indicative of the fact that many people in China 
are still suspicious of foreign investors and foreigners in general.  
 
Table 9.8 Non-performing loans market in China by state-owned commercial banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(percentage)  
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12 The non-performing loans 
market is underdeveloped in 
China 
0(0%) 3(7.5%) 2(5.0%) 6(15.0%) 9(22.5%) 14(35.0%) 6(15.0%) 40(100%) 
13A weak legislative framework 
prevents banks from collecting 
payments for non-performing 
loans 
0(0%) 5(12.5%) 2(5.0%) 7(17.5%) 11(27.5%) 10(25.0%) 5(12.5%) 40(100%) 
14The non-performing loans 
market needs to be regulated  
0(0%) 2(5.0%) 0(0%) 5(12.5%) 9(22.5%) 18(45%) 6(15.0%) 40(100%) 
15It is important for foreign 
investors to be involved in the 
non-performing loans market 
0(0%) 2(5.0%) 3(7.5%) 12(30.0%) 10(25.0%) 9(22.5%) 4(10.0%) 40(100%) 
16Foreign investors have a great 
deal of interest in the 
non-performing loans market 
0(0%) 2(5.0%) 3(7.5%) 12(30.0%) 10(25.0%) 9(22.5%) 4(10.0%) 40(100%) 
 
9. 3.2 Joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Table 9.9 shows that 84 percent of respondents, i.e. slightly more than in state-owned 
commercial banks, agreed that the measures taken to resolve NPLs in joint-stock 
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commercial banks are effective (Q1). In this respect, 61 percent believed that AMCs can 
be an effective resolution to the problem (Q2); 46 percent agreed that debt-equity swaps 
can be effective (Q3); and, 52 percent believed that capital injections by government 
into state-owned commercial banks can help to resolve the problem of NPLs (Q4). 
Accordingly, the findings reveal that, as with state-owned commercial banks, the 
measures already in place to deal with NPLs are effective in joint-stock commercial 
banks.  
 
Table 9.9 Measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in joint-stock commercial 
banks  
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1The measures taken to deal with 
non-performing loans 
0(0%) 1(1.6%) 3(4.9%) 6(9.8%) 23(37.7%) 27(44.3%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
2 AMCs can effectively resolved 
the problem of non-performing 
loans 
2(3.3%) 5(8.2%) 4(6.6%) 13(21.3%) 16(26.2%) 20(32.8%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
3Debt-equity swaps can 
effectively resolved the problem 
of non-performing loans  
1(1.6%) 4(6.6%) 5(8.2%) 23(37.7%) 22(36.1%) 5(8.2%) 1(1.6%) 61(100%) 
4Government capital injections 
can effectively resolve the 
problem of non-performing loans  
3(4.9%) 10(16.4%) 5(8.2%) 11(18.0%) 17(27.9%) 13(21.3%) 2(3.3%) 61(100%） 
 
Public listing of banks in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
With regard to public listing, Table 9.10 shows that 80 percent of bank mangers agreed 
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with the assertion that a public listing of a bank encourages prudent lending by 
introducing an element of market discipline and accountability to shareholders. Table 
9.10 also reveals that this is accomplished through a number of different ways. With 
regard to public listing, Table 9.10 shows that 80 percent of bank managers agreed with 
the assertion that a public listing of a bank encourages prudent lending by introducing 
an element of market discipline and accountability to shareholders (Q5). Table 9.10 also 
reveals that this is accomplished through a number of different ways. For example, 92 
percent of respondents believed that a public listing reinforces bank supervision and 
regulation (Q6). A high number of respondents (57 percent) believe that the financial 
performance of a bank is improved by a public listing (Q7) and 72 percent supported the 
assertion that levels of risk management are improved when a bank has a public listing 
(Q8). In this respect, the findings were similar to those of state-owned commercial 
banks, with the consensus being that a public listing has a positive influence on the 
management and the performance of banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 321 
Table 9.10 Public listing of banks in joint-stock commercial banks  
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5 A public listing of a bank 
encourages prudent lending by 
introducing an element of 
accountability to shareholders 
1 (1.6%) 2 (3.3%) 2(3.3%) 7(11.5%) 14(23.0%) 32(52.5%) 3(4.9%) 61(100%) 
6A public listing of a bank 
reinforces its supervision and 
regulation 
0(0%) 2(3.3%) 1(1.6%) 2(3.3%) 9(14.8%) 37(60.7%) 10(16.4%) 61(100%) 
7The financial performance of a 
bank is improved by a public 
listing 
0(0%) 2(3.3%) 3(4.9%) 21(34.4%) 13(21.3%) 20(32.8%) 2(3.3%) 61(100%) 
8Levels of risk management are 
also improved in a bank with a 
public listing 
0(0%) 1(1.6%) 2(3.3%) 8(13.1%) 23(37.7%) 23(37.7%) 4(6.6%) 61(100%) 
 
Foreign investors and public listing in joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Table 9.11 shows that approximately 69 percent of bank managers agreed with the 
assertion that foreign investors are attracted to banks with a public listing (Q9) and a 
significant 72.1 percent agreed that foreign minority shareholdings have a positive 
influence on the management of Chinese banks (Q10). Nevertheless, almost 39 percent 
of respondents believed that foreign shareholders purchased Chinese bank shares for 
speculative purposes but a relatively high 42.5 percent neither agreed nor disagreed with 
the assertion (Q11). Once again, this finding might be reflecting some of the 
sensitivities associated with foreign investors in China. 
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    Table 9.11 Foreign investors and public listing in joint-stock commercial banks 
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
9Foreign investors are attracted 
to banks with a public listing  
0(0%) 1(1.6%) 2(3.3%) 16(26.2%) 11(18.0%) 27(44.3%) 4(6.6%) 61(100%) 
10Foreign minority shareholders 
have positive influences on the 
management of Chinese banks 
0(0%) 4(6.6%) 3(4.9%) 10(16.4%) 18(29.5%) 21(34.4%) 5(8.2%) 61(100%) 
11Foreign shareholders purchase 
Chinese bank shares for 
speculative purposes  
00%) 4(6.6%) 7(11.5%) 26(42.5%) 12(19.7%) 7(11.5%) 5(8.2%) 61(100%) 
 
The market for non-performing loans in Chinese Banks by joint-stock commercial banks 
 
Table 9.12 indicates that in response to question 12, the majority of respondents (67 
percent) believe that the market for NPLs in China is underdeveloped and 80 percent 
supported the assertion that a weak legislative framework prevented their bank from 
collecting payments on NPLs (Q13). A high proportion of bank managers (80 percent) 
agreed that the NPLs market needed to be more regulated (Q14). Almost 61 percent 
agreed that it is important for foreign investors to be involved in the NPLs market (Q15) 
but a relatively small 36.1 percent believed that they had shown any real interest to-date 
(Q16). This response was far less than that relating to state owned commercial banks 
and may be reflecting the political sensitivities attaching to state owned banks.   
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  Table 9.12 Non-performing loans market in China by joint-stock commercial banks  
Statement 
Strongly 
disagreed 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12The non-performing loans 
market is underdeveloped in 
China 
1 (1.6%) 4(6.6%) 5(8.2%) 11(18.0%) 19(31.1%) 16(26.2%) 5(8.2%) 61(100%) 
13A weak legislative framework 
prevents banks from collecting 
payment for non-performing 
loans  
1(1.6%) 3(4.9%) 2(3.3%) 6(9.8%) 21(34.4%) 18(29.5%) 10(16.4%) 61(100%) 
14 The non-performing loans 
market needs to be regulated  
1(1.6%) 3(4.9%) 2(3.3%) 6(9.8%) 21(34.4%) 18(29.5%) 10(16.4%) 61(100%) 
15It is important for foreign 
investors to be involved in the 
non-performing loans market  
2(3.3%) 4(6.6%) 4(6.6%) 14(23.0%) 12(19.7%) 22(36.1%) 3(4.9%) 61(100%) 
16 Foreign investors have a great 
deal of interest in the 
non-performing loans market 
1(1.6%) 2(3.3%) 3(4.9%) 33(54.1%) 7(11.5%) 10(16.4%) 5(8.2%) 61(100%) 
 
9. 3.3 City commercial banks 
 
Measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in city commercial banks 
 
The findings relating to city commercial banks were generally quite similar to 
state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks. Accordingly, as Table 
9.13 shows there was almost unanimous agreement that the measures taken to deal with 
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NPLs are effective (Q1). In response to question 2, 80 percent agreed that AMCs can 
effectively resolve the problem of NPLs and 60 percent agreed that government capital 
injections into state-owned commercial banks were similarly effective in resolving the 
problem (Q4). However, in contrast to the findings of the two banks already discussed, 
only 10 percent agreed with the assertion that debt-equity swaps can effectively resolve 
the problem of NPLs and a significant 70 percent expressed no opinion (Q3). This could 
be indicative of the fact that these respondents have limited experience or knowledge of 
debt equity swaps. 
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Table 9.13 Measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in city commercial banks  
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
1The measures taken to deal 
with non-performing loans are 
effective 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 9(90%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
2AMCs can effectively 
resolve the problem of 
non-performing loans  
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 3(30%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
3Debt-equity swaps can 
effectively resolve the 
problems of non-performing 
loans  
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
4Government capital 
injections into state-owned 
commercial banks can 
effectively resolve the 
problem of non-performing 
loans  
0(0%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 4(40%) 
 
0(0%) 
 
10(100%) 
 
Public listing of banks in city commercial banks 
 
As Table 9.14 reveals, there was unanimous agreement that the public listing of a bank 
encourages prudent lending by introducing an element of market discipline and 
accountability to shareholders (Q5) and that it reinforces bank supervision and 
regulation (Q6). Although not unanimous, a significant 80 percent of respondents 
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agreed that the financial performance of a bank is improved by a public listing (Q7) and 
all of the respondents believed that a public listing improved the level of risk 
management (Q8). In this respect, the benefits associated with a public listing were 
strongly and emphatically entrenched in the minds of managers at city commercial 
banks 
 
Table 9.14 Pubic listing of banks in city commercial banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5A public listing of a bank 
encourages prudent lending by 
introducing an element of 
accountability to shareholders 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 3(30%) 4(40%) 10(100%) 
6A public listing of a bank 
reinforces its supervision and 
regulation 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 3(30%) 6 (60%) 10(100%) 
7The financial performance of a 
bank is improved by a public 
listing  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 5(50%) 10(100%) 
8Levels of risk management are 
also improved in a bank with a 
public listing 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 3(30%) 6(60%) 10(100%) 
 
Public listings and foreign investors in city commercial banks 
 
Table 9.15 shows that the majority of respondents, i.e.80 percent, agreed with the 
assertion that foreign investors are attracted to banks with a public listing (Q9) but only 
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50 percent “slightly agreed” that they have a positive influence on the management of 
Chinese banks and the remaining 50 percent expressed no opinion (Q10). To some 
extent, this finding might have been reflecting the fact that a significant 40 percent of 
respondents believed that foreign investors purchased Chinese bank shares for 
speculative purposes (Q11). However, as we have mentioned before it could be 
indicative of a general lack of respondent‟s knowledge on this subject or a more general 
suspicion of foreigners in China. 
 
        Table 9.15 Public listing and foreign banks in city commercial banks  
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percenta
ge) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
9Foreign investors are 
attracted to banks with a 
public listing  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 5(50%) 10(100%) 
10Foreign minority 
shareholders have positive 
influences on the management 
of Chinese banks 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
11Foreign shareholders 
purchase Chinese bank shares 
for speculative purposes  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
The Market for Non-performing loans market in Chinese banks by city commercial 
banks 
 
Table 9.16 reveals that 40 percent of managers believe that the NPLs market in China is 
underdeveloped (Q12) and an identical proportion agreed that a weak legislative 
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framework prevents their bank from collecting payments for NPLs (Q13). Fifty percent 
of respondents agreed that the NPLs market needs to be more regulated. However, what 
was interesting were the fifty percent who expressed no opinion on this subject (Q14). 
Fifty percent of bank managers also agreed that it is important for foreign investors to 
be involved in the NPLs but once again, the remaining 50 percent expressed no opinion 
(Q15). However, in response to question 16, 70 percent agreed that foreign investors 
show a great deal of interests in the NPLs.  
 
  Table 9.16 Non-performing loans market in China by city commercial banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagreed 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12The non-performing loans 
market is underdeveloped in 
China 
0(0%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 1(10%) 10(100%) 
13Aweak legislative 
framework prevents bank 
from collecting loans 
0(0%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 4(40%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
14The non-performing loans 
market needs to be regulated 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 1(10%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 10(100%) 
15It is important for foreign 
investors to be involved in the 
non-performing loans market  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(50%) 1(10%) 2(20%) 2(20%) 10(100%) 
16Foreign investors show a 
great deal of interest in the 
non-performing loans market 
0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 2(20%) 4(40%) 1(10%) 10(100%) 
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9.3.4 Policy banks 
 
The measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in policy banks 
 
Table 9.17 reveals that a high number of respondents (90 percent) agreed with the 
assertion that the measures taken to resolve the problem of NPLs in policy banks are 
effective (Q1). However, in contrast to the findings relating to the banks already 
discussed only 20 percent agreed that AMCs can effectively resolve the problem of 
NPLs (Q2). Similarly, only 10 percent agreed that debt-equity swaps or government 
injections of capital into state-owned commercial banks were the answer to non 
performing loans (Q3 and Q4). This different response profile would appear to reflect 
the different nature of the policy bank‟s business compared to commercial banks and to 
some extent, it is also indicative of political tensions between the two categories of 
bank.   
 
Table 9.17 reveals that a high number of respondents agreed with the assertion that the 
measures taken to resolve the problem of NPLs in policy banks are effective. However, 
in contrast to the findings relating to the banks already discussed only 20 percent agreed 
that AMCs can effectively resolve the problem of NPLs. Similarly, only 10 percent 
agreed that debt-equity swaps or government injections of capital into state-owned 
commercial banks were the answer to non-performing loans. This different response 
profile would appear to reflect the different nature of the policy banks‟ business 
compared to commercial banks and to some extent, it is also indicative of political 
tensions between the two categories of banks. 
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    Table 9.17 The measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in policy banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly  
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
1The measures taken to deal 
with non-performing loans are 
effective 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 7(70%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
2AMCs can effectively 
resolve the problem of 
non-performing loans 
1(10%) 5(50%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 1(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
3Debt-equity swaps can 
effectively resolve the 
problem of non-performing 
loans  
2(20%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
4Government capital 
injections into state-owned 
commercial banks can 
effectively resolve the 
problem of non-performing 
loans 
2(20%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 
 
0(0%) 
 
10(100%) 
 
Public listing of banks in policy banks 
 
Table 9.18 shows that 80 percent of respondents agreed with the assertion that the 
public listing of a bank encourages prudent lending by introducing an element of market 
discipline and accountability to shareholders (Q5). A significant 90 percent agreed that a 
public listing reinforces bank supervision and regulation (Q6). However, a surprisingly 
small proportion of respondents (20 percent) agreed that it improved financial 
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performance (Q7) and only 30 percent believed that it improved risk management (Q8). 
A moment‟s reflection on the findings relating to these last two questions reveal that 
significantly high numbers of respondents expressed no opinions on the assertions. As 
before, it seems reasonable to infer that the responses are reflecting political 
considerations and to some extent, political tensions between commercial banks and 
policy banks. 
Table 9.18 Public listing of banks in policy banks  
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5 A public listing of a bank 
encourages prudent lending by 
introducing an element of 
accountability to shareholders  
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 6(60%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 61(100%) 
6A public listing of a bank 
reinforces its supervision and 
regulation 
0(0%) 2(3.3%) 1(1.6%) 2(3.3%) 9(14.8%) 37(60.7%) 10(16.4%) 61(100%) 
7The financial performance of 
a bank is improved by a public 
listing 
0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
8Levels of risk management 
are also improved in a bank 
with a public listing 
0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 5(50%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 61(100%) 
 
Foreign investors and public listing in policy banks 
 
Table 9.19 reveals that 90 percent of the respondents believe that foreign investors are 
attracted to banks with a public listing (Q9) and all of them agreed with the assertion 
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that foreign minority shareholders have a positive influence on the management of 
Chinese banks (Q10). In this respect, 70 percent of respondents did not believe that 
foreign investors purchased Chinese bank shares for speculative purposes (Q11). Once 
again, the findings relating to policy banks are different compared to those for 
commercial banks and are certainly more consistent regarding the role of foreign 
investors in China. 
          Table 9.19 Foreign investors and public listing in policy banks  
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
9Foreign investors are 
attracted to banks with a 
public listing  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 7(70%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
10Foreign minority 
shareholders have positive 
influences on the management 
of Chinese banks 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%)) 7(70%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
11Foreign shareholders 
purchase Chinese bank shares 
for speculative purposes  
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 7(70%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
Non-performing loans market in policy banks 
 
Table 9.20 shows that 80 percent of respondents agreed with the assertion that the NPLs 
market in China is underdeveloped (Q12). However, although the same proportion 
agreed that a weak legislative framework prevents their bank from collecting payments 
on NPLs, the strength of this agreement was only “slight” (Q13). Accordingly, although 
the results were in marked contrast to those for commercial banks it was not that 
surprising to find that 70 percent either disagreed or “slightly” disagreed with the 
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assertion that the NPLs market needs to be more regulated (Q14). In accordance with 
the above findings on foreign investors 90 percent believed that it is important for 
foreign investors to be involved in the NPLs market (Q15) but only 30 percent agreed 
with the assertion that foreign investors show a great deal of interest in the NPLs market 
(Q16). 
            Table 9.20 Non-performing loans market in policy banks  
Statement   
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12The non-performing loans 
market is underdeveloped in 
China 
0(0%) 1(10%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 7(70%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
13A weak legislative 
framework prevents banks 
from collecting payments for 
non-performing loans   
0(0%) 2(20%) 0(0%) 3(30%) 7(70%) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
14 The non-performing loans 
market needs to be regulated 
0(0%) 1(10%) 6(60%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 10(100%) 
15 It is important for foreign 
investors to be involved in the 
non-performing loans market 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(10%) 6(60%) 2(20%) 1(10%) 10(100%) 
16Foreign investors have a 
great deal of interest in the 
non-performing loans market 
0(0%) 6(60%) 1(10%) 7(0%) 2(20) 1(10%) 0(0%) 10(100%) 
 
9.3.5 Foreign banks 
 
The final classification of banks in the study sample was foreign banks, and Table 9.21 
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reveals that almost 42 percent of respondents agreed with the assertion that the 
measures taken to resolve NPLs in their banks are effective (Q1). In response to 
question 2, the findings show that 62.5 percent believed that AMCs can resolve the 
problem of NPLs; almost 67 percent agreed that debt-equity swaps are another effective 
alternative (Q3); and, almost 71 percent were positively inclined towards capital 
injections into state-owned commercial banks by government (Q4). In this respect, the 
findings were broadly in accord with those relating to commercial banks but were less 
reconcilable with those for policy banks.  
 
Table 9.21 The measures taken to deal with non-performing loans in foreign banks  
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage)  
1The measures taken to deal with 
non-performing loans are 
effective 
0(0%) 0(0%) 9(37.5%) 5(20.8%) 6(25.0%) 4(16.7%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
2AMCs can effectively resolve 
the problem of non-performing 
loans  
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(4.2%) 8(33.3%) 2(8.3%) 7(29.2%) 6(25%) 24(100%) 
3Debt-equity swaps can 
effectively resolve the problems 
of non-performing loans  
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(4.2%) 7(29.2%) 1(4.2%) 10(41.7%) 5(20.8%) 24(100%) 
4Government capital injections 
into state-owned commercial 
banks can effectively resolve the 
problem of non-performing loans  
0(0%) 1(4.2%) 2(8.3%) 4(16.7%) 7(29.2%) 8(33.3%) 
 
2(8.3%) 
 
24(100%) 
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Public listing of banks in foreign banks 
 
Table 9.22 shows that just over 79 percent of respondents agreed with the assertion that 
the public listing of a bank encourages prudent lending by introducing an element of 
market discipline and accountability to shareholders (Q5). Similarly, a high number of 
respondents (87.5 percent) agreed that a public listing reinforces bank supervision and 
regulation (Q6); just over 83 percent agreed that it improved the financial performance 
of the bank (Q7); and, 79.1 percent agreed that it also improved risk management (Table 
9.21, Q8). 
               Table 9.22 Public listing of banks in foreign banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
5 A public listing of a bank 
encourages prudent lending by 
introducing an element of 
accountability to shareholders 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 5(20.8%) 7(29.2%) 12(50.0%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
6 A public listing of a bank 
reinforces its supervision ad 
regulation 
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(4.2%) 2(8.3%) 10(41.7%) 11(45.8%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
7 The financial performance 
of a bank is improved by a 
public listing 
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 4(16.7%) 8(33.3%) 11(45.8%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
8 Levels of risk management 
are also improved in a bank 
with a public listing 
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 8(33.3%) 11(45.8%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
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Foreign investors and public listing in foreign banks 
 
On the question of foreign investors it was not surprising to find that 87.5 percent of the 
respondents agreed that foreign investors are attracted to banks with a public listing 
(Table 9.23, Q9). Almost 42 percent agreed that foreign minority shareholders have a 
positive influence on the management of Chinese banks (Q10) and 71 percent believed 
that foreign shareholders purchase Chinese bank shares for speculative purposes (Q11). 
The findings for these last two questions were broadly in accordance with those for 
commercial banks but were less reconcilable with those for the policy banks.  
 
          Table 9.23 Foreign investors and public listing in foreign banks  
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency  
(percentage) 
9Foreign investors are 
attracted to banks with a 
public listing  
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 3(12.5%) 7(29.2%) 11(45.8%) 3(12.5%) 24(100%) 
10Foreign minority 
shareholders have positive 
influences on the management 
of Chinese banks 
0(0%) 1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 9(37.5%) 7(29.2%) 2(8.3%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
11Foreign shareholders 
purchase Chinese bank shares 
for speculative purposes  
1(4.2%) 0(0%) 1(4.2%) 5(20.8%) 8(33.3%) 7(29.2%) 2(8.3%) 24(100%) 
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The market for non-performing loans in China by foreign banks 
Table 9.24 indicates that just over 79 percent of respondents believed that the NPLs 
market is underdeveloped in China (Q12). These same number of respondents agreed 
with the assertion that a weak legislative framework prevents their bank from collecting 
payment for NPLs (Q13) and exactly the same number of respondents, i.e. just over 78 
percent, believed that the NPLs market needs to be more regulated (Q14). Regarding the 
issue of foreign involvement, 70.8 percent of managers agreed that it is important for 
foreign investors to be involved in the market (Q15) but only 16.7 percent believed that 
foreign investors show a great deal of interest (Q16). 
           Table 9.24 The non-performing loans market by foreign banks 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagreed 
(percentage) 
Disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(percentage) 
Slightly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Agree 
(percentage) 
Strongly 
agree 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
12The non-performing loans 
market is underdeveloped in 
China 
1(4.2%) 0(0%) 1(4.2%) 3(12.5%) 8(33.3%) 7(29.2%) 4(16.7%) 24(100%) 
13A weak legislative 
framework prevents banks 
from collecting payments for 
non-performing loans 
0(0%) 0(0%) 2(8.3%) 3(12.5%) 9(37.5%) 9(37.5%) 1(4.2%) 24(100%) 
14The non-performing loans 
market needs to be regulated 
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(4.2%) 4(16.7%) 8(33.3%) 11(45.8%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
15It is important for foreign 
investors to be involved in the 
non-performing loans market 
0(0%) 1(4.2%) 0(0%) 6(25.0%) 12(50.0%) 3(12.5%) 2(8.3%) 24(100%) 
16Foreign investors have a 
great deal of interest in the 
non-performing loans market  
0(0%) 3(12.5%) 7(29.2%) 10(41.7%) 3(12.5%) 1(4.2%) 0(0%) 24(100%) 
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9.3.6 Summary of the analysis of the different sample banks 
 
The empirical findings suggest that the respondents were in broad agreement that the 
measures taken to resolve the problem of NPLs in their respective banks were generally 
effective. The only significant difference was the findings from the policy banks, which 
suggested that the specific solutions identified in the questionnaire, i.e. the involvement 
of AMCs, debt equity swaps and injections of capital into state-owned commercial 
banks, were not very effective. Policy banks apart, the other banks in the sample were 
generally favorably disposed toward the effectiveness of these measures. Policy banks 
apart, the other banks in the sample were generally favorably disposed toward the 
effectiveness of these measures.  
 
Similarly, the majority of respondents in the different categories of commercial banks 
and foreign banks agreed that a public listing encourages prudent lending by 
introducing an element of market discipline and accountability to shareholders. They 
also believed that it reinforces bank supervision and regulation, generally improves 
bank financial performance and improves the level and quality of risk management. The 
only exception, once again, were the policy banks who despite overwhelmingly 
agreeing with the assertion that a public listing encourages prudent lending practices 
and reinforces bank regulation seemingly refuted the notion that it also improved 
financial performance and risk management.  
 
With the exception of city commercial banks, the majority of the respondents agreed 
that the NPLs market in China is underdeveloped. Accordingly, they believed that the 
market needs to have more regulation. Similarly, most of the respondents (with the 
exception of the policy banks) agreed that foreign investors show a great deal of interest 
in the NPLs market. In addition, except for joint-stock commercial banks and foreign 
banks, the majority of respondents agreed that foreign investors show a great deal of 
interest in the NPLs market. The majority of respondents in city commercial banks and 
foreign banks also believe that it is important for foreign investors to be involved in the 
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non-performing loan market but this view was apparently not shared by the majority of 
respondents in state-owned commercial banks. 
 
9.4 Conclusion  
 
Having discussed the empirical findings from the interviews and the questionnaire, the 
analysis suggests that there is a general consensus within the sample on a number of 
substantive issues concerning the problem of non-performing loans in Chinese banks. 
The analysis also reveals some differences amongst the sample banks, which generally 
reflect their different expertise and the different nature of their respective core activities. 
Political considerations and tensions between state owned and government controlled 
banks also explain, to some extent, the difference in the sample banks.  
 
The next chapter accordingly discusses the main findings of the research and makes 
appropriate policy recommendations. The limitations of the research and future research 
initiatives in the broad area of NPLs in China are also identified and discussed. 
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          Chapter Ten Summary and Conclusion             
10. 1 Introduction 
 
In order to identify the main aims and objectives of the study and then address the 
issues raised in the research questionnaire it was important to place the study within a 
context. Accordingly, chapters two–four set the scene for the research. Chapter 5 
introduces the research methods and chapter six–eight present and discuss the empirical 
findings. This chapter will refresh the reader with a synopsis of the scene setting 
chapters and the rationale for the research methods and then reintroduce the primary 
research objectives and discuss the major empirical findings. The chapter then discusses 
the main recommendations, the limitations of the research and concludes by identifying 
a number of potentially interesting areas for future research. 
 
10.2 Contextualizing the Research   
 
The thesis commenced in chapter two by providing the reader with a descriptive 
account of the evolution and development of China‟s economy and financial system. In 
particular, the chapter attempts to explain why China has experienced far more rapid 
growth and success than any other transition economy over the last couple of decades or 
so. As such, it discusses the process of China‟s transition from a “planned” economy to 
a “market” economy and presents the key characteristics of the three economic stages of 
the transition. In this respect, the chapter provides a useful background for reviewing 
the development of the Chinese banking system.  
 
Chapter three provides a discussion and a literature review of the development of the 
Chinese banking sector. It discusses the evolution of the Chinese banks and financial 
institutions and crucially provides an insight into the main structural characteristics of 
the Chinese banking industry. The chapter also examines the performance of the 
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Chinese banks and identifies and examines the major banking reforms in China. In 
examining these reforms the chapter makes a critical assessment of their immediate and 
likely future impact. 
 
Chapter four examines the magnitude and causes of NPLs and problem loans in China‟s 
banking sector. As such, it places into some sort of perspective the sheer size of these 
loans size and discusses their principal causes. In this respect, the chapter emphases the 
seriousness of the problem and in so doing underlines why the research is important 
both from a practical and an academic viewpoint. The chapter also analyses the 
principal causes of NPLs, the measures taken to deal with them and the effect they have 
had on different parts of the economy.  
 
Chapter five discusses the research methods used to examine the data and introduces the 
reader to the aims and objectives of the research, and the research questions. A 
justification for the selected research methods and a description of the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with alternative research methods is also presented in this 
chapter. Specifically, the chapter discusses the interview schedule and the questionnaire, 
which to a large extent emanated from the literature review and the discussions on the 
Chinese banking system and the problem of NPLs in China. The rationale behind the 
chosen research methods, which consisted of a combination of content analysis and 
frequency analysis, are also discussed in the chapter. 
 
The methods used to gather empirical data on the causes of NPLs in Chinese banks are 
also discussed in chapter 5 and the interview and questionnaire populations are similarly 
described. The chapter also explains the rationale for choosing the interview and 
questionnaire methods. Essentially, this derived from the fact that the nature of the 
subject lent itself to these sorts of methodological approaches and the preliminary 
interviews provided invaluable insights that subsequently informed the design of the 
questionnaire. The fact that the response rate was just over 90 percent suggests that the 
subject was deemed to be important by the respondents. Moreover, it probably indicates 
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that the methods of collecting the data were similarly appropriate.  
 
The methods used to gather empirical data on the causes of NPLs in Chinese banks are 
also discussed in chapter 5 and the interview and questionnaire populations are similarly 
described. The chapter also provides or explains the rationale for choosing the interview 
and questionnaire methods. Essentially, this derived from the fact that the nature of the 
subject lent itself to these sorts of methodological approaches and the preliminary 
interviews provided invaluable insights that subsequently informed the design of the 
questionnaire. The fact that the response rate was just over 90 percent suggests that 
subject was deemed to be important by the respondents. Moreover, it probably indicates 
that the methods of collecting the data were similarly appropriate. 
 
The methods used to gather empirical data on the causes of NPLs in Chinese banks are 
also discussed in chapter 5 and the interview and questionnaire populations are similarly 
described. The chapter also provides or explains the rationale for choosing the interview 
and questionnaire methods. Essentially, this derived from the fact that the nature of the 
subject lent itself to these sorts of methodological approaches and the preliminary 
interviews provided invaluable insight that subsequently informed the design of the 
questionnaire. The fact that the response rate was just over 90 percent suggests that 
subject was deemed to be important by the respondents. Moreover, it probably indicates 
that the methods of collecting the data were similarly appropriate. 
 
10.2 Major findings  
 
Chapters 6-9 presented and analyzed the empirical findings As such these chapters 
addressed the main aims of the research, which were to analyze the factors that 
influence bank lending in Chinese banks; examine the measure that have been taken to 
ameliorate the problem of high levels of NPLs; and, identify some policy 
recommendations. With these aims in mind the following research questions were 
addressed in the thesis:  
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What are the principal causes of non-performing loan in Chinese banks?  
What measures have been taken to deal with NPLs?  
Is the lack of management incentives when selecting projects an important explanatory 
reason behind non-performing loans?  
Are government guarantees and interference a main reason behind the high levels of 
non-performing loans?  
Have the measures taken to deal with NPLs been effective?  
What are the policy recommendations for resolving the problem of China‟s NPLs? 
 
These aims were accommodated under three broad research themes, which were an 
explicit part of the interview and research questionnaire. These three themes, which 
were repeatedly addressed in each of the four empirical chapters, were as follows: 
manager‟s lack of incentives when selecting projects; the effect that government 
guarantees and interference had on bank lending; and the measures taken to deal with 
NPLs. 
 
The main research findings will now be summarized under each of the research question 
as follows: 
 
Principal causes of non-performing loans in Chinese banks- The findings revealed that 
although political motives, particularly, in attempting to grow the Chinese economy as 
quickly as possible were clearly an important causal reason behind the high levels of 
NPLs they were not the only reason. Government interference in bank lending was 
understandably quite widespread, especially, at the local committee level. Nevertheless, 
other considerations, such as, the finding that lending managers generally lacked 
adequate incentives to make efficient lending decisions also featured quite strongly . In 
particular, financial rewards were not related to performance and the sanctions for bad 
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lending were largely ineffective. In addition, the findings from the foreign banks 
revealed a lack of adequate professional training and a lack of relevant experience. 
 
Measures taken to deal with NPLs- Somewhat interestingly, the findings revealed that 
the majority of respondents believed that their lending behavior and practices were 
adequately controlled by internal regulations within their respective banks and that they 
had clear internal processes for approving loans. The majority of respondents also 
believed that documentation relating to projects accurately reflects the real facts of the 
proposal. The exceptions in this respect were foreign banks. However, there was 
overwhelming evidence that social ties and interpersonal relationships were very 
important in obtaining government support and that this had a significant influence on 
lending decisions in all of the selected banks.  
 
With the exception of foreign banks most of the respondents believed that bank 
managers were highly qualified and competent in the selection of projects. However, it 
was interesting to find that only a relatively small percentage of respondents felt that 
credit managers had autonomous powers in the selection of projects and believed that 
personal ties i.e. social and political networks had a greater influence on lending 
decisions. Respondents were also generally favourably disposed towards Asset 
Management Companies as a method of getting NPLs off the bank‟s balance sheets.  
 
Lack of Management Incentives- Most of the respondents felt that penalties were more 
effective than rewards in influencing the performance of managers. This finding could 
be reflecting the fact that not all of the sample banks have performance related pay or 
bonus policies. In this respect, only state owned commercial banks and foreign banks 
felt that rewards were more important than penalties. However, somewhat interestingly, 
despite the influence of the Chinese government in the lending decision, the majority of 
respondents did not think that political interference detracted from individual managers‟ 
incentives to select appropriate projects. In fact, the majority of the respondents claimed 
that bank performance could be improved by management incentives in the form of 
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financial rewards. 
 
Government guarantees and interference- The most striking feature of the findings 
relating to the role of government was the relatively high frequency of “neither agree 
nor disagrees”. This could simply be reflecting the fact that respondents have no opinion 
on the assertions or that they did not feel that they were of any significant importance. 
However, this would be somewhat surprising because the assertions were derived from 
a thorough review of the literature and include the key considerations that are shaping 
and influencing NPLs, and the future development of banks in China. An alternative 
explanation could, therefore, be that the findings are reflecting the political sensitivity 
of the issues raised by the questionnaire.    
 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the findings did not suggest that government 
interference and the provision of government guarantees leads to inefficient bank 
lending. Similarly, the majority of respondents did not believe that government 
interference had resulted in non profitable lending or the occurrence of NPLs. Rather 
they believed that government interference in bank lending was based on tangible 
considerations, such as, generating economic growth, and political and social stability. 
 
With the exception of joint stock commercial banks, the analysis also revealed that 
Chinese banks are inclined to lend to state owned rather than private enterprises. In 
trying to obtain some insight into whether government interference detracted from good 
lending practice or a careful evaluation of the proposal, the findings were unfortunately 
inconclusive. As mentioned above, this was because of the high incidence of 
respondents who expressed no opinion on these potentially important issues. 
 
The findings did, nevertheless, establish that government plays a positive and important 
role in bank lending to Chinese firms. However, the majority of respondents believed 
that the central bank should concentrate more on the regulation of the banking system 
and that government should be more prescriptive in terms of providing guidance on 
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what is prudent lending. 
 
In terms of the considerations, which could have a major impact on NPLs in China, the 
findings failed to show that government interference was a major contributory factor. 
Once again, respondents failed to express a definitive opinion on this subject. However, 
managerial autonomy and the incidence of weak credit risk management procedures 
were not regarded as important contributory factors. In contrast, the government‟s 
emphasis on social and political considerations was regarded as important and this 
probably reflects the fact that although China is growing at an unprecedented rate it is 
still an emerging economy. Accordingly, lending decisions are predominantly influenced 
by the need to maintain and promote political and social stability. 
 
The effectiveness of measures taken to deal with NPLs-With the exception of policy 
banks, the findings for all of the banks revealed that the measures currently being taken 
by the government to alleviate the problem of NPLs, i.e. injections of government 
capital and debt equity swaps, etc, are effective. Apart from policy banks, there was also 
a consensus of opinion that a public listing by a bank was conducive to prudent lending 
and better risk management because it introduced an element of market discipline and 
reinforced bank supervision. However, the findings were inconclusive in terms of 
establishing whether foreign investors were attracted to banks with a public listing. 
Nevertheless, despite believing that foreign investors were attracted to Chinese banks 
for essentially speculative purposes there was general agreement that they had a positive 
influence on their management.  
 
Regarding the market for NPLs and, therefore, indirectly the role of the Asset 
Management Companies, the findings revealed that with the exception of joint-stock 
commercial banks, there was general agreement that the market was underdeveloped 
but that it had a great deal of future potential. In this respect, foreign investors could be 
major players in any future developments. However, before this could happen a legal 
framework would have to be developed and the market would have to be appropriately 
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regulated. 
 
10.3 Policy Recommendation 
 
The final research question related to policy recommendations. Accordingly, the 
following recommendations stem directly from the findings of the study and are 
primarily aimed at alleviating the problem of NPLs in Chinese banks. 
 
The findings have shown that credit managers in their bank should have more 
autonomous powers in selecting projects. This can effectively reduce the effects of 
government interference in selecting projects and bank managers should be given more 
power to select projects using conventional credit risk assessment methods. In this 
respect the corporate governance structures of credit assessment in Chinese banks needs 
to be reassessed and managers allocated lending limits based on experience and 
seniority. Similarly credit committees for loans above certain prescribed limits need to 
be introduced.  
 
The findings have also shown that the rewards and penalties are very important in 
determining and influencing the performance of individual managers and that of the 
banks. Accordingly, some form of incentive scheme or performance related pay might 
be appropriate in encouraging managers to select viable projects. This approach would 
need to be balanced with penalties and sanction schemes. This could take the form of 
demotion or non-promotion or even loss of employment when bad lending decisions are 
made. However, these schemes need to be carefully thought through in order to avoid 
making managers too fearful of making decisions. 
 
Guarantees provided by government and government interference in general are not 
regarded as an important causal factor in the accumulation of NPLs. Nevertheless, at the 
present time there is too much reliance on relatively high risk policy lending and 
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government interference is quite substantial. Accordingly, this interference needs to be 
gradually reduced in order to introduce more efficient lending in Chinese banks.  
 
The Central Bank should be encouraged to concentrate more on the supervision and 
regulation of bank. The government should also provide more guidance on what it 
considers to be prudent lending and the development of banker-customer relationships 
should be encouraged as a method of managing and ameliorating credit risks.  
 
Banks should have more managerial autonomy in selecting projects and making lending 
decisions. This will give both the managers and the banks more incentive to select 
profitable business and simultaneously reduce the risk of creating new NPLs.  
 
The pervasive soft credit culture in China should be addressed and lending managers 
should be professionally qualified and trained. Similarly, there is a need to educate the 
Chinese business community about the dangers of excessive borrowing and the 
importance of repaying business loans. 
 
AMCs and the use of debt-equity swaps were generally recognized as effective methods 
for resolving the problem of NPLs. Therefore, a regulatory and legal environment that 
encourages these types of businesses should be encouraged. In particular, an appropriate 
legal and regulatory framework must be developed that attracts foreign investors and 
fosters the future development of a secondary market in debt-equity swaps.  
  
The public listing of banks will encourage prudent lending by introducing an element of 
accountability to shareholders, i.e. so-called market discipline. Moreover, not only 
would this potentially improve the performance of the banks it would also reinforce any 
measure that are introduced to increase the central bank‟s supervision and regulation of 
the banking sector.  
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Despite the speculative motive behind foreign investors in Chinese banks, such 
investments would appear to have a positive influence on bank management. 
Accordingly, foreign investors should be actively encouraged to invest in Chinese 
public listed banks. Not only would this provide external capital but it would also 
introduce technical and managerial expertise from the West. 
  
10.4 Limitations of the research 
  
During the courses of completing the research a number of limitations of the study 
became apparent. Some of these limitations were the result of time constraint on the 
researcher and others were regarded as peripheral to the main purpose of the researcher. 
The limitations of this research can be presented as follows:  
 
The questionnaire samples were collected from two major cities in China, namely, 
Shanghai and Beijing. These two cities comprise the most developed financial centers in 
China and account for a high density of banking activity. Taking into account both the 
time and transaction costs of circulating the questionnaires to other major cities, 
focusing on these two cities seemed to be a reasonable and pragmatic approach to 
getting a fairly representative sample. However, it must be recognized that the sample 
may not be fully representative. 
 
The time constraints of the researcher meant that a more rigorous statistical analysis 
could not be undertaken. For example, regression analysis, cross tabulation and ANOVA 
would have resulted in a more detailed exposition of the results.  
 
The interviewees were mainly from three different types of bank, i.e. state-owned 
commercial bank, policy banks and joint-stock commercial banks. In this respect, the 
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sample was not fully representative of all types of bank in China. 
 
Some of the questions in the interviews and questionnaire related to government 
guarantee and government interference and were, therefore, politically sensitive and 
attracted high levels of “no opinions”. Similarly questions on the competence of 
respondents tended to result in quite favorable responses, such as “strongly agree”. The 
problem of response bias was, therefore, an important issue in this research. The seven 
point Likert scale was used to try and remedy this problem but it must be recognized 
that this problem is difficult to eradicate in research of this nature. 
 
10.5 Future research  
 
The thesis provides several opportunities for conducting future in-depth research on 
NPLs problem in Chinese banking. The final part of this chapter, accordingly, examines 
some of the researcher‟s ideas for undertaking future research in this area as follows: 
 
Currently, four AMCs in China are negotiating with foreign investors about sale of 
NPLs. However, there is no available empirical data or academic research on this 
subject. This research topic could, therefore, be usefully addressed and incorporate 
either a qualitative or a quantitative approach or a combination of both techniques. 
 
There is little empirical work on attempting to quantify the importance of the causal 
factors NPLs in China. Similarly, the impact NPLs have had on the efficiency of 
Chinese banks and China‟s economy remains under researched. The lack of such 
analysis is partially due to the complexity of the issues and the availability of accurate 
and reliable data. Nevertheless, such research can utilize data for public listed 
companies that are provided by the Shengzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock 
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Exchange.  
 
Accordingly, further research should be encouraged, which attempts to provide new 
insights into the following related issues and questions: 
 
 The determinants of banks‟ lending decisions in a transition economy. 
What are the key factors that determine or influence bank‟s lending 
decision in a transition economy and is there any lending bias in a 
transition economy? 
 
 The extent to which business and organizational characteristics influence 
lending decisions and lead to non-performing loan in China‟s banking 
sector. Is there any the relationship between the characteristics of the 
businesses and the accumulation of non-performing loans in the Chinese 
banking sector? 
 
 The factors that affect foreign investors‟ perceptions of the 
non-performing loan market in China. What are the factors that will 
influence foreign investor‟ choices about whether or not they will invest in 
Chinese non-performing loans market? 
 
 Finally, some insight into the sort of policy guidelines, and regulatory and 
legal requirements that is necessary for the future development of a 
successful and dynamic secondary market in NPLs should provide a 
fruitful source of enquiry for future doctoral students. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
                          Letter of introduction 
 
To Whom It May Concern 
 
I am pleased to introduce Miss Wei Zhang who is currently studying for a PhD at 
Loughborough University under the supervision of me and a colleague, Paul 
Hamalainen. The PhD is researching into non-performing loans in Chinese banks. In 
order to introduce some empiricism into the thesis she needs to interview a number of 
experts in Chinese banking and to subsequently design a questionnaire that will address 
the main issues relating to the research. 
 
In this respect I am pleased to write this letter of introduction for Miss Zhang and to ask 
for your co-operation in completing the empirical part of her research. I fully 
understand just how busy you are but research of this kind can play a valuable part in 
the transformation and development of the Chinese banking sector. Needless to say, 
information you divulge will be treated with sensitivity and the student is quite prepared 
to share the findings of the research with you. 
 
Thank you in anticipation of your support. 
 
Professor Barry Howcroft 
 
Mr. Paul Hamaleinen 
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                                 推荐信 
 
尊敬的有关人士， 
 
张薇现在英国拉夫堡大学商学院就读博士学位。我和我的同事 Paul 
Hamalainen 先生是她的博士生导师。她的博士研究主要是关于中国银行业的不良
贷款和治理。为了把一些实际经验引进博士论文当中，她需要对中国银行业的专
家们进行采访，然后通过这些采访来设计问卷调查。这些问卷调查主要是讨论跟
研究相关的一些主要问题。 
 
我非常高兴为张薇写这封推荐信，同时也恳求您的合作，帮助她完成研究中
的经验调查部分。我完全理解您的工作很繁忙，但是这个研究能够对中国银行业
的转型和发展具有重要价值. 当然，您在采访中所提供或泄漏的任何信息我们都会
谨慎处理，仅用于学术研究而不用于研究之外的任何其他目的。同时，学生也将
非常乐意与您分享她的研究成果。 
非常谢谢您的支持与合作！ 
 
 
Barry Howcroft 教授 
Paul Hamaleinen 先生 
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Interview questions with senior managers 
 
Please circle one answer: 
 
The bank name:  
 
Part One:  Managers’ lack of incentives for project selection. 
 
1. Does your bank have a very clear project selection system or mechanism? 
1.1 If „Yes‟, what is it? 
1.2 If‟ No‟, why? 
 
2. What department/ departments is/ are responsible for project selection? 
 
 
3. Do the managers in these departments have the necessary and enough skills/ 
information to select appropriate projects? 
 
4. If „No‟, what are the reasons? 
 
 
5. Do you think a large number of NPLs in your bank mainly result from lack of 
incentives for project selection? 
5.1 If „Yes‟, what is your view about the reasons for the lack of incentives for project 
selection in your bank? 
5.2  If „No‟, what reasons can explain the large number of NPLs in your bank? 
 
 
6. To your knowledge, does your bank have tried to take measures to prevent the lack 
of incentives for project selection? 
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7. Do project selection managers in your bank get rewards or penalties after they make 
loans to the project? 
 
 
8. In your opinion, do managers‟ incentives for appropriate project incentives have 
effects on your bank‟s performance? 
 
 
9. Do the government‟s political decisions influence managers‟ incentives to select 
projects? 
 
 
10. Do social or personal ties play an important role in your bank‟s decision to select 
project? 
 
 
11. If „Yes‟, why this happens? Is it because the culture in Chinese banking? 
 
 
Part Two: Government guarantee and interference 
 
1. Do you think government guarantees are the most significant factor for the big 
accumulation of NPLs in Chinese banks? 
 
2.1 If „Yes‟, why do you think so/In what way do you think government guarantees have 
influenced the accumulation of NPLs ?  
2.2 If „No‟, what is the most important factor for the big accumulation of NPLs in 
Chinese banks? 
 
3.What is the main purpose of government guarantees in China? 
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4. Do you think government guarantees influence both banks and enterprises? 
4.1 If „Yes‟, in what ways do they influence banks and enterprises? 
4.2 If „No‟, what is the reason? 
  
5. Do you think government guarantees lead to inefficient lending decisions in your 
bank? 
5.1 If „Yes‟, how do government guarantees influences bank‟s lending decisions? 
5.2 If „No‟, what is the reason? 
 
6. To your knowledge, what are the main forms of government guarantee in China? 
 
7. Do you think government guarantees are necessary or not? 
7.1 If „Yes‟, what is the reason? 
7.2 If „No‟, what is the reason? 
 
8. Have you tried to take measures to eliminate the influence of government guarantees 
on your bank? 
8.1 If „Yes‟, what are these measures? Why they do these? 
8.2 If „No‟, what is the reason? 
 
9. Are social ties/ personal connection an important factor that helps to build up the 
relationship between the government and your bank? 
9.1 If „Yes‟, how do you try to build up this relationship? 
9.2 If „No‟, what is the reason? 
 
10. Do you think that government guarantees lead to moral hazard problems in your 
bank? 
10.1 If „Yes‟, what is the reason? 
10.2 If „No‟, what is the reason? 
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11. Do you think government guarantees lead to principal agent problems in your bank? 
11.1 If „Yes‟, what is the reason? 
11.2If „No‟, what is the reason? 
 
12. Do you think government guarantees lead to soft budget constraints in your banks 
and the enterprise borrower? 
12.1If „Yes‟, what is the reason? 
12.2 If „No‟, what is the reason? 
 
13. Concluding questions: In your opinion, what are the main reasons for China‟s large 
NPLs? 
 
 
Part Three: the measures that Chinese banks and the government took to deal with 
NPLs. 
 
1. What measures have been taken to deal with NPLs in your bank? 
 
2. What effect have they had in your bank? 
 
3. Do you think these measures are effective or not? Why? 
 
4. Which measure do you think is the most effective one? Why? 
 
5. What is the influence of these measures on the performance of your bank? 
 
6. In order to reduce NPLs in your bank, in your opinion, what should be changed? 
 
7. What measures should be taken in the future to prevent the creation of new NPLs? 
 
8. What is the aim of public listing of SOCBs? 
 
9. Do you think public listing will improve corporate governance of SOCBs? 
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10. In what way do you think public listing of banks will influence the NPL problem in 
Chinese banks? 
 
11. Do you think that the public listing of Chinese banks is attractive to foreign 
investors? 
 
12.  What are the recent developments in the NPL market in China?  
 
13.  Are they attractive to foreign investors? 
 
14.  What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Chinese NPLs market? 
 
 
Thank you for your support and cooperation! I am very willing to share the 
research result with you! 
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对高级管理人员采访的问题 
请对一个答案划圈： 
银行名称： 
 
第一部分：管理人员缺乏激励机制去选择贷款项目 
 
1.你们银行有没有一个非常清晰的贷款项目选择机制/系统? 
1.1 如果 “是”, 这个贷款项目选择机制是什么?  
1.2 如果 “不是”, 为什么? 
 
2.哪个部门/那些部门是负责选择贷款项目的? 
  
3. 这些部门的管理人员有没有必要的和足够的技术/信息选择合适的贷款项目? 
 
4. 如果 “不是”, 原因是什么? 
 
5. 你认为你们银行的不良贷款是不是主要来源于管理人员缺乏选择合适贷款项目
的动机? 
5.1 如果 “是”, 你们银行管理人员缺乏选择贷款项目动机的原因是什么? 
5.2 如果 “不是”, 你们银行不良贷款产生的原因是什么? 
 
6. 根据你的知识, 你们银行有没有尝试采取措施来改变管理人员缺乏项目选择动
机的状况呢? 
 
7. 你们银行的管理人员在发放项目贷款之后会不会因此受到奖励或惩罚呢? 
 
8.  你认为银行管理人员选择合适贷款项目的动机会对银行的业绩产生什么影响
呢? 
 
9. 政府的政治决策会影响管理人员选择项目的动机吗? 
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10. 在你们银行项目选择的决策中, 社会或人际关系是不是会发挥很重要作用? 
 
11. 如果 “是”, 为什么? 是不是因为中国银行业的文化? 
 
第二部分: 政府干预和担保 
 
1.你认为政府担保或政府干预是中国银行业大量不良贷款的最重要的一个因素吗? 
 
2.1 如果 “是”, 你为什么这样认为? 政府担保是如何影响不良贷款的? 
2.2 如果 “不是”, 中国银行业大量不良贷款的最重要因素是什么? 
 
3. 在中国, 政府担保的主要目的是什么? 
 
4. 你认为, 政府担保对银行和企业有影响吗? 
4.1 如果 “是”, 它是如何影响银行和企业的? 
4.2 如果 “不是”, 为什么? 
 
5. 你认为政府担保是不是很容易导致你们银行非有效的贷款决策? 
5.1 如果 “是”, 政府担保是如何影响银行的贷款决策的? 
5.2 如果 “不是”, 原因是什么? 
 
6. 根据你的知识, 中国政府担保的主要形式有那些? 
 
7. 你认为政府担保是必要的吗? 
7.1 如果 “是”, 为什么? 
7.2 如果 “不是”, 为什么? 
 
8. 你们银行有没有尝试过采取措施来消除政府担保对银行的影响? 
8.1 如果 “是”, 这些措施是什么? 银行为什么这样做? 
8.2 如果 “不是”, 原因是什么? 
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9. 社会关系/人际关系是不是能帮助政府与银行之间建立关系的一个重要因素呢? 
9.1 如果 “是”, 你们是如何来建立这种关系的呢? 
9.2 如果 “不是”, 原因是什么? 
 
10. 你认为政府担保是不是很容易使你们银行产生道德风险? 
10.1 如果 “是”, 为什么? 
10.2 如果 “不是”, 为什么? 
 
11. 你认为政府担保是不是很容易导致你们银行的委托-代理人问题呢? 
11.1 如果 “是”, 为什么? 
11.2 如果 “不是”, 为什么? 
 
12. 你认为政府担保是不是很容易导致银行和企业借款者的软约束问题呢? 
12.1 如果 “是”, 为什么? 
12.2 如果 “不是”, 为什么? 
 
13.总结性问题:  你认为中国银行业有大量不良贷款的主要原因有那些呢? 
 
第三部分：中国银行和政府采取的处理不良贷款措施 
 
1.你们银行采取了那些措施来处理不良贷款问题? 
 
2.这些措施对你们银行有些什么影响? 
 
3. 你认为这些措施是有效的吗? 为什么? 
 
4.你认为哪项措施是最有效的呢? 为什么? 
 
5.这些措施对你们银行的业绩有什么影响呢? 
 
 377 
6.你认为降低银行不良贷款, 那些方面值得改进呢? 
 
7.你认为将来应该采取那些措施来防范新一轮的大量不良贷款的产生呢? 
 
8. 国有商业银行上市的目的是什么? 你们银行上市的目的是什么? 
 
9. 你认为上市会提高国有商业银行的内部治理吗? 为什么? 上市提高了你们银行
的内部治理吗? 
 
10. 你认为银行上市会如何影响中国银行业的不良贷款问题? 
 
11. 你认为银行上市会吸引外国投资者吗? 为什么? 
 
12.  中国不良贷款市场最近有哪些发展? 
 
13. 中国不良贷款市场对外国投资者有吸引力吗? 为什么? 
 
14. 中国不良贷款市场的优缺点 
 
谢谢您的支持和合作!!! 我将非常乐意与您分享我的研究论文成果! 
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Appendix 5 
 
                   请回答下面所有的问题, 谢谢您有价值的帮助. 
 
第一项 请指出您对下面每一个陈述同意或不同意的看法并用把相应的数字圈起来.  
  这里, 1=完全不同意, 2=不同意, 3=有点不同意, 4=既不同意也没有不同意, 5=有点同意, 6=同意,           
7=完全同意. 比如, 如果你完全不同意某一个观点, 就在数字 1 上打圈. 
 
                第一部分 管理人员缺乏选择合适项目的动机 
 
  
完全
不同
意 
不同
意 
有点
不同
意 
既不
同意
也没
有不
同意 
有点
同意 
同意 
完全
同意 
1. 在我的银行, 项目选择的规章制度能够控制管理人员在选择
项目时的行为. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. 在我的银行, 批准贷款的程序是清晰的. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. 政府官员的支持决定受人际关系或社会关系的影响.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. 在信贷风险评估过程当中所用的材料文件反应了项目的真实
情况. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. 在我的银行, 项目选择管理人员有高资格和高技术. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. 在我的银行, 信贷管理人员有能力胜任项目选择.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. 在我的银行, 信贷管理人员在选择项目时有自主权. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. 在我的银行, 贷款决策受社会或人际关系的影响 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. 在我的银行, 贷款决策是独立于政府或社会考虑之外的. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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10. 在我的银行, 管理人员没有动机对贷款进行准确定价. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. 在我的银行, 管理人员没有动机监控贷款.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. 在我的银行, 借款人没有动机偿还贷款.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. 薄弱的法律构架防碍了我的银行监测贷款. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. 在我的银行, 金钱或财务上的奖励应该建立在个人的业绩上.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. 在我的银行, 因为坏的贷款决策, 以非提拔或失业为形式的
惩罚施加在了个人身上. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. 金钱或财务上的奖励激发我所在银行的管理人员选择高利润
的贷款项目. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17.  以非提拔或失业为形式的惩罚使得我所在银行的管理人员
在进行项目选择的时候感到不安 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. 因为政府的政治干预, 我所在银行的管理人员缺乏动机去选
择项目. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. 政策性贷款总是会影响我所在银行的贷款决策.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. 管理人员选择项目的动机提高我所在银行的业绩. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. 金钱或财务上的奖励提高我的业绩. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. 以非提拔或失业为形式的惩罚影响我的业绩. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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                   第二部分 政府干预和担保 
 
 
完全
不同
意 
不同
意 
有点
不同
意 
既不
同意
也没
有不
同意 
有点
同意 
同意 
完全
同意 
1. 政府干预导致我所在银行的政策性贷款增加. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. 政府干预加大了我所在银行的政策性风险. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. 政府干预和担保导致我所在银行非有效的贷款决策. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. 政府干预和担保帮助我所在银行做出有效的贷款决策. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. 政府干预和担保导致大量的无利润借贷和不良贷款. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.  政府干预和担保被认为是我所在银行不良贷款聚集的重要原
因.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.  政府担保和对银行贷款的干预支持国有企业改革. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. 政府通过银行的政策性贷款以促进经济增长. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. 政府担保和对银行贷款干预的主要目的之一是降低失业. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10.  政府担保和对银行贷款干预的主要目的之一是维护社会稳
定. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. 政府官员干预银行的贷款政策有其政治原因. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. 在政府担保下, 我所在银行更喜欢贷款给效率低的国有企业. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. 我所在银行更愿意贷款给国有企业胜过贷款给非国有企业. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. 低效率运转的国有企业是解释我所在银行大量不良贷款的一
个重要原因. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. 国有企业发放的贷款更易于导致我所在银行的非有效贷款. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. 政府和我所在银行的关系会更好如果没有当前程度的政府干
预和担保.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. 政府干预和担保削弱了/防碍了我所在银行好的借贷实践. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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18. 政府干预和担保削弱了银行在贷款提议中对财务方面的仔细
评估. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. 政府干预和担保削弱了我所在银行对谨慎商业贷款的内部规
章与方针的作用 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. 政府通过宏观经济政策帮助我所在的银行作出有效的贷款决
策. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. 政府在我所在银行的商业借贷中发挥着重要和正面的作用. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. 中央银行应该关注于银行因为的监督和管理. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. 政府应该对关于它认为的谨慎商业借贷提供更多的指导. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24.  银行和政府关系受个人之间联系和关系的影响. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. 银行和客户的关系对我所在银行的项目选择很重要. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26.  银行和客户的关系对吸引商业客户到我所在银行很重要.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27.  以下事项对我所在银行的不良贷款水平有主要的影响:        
    a.社会和政治体制 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. 太多的政府干预和担保  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. 我所在银行管理自治权的缺乏 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d.  较弱的信贷风险管理  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. 低效率运转的国有企业  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. 软的信用文化  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. 建立在个人联系上的贷款(关系贷款)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. 其它(请注明) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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                   第三部分  处理不良贷款的措施 
 
 
完全
不同
意 
不同
意 
有点
不同
意 
既不
同意
也没
有不
同意 
有点
同意 
同意 
完全
同意 
1. 我所在银行处理不良贷款的措施是有效的. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. 资产管理公司能有效解决不良贷款的问题 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. 债转股能有效解决不良贷款的问题. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. 政府对国有商业银行的资本注入能有效解决不良贷款的问题. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. 银行上市通过引进对股东的责任制鼓励了谨慎的借贷. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. 银行上市加强了自身的监督和管理. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. 通过上市银行的财务业绩提高了. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. 通过上市, 银行的风险管理水平提高了 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. 上市的银行对外国投资者有吸引力. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. 外国股东对中国的银行的管理有正面的影响. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. 外国投资者为了投机目的购买中国的银行的股份. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. 不良贷款市场在中国是不发达的. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. 薄弱的法律构架防碍我的银行清收不良贷款. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. 不良贷款市场需要得到更多的管制. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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15. 外国投资者参与到不良贷款市场中来很重要. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. 外国投资者对不良贷款市场有很大的兴趣. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
您还有任何关于中国不良贷款的评论吗? 
第二项 下面的问题是关于您的性别,年龄, 收入, 教育,资格, 职位,还有您在您当前的职位上工作了多少年. 请在下面每
个问题下打勾. 
性别 
  
男性   
女性   
年龄 
  
  
22-35 岁   
36-45 岁   
46-60 岁   
您在您的银行已经工作多少年了? 
  
  
少于 5 年   
5-10 年   
多于 10 年   
年度收入包括红利 
  
  
少于 60,000 人民币   
60,000-100,000 人民币   
多于 100,000 人民币   
教育背景 
  
  
低于大学教育   
大学教育(本科)   
研究生教育   
工作职位 
  
  
高级管理人员    
管理人员   
其它(请注明):   
 
谢谢您的合作! 
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Appendix 6   
 
The problems of non-performing loans in Chinese banks 
 
Please answer all of the following questions and thank you for your valuable help. 
 
Section 1. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by circling only one number, where: 
1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 5=slightly agree, 6=agree, and 7=strongly agree. For example, if 
you strongly disagree with a specific statement put a circle around number 1.  
 
   Part One:  Managers’ lack of incentives for appropriate project selection 
 
               Strongly    Disagree       Slightly      Neither Agree     Slightly   Agree     Strongly  
               Disagree                 Disagree     Nor Disagree      Agree               Agree 
       
 1. Project selection regulations 
 in my bank can control managers‟ 1       2     3              4            5         6          7 
 behaviour in selecting projects. 
 
 2. The process of approving loans 1       2     3              4            5         6          7  
                      in my bank is clear. 
 
                      3. Government officials‟ supporting 
                      decisions are influenced by      1       2     3              4            5         6          7 
                      interpersonal relationship/ social ties. 
 
                     4. Documents used in credit risk  
                   Assessment reflect the real facts     1       2     3              4            5         6           7 
                    about the projects. 
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                      5. Project selection managers  
                  Are highly qualified and highly    1       2     3             4            5          6           7 
                  skilled in my bank.       
 
                    6. Credit managers in my bank  
                  are competent and capable in   1       2     3             4            5           6         7 
                  project selection.         
 
                   7. Credit managers in my bank  
                 have autonomous powers           1          2         3             4            5           6           7 
                   in selecting projects.  
 
                    8. Lending decisions in my  
                  bank are influenced by social      1       2    3             4            5           6         7 
                  or personal ties. 
 
                    9. Lending decisions in my bank  
                  are independent of government      1       2         3            4            5           6         7 
                  and social considerations. 
 
                  10. Managers within my bank      1       2     3            4            5           6         7 
                  have no incentive to price loans  
                  accurately. 
 
                    11. Managers in my bank          1      2        3             4              5           6         7 
                  have no incentive to monitor loans. 
 
                    12. Borrowers in my bank have no  1       2     3            4               5          6         7 
                    incentive to repay loans.  
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                    13. A weak legal framework prevents 1      2      3             4              5           6        7 
                 my bank from monitoring loans. 
 
                    14. Financial reward should be based               
                  on an individual‟s performance      1      2          3             4              5           6         7 
                in my bank. 
 
                    15. Penalties in the form of      1       2     3             4             5            6         7 
                  non-promotion or loss of employment  
                  are imposed on individuals in my bank  
                   because of bad lending decisions. 
 
                    16. Financial rewards motivate      1       2     3             4             5            6         7 
                  Managers in my bank to select  
                  highly-profitable projects. 
 
                    17. Penalties in the form of      1           2      3            4              5           6         7 
                  non-promotion or loss of employment  
                  make managers in my bank  
                  uncomfortable when selecting projects.  
 
                    18. Managers in my bank lack      1       2     3            4             5             6         7 
                  Incentives to select projects  
                  Because of political interference 
                  by the government. 
 
                    19. Policy lending always influences 1       2     3             4            5              6         7 
                  my bank‟s lending decisions.   
 
                     20. Managers‟ incentives to select   1       2         3              4           5              6         7 
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                   good projects improve the  
                   performance of my bank.  
 
                    21. Financial rewards improve     1        2     3              4           5              6         7 
                  my performance.      
 
                    22. Penalties in the form of      1        2          3             4            5              6         7 
                  non-promotion or loss of  
                  employment influence my performance. 
 
 
                      Part two: Government interference and guarantees 
 
            Strongly       Disagree        Slightly      Neither Agree     Slightly     Agree     Strongly  
            Disagree                     Disagree     Nor Disagree       Agree                Agree 
 
                  1.Government interference leads to1        2       3             4            5          6         7 
                   increased policy lending in my bank. 
 
                   2.Government interference      1    2   3             4            5          6         7 
                    increases policy risk in my bank. 
 
                   3.Government interference and   1    2   3             4            5          6         7 
                   guarantees lead to inefficient  
                   lending decisions in my bank. 
 
                   4.Government interference and    1        2  3             4            5          6         7 
                   guarantees helps my bank to make  
                   effective lending decisions. 
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                  5.Government interference and   1    2   3             4            5          6         7 
                   guarantees result in a large amount  
                   of non-profitable lending and non-performing  
                   loans in my bank. 
 
                  6.Government interference and   1    2   3             4            5          6         7 
                   guarantees are considered to be  
                   important reasons for the accumulation of  
                   non-performing loans in my bank. 
 
                     7.Government guarantees and   1     2     3            4             5           6        7 
                    interference with bank lending  
                   support state-owned enterprise reforms. 
 
                     8.The government aims to increase 1     2     3            4             5           6         7 
                   economic growth through policy  
                    lending by banks. 
                     
                  9.One of the main goals of       1     2     3            4             5           6         7 
                  government guarantees and interference  
                  with bank lending is to reduce unemployment.  
 
                  10. One of the main goals of    1     2     3            4             5           6         7 
                  government guarantees and  
                  interference with bank lending is  
                  to maintain social stability. 
 
  11.Government officials have    1        2     3             4            5           6         7 
                  political reasons for interfering  
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                  with bank lending policies.  
 
  12.My bank prefers to make    1        2     3             4            5           6         7 
                  loans to inefficient state-owned  
                  enterprise under government guarantees. 
 
13.My bank is more likely to    1         2     3             4            5           6         7 
                  lend to State-owned enterprises  
                  rather than non-state-owned enterprise.. 
 
14.Poor-performing state-owned 1       2     3             4            5           6         7 
                   Enterprises are an important  
                   explanatory reason for the large  
                   amount of non-performing loans in my bank.  
 
15.Loans made to state-owned  1        2     3             4            5           6         7 
                  Enterprises are more likely to result  
                  in inefficient lending in my bank. 
 
16.The relationship between   1        2        3               4             5          6         7 
                  government and my bank would  
                  be better without the current level  
                  of government interference and  
                  guarantees.  
 
17.Government interference and 1       2   3             4              5            6         7 
                  guarantees detract from good  
                  lending practices in my bank. 
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18.Government interference and 
                  guarantees detract from       1   2   3             4              5             6         7 
                  careful evaluation of the financial  
                  considerations in a lending proposal of my bank. 
 
19.Government interference and 1       2   3             4               5            6         7 
                  guarantees detract from my bank‟s  
                  internal rules and guidelines on  
                  prudent business lending. 
 
20.The government helps my  1      2    3             4               5            6         7 
                  bank to make effective lending  
                  through macro-economic policies. 
 
21.The government plays an  1      2    3             4               5            6         7 
                  important and positive role  
                  in lending to business by  
                  my bank. 
 
22.The Central Bank should  1     2    3              4              5            6         7 
                  concentrate on the supervision and  
                  regulation of bank behaviours. 
 
23.Government should provide 1     2        3              4              5            6         7 
                  more guidance on what it considers  
                  to be prudent business lending. 
 
24.Bank-government relationships 1     2        3             4               5            6         7 
                  are influenced by personal contacts and  
                  relationships. 
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25.Banker-customer relationships 1     2    3             4               5            6         7 
                  are important in choosing projects in  
                  my bank. 
 
26.Banker-customer relationships 1     2    3             4               5            6         7 
                  are important in attracting business  
                  customers to my bank. 
 
 
27. The following considerations  
               have a major impact on the level 
               of non-performing loans in my bank. 
 
                  a) The social and political regime 1     2       3               4            5             6          7 
 
                     b) Too much government interference1        2   3              4             5             6          7 
                 and guarantees 
 
                    c) lack of managerial autonomy    1            2        3             4              5             6         7 
                    in my bank  
 
                    d) Weak credit risk management   1       2   3             4               5            6         7 
 
                    e) poor-performing state-owned   1       2   3             4               5            6         7 
                    Enterprises       
 
                    f) soft credit culture            1       2   3             4               5            6         7 
 
                    g) loans based on personal       1       2   3             4               5            6         7 
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                    contacts (relationship loans) 
 
                    h) others (please specify):       1   2   3             4                5            6         7 
 
 
              Part three: measures for dealing with non-performing loans in Chinese banks 
 
 
              Strongly    Disagree       Slightly      Neither Agree     Slightly   Agree    Strongly  
              Disagree                   Disagree     Nor Disagree     Agree              Agree 
 
1.Measures taken to resolve  
                     non-performing loans in my bank  1   2   3             4            5        6         7 
                 are effective. 
 
2.Asset Management Companies   
                     can effectively resolve the problem  1   2    3            4            5        6         7 
                     of non-performing loans. 
 
              3.Debt-equity swaps can 
                     effectively resolve the    1   2   3             4            5        6         7 
                  problem of non-performing loans. 
 
4.Government capital injections  
                     into state-owned commercial banks  1      2     3             4            5        6         7 
                  can effectively resolve the problem of  
                  non-performing loans. 
 
5. A public listing of a bank encourages  
                      prudent lending by introducing an  1       2       3             4            5        6         7 
                   element of accountability to shareholders. 
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6. A public listing of a bank reinforces  
                  its supervision and regulation.  1     2        3             4               5             6         7 
 
                    7. The financial performance of  1         2          3             4               5             6         7 
                    a bank is improved by a public listing. 
 
8.Levels of risk management are 1     2          3             4               5              6         7 
                  improved in a bank with a public listing. 
 
9.Foreign investors are attracted to 1     2         3             4               5             6         7 
                   banks with a public listing. 
 
10.Foreign minority shareholders  
                  have positive influence on the  
                  management of Chinese banks.     1      2         3              4               5            6         7 
  
                  11. Foreign shareholders purchase 1      2         3              4               5             6         7 
                  Chinese bank shares for speculative  
                  purposes.   
 
                    12. The non-performing loans    1      2         3             4                5             6         7 
                    Market is underdeveloped in China. 
 
                    13. A weak legislative           1           2                 3             4                 5            6         7 
                    framework prevents my bank from 
                    collecting payments for non-performing loans. 
 
                     14. The non-performing loans     1      2         3             4                 5           6         7 
                      market needs to be more regulated. 
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                      15. It is important for foreign      1     2    3             4            5        6         7 
                       investors to be involved in the  
                       non-performing loans market. 
 
  16. Foreign investors show a      1         2      3             4            5        6         7 
                       great deal of interest in the   
                       non-performing loans market. 
 
                       Would you like to make any additional comments relating to non-performing loans in China? 
 
Section 2. The following questions relate to your gender, age, income, education and qualifications, position, and how many                    
years you have been in your current position. Please tick one box in every question.  
 
      Sex 
        
 Male   
     
 Female 
 
       Age 
   
  22-35 
 
   36-45 
  
  
46-60 
 
              How long have you been working in your bank? 
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  Less than five years  
     
 
  Five to ten years  
 
 
  More than ten years 
 
Annual income including bonuses 
 
Less than 60,000 RMB 
    
 
 60,000-10,000 RMB 
 
 
More than 10,000RMB 
 
              Education background 
 
Less than university  
    
 
 University education: first degree 
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Postgraduate degree: second degree 
 
        Job position 
 
        Senior manager 
 
    
          Managers 
 
 
         
      Others (please specify) 
 
   Thank you for your cooperation! 
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Appendix 7  
 
                Content Analysis                                               
 
Table 1 Interviews with managers of six Chinese banks 
 
Bank name Bank ownership  Department and Manager Position 
Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC) 
 State-owned 
Commercial Banks 
-Risk Management Department 
-Department Manager 
China Construction Bank 
(CCB) 
      State-owned 
    Commercial Banks 
-Credit Administration Department 
-General Manager 
Bank of China (BOC)       State-owned 
    Commercial Banks 
-Corporate Banking Department 
- Customer Manager 
Agriculture Bank of China 
(ABC) 
      State-owned  
    Commercial Banks 
-Asset Disposal Department 
-Department manager 
The State and Development 
Bank (SDB) 
      Policy Bank -Credit Administration Department 
-Senior Manager 
Citic Bank (CB)       Joint-stock  
Commercial Bank 
-President of Chongqing Citic Bank 
Source: Author (Field Work). 
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Table 2.1   Interviews Analysis (closed end questions)  
  
Bank 
Name 
Lack of Incentives for Project Selection 
 Have Clear 
Project Selection 
Mechanism 
     (Q1) 
Good Project 
Selection 
Skills 
    (Q3) 
Lack of 
Incentives is a 
Main Reason 
for NPLs (Q5) 
Government‟s  
Political 
Influence 
    (Q9) 
Social/ Personal 
Relations 
Influence Project 
selection 
     (Q10) 
ICBC Y N + + ++ 
CCB N N + + ++ 
BOC Y Y 0 ++ 0 
ABC Y Y 0 0 0 
SDB Y Y 0 - 0 
CB Y Y - - + 0 
Source: Bank Managers‟ Interviews. 
++ =strongly agree   +=agree   0=neutral          - =disagree    - - =strongly disagree 
Y=yes             N=no     NA=not applicable 
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                                  Table 2.2 Interview Analysis (closed end questions) 
Bank 
Name 
Government Interference and Guarantee 
 The Most 
Important 
Factor for 
NPLs 
  (Q1) 
Influence 
on Both 
Banks and 
Enterprises 
   (Q4) 
Lead to 
Inefficient 
Lending 
Decisions 
   (Q5) 
A 
Necessary 
Measure 
  (Q7) 
Take 
Measures to 
Eliminate 
government 
Influence 
    (Q8) 
Social/Personal 
Relations 
Influence on  
Government –Bank 
Relationship 
      (Q9) 
Lead to 
Moral 
Hazard 
(Q10) 
Lead to 
Principal 
Agent 
Problem 
(Q11) 
Lead to 
Soft 
Budget 
Constraint 
   (12) 
ICBC + + 0 0 Y ++ Y Y Y 
CCB + ++ 0 + Y ++ Y Y Y 
BOC + ++ 0 0 Y 0 Y Y Y 
ABC + ++ 0 - N ++ Y Y Y 
SDB 0 + - - ++ N + 0 0 0 
CB - - - 0 Y + 0 0 Y 
            Source: Bank Managers‟ Interviews. 
            ++ =strongly agree   +=agree   0=neutral   - =disagree    - - =strongly disagree   Y=yes     N=no     NA=not applicable 
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                                      Table 2.3 Interviews Analysis (closed end questions) 
 
Bank Name Measures dealing with NPLs 
 Effective Measures 
     (Q3) 
Public Listing Improves Corporate 
Governance of Chinese Banks 
(Q9) 
Public Listing is Attractive 
to Foreign Investors. 
(Q11) 
NPLs Market is Attractive 
to Foreign Investors 
(Q13) 
ICBC - + - - 
CCB 0 ++ 0 - 
BOC + ++ + - 
ABC + + 0 0 
SDB + ++ + 0 
CB + + + + 
             Source: Bank Mangers‟ Interviews. 
              ++ =strongly agree   +=agree   0=neutral          - =disagree    - - =strongly disagree 
          Y=yes             N=no     NA=not applicable 
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Table 3.1 Interview Analysis (open questions) Managers‟ Lack of Incentives for Project 
Selection 
 
Type Bank Name Content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project Selection 
Mechanism (Q1.1) 
ICBC 1-the enterprise asks for a report from the designing institution. 
2-the enterprise applies to the government for an agreement/support report. 
3-the bank itself writes an assessment report after investigating into the 
enterprise 
CCB 1-the bank assesses the potential risk of the project 
2-restrict credit managers‟ behaviours 
3-regulations 
BOC 1-investigate into the information including financial performance, corporation 
structure, financial report, collateral and mortgage. 
2-assess projects 
3-customer managers‟ loan approving 
4-credit rating system 
ABC 1-select high-technology projects 
2-demanding requirements for loan application 
3-strict regulation 
SDB 1-the central government‟ industry development policy 
2-divide the process into credit rating assessment and project assessment 
3-assess credit risk and local government‟ financial strength 
4-credit analysts will investigate into the projects based on credit assessment 
report, project assessment report and professionals‟ advices 
CB 1-the head bank directs marketing department to choose the appropriate projects 
2-marketing department collects information about projects and hands in 
investigation reports 
3-the professional censors analyze clients and projects‟ credit risk based on 
Moody credit rating system and hand in reports 
4-credit committee makes loan decisions based on the handed reports 
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5-the risk analysis manager and the president of provincial bank branch can make 
decisions to refuse a loan even if this has been agreed by the credit committee 
 
 
 
 
Departments 
Responsible for 
Project Selection 
(Q2) 
ICBC 1-credit administration department,  
2-risk management department 
CCB 1-credit administration department,  
2-risk control department 
BOC 1-risk management department, 
2-credit administration department 
ABC 1-risk management department  
SDB 1-credit rating assessment department,  
2-project assessment department 
CB 1-marketing department 
2-risk management department  
3-credit censoring department 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reasons for Lack of 
Incentives (Q5.1, 
Q5.2) 
ICBC 1-moral hazard 
2-government guarantee 
3-neither penalty nor reward 
CCB 1-managers‟ low qualification and moral hazard,  
2-no independent rights to select project. 
3-the leader/top managers‟ advice is always the priority 
4-rights and commitments are asymmetric. 
BOC 1-government policy 
ABC 1-result of a planned economy  
2-managers‟lack of responsibility 
3-loan scale target 
SDB 1-manager‟ low qualification 
2-the structure of bank ownership 
CB 1-NA 
 
 
ICBC 1-no reward,  
2-some penalties: reduced salary or laid-off 
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Reward or Penalty 
Mechanism (Q.7) 
CCB 1-few rewards,  
2-too many penalties: reduced salary or laid-off 
BOC 1-rewards/penalties based on branch‟s performance and individual performance 
ABC 1-rewards: bonus; increased salary 
2-penalties: salary reduction; administrative demotion 
SDB 1-no reward,  
2-no penalty 
CB 1-some reward 
2-some penalty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures Applied to 
Prevent or Reduce 
Managers‟ Lack of 
Incentives for Project 
Selection (Q.6) 
ICBC 1-recruit more qualified employees 
2-eliminate government guarantee 
3-strenthen managers‟ sense of responsibility 
CCB 1-public listing 
2-attract more public investors 
3-reduce government interference 
4-improve managers‟ sense of responsibility 
5-penalities 
BOC 1-panelites: salary reduction 
ABC 1-impove knowledge of law 
2-improve sense of responsibility 
3-increased or decreased salary  
4-laid-off 
SDB 1-separate loan granting from loan approving 
2- strengthen risk management 
3-“no mortgages, no loan granting” policy 
CB 1-examine the behaviours of different levels of administrators 
2-strengthen regulations within the banks 
3-carry out employee training projects 
 
 
ICBC 1-no repayment of principal and interest 
2-financial losses 
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Influence on Bank 
Performance (Q.8) 
3-higher loan loss provisions 
4-reduced profits 
CCB 1-ineffective lending decisions 
2-negative effects on bank performance 
3-decreased profits 
BOC 1-the government control loans or encourage loan according to its policy 
ABC 1-result in large amounts of NPLs in planned economy 
SDB 1-not obvious effects 
CB 1-the basis of a healthy and stable development of bank operations 
 
 
 
 
Reasons for 
Importance of 
Relationships in 
Project Selection 
(Q.11) 
ICBC 1-Chinese culture 
2-common interests 
3-political goal 
CCB 1-wealth structure in the society 
2-Chinese banking Culture 
3-easy access to deposit or loan market 
BOC 1-customer-bank commercial relationship is the most important one. 
ABC 1-common interests 
2-Chinese culture 
SDB 1-long-time cooperation 
2-the amount of loans is very small 
3-relationship helps give more accurate and reliable information than financial 
report. 
CB 1-NA 
 
Source: Bank Managers‟ Interviews. 
NA-not applicable. 
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Table 3.2 Interview Analysis (open questions) Government Interference and Guarantee 
 
Type Bank Content 
 
 
 
 
Influence on 
NPLs (Q2.1) 
ICBC 1-increased policy lending,  
2-result in a large amount of NPLs 
CCB 1-the government used to have dominant controls over banks,  
2-the government‟ influence becomes weaker and weaker 
BOC 1-policy risk may lead to NPLs. 
ABC 1-result in a large amount of NPLs in a planned economy 
2-lack of incentives for project selection 
SDB 1-sometimes lead to wrong lending decisions and result in NPLs 
CB 1-the government‟s influence is not as important as before 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
Fundamental 
Factors for 
NPLs 
Accumulation 
(Q2.2) 
ICBC 1-weak corporate governance of bank,  
2-loan approving method, 3-socialism 
CCB 1-economic factor: lack of modern finance knowledge,  
2-weak information infrastructure 
3-cultural factor: bureaucracy 
BOC 1-enterprise‟s moral hazard, 
2-policy risk 
3-rapid credit growth 
ABC 1-historical factor 
2-China‟political regime 
3-borrower and collateral party‟s moral hazard 
4-lack of responsibility and knowledge of law 
5-the government‟s ineffective lending decisions direction 
6-weak law framework 
7-loan scale target 
SDB 1-China‟s political regime,  
2-a centrally planned economy in the past, 
3-economic cycles 
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4-different levels of development in different areas 
5-historical factors 
CB 1-failures of corporations in market competitions 
2-government‟s economic development policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objectives of  
Government  
Guarantee and  
Interference 
(Q3) 
ICBC 1-social stability,  
2-support low-efficient SOEs reform 
3-develop economy 
4-focus on GDP growth,  
5-political achievement 
CCB 1-develop macro economy through policy lending,  
2-support SOEs reform 
3-political goals 
BOC 1-adjust and regulate macro economy,  
2-social stability 
ABC 1-support the development of some enterprises 
2-protect interests of banks 
SDB 1-the central government cooperates with the local government through policy lending 
2-develop rural areas and other poor areas: tax reduction 
3-establish new public facilities and infrastructures 
4-develop the economy of western area : e.g. Tibet 
5-development policies and strategies 
CB 1-guide and boost the local economic development 
 
 
 
 
 
Influence on 
Banks and 
ICBC 1-increase bank credit risk, 
2-result in NPLs,  
3-support low-efficient SOEs reform  
4-lessen enterprises‟ financial burden 
5-moral hazard of enterprises 
CCB 1-positive side: loan support for SOEs and SMEs; support infrastructure construction; direct 
banks through policy lending to develop economy 
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Enterprises 
(Q4,Q4.1,Q4.2) 
2-negative side: control banks and bring banks with financial losses; reduced profits 
BOC 1.control the amount of loans to a specific industry 
2-government policy determines whether enterprises will get support. 
ABC 1-support the development of a certain industry 
2-protect interests of banks 
SDB 1-government support  
CB 1-NA 
 
 
 
Influence on 
Lending 
Decisions 
(Q5.1,Q5.2) 
ICBC 1-direct interference before 1990s, 
2-weak influence now 
CCB 1-a wise government leads to effective lending decisions 
2-an incapable government leads to ineffective lending decisions 
BOC 1-government policies direct banks to make loans  
ABC 1-government officials‟ decisions have an important role in banks‟ lending decisions. 
SDB 1-direct banks to lend to superior and profitable industries: heavy industry, information 
technology industry 
CB 1-NA 
 
 
The Main 
Forms of 
Government 
Guarantee 
(Q6) 
ICBC 1-guarantee on words 
CCB NA 
BOC NA 
ABC 1-asset collateral 
SDB 1-government honour 
CB 1-fiscal repayment consent 
2-guarantee letter 
 
 
 
Reasons for the 
Necessarily of 
Government 
ICBC 1-necessary in a planned economy,  
2-social stability,  
3-political goal 
CCB 1-make up the weaknesses of market in economic activities 
2- play plan‟s role to an ultimate level 
BOC 1-surpport /restrict the rapid development of a certain industry 
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Interference 
(Q.7.1, Q7.2) 
ABC 1-scale economy 
2-certain loan target 
3-surport the development of certain enterprises 
4-some enterprises cheat the government and get its support 
SDB 1-support the development of a planned economy in the past 
2- make up the weaknesses of market in a market-oriented economy 
CB 1-guide the economic development 
 
 
 
Measures to 
Reduce 
Government 
Interference 
(Q8.1,Q8.2) 
ICBC 1-personnel and administrative reform 
2-supervised by central bank rather than the local government 
3-reduce relationship influence 
CCB 1-attract more investors and shareholders through public listing 
2-let the government play a more important role on supervision rather than direct 
interference, 3-create a more market-oriented environment 
BOC 1-create new financial products 
ABC NA 
SDB NA 
CB 1-make regulations on prohibiting making loans based on government guarantee 
 
 
 
 
 
Activities to 
Build Up 
Relationship  
(Q9.1,Q9.2) 
ICBC 1-long-time cooperation,  
2-friends 
3-leader-empoyee relationship 
4-play Gulf 
5-help each other when in difficulty,  
6-have fun together in athletic sports 
CCB 1-relatives,  
2-classmates,  
3-supervisor, -student relationship, etc. 
BOC 1-long-time commercial cooperation between customers and banks 
2-banking culture 
ABC 1-long time cooperation lead to relationship loans 
SDB 1-travelling 
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2-meeting 
CB 1-long-time cooperation relationships  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reasons for 
NPLs 
Accumulation 
(Q.13) 
ICBC 1-weak corporate governance of bank 
2-loan approving method,  
3-managers‟ low quality, 
4-government interference, 
5-policy loans 
6-relationship culture, 
7-financial crime 
8-socialism 
9-market risk,  
10-change of leader team 
CCB 1-covered in fundamental factors 
BOC 1-covered in fundamental factors 
ABC 1-moral hazard 
2-political regime 
3-covered in fundamental factors 
SDB 1-many reasons contribute to NPLs.  
2-covered in fundamental factors/ 
CB 1-some companies‟ defaults 
2-weak risk management and control in banks 
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Table 3.3 Interview Analysis (open questions) Measures Dealing with NPLs  
 
Type  Bank Content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methods to  
Deal With 
NPLs 
(Q1) 
ICBC 1-AMCs take off NPLs from SOCBs,  
2-improve loan loss provisions 
3-collecting NPLs initiatively,       
4-debt-equity swap 
CCB 1-establish a more effective risk assessment system and credit rating system 
2-stop/freeze borrower‟s capitals in banks, 
3-go to court and ask for bankruptcy 
4-mortgage,  
5-AMCs 
6-asset securitization:, debt-equity swap 
BOC 1-debt restructuring,  
2-auction 
3-write-off 
4-AMCs 
ABC 1-collecting and dunning 
2-asset collateral 
3-support enterprises with interest rate reduction 
4-write-ff as losses 
SDB 1-dunning and collecting 
2-reduce interests payment 
3-extend the due date of repayment 
4-provide more loans to borrower if it has potential to make profits 
5-reduced taxes support for any party joining to inject capitals to a potentially good project 
6-write off NPLs as losses 
7-selling mortgages 
8-debt restructuring 
CB 1-debt restructuring 
  411 
2-lawsuit and asset protection 
3-pay back the debt using assets 
4-write-off as losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Influence on 
Banks (Q2, 
Q5) 
ICBC 1-reduce NPLs ratio, 2-lessen banks‟ financial burden, 3-increased profits 
CCB 1-prove that the government is responsible 
2-get support from the government 
3-lessen heavy NPLs burden 
4-reduced NPLs ratio 
5-good looking financial report 
6-improved performance 
BOC 1-reduced NPLs 
2-reduced loan loss provisions 
3-increased profits, 
4-reduced risky capital 
5-core capital adequacy ratio 
6-increased amount of loans 
ABC 1-reduced NPLs 
SDB 1-reduced NPLs 
CB 1-reduce the systematic risk of banks 
2-better achievement 
 
The Most 
Effective 
Measure 
(Q4) 
ICBC NA 
CCB NA 
BOC 1-debt restructuring 
ABC 1-collecting and dunning 
SDB 1-debt restructuring 
CB 1-debt restructuring 
 
 
 
 
ICBC 1-depending on reasons for NPLs 
CCB 1-supervise customer managers,  
2-reduce their moral hazard and rent seeking behaviour 
BOC 1-create more good financial products,  
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New 
Measures to 
Be Taken 
(Q7) 
2-emphasize team-working  
ABC 1-provide more loans to some enterprises and support them to survive 
SDB 1-banking system reform, 
2-corporate governance reform,   
3- encouraging or restricting mechanism,   
4-improved risk assessment skills 
5-high-qualified employees 
CB 1- strengthen loan management   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
Objective of 
SOCBs‟ 
Public 
Listing 
(Q8) 
ICBC 1-improve capital adequacy ratio 
2-reduce asset liability ratio, 
3-increase capitals 
4-improve corporate governance of banks,  
5-advices and pressures from investors 
CCB 1-better performance 
2-increase information disclosure and transparency 
3-get more capitals, 
4-gain higher reputation 
5-better supervision, 
6-better corporate governance structure 
7-an impetus to banking sector reform 
BOC 1-optimize corporate governance structure 
2-improve information disclosure and transparency 
3-better supervision and regulation 
ABC 1-make more profits 
2-gain higher reputation 
3-attract more investors 
4-make more effective lending decisions 
SDB 1-attract more capitals  
2-gain higher reputation 
CB 1-enhance capital-adequacy ratios  
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2-introduce advanced management skills 
3-improve social image and reputation 
4-improve supervision  
 
 
 
 
 
Influence of 
public listing 
on NPLs 
(Q10) 
ICBC 1-high level of risk control, 
2-more effective lending decisions 
3-control the creation of high- level NPLs 
CCB 1-more transparent financial information disclosure 
2-reduce credit risk 
BOC 1-the share price will influence the performance of banks. 
ABC 1-reduced NPLs ratio 
2-more pressures from the public to reduce NPLs 
3-improve corporate governance of banks 
SDB 1-strengthen banking sector reform,  
2-optimize corporate governance structure, 
3-increase capitals 
CB 1-improve corporate governance of banks 
2-reduced NPLs 
 
Advantages 
and 
disadvantages 
of NPLs 
market  
(Q12,Q13) 
ICBC NA 
CCB 1-weak law framework, and monopoly market 
BOC NA 
ABC 1-weak law framework 
SDB 1-need to regulate NPLs market 
CB NA 
Source: Bank Managers‟ Interviews. 
Q-question 
NA-not applicable.  
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